EAI Presidential Election Panel Survey] ⑥ Intra-Generational Differences Over Inter-Generational Ones: The '86ers' or the '60s Born'?

1. Introduction

The so-called '86 generation' has been perceived as synonymous with Korean democracy. Born in the 1960s, they acquired their political identities during the 1980s, a period of democratization, while in their youth. Their 'progressive' stance during the 2002 presidential election, when they were in their 30s, left a deep impression on the public. This has not always been the case. After the 2007 presidential election, discussions about the 'disappearance of the '86 generation'' emerged. Debates have continued regarding whether they are a homogeneous group and whether they are ideologically or politically 'progressive.' The question of whether they became 'conservative' after being 'progressive,' or were never 'progressive' in the first place, remains contentious.

The 2022 presidential election was the first in which all members of the '86 generation' had fully entered their 50s. The 50s are a turning point for conservatism in generational studies. It is generally accepted that older generations support conservative parties, as an attachment to authority and order aligns with conservative values. This is generally true even for those who rejected established authority in their youth. As income increases and social status stabilizes, it becomes difficult to avoid becoming more conservative. This is why the adage, 'If you are not progressive in your youth, you have no heart; if you are still progressive in old age, you have no brain,' is widely circulated. This is known as the 'aging' effect.

The '86 generation' was expected to be an exception to the aging effect. The expectation was that the tendency to become more conservative with age might not apply to this generation. Their identity, acquired during their youth, would be maintained as they aged, unlike the aging effect. This is known as the 'cohort' effect, similar to the New Deal generation in the United States.

The 2022 presidential election provides an opportunity to properly examine the conservatism of the '86 generation.' Let us examine their voting choices and the factors influencing them. Although controversial, this report will use a method of dividing generations by decade of birth. Therefore, the '86 generation' in this text refers to those born in the 1960s.

2. Whom Did the '86 Generation' Choose?

The 2022 EAI Presidential Election Panel Survey does not perfectly align with the exit poll data from the three major broadcasters. However, it is sufficient to grasp the general trends. Considering this, the voting choices of those born in the 1960s were split 'down the middle.' While candidate Yoon Suk-yeol received slightly more votes, the votes from the 1960s born were divided. The difference in voting tendencies between generations was also significantly mitigated in this election. It differed from the expectation that 'young adults = Lee Jae-myung, middle-aged and older adults = Yoon Suk-yeol.' This trend is clear when compared to the 2012 presidential election, which was a two-candidate race. It also differs from the generational voting differences observed in the 2017 presidential election. In general, the voting choices of those born in the 1960s in the 2022 presidential election closely mirrored the voting choices of the overall electorate (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Generational Voting Tendencies in Recent Presidential Elections

The variables that significantly influenced voters' candidate choices in this election were their subjective perception of ideology, their evaluation of President Moon Jae-in's job performance, and their preference for North Korea policy. Socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, generation, gender, region, education level, and income, which are known determinants of voting choices, did not have a significant impact. Of course, political issues that arose during the election campaign, such as the morality issues concerning the candidates and their families from both camps, had a considerable influence. When all these variables were controlled, the influential variables were ideology, presidential job performance evaluation, and preference for North Korea policy.

In summary, voters who were more conservative, evaluated President Moon Jae-in's job performance more negatively, and favored a hardline approach toward North Korea chose candidate Yoon Suk-yeol. Conversely, voters who were more progressive, evaluated President Moon Jae-in's job performance more positively, and favored reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea chose candidate Lee Jae-myung. One's generational affiliation had little impact. This was also true for those born in the 1960s. Generational identity did not influence voting choices. Those born in the 1960s were no different from other voters. They chose candidates based on their ideology, their evaluation of the president's job performance, and their stance on North Korea policy (see Figure 2). Let us now examine the factors that influenced the voting choices of those born in the 1960s.

Figure 2: Determinants of Voting Choice

3. Determinants of the '86 Generation's' Voting Choices

Among those born in the 1960s, the largest proportion (42%) identified themselves as ideologically moderate (see Figure 3). Conservatives accounted for about 32%, and progressives for 25%. This is almost identical to the average for all voters. When ideology is scored from 0 (most progressive) to 10 (most conservative), the average subjective ideological perception of those born in the 1960s was 5.15. This indicates a slight leaning towards the conservative side of moderate. The average ideological perception for all voters was 5.28, meaning they were almost the same or slightly more progressive. This falls between the 70s born, who had an average of 4.79 and were the most progressive, and the 40s-50s born, who were considerably more conservative. They were slightly more progressive than the 90s born, who are currently debated for their conservatism. This figure represents self-assessment of one's own ideology and may be separate from actual voting choices or policy preferences.

Figure 3: Subjective Ideological Perceptions by Generation

Those born in the 1960s gave President Moon Jae-in's job performance an average score of 4.8 out of 10 (see Figure 4). This also exactly matches the average for all voters. While their evaluation was more negative than that of the 70s and 80s born, who rated it in the mid-to-high 5s, it was more positive than that of previous generations, who rated it in the low 4s.

Figure 4: Presidential Job Performance Evaluation by Generation

61% of those born in the 1960s preferred a conciliatory and cooperative policy toward North Korea over a hardline policy (see Figure 5). This is the same proportion as the 70s born, who perceive themselves as slightly more progressive. This proportion was about 10 percentage points higher than the average for all voters. The so-called inverted U-shaped pattern, observed for over a decade, was evident. This means that young adults and the elderly prefer hardline policies, while middle-aged individuals prefer reconciliation and cooperation policies. This contradicts the previous notion that the youth prefer reconciliation and cooperation, while the middle-aged and elderly prefer hardline policies. Among those born in the 1960s, 39% prioritized welfare over growth. This was lower than the average for all voters, which was 46%. A notable characteristic is that the gap between preference for a conciliatory North Korea policy and prioritizing welfare was largest among those born in the 1960s. While the difference between these two variables was minimal or non-existent for most generations, it was pronounced only for the post-90s generation and those born in the 1960s.

Figure 5: Preference for North Korea Policy and Growth-Welfare Policy by Generation

Interestingly, this pattern is the exact opposite of that observed for the 90s born. While a majority of the '86 generation' (parents) are positive towards a conciliatory North Korea policy, they are negative towards welfare-prioritizing policies. Conversely, a majority of the younger generation (90s born) are negative towards a conciliatory North Korea policy but somewhat positive towards welfare-prioritizing policies. This finding aligns with previous research indicating that the factors influencing subjective perceptions of progressivism and conservatism differ between generations. Middle-aged and older adults primarily define their ideology based on North Korea policy, while young adults define their ideology based on their preference for welfare versus growth. It can be inferred that for the 70s and 80s born, both variables influenced their progressive tendencies, while for the 60s and 90s born, the influence of these two variables canceled each other out. In this election, preference for North Korea policy significantly influenced voting choices, but preference for growth versus welfare policies did not have a statistically significant impact.

In conclusion, the 1960s born showed patterns in subjective ideological perception and presidential job performance evaluation, which were the most prominent determinants of voting choices in this election, almost identical to the average voter. Regarding North Korea policy, a majority of the 1960s born were slightly more favorable towards a conciliatory and cooperative policy than the average voter, which was a notable characteristic. Ultimately, the specific generational identity of the 1960s born did not influence their voting choices. This was also true for other generations. While generational identity was found to have some influence on the voting choices of the 70s born for candidate Lee Jae-myung, the impact was not significant.

4. Has the '86 Generation' Become Conservative?

In the 2022 presidential election, the '86 generation' chose candidates in a manner almost identical to the average voter. The same was true for subjective ideological perception and presidential job performance evaluation, which were the most influential factors in voting choices. Their preference for North Korea policy was slightly more inclined towards reconciliation and cooperation than the average voter, but the difference was not significant. So, has the '86 generation' become 'conservative' with age after being 'progressive' in the past? Or have they followed a different path?

South Korean elections since democratization have experienced ideological fluctuations. Voting choices alone can be misleading, as they differ in two-candidate versus multi-candidate races. Therefore, it is difficult to definitively label votes as 'progressive' or 'conservative' based solely on the proportion of votes for a particular party. Two methods were used to correct for these fluctuations. First, the conservative advantage rate, which measures the extent to which conservative party candidates' vote share was dominant. Second, the overall average centering technique, which subtracts the average value for a specific generation from the average value for the election period. The graph applying this method is shown in [Figure 6]. In addition, one more method was added: instead of looking for generational voting characteristics in each election, we examined the voting characteristics of each generation by life cycle. The aim was to observe the voting choices of each generation at specific age ranges.

Figure 6: Generational Voting by Life Cycle[1]

The thick red line represents the voting pattern of those born in the 1960s. Interpreting the graph with 0 as the center, points below indicate progressive voting, and points above indicate conservative voting. The most distinctive feature is the very gentle slope of the voting choices of those born in the 1960s. This slope is markedly gentler compared to the preceding generations, the 50s and 40s born. This pattern differs from the aging effect, which suggests that people become more conservative as they age. In the 2017 presidential election, when the average age of those born in the 1960s was 53 (born in 1965), their voting was slightly more conservative than the average, but in other elections, their voting was generally slightly more progressive than the average. Another distinctive feature is that the voting behavior of those born in the 1960s during their youth and early adulthood was not particularly 'progressive.' While a comparison with preceding generations is impossible due to a lack of empirical data, a comparison with subsequent generations is possible. When compared at the same age, the 'progressive' voting of the 70s and 80s born is clearly more pronounced than that of the 60s born.

In summary, those born in the 1960s exhibit voting choice characteristics different from previous generations. This is because the voting choice characteristics observed during their youth and early adulthood have been maintained as they have aged. Signs of rapid conservatism observed in their 40s and 50s have not yet been detected. In this regard, there is a clear difference from previous generations. At the same time, the '60s born did not, as is commonly believed, vote progressively during their youth and early adulthood. In fact, in the eight presidential elections held since democratization, the 1960s born supported progressive candidates more than conservative candidates in only three elections: 1997, 2002, and 2017. In the remaining five elections, including the most recent one, they supported conservative candidates more. The three elections in which this generation supported progressive candidates were elections where the entire generation shifted towards progressivism. Conversely, the five elections in which this generation supported conservative candidates were elections where the entire generation shifted towards conservatism. This indicates the operation of a 'period' effect. After correcting for this apparent effect, it was confirmed that the 1960s born, even in their 20s and 30s, voted with a slight progressive tendency close to the average for all generations. This trend has not changed significantly since then.

Another interesting point emerges when examining the changes in ideological perception. The graph in [Figure 7], like the voting choices, uses the life cycle effect and the centering technique to track generational ideological perceptions. In the left graph, the 1960s born, in their 20s and 30s, perceived themselves as progressive at a level similar to the preceding generation, the 70s born. However, the actual voting choices in the lower graph show a considerable divergence from those of the 70s born. While the 1960s born perceived themselves as progressive, their voting choices were not as progressive as their ideological perceptions.

Figure 7: Subjective Ideological Perception and Voting Tendency

In summary, the rate of conservatism among the 1960s born is very gradual, which can be considered a generational effect. However, their voting choices were not as progressive as their self-perceived progressivism. This is based on the results of presidential election opinion polls conducted since democratization.

5. Conclusion: Still the '86 Generation'?

In the 2022 presidential election, the generational identity of the '86 generation' was not reflected in their voting choices. This was also true for other generations. Voters did not vote based on generational characteristics. Ideological and policy preference heterogeneity influenced voting choices, namely ideological perception, presidential job performance evaluation, and North Korea policy. Heterogeneity in income, assets, homeownership, and perceived social class has not received sufficient attention. It is a reasonable interpretation that these variables were not expressed due to the constraints of available political parties. Ultimately, a generation cannot be a monolithic entity. This is why discussions in academia in recent years, emphasizing the need to focus on intra-generational differences over inter-generational ones, are gaining attention.

At the beginning of this article, it was stated that the term '86 generation' is controversial. Although the method of dividing generations by decade is subject to considerable criticism in academia, we have tracked the political characteristics of the so-called '86 generation' using this method. This 'generation' was not significantly different from any other 'generation.' It is now appropriate to discuss a return to the term 'those born in the 1960s' instead of '86 generation.' ■

[1]The 'conservative advantage rate' and the 'overall average centering' techniques were used.

■ Author: Bae Jin-seok_Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Gyeongsang National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Texas, Austin. His main research areas include elections, political parties, and public opinion in the context of democratization and new democracies. As a Senior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute (EAI), he was involved in the practical aspects of establishing the Asia Democracy Network (ADN) and the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) in 2013.

■ Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun_EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr