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[EAI Presidential Election Panel Survey] V. Youth Gender Conflict: Will it Become a New Fault Line in Korean Politics, Transcending Ideological Conflict?
Editor's Note
Kim Hanna, a researcher at the Seoul National University Institute for Korean Political Studies, argues that the political attitude differences between genders within the 20s youth demographic are not divided along a single issue of feminism support versus opposition. She analyzes the gender divide within the youth generation by linking it to voters' ideological orientation, favorability towards political parties, favorability towards candidates, and policy attitudes. Specifically, she characterizes the tendency of men in their 20s to exhibit a level of conservatism similar to men in their 60s, while women in their 20s tend to pursue progressive values, as a 'modern gender gap.' She asserts that the 20s gender divide is a newly emerging factor of political division in Korea, in addition to ideology, which has been the primary fault line in Korean politics.
1. Introduction
To date, research on the behavior of Korean voters has treated region, ideology, and generation as important axes of division in elections. While a pattern of voters in the 영남 (Yeongnam) region, who are conservative and older, voting for conservative parties/candidates, and voters in the 호남 (Honam) region, who are progressive and younger, voting for progressive parties/candidates has been prominent, gender has not played a decisive role in influencing voting choices and producing meaningful results in past elections.
One notable aspect of the 20th Presidential Election was the divergence in party candidate support based on gender among voters in their 20s, a youth demographic. According to the exit poll results released by the three major broadcasting networks (KBS, MBC, SBS) upon the closing of polls on March 9, 2022, approximately 58.7% of men aged 18 to 29 voted for the People Power Party's candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, while 58% of women in the same age group voted for the Democratic Party's candidate Lee Jae-myung, indicating that a majority of men and women in their 20s cast their votes for different candidates. In other age groups, there were no distinct differences in candidate support by gender. For instance, in their 40s, both men and women supported Lee Jae-myung, whereas those aged 60 and above supported Yoon Suk-yeol, regardless of gender. Unlike other generations, distinct gender differences in support tendencies were observed only within the 20s voter demographic ([Table 1]).
[Table 1] Predicted Vote Share by Candidate (Exit Poll Results from KBS, MBC, SBS)
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| Democratic Party Lee Jae-myung (%) | People Power Party Yoon Suk-yeol (%) | Others (%) | ||
| Under 20s | Male | 36.3 | 58.7 | 5 |
| Female | 58.0 | 33.8 | 8.2 | |
| 30s | Male | 42.6 | 52.8 | 4.6 |
| Female | 49.7 | 43.8 | 6.5 | |
| 40s | Male | 61.0 | 35.2 | 3.8 |
| Female | 60.0 | 35.6 | 4.4 | |
| 50s | Male | 55.0 | 41.8 | 3.2 |
| Female | 50.1 | 45.8 | 4.1 | |
| 60s and over | Male | 30.2 | 67.4 | 2.4 |
| Female | 31.3 | 66.8 | 1.9 |
These results prompt the question: 'Has gender, as a potential source of conflict, truly emerged as a significant political cleavage factor in Korean politics, particularly among the youth?' This report seeks to explore how voters' gender and their attitudes toward gender-related issues are closely linked with other political and social attitudes and values within the youth generation, and to examine the implications for Korean politics.
2. Differences in Gender Political Orientations
① Ideological Tendency
When addressing gender as a new political cleavage, the first point to ascertain is ‘how closely is voters’ gender intertwined with their existing political orientations and attitudes?’. The following [Figure 1] and [Table 2] show the results of an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the extent to which ideological tendencies by gender are statistically significant and differ within each generation.
Examining [Figure 1] and [Table 2], we can confirm that the differences in ideological tendencies by gender are more pronounced within the 20s generation compared to other generations. Specifically, using an 11-point scale measuring ideological tendency from 0 (very progressive) to 10 (very conservative), the average ideological score for men in their 20s was approximately 5.89, which was 1.25 points higher than that for women in their 20s (4.64). This difference was statistically significant (p<0.001). The groups for which the difference in ideological tendency by gender within the generation was statistically significant were those in their 20s and 30s, and the difference was larger for men and women in their 20s (1.25) than for men and women in their 30s (0.60). Meanwhile, the conservatism of men in their 20s was the second highest among all age and gender groups, following men in their 60s (5.99), and this score was higher than the overall average of 5.29.
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| [Figure 1] Differences in Ideological Tendency by Gender within Generations | [Table 2] Differences in Ideological Tendency by Gender within Generations | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Age Group Gender Ideological Tendency Average Difference 20s Male 5.89 1.25*** Female 4.64 30s Male 5.50 0.60* Female 4.89 40s Male 4.80 0.06 Female 4.74 50s Male 5.27 0.35 Female 4.93 60s Male 5.99 0.39 Female 5.61 Total 5.29 ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 | Age Group | Gender | Ideological Tendency | Average | Difference | 20s | Male | 5.89 | 1.25*** | Female | 4.64 | 30s | Male | 5.50 | 0.60* | Female | 4.89 | 40s | Male | 4.80 | 0.06 | Female | 4.74 | 50s | Male | 5.27 | 0.35 | Female | 4.93 | 60s | Male | 5.99 | 0.39 | Female | 5.61 | Total | 5.29 | ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 | |
| Age Group | Gender | Ideological Tendency | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Average | Difference | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20s | Male | 5.89 | 1.25*** | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Female | 4.64 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 30s | Male | 5.50 | 0.60* | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Female | 4.89 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 40s | Male | 4.80 | 0.06 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Female | 4.74 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 50s | Male | 5.27 | 0.35 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Female | 4.93 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 60s | Male | 5.99 | 0.39 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Female | 5.61 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Total | 5.29 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 |
② Party Favorability
The following [Figure 2] and [Table 3] show the differences in party favorability by gender within each age group. Favorability was measured on an 11-point scale from 0 (dislike very much) to 10 (like very much) regarding how much respondents liked or disliked each party. First, the most striking point in [Table 3] is that the difference in favorability toward each party between males and females in their 20s is clearly evident compared to other age groups (p<0.001). For example, 20-something males showed a favorability of 2.62 toward the Democratic Party, while 20-something females showed a favorability of 5, resulting in a difference of approximately 2.38 between the two groups. This was a significantly larger difference compared to the gender gap in favorability observed in other age groups. Similarly, the difference in favorability toward the People Power Party and the Justice Party between 20-something males and females was relatively larger than the differences between males and females within other age groups, and the statistical significance was also clearly demonstrated. Unlike the Democratic Party, toward the People Power Party, 20-something males showed a favorability of 5.4, and 20-something females showed a favorability of 3.29, indicating a difference of 2.11. For 20-something males, the party preference order was People Power Party (5.4), Democratic Party (2.62), and Justice Party (2.16). For 20-something females, the order was Democratic Party (5), Justice Party (4.52), and People Power Party (3.29).
Meanwhile, statistically significant differences in favorability toward the Democratic Party and the Justice Party were found between males and females in their 30s, and significant differences in favorability toward the Justice Party between males and females in their 40s, and toward the Democratic Party between males and females in their 50s. However, these differences were generally smaller than the gap in party favorability observed between males and females in their 20s. The group with the most distinct difference in favorability across all age groups is males and females in their 20s.
[Table 3] Gender Differences in Party Favorability within Age Groups
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| Age Group | Gender | Democratic Party Favorability | People Power Party Favorability | Justice Party Favorability | |||
| Average | Difference | Average | Difference | Average | Difference | ||
| 20s | Male | 2.62 | -2.38*** | 5.40 | 2.11*** | 2.16 | -2.35*** |
| Female | 5.00 | 3.29 | 4.52 | ||||
| 30s | Male | 3.35 | -0.88* | 4.17 | 0.86 | 1.95 | -1.74*** |
| Female | 4.23 | 3.32 | 3.69 | ||||
| 40s | Male | 4.64 | 0.26 | 3.20 | 0.73 | 2.49 | -0.81* |
| Female | 4.38 | 2.47 | 3.30 | ||||
| 50s | Male | 4.88 | 0.93* | 3.60 | -0.45 | 3.35 | -0.36 |
| Female | 3.95 | 4.05 | 3.72 | ||||
| 60s | Male | 4.08 | 0.29 | 4.93 | -0.54 | 3.63 | 0.02 |
| Female | 3.78 | 5.47 | 3.61 | ||||
| Total | 4.08 | 4.13 | 3.29 | ||||
| ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 |
[Figure 2] Gender Differences in Party Favorability within Generations
③ Favorability Toward Candidates
Next, let us examine how favorability toward presidential candidates differs by gender within each generation. The same 11-point scale used previously for favorability is applied here. 'Before Election' and 'After Election' refer to the analysis of public opinion poll data collected from January (12th-15th) before the presidential election and March (10th-15th) immediately after the election, respectively.
[Table 4] Gender Differences in Presidential Candidate Favorability within Generations – Lee Jae-myung, Yoon Suk-yeol
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| By Age | Gender | Lee Jae-myung (Pre-election) | Lee Jae-myung (Post-election) | Yoon Suk-yeol (Pre-election) | Yoon Suk-yeol (Post-election) | ||||
| Average | Difference | Average | Difference | Average | Difference | Average | Difference | ||
| 20s | Male | 3.04 | -0.73 | 2.93 | -1.94*** | 4.89 | 1.62*** | 5.49 | 2.58*** |
| Female | 3.78 | 4.88 | 3.27 | 2.91 | |||||
| 30s | Male | 4.34 | 0.91* | 4.10 | 0.03 | 4.08 | 0.55 | 4.30 | 0.68 |
| Female | 3.44 | 4.08 | 3.53 | 3.62 | |||||
| 40s | Male | 5.59 | 0.69 | 5.51 | 0.28 | 2.70 | 0.35 | 3.09 | 0.31 |
| Female | 4.90 | 5.23 | 2.36 | 2.78 | |||||
| 50s | Male | 6.01 | 1.85*** | 5.53 | 1.42* | 3.45 | -0.31 | 4.05 | -0.66 |
| Female | 4.17 | 4.11 | 3.77 | 4.71 | |||||
| 60s | Male | 3.73 | -0.22 | 4.00 | 0.20 | 5.45 | -0.05 | 5.60 | -0.35 |
| Female | 3.95 | 3.80 | 5.49 | 5.95 | |||||
| Total | 4.29 | 4.38 | 4.08 | 4.45 | |||||
| ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 |
First, looking at [Table 4] and [Figure 3], in January before the election, there was almost no difference in favorability towards candidate Lee Jae-myung between men and women in their 20s, and it was not statistically significant. However, in the March survey period, immediately after the election, 20-something men showed low favorability towards Lee Jae-myung at 2.93, while 20-something women showed higher favorability than 20-something men at 4.88. This represents an increase of about 1.1 in favorability towards candidate Lee compared to the pre-election figure of 3.78. In contrast, regarding candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, a clear difference in favorability between men and women in their 20s consistently appeared before and after the election, and the gap widened further after the election (2.58) compared to before the election (1.62). While the difference in favorability between men and women within other age groups for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol is not statistically significant, a distinct gender gap in favorability is observed among those in their 20s.
This change in favorability of women in their 20s towards candidate Lee is related to changes in candidate Lee Jae-myung's stance. Since before the presidential election, Lee Jae-myung's support among female voters had been weak due to controversies such as his vulgar language towards his sister-in-law and scandals involving actresses. Until November of last year, he strategically shared posts from online communities opposing feminism on Facebook, and in January, he took a passive and ambiguous stance, stating, "I am not an anti-feminist, but I am not a feminist either." Candidate Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party's presidential campaign then abandoned their strategic ambiguity on feminism and began to strive to win the votes of young female voters in their 20s and 30s. For example, in late January, they recruited Park Ji-hyun, a woman in her 20s who first brought public attention to the 'Nth Room' case, a widespread sexual exploitation crime conducted via Telegram. Furthermore, in the final TV debate just before the election, candidate Lee Jae-myung showed a stance of actively defending feminism. This shift in election strategy may have influenced women in their 20s to favor him.
[Figure 3] Favorability Gap Between Men and Women in their 20s Towards Major Presidential Candidates
Meanwhile, the attitudinal differences between men and women in their 20s were also observed in their favorability towards other presidential candidates and politicians. [Table 5] shows the favorability ratings for Justice Party candidate Sim Sang-jung and People Power Party leader Lee Jun-seok by age group. Voters in their 20s and 30s show a distinct gender gap in favorability towards Sim Sang-jung and Lee Jun-seok. Sim Sang-jung, the only female candidate among the major party presidential nominees, consistently made statements supporting feminism throughout the campaign period, which can be seen as a differentiation from candidate Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party, who maintained strategic ambiguity until the end of the campaign period.
[Table 5] Favorability Gap Between Genders Within Age Groups for Presidential Candidates – Sim Sang-jung, Lee Jun-seok
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| Age Group | Gender | Sim Sang-jung (Post-election) | Lee Jun-seok (Post-election) | ||
| Average | Difference | Average | Difference | ||
| 20s | Male | 2.30 | -2.98*** | 6.15 | 3.66*** |
| Female | 5.28 | 2.49 | |||
| 30s | Male | 2.19 | -2.15*** | 4.47 | 2.47*** |
| Female | 4.34 | 2.00 | |||
| 40s | Male | 2.53 | -1.08* | 2.48 | 0.22 |
| Female | 3.62 | 2.26 | |||
| 50s | Male | 3.73 | -0.44 | 2.35 | -0.83*** |
| Female | 4.17 | 3.18 | |||
| 60s | Male | 3.90 | -0.15 | 3.70 | -0.24 |
| Female | 4.05 | 3.94 | |||
| Total | 3.60 | 3.34 | |||
| ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 |
Conversely, 20-something males showed the highest favorability rating (6.15) among all age groups towards Lee Jun-seok, the party leader who spearheaded the presidential campaign strategy for the People Power Party's candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, as a young male in his 30s. In contrast, 20-something females exhibited a relatively low favorability rating (2.49), resulting in the largest gender gap across all age groups (p<0.001). While the favorability gap between males and females in their 30s also proved to be statistically significant, similar to the 20s, the gap was less pronounced compared to that of the 20s.
④ Policy Attitudes
What about policy attitudes, which are closely related to ideological orientation? Do gender differences exist within age groups regarding policy attitudes? [Table 6] presents the results of a survey on attitudes toward the women's quota system, inter-Korean policy, and welfare policy, respectively. For the women's quota system, a higher score indicates greater agreement with the statement, "What do you think about the quota system that guarantees a certain level of representation for women in employment and promotions?" on a 5-point Likert scale. For inter-Korean policy, a score of 1 was assigned if respondents favored "Strengthening exchanges and cooperation between South and North Korea," and 0 if they favored "Maintaining and strengthening a hardline policy towards North Korea." Lastly, for welfare policy, a score of 1 was assigned if respondents indicated that "Welfare is more important than growth" in response to the question, "In our society today, which is more important, welfare or growth?", and 0 if they indicated that "Growth is more important."
According to [Table 6], similar to other political attitudes, the attitude gap between genders within the 20s age group is larger compared to other age groups. Within the 20s, females showed a more favorable attitude towards the women's quota system, were more supportive of strengthening inter-Korean exchanges, and responded that welfare is more important than growth compared to males. This pattern of intra-generational gender difference was also observed in the 30s, but to a lesser extent than in the 20s.
[Table 6] Gender Differences in Policy Attitudes within Age Groups
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| Age Group | Gender | Support for Women's Quota | Strengthening Inter-Korean Exchange | Welfare over Growth | |||
| Average | Difference | Average | Difference | Average | Difference | ||
| 20s | Male | 2.07 | -1.67*** | 0.19 | -0.32*** | 0.36 | -0.34*** |
| Female | 3.74 | 0.51 | 0.70 | ||||
| 30s | Male | 2.03 | -1.65*** | 0.40 | -0.14* | 0.41 | -0.15* |
| Female | 3.68 | 0.53 | 0.56 | ||||
| 40s | Male | 2.63 | -0.79*** | 0.63 | 0.04 | 0.52 | -0.06 |
| Female | 3.424 | 0.58 | 0.58 | ||||
| 50s | Male | 3.37 | -0.08 | 0.70 | 0.17* | 0.51 | 0.11* |
| Female | 3.45 | 0.53 | 0.40 | ||||
| 60s | Male | 3.46 | -0.10 | 0.55 | 0.09 | 0.40 | 0.04 |
| Female | 3.56 | 0.46 | 0.36 | ||||
| Total | 3.19 | 0.51 | 0.47 | ||||
| ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 |
Meanwhile, the survey on ideological orientation previously revealed that men in their 20s are conservative and women in their 20s are relatively progressive. [Table 6] suggests that the attitudinal differences between men and women within their 20s are not confined solely to specific gender issues such as the women's quota system or the abolition of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. In other words, in terms of the ideological direction of North Korea policy or welfare policy, men in their 20s exhibit a distinct conservative tendency, whereas women in their 20s appear to pursue progressive values more relatively. This gender gap, where women show more progressivism than men, is a characteristic of a 'modern gender gap' that does not appear in older generations (50s and 60s), and it becomes more pronounced as the age decreases from the 40s to the 20s.
3. Conclusion
This study has explored the level of the gender gap within the youth generation during the 20th presidential election, in connection with various political attitudes. The analysis results showed that significant differences in political attitudes based on gender were found within the 20s age group. While men in their 20s strongly exhibit conservative tendencies, similar to men in their 60s, women in their 20s display relatively progressive tendencies. These gender-based differences within the 20s are the most pronounced when compared to other generations and are statistically significant. Furthermore, based on these ideological orientations, significant differences were observed in favorability towards major political parties, presidential candidates and key politicians, and policy attitudes.
The analysis suggests that the attitudinal differences between men and women within their 20s are not limited to the binary opposition of support versus opposition to feminism or single-issue agendas. Rather, it can be interpreted that the differences between men and women in their 20s are rooted in differences in ideological orientation, and one manifestation of this is the divergence in stances on policies like the women's quota system. This is because progressive values that pursue equality and coexistence over competition and growth are inherent in the policy of the women's quota system, and these progressive values can also be linked to the direction of North Korea policy or welfare policy, and the values espoused by each party and their candidates. Therefore, the reality of the political attitude differences between men and women in their 20s is not a completely different dimension drawn within the youth generation, replacing 'ideology' as the core cleavage of existing politics. Rather, it is closer to a new cleavage superimposed on the existing ideological conflict.
■ Author: Kim Hanna_Research Fellow, Institute for Korean Political Studies, Seoul National University. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from Seoul National University and has lectured on Korean politics and party politics at Seoul National University and Ewha Womans University. Her primary research interests include electoral systems and voting behavior, parliamentary politics, and party politics. She has recently published articles in major journals such as Korean Politics, Korean Political Science Review, and the Journal of Parliamentary Research.
■ Editor: Jeon Juhyun_EAI Research Fellow
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.