[Enquête sur les élections présidentielles de l'EAI] ⑦ Polarisation partisane : Quelle était l'attitude des partisans des principaux partis politiques lors de l'élection des "moins aimés" ?

La 20e élection présidentielle s'est déroulée dans un contexte de vives critiques, avec diverses allégations soulevées contre les candidats des deux principaux partis politiques pendant la campagne. Les médias nationaux et internationaux ont qualifié cette élection d'« élection des moins aimés » ou de « choix du moindre mal » (Reuter 2022 ; The Korea Herald 2021 ; Yonhap News 2022). Cependant, il est remarquable que malgré ces évaluations négatives généralisées, les électeurs ayant une préférence partisane pour les deux principaux partis ont manifesté un soutien solide à leur parti et à leur candidat préférés. Par conséquent, ce rapport vise à examiner les tendances et les caractéristiques des préférences partisanes des électeurs observées lors de la 20e élection présidentielle.

1. Attitude envers les deux principaux partis et candidats

① Électeurs dans leur ensemble

Le [Tableau 1] ci-dessous présente la moyenne des attitudes envers les deux principaux partis et les deux candidats. En calculant la moyenne des réponses des électeurs sur une échelle de 0 (le moins apprécié) à 10 (le plus apprécié), les valeurs inférieures à 5 ont été observées pour toutes les cibles. Il n'y avait pas de différence significative entre les deux partis et les deux candidats. Cependant, les candidats ont montré une moyenne légèrement plus élevée que les partis.

[Tableau 1] Attitude envers les deux principaux partis et candidats : moyenne et écart-type

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

Le [Graphique 1] présente la distribution des attitudes envers les deux partis et les deux candidats sous forme d'histogramme. Reflétant la situation de sentiments négatifs généralisés tels que l'aversion ou le choix du moindre mal lors de cette élection, le taux de l'attitude la plus négative était le plus élevé pour les deux partis et les deux candidats. Le pourcentage de répondants exprimant le sentiment le plus négatif envers le Parti Démocrate de Corée et le Parti du Pouvoir du Peuple était respectivement de 21,04 % et 24,25 %, et le pourcentage de répondants exprimant le sentiment le plus négatif envers les candidats Lee Jae-myung et Yoon Suk-yeol était de 25,72 % et 25,07 %. De plus, la distribution des attitudes présentait un schéma très similaire pour toutes les cibles.

[Graphique 1] Distribution des attitudes envers les deux principaux partis et candidats

② Selon le soutien partisan des répondants

Le [Tableau 2] analyse les attitudes émotionnelles envers les quatre cibles, segmentées par le soutien partisan des répondants. Bien que les moyennes globales pour les deux partis et les deux candidats soient similaires, des différences significatives selon les préférences partisanes ont été observées. Les répondants soutenant les deux partis ont montré une attitude positive élevée envers leur parti et leur candidat respectifs, tandis que les moyennes étaient considérablement faibles pour le parti et le candidat adverses. Par conséquent, il a été confirmé que la différence entre les sentiments positifs envers leur propre camp politique et les sentiments négatifs envers le camp adverse est grande parmi les répondants soutenant les deux partis. Il convient de noter davantage la différence partisane marquée au sein des attitudes envers chaque cible, plutôt que le sentiment négatif généralisé envers les deux partis et les deux candidats.

[Tableau 2] Attitude envers les deux principaux partis et candidats : selon le soutien partisan des répondants

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

[Figure 2] and [Figure 3] present histograms of favorability toward the two parties and two candidates, broken down by respondents' party preference. As observed in [Figure 1], the proportion of the most negative attitude toward both parties and candidates was the highest. However, in [Figure 2] and [Figure 3], which illustrate this by party support, a significant difference was found between supporters of the Democratic Party and the People Power Party. Looking at [Figure 2-1] and [Figure 3-1], which focus on favorability toward the Democratic Party and Lee Jae-myung, the proportion of negative attitudes toward the Democratic Party and Lee Jae-myung significantly decreased when only Democratic Party supporters were isolated. Conversely, among People Power Party supporters, this proportion of negative attitudes increased substantially. In contrast, in the histograms of favorability toward the People Power Party and Yoon Suk-yeol, [Figure 2-2] and [Figure 3-2], negative attitudes were almost non-existent among People Power Party supporters, while they markedly increased among Democratic Party supporters. Therefore, we can infer that the negative sentiment toward the two parties and two candidates shown in [Figure 1] originated from respondents supporting the opposing party. In short, affective polarization (Iyengar et al. 2012), characterized by a large gap between positive sentiment toward one's own party and negative sentiment toward the opposing party, was observed among partisan voters, and for them, this 'dislike' was directed solely at the opposing party.

[Figure 2] Distribution of Favorability Toward the Two Parties: By Respondent's Party Support

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

[Figure 3] Distribution of Favorability Toward the Two Candidates: By Respondent's Party Support

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

2. Satisfaction with Democracy and Favorability Toward Parties and Candidates

① Satisfaction with Democracy

How satisfied are respondents with the current state of Korean democracy? And how is this satisfaction related to partisan attitudes? Satisfaction with democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson et al. 2005) can be understood as one component of democratic support. Respondents chose a score from 0 ('not at all satisfied') to 10 ('completely satisfied'), with 5 being 'neutral.' [Figure 4], which presents the results, shows that the proportion of 'neutral' responses was the highest at 30.21%, and the proportion generally decreased as the responses moved toward the extreme values.

[Figure 4] Distribution of Satisfaction with Democracy

Meanwhile, [Figure 5], which illustrates respondents' satisfaction with democracy broken down by party support, shows no significant differences between supporter groups. In each group, the proportion of 'neutral' responses was the highest, and the pattern of decreasing proportions as the scores moved toward 0 and 10 was observed consistently across all groups. This pattern was similar to [Figure 4], which analyzed all respondents. Therefore, it is concluded that there are no discernible differences in the perception and evaluation of the current operation of Korean democracy based on party preference.

[Figure 5] Distribution of Satisfaction with Democracy: By Respondent's Party Support

② Satisfaction with Democracy and Favorability Toward Major Parties and Candidates

[Figure 6] and [Figure 7] present interesting findings. Despite the absence of significant differences in satisfaction with democracy based on party preference, respondents who support the two major parties tend to associate satisfaction with democracy primarily with positive attitudes toward their own party and candidate. In [Figure 6-1], Democratic Party supporters show high satisfaction with democracy and high favorability toward the Democratic Party simultaneously. In contrast, People Power Party supporters exhibit high satisfaction with democracy but low favorability toward the Democratic Party. Conversely, in [Figure 6-2], People Power Party supporters demonstrate high satisfaction with democracy and high favorability toward the People Power Party, while Democratic Party supporters show high satisfaction but negative attitudes toward the People Power Party.

[Figure 6] Satisfaction with Democracy and Favorability Toward Parties

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

[Figure 7] Satisfaction with Democracy and Favorability Toward Candidates

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

This pattern is also evident in [Figure 7]. In [Figure 7-1], Democratic Party supporters show high satisfaction with democracy and high favorability toward Lee Jae-myung simultaneously. In contrast, People Power Party supporters who are highly satisfied with democracy exhibit low favorability toward Lee Jae-myung. Conversely, in [Figure 7-2], People Power Party supporters demonstrate high satisfaction with democracy and high favorability toward Yoon Suk-yeol, while Democratic Party supporters show high satisfaction but negative attitudes toward Yoon Suk-yeol.

In summary, [Figure 6] and [Figure 7] reveal that while there are no differences in the evaluation or satisfaction with the current operation of Korean democracy based on party preference, partisan voters attribute their satisfaction with democracy differently. Specifically, by confirming that partisan voters associate satisfaction with democracy with positive sentiment toward their own party and negative sentiment toward the opposing party, we can see that different partisan considerations lie beneath the surface-level satisfaction with democracy. These results illustrate the underlying dynamics of this presidential election, which has been characterized as an 'election of dislike.' The candidates from the two major parties were both embroiled in scandals during the election process, leading to a superficial impression of widespread dislike for both parties. However, the actual dislike for the two parties stemmed from the supporters of the opposing parties. ■

References

Anderson, Christopher J. and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. “Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems.” American Political Science Review 91(1): 66-81.

Anderson, Christopher J., Andre Blais, Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Ola Listhaug. 2005. Losers’ Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy. Oxford University Press.

Iyengar, Shanto, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. “Affect, Not Ideology: Social Identity Perspective on Polarization.” Public Opinion Quarterly 76(3): 405-431.

Reuters. 2022. “S.Korean Voters Hold Noses as Rivals Land Low Blows in ”Unlikeable Election.“ https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/skorean-voters-hold-noses-rivals-land-low-blows-unlikeable-election-2022-02-03/

The Korea Herald. 2021. “‘Lesser Evil’? Disapproval of Presidential Candidates Rises.” http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211024000193

Yonhap News. 2022. “Record-breaking 'Dislike Election,' Record-breaking Close Contest... 20th Presidential Election Shatters Records.” https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220310078300001?input=1195m

■ Author: Gil Jeong-ah_Research Professor, Institute for Government Studies, Korea University. Teaches political attitudes of voters, Korean politics, and quantitative analysis. Holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Seoul National University. Her primary research interests include voters' political attitudes, partisan polarization, and political accountability in representative democracy. She has published articles in numerous journals, including Social Science Research, Korean Political Science Review, Korean Association of Party Studies Review, and the Journal of Legislative Studies.

■ Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun_EAI Research Fellow

    Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr