[EAI Presidential Panel Survey] ⑨ Voter Partisan Alignment of Ideology, Policy, and Affect: Is Korean Democracy Falling into the Trap of Destructive Polarization?

1. 2022 Presidential Election Results: Hyper-Contestation-Hyper-Mobilization Two-Party Competition

[Figure 1] illustrates the presidential election results from 1963 to 2022 as a scatter plot, with 'election contestation' on the horizontal axis and 'election mobilization' on the vertical axis. 'Election contestation' represents the absolute difference in vote share between the top two parties, while 'election mobilization' represents the proportion of the combined vote share of the top two parties out of the total votes cast. The upper value of the 'election contestation' line, shown from top to bottom, is 0.076 from the 1971 election results, and data points located to its right can be described as 'hyper-contestation' two-party competition. The upper value of the 'election mobilization' line, shown from left to right, is 0.838 from the 1963 election results, and data points located above it can be described as 'hyper-mobilization' two-party competition.

[Figure 1] Comparison of Contestation and Mobilization in Korean Presidential Election Results, 1963-2022[1]

Source: National Election Commission Election Statistics System"http://info.nec.go.kr/"(Accessed: March 20, 2022).

It is clear that the 2022 election, which recorded an 'election contestation' of 0.007 and an 'election mobilization' of 0.955, was an unprecedented two-party competition historically ranking first in 'hyper-contestation' and second in 'hyper-mobilization.' The 2022 election results surpassed the 0.014 'election contestation' of the 1963 election, where Park Chung-hee of the Democratic Republican Party competed against Yun Posun of the Minjung Party, and trailed only the 0.996 'election mobilization' of the 2012 election, where Park Geun-hye of the Saenuri Party vied against Moon Jae-in of the Democratic United Party.

The problem is that this unprecedented election outcome is unlikely to be the result of healthy party competition contributing to the qualitative development of Korean democracy. Rather, it strongly suggests a dysfunction in party competition that will lead to the qualitative regression of Korean democracy. At its core lies voter 'partisan sorting,' or 'the division of voters into two mutually hostile political camps' (Mason and Kalmoe 2022).

2. Voter Partisan Alignment: Ideology, Policy, Affect

Using data from the 2012 and 2022 presidential election panel surveys conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI), we examined the time-series changes in voter partisan alignment across three dimensions: ideology, policy, and affect. For each category, subtracting the vote share for the progressive party candidate from the vote share for the conservative party candidate allows us to ascertain the level of voter partisan alignment. A negative value indicates the level of partisan alignment between progressive parties and voters, while a positive value indicates the level of partisan alignment between conservative parties and voters.

[Table 1] presents the level of voter partisan alignment in terms of ideology, dividing voters who cast ballots for the two main party candidates into progressive, moderate, and conservative. In the 2012 presidential election, 84.8% of progressive voters voted for Moon Jae-in of the Democratic United Party, and 14.2% voted for Park Geun-hye of the Saenuri Party. Moderate voters cast 54.1% of their votes for Moon Jae-in and 44.3% for Park Geun-hye. Conservative voters cast 20.0% of their votes for Moon Jae-in and 78.3% for Park Geun-hye. Progressive voters showed an ideological alignment of 70.6 percentage points with the Democratic United Party, moderate voters showed an alignment of 9.8 percentage points with the Democratic United Party, and conservative voters showed an alignment of 58.3 percentage points with the Saenuri Party.

[Table 1] Ideological Partisan Alignment, 2012 and 2022[2]

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Source: East Asia Institute 2012 and 2022 Presidential Election Panel Surveys"https://kossda.snu.ac.kr/"(Accessed: March 20, 2022).

In the 2022 presidential election, 85.1% of progressive voters voted for Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party, and 11.0% voted for Yoon Suk-yeol of the People Power Party. Moderate voters cast 49.2% of their votes for Lee Jae-myung and 45.6% for Yoon Suk-yeol. Conservative voters cast 17.1% of their votes for Lee Jae-myung and 80.3% for Yoon Suk-yeol. Progressive voters showed an ideological alignment of 74.1 percentage points with the Democratic Party, moderate voters showed an alignment of 3.6 percentage points with the Democratic Party, and conservative voters showed an alignment of 63.3 percentage points with the People Power Party. The level of voter partisan alignment in terms of ideology was already quite high in the 2012 election, and we can confirm that in the 2022 election, the alignment strength with their preferred party increased by 3.5 percentage points for progressive voters and 5.0 percentage points for conservative voters, while it decreased by 6.2 percentage points for moderate voters.

In summary, over the past decade, progressive and conservative voters have strengthened their ideological alignment with their preferred parties, while moderate voters have weakened their ideological alignment with their preferred parties. The 2022 election results, compared to the 2012 election results, confirm that voter partisan alignment in terms of ideology has strengthened in Korea.

[Table 2] Policy Partisan Alignment, 2012 and 2022[3]

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Source: East Asia Institute 2012 and 2022 Presidential Election Panel Surveyhttps://kossda.snu.ac.kr/ (Accessed: March 20, 2022).

[Table 2] was created by dividing voters who voted for the two major party candidates into 'pro-engagement doves' and 'pro-engagement hawks' to indicate the level of voter partisan alignment at the policy level. In the 2012 presidential election, 'pro-engagement doves' voters cast 56.6% of their votes for candidate Moon Jae-in of the Democratic United Party and 42.0% for candidate Park Geun-hye of the Saenuri Party. 'Pro-engagement hawks' voters cast 30.4% of their votes for candidate Moon Jae-in and 68.1% for candidate Park Geun-hye. 'Pro-engagement doves' voters showed a policy alignment level of 14.6%p with the Democratic United Party, while 'pro-engagement hawks' voters showed a policy alignment level of 37.7%p with the Saenuri Party.

In the 2022 presidential election, 'pro-engagement doves' voters cast 72.6% of their votes for candidate Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party and 23.1% for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol of the People Power Party. 'Pro-engagement hawks' voters cast 16.8% of their votes for candidate Lee Jae-myung and 80.1% for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol. 'Pro-engagement doves' voters achieved a policy alignment level of 49.6%p with the Democratic Party, and 'pro-engagement hawks' voters achieved a policy alignment level of 63.3%p with the People Power Party. While voter partisan alignment at the policy level was relatively low in the 2012 election, it can be confirmed that the alignment intensity with their preferred parties increased significantly in the 2022 election, by 35.0%p for 'pro-engagement doves' voters and 25.6%p for 'pro-engagement hawks' voters.

In summary, the finding is that over the past decade, both 'pro-engagement doves' and 'pro-engagement hawks' voters have significantly increased the intensity of policy alignment with their preferred parties. The 2022 election results, compared to the 2012 election results, confirm that voter partisan alignment at the policy level has become very strong in South Korea.

[Table 3] Affective Partisan Alignment, 2012 and 2022[4]

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Source: East Asia Institute 2012 and 2022 Presidential Election Panel Surveyhttps://kossda.snu.ac.kr/(Accessed: March 20, 2022).

[Table 3] was created by dividing voters who voted for candidates of the two major parties into progressive party 'high favorability' voters, 'medium favorability' voters, 'low favorability' voters, and conservative party 'high favorability' voters, 'medium favorability' voters, and 'low favorability' voters, respectively, to show the level of voter partisan alignment in the emotional dimension. In the 2012 presidential election, progressive party 'high favorability' voters voted 44.2% for Democratic United Party candidate Moon Jae-in and 15.0% for Saenuri Party candidate Park Geun-hye. Progressive party 'medium favorability' voters voted 45.8% for Moon Jae-in and 52.1% for Park Geun-hye. Progressive party 'low favorability' voters voted 22.8% for Moon Jae-in and 65.6% for Park Geun-hye. Progressive party 'high favorability' voters showed an emotional alignment of 29.2%p with the Democratic United Party, progressive party 'medium favorability' voters showed an emotional alignment of 6.4%p with the Saenuri Party, and progressive party 'low favorability' voters showed an emotional alignment of 28.8%p with the Saenuri Party.

In the 2012 presidential election, conservative party 'high favorability' voters voted 9.8% for Democratic United Party candidate Moon Jae-in and 65.6% for Saenuri Party candidate Park Geun-hye. Conservative party 'medium favorability' voters voted 46.0% for Moon Jae-in and 51.7% for Park Geun-hye. Conservative party 'low favorability' voters voted 66.3% for Moon Jae-in and 11.1% for Park Geun-hye. Conservative party 'high favorability' voters showed an emotional alignment of 55.8%p with the Saenuri Party, conservative party 'medium favorability' voters showed an emotional alignment of 5.6%p with the Saenuri Party, and conservative party 'low favorability' voters showed an emotional alignment of 55.2%p with the Democratic United Party.

In the 2022 presidential election, progressive party 'high favorability' voters voted 60.4% for Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung and 5.7% for People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol. Progressive party 'medium favorability' voters voted 62.6% for Lee Jae-myung and 29.6% for Yoon Suk-yeol. Progressive party 'low favorability' voters voted 13.9% for Lee Jae-myung and 81.9% for Yoon Suk-yeol. Progressive party 'high favorability' voters showed an emotional alignment of 54.7%p with the Democratic Party, progressive party 'medium favorability' voters showed an emotional alignment of 33.0%p with the Democratic Party, and progressive party 'low favorability' voters showed an emotional alignment of 68.0%p with the People Power Party.

In the 2022 presidential election, conservative party 'high favorability' voters voted 3.2% for Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung and 62.2% for People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol. Conservative party 'medium favorability' voters voted 33.7% for Lee Jae-myung and 59.8% for Yoon Suk-yeol. Conservative party 'low favorability' voters voted 83.2% for Lee Jae-myung and 14.8% for Yoon Suk-yeol. Conservative party 'high favorability' voters showed an emotional alignment of 58.9%p with the People Power Party, conservative party 'medium favorability' voters showed an emotional alignment of 26.1%p with the People Power Party, and conservative party 'low favorability' voters showed an emotional alignment of 68.4%p with the Democratic Party.

In the 2012 election, voter partisan alignment in the emotional dimension remained at a relatively low level, except for conservative party 'high favorability' and 'low favorability' voters. However, in the 2022 election, the alignment strength with their preferred party increased by 25.5%p for progressive party 'high favorability' voters and by 39.2%p for progressive party 'low favorability' voters. Furthermore, the alignment strength with their preferred party increased by 3.1%p for conservative party 'high favorability' voters and by 13.2%p for conservative party 'low favorability' voters.

In summary, over the past decade, voters with 'high favorability' and 'low favorability' for both progressive and conservative parties have significantly increased the strength of emotional alignment with their preferred parties. The findings confirm that voter partisan alignment in the emotional dimension has become much stronger in South Korea in the 2022 election compared to the 2012 election results.

3. Quality of South Korean Democracy: The Danger of Pernicious Polarization

As shown in [Figure 2], South Korea's 'partisan alignment' level in 2021 was 2.69, which is higher than the median value of 2.07 among 38 OECD member countries, and its rank is not low at 11th (V-Dem Dataset version 12). Among the countries ranked higher, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Mexico, and Colombia are essentially non-democratic countries with a V-Dem 'liberal democracy index' below 0.5. Considering this, among advanced industrial democracies, South Korea ranks effectively 6th, following Slovenia, the United States, Italy, Israel, and Chile.

[Figure 2] Comparison of Voter Partisan Alignment in 38 OECD Member Countries, 2021 (Somer et al.)[5]

Source: ‘political polarization’ in V-Dem Dataset version 12https://www.v-dem.net/vdemds.html(Accessed: March 20, 2022).

The results of the 2022 presidential election appear to serve as a warning that South Korea's party politics are entering a path of 'pernicious polarization' (Somer et al. 2021). President Yoon Suk-yeol, who will have to govern in a 'divided government' situation for the next two years, may easily fall into the temptation of using a 'going public strategy' to bypass the National Assembly. If he attempts to break political gridlock through the president's 'unilateral action' using this strategy, it could create strong political centrifugal forces in party competition within the context of 'pernicious polarization,' consequently opening the path to a qualitative regression of South Korean democracy (Kim 2021). The quality of South Korean democracy will be critically influenced by how President Yoon Suk-yeol can engage in statecraft that generates political centripetal force in response to the challenge of voter partisan alignment. ■

References

Lilliana Mason and Nathan P. Kalmoe. 2022. “The Social Roots, Risks, and Rewards of Mass Polarization,” in Robert C. Lieberman, Suzanne Mettler, and Kenneth M. Roberts (eds.),Democratic Resilience: Can the United States Withstand Rising Polarization?New York: Cambridge University Press: 171-194.

Murat Somer, Jennifer L. McCoy, and Russell E. Luke. 2021. “Pernicious Polarization, Autocratization and Opposition Strategies,”Democratization,28:5: 929-948.

Jung Kim. 2022. “South Korea’s 2022 Presidential Election: AVox Populithat is Evenly Divided,” ADRN Issue Briefings (Mar 16)http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?at=view&idx=238(Accessed: March 20, 2022).

V-Dem Dataset version 12https://www.v-dem.net/vdemds.html(Accessed: March 20, 2022).

[1]Election competitiveness was inverted and displayed.

[2]This is the result of categorizing 0-4 as progressive, 5 as moderate, and 6-10 as conservative in 'Perceived Ideological Self-Placement'.

[3]'Dove' refers to voters who support the policy that 'strengthening exchange and cooperation between North and South Korea is more important,' and 'Hawk' refers to voters who support the policy that 'maintaining and strengthening a hardline policy toward North Korea is more important.'

[4]This is the result of categorizing 0-4 as low favorability, 5 as medium favorability, and 6-10 as high favorability in 'Favorability by Party'.

[5]This is the result of an expert assessment of 'how much the society has polarized into hostile political camps,' ranging from a maximum of 4 to a minimum of 0.

■ Author: Kim Jeong_Associate Professor, University of North Korean Studies. Ph.D. in Political Science, Yale University. Currently serves as a visiting professor at Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies, a regional coordinator for the Asian Democracy Research Network, and a policy advisor to the Ministry of National Defense and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Previously held positions as a visiting researcher at the University of Tokyo's Graduate School of Interdisciplinary Information Studies, a senior researcher at the East Asia Institute (EAI), and a principal researcher at Kyungnam University's Institute for Far Eastern Studies. Research interests include comparative political institutions, comparative political economy, inter-Korean relations, and East Asian international relations. Authored publications such as “South Korean Democratization: A Comparative Empirical Appraisal” (2018), “The Legislative Production Capacity of a Democratic Constitutional State: The Case of South Korea's Divided Government” (2020), “A Working Parliament, A Talking Parliament, A Confrontational Parliament: Macro-level Consequences and Micro-level Foundations of Parliamentary Distrust” (2020), “Conditions for the Success of COVID-19 Containment Policies: A Comparative Study of the Korean Case” (2021), and “Failure of the Constitution, Failure of the Judiciary, Failure of the President: Exercise Leadership to Set the Judiciary Right” (2022).

■ Contact and Editing: Jeon Ju-hyun_EAI Researcher

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