⑤ Building a Security Order Based on Co-Prosperity Values and Norms

I. Objectives

The competition between the United States and China is rapidly expanding beyond economic, technological, value, and normative domains into the military security sphere, and is quickly escalating from conventional arms races to nuclear weapon competition. The Russia-Ukraine war has threatened the foundations of the existing rules-based security order and, by activating a bloc mentality of authoritarian forces versus democratic forces, has increased the rigidity of US-China strategic competition. This has lowered the threshold for more adventurous security policies for countries located at flashpoints, including North Korea. As this competition continues for a considerable period, crises and tensions at geopolitical flashpoints such as Taiwan, North Korea, and the South and East China Seas will gradually intensify. South Korea's security environment now encompasses not only military security but also economic security, food security, resource security, technology security, and transportation routes, necessitating a comprehensive consideration of the strategic space extending beyond Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.

As articulated in its National Security Strategy (NSS) released on October 12, the United States is formulating its security strategy around "integrated deterrence." This strategy emphasizes countering "multidomain" and "numerous geographic areas of responsibility" threats by mobilizing all instruments of national power, including nuclear assets, conventional forces, joint readiness, homeland defense, economy, and diplomacy, while also stressing the integrated operation of the capabilities of allies and partners. By establishing and connecting the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific strategies on a global scale, the U.S. aims to simultaneously counter Russian and Chinese military security challenges globally.

In response, China proposes its Global Security Initiative (GSI). The core principles of the GSI are "common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security." China emphasizes that global security is interconnected, that no single party should pursue absolute security for itself, and that pursuing common security is crucial. China has consistently highlighted genuine multilateralism, a rules-based order, and democracy and human rights with Chinese characteristics in its overall foreign policy, indicating that China is also attentive to the general direction of the international order. Delving into specific positions reveals a clearer emphasis on China's stance: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal political affairs, freedom to choose one's development path, respect for the principles of the UN Charter, moving beyond Cold War mentality, opposition to unilateralism, acknowledgment of the legitimate security concerns of all countries, opposition to threatening the security of others for one's own security, opposition to double standards, and opposition to malicious and unilateral sanctions. In essence, China is advocating for respect for its core interests under the guise of common security.

As long as a significant asymmetry in military power, including nuclear capabilities, exists between the U.S. and China, the likelihood of a direct military conflict (warfare) between them in the short to medium term, particularly in gray zones or Indo-Pacific flashpoints, remains low. In this context, the ongoing security competition between the U.S. and China appears as a competition of international law or norms (lawfare or normfare). Both the U.S. and China agree on norms and principles such as compliance with international law, freedom of navigation, respect for sovereignty, peaceful settlement of disputes, and joint resolution of non-traditional security threats and global issues (e.g., terrorism, climate change, cybersecurity, ecological security). The issue lies in how these normative contents are defined and implemented in specific issue areas.

In this context, the core objective of South Korea's Indo-Pacific security strategy is to secure strategic stability before China's military capabilities approach a level that overcomes the existing significant asymmetry between the U.S. and China, thereby drastically increasing the possibility of direct military conflict between them. To this end, it is necessary to propose Indo-Pacific regional security norms that can promote security compromise and co-prosperity values between the U.S. and China, and to establish peaceful methods for conflict resolution among the parties concerned, especially between the U.S. and China, before military conflicts erupt. South Korea's foreign policy principles should also be established based on these norms. The fundamental principles that South Korea should pursue are: (1) opposition to the conventionalization of nuclear weapons, (2) opposition to changes in the status quo by force or coercion, (3) strategic stability, strategic communication during crises, and conflict resolution based on agreed procedures, (4) conflict resolution based on universal human values shared by both the U.S. and China, such as peace, common prosperity, human rights, and freedom of navigation, and (5) the realization of multilateral mechanisms that reflect the interests of middle powers and avoid hegemonic competition in the Indo-Pacific region. Applying these principles to specific issues according to South Korea's security interests, the following Indo-Pacific strategy is proposed.

II. South Korea's Indo-Pacific Security Strategy

1. Efforts to Ensure Stability on the Korean Peninsula and Resolve North Korea's Nuclear Issue

The stability of the Korean Peninsula and the denuclearization of North Korea are not merely issues for South and North Korea alone but are critical concerns related to the entire region and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this context, South Korea must reframe the North Korean nuclear issue as a significant problem at the Indo-Pacific regional level, not just the Korean Peninsula level, and strive to foster cooperation between the U.S. and China, as well as inter-Korean dialogue. Cooperation between the U.S. and China centered on the Korean Peninsula issue can also contribute to enhancing cooperative security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Although nearly 30 years have passed since the North Korean nuclear issue emerged, there is no sign of a resolution, North Korea's military threats are growing, and its diplomatic leverage has paradoxically strengthened amidst US-China strategic competition. North Korea is further advancing its nuclear technology, developing miniaturized and tactical nuclear weapons that can be applied as distinct means in modern warfare depending on operational missions and targets, and has even legislated the use of nuclear weapons. If the U.S. mainland becomes vulnerable to North Korean nuclear missiles, military tensions and risks between the U.S. and North Korea, and between South Korea and North Korea, will increase.

Resolving the North Korean nuclear issue depends heavily on cooperation not only between the U.S. and China but also among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. If North Korea's nuclear capabilities extend to the U.S. mainland, security decoupling between the U.S. and South Korea/Japan can be easily anticipated. Currently, Japan plays a role in indirectly supporting contingency response in South Korea based on its seven rear bases. If North Korea threatens Japan with nuclear attack, the deployment of U.S. Forces Japan to South Korea could be jeopardized, potentially isolating South Korea. To prevent this, close security cooperation between South Korea and Japan, and continuous discussion and cooperation on contingency response, are crucial.

Cooperation with China on denuclearization negotiations is also important, although the reality is that the possibility of cooperation is diminishing amidst US-China conflict. To prevent China from deviating from the denuclearization and sanctions regime against North Korea, citing South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy or the strengthening of the ROK-US alliance within the US-China conflict framework, it is necessary to emphasize the universal and normative nature of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula while also making efforts for both denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime as advocated by China. If South Korea and the U.S. make sincere efforts for North Korea's security, and China acknowledges these efforts, it will be difficult for China to explicitly deviate from the principle of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

To resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and ensure peace on the Korean Peninsula in the future, it is necessary to move beyond the current phase of military deterrence and economic sanctions against North Korea and pursue a long-term, complex strategy that includes engagement with North Korea and enables its development and participation as a member of the international community. It is essential to secure the support of the international community in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as neighboring countries, overcoming the tendency of major powers to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

2. Cooperation to Prevent Regional Military Conflicts and Manage Crises: South China Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Issue

Although South Korea is not a direct party to these conflicts, it has significant interests in the South China Sea, the stability of cross-strait relations, and the East China Sea. South Korea has a high degree of trade dependence, imports most of its energy resources from abroad, and relies on imports for 77% of its grain. The South China Sea, in particular, is a critical maritime route through which 30% of our export cargo and 90% of imported energy pass. Therefore, if conflicts between the U.S. and China escalate in the South China Sea, rendering maritime transport routes unstable, South Korea could suffer direct damage. Currently, South Korea's security of maritime transport routes in the South China Sea largely depends on its alliance with the United States. As South Korea is not a party to the maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, direct intervention is difficult. However, it must uphold principles such as the peaceful resolution of maritime territorial disputes, compliance with international law, prevention of armed conflict, and prevention of the deterioration of transport routes due to conflict. Articulating a principled stance on the South China Sea is central to South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy. Concurrently, South Korea must seek active roles by strengthening multi-layered cooperation with regional countries, including Southeast Asian nations.

South Korea needs to maintain a strategy of maintaining a certain 'distance' from the U.S.-China military or geopolitical conflict in the South China Sea, thereby avoiding direct involvement in disputes. On the other hand, in terms of geo-economics, it should seek an approach that keeps open possibilities for cooperation with both the U.S. and China through bilateral or multilateral cooperation spaces in the region. Regarding the issue of confrontation between the U.S. and China over international norms, South Korea should fundamentally align with the U.S. position while refraining from expressions that could directly target or provoke China. It should attempt to align with the principle of compliance with international norms on a theoretical and principled level, considering the positions of ASEAN countries.

The Taiwan issue has been a long-standing source of conflict between the U.S. and China, and while tensions have recently escalated, there is considerable room for change due to various factors including communication and coordination between the two countries, their domestic political situations, and Taiwan's presidential elections. Therefore, South Korea should closely monitor the situation while maintaining a principled stance. It needs to strengthen its position of opposing changes to the status quo by force and emphasizing peaceful, consensus-based unification under the one-China principle, and enhance communication with the international community. In particular, it must maintain the stance that heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait could lead to accidental conflict and potentially escalate to the Korean Peninsula, necessitating consultations for crisis prevention and management. Furthermore, it should consider pursuing multilateral strategic dialogues for the security of the Western Pacific region, taking into account the direct challenges posed to the security interests of Japan and Australia by any accidental events in Taiwan.

3. Preventing the Overheating of US-China Arms Competition and Eliminating the Possibility of Nuclear Conflict

The security conflict between the U.S. and China is divided into conflicts stemming from China's so-called gray zone strategy, competition in conventional capabilities, and the increasing competition in the nuclear weapons sector. China has historically pursued a policy of "minimum deterrence" and No First Use, but has been rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal in recent years. Efforts appear to be underway to develop new intercontinental ballistic missiles, increase the number of nuclear warheads, construct silo fields for solid-fuel ICBMs, and build hundreds of new silos.

As China's nuclear capabilities increase, many Asian countries will become more vulnerable to Chinese threats even in conventional conflict situations limited to the use of conventional forces. If a significant shift occurs in the balance of US-China nuclear capabilities, making the U.S. mainland more vulnerable to Chinese nuclear attack, and China pursues an assertive policy of changing the status quo in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait, U.S. allies will inevitably worry about security decoupling.

First, amidst the US-China nuclear competition, both South Korea and the U.S., as well as the trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, should be pursued. Efforts for nuclear disarmament between the U.S. and Russia, future nuclear disarmament between the U.S. and China, and the denuclearization of North Korea require both negotiation and balancing strategies. Therefore, it is crucial to develop creative responses through diverse strategic dialogues with Indo-Pacific countries sharing similar security interests.

Second, as US-China strategic competition exhibits characteristics of power politics between superpowers, South Korea must explore new alternatives from the perspective of a third power. Amidst the increasingly complex dynamics of international politics, it will be very difficult for any single nation to exclusively provide the public goods necessary for the international order, even if it wins the strategic competition. In this regard, it is difficult to view the US-China competition as a hegemonic struggle, and collective leadership that fosters cooperation among various countries in the Indo-Pacific region will be more important in the future. It is important for South Korea to strengthen cooperation and dialogue with countries such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, from the perspective of seeking a new regional and global security order, rather than solely from the viewpoint of US-China strategic competition.

Third, in the process of fundamental change in the Asian alliance structure, it is necessary to create an ideal form of multi-layered security cooperation. The security of South Korea, the United States, and Japan is structurally interconnected, and security cooperation centered around the United States has been ongoing for a long time. As the existing hub-and-spoke alliance system transforms into a multi-layered security cooperation system, it is necessary to prevent the emergence of conflicts arising from hierarchies among U.S. allies. Efforts should be made to ensure that the new alliance system becomes a division-of-labor alliance system rather than a hierarchical one. It is important to bear in mind that key conflict areas such as the South China Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and the Korean Peninsula are not separate but are becoming interconnected, and that the interests and threat perceptions among various countries are being readjusted. Based on this, the division-of-labor system needs to be reorganized for a desirable security order.■

■ Author: Jeon Jae-sung_Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies and Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, international relations history, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works and edited volumes include "Threats of War and Peace Between South and North Korea" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Author: Kim Yang-gyu_Director of the East Asia Institute Secretariat (Senior Research Fellow) and concurrently a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. He holds a Bachelor's degree in French Education and Diplomacy and a Master's degree in Diplomacy from Seoul National University, and a Ph.D. in International Politics from Florida International University. He has served as an adjunct professor at Florida International University and a visiting scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. His main research areas include coercive diplomacy, nuclear strategy, power transition, US-China relations, the North Korean nuclear issue, and international politics and security theory.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Han-soo, EAI Research Assistant

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | hspark@eai.or.kr