[EAI Presidential Election Panel Survey] IV. The Emergence of Young Conservatives: Have the 20-somethings Changed Their Minds?

This presidential election garnered significant attention for the voting behavior of young people in their 20s, referred to as 'men in their 20s' (20대 남성) and 'women in their 20s' (20대 여성). The interest in the voting patterns of young voters is not new. In Western societies, as well as in Korea, the differences in voting behavior between young people and other age groups during election processes have long been a subject of social concern. However, the reason young voters attracted particular attention in this election was the expectation that their voting behavior would differ significantly from past patterns observed in Korean society. The mass media also devoted considerable time to reporting on the potential shifts in this demographic, and candidates from various parties made youth-oriented pledges a core component of their platforms to gauge and mobilize this group. Has the electoral behavior of young people in their 20s changed in this election? If so, what phenomena are closely related to this change? This report aims to offer some tentative answers to these questions, focusing on the candidate choices of voters in their 20s.

1. Who are the young voters?

Who are the young voters? The Framework Act on Youth (enacted in 2020) defines youth as individuals aged 19 to 34. In contrast, the Enforcement Decree of the Special Act on Youth Employment Promotion defines youth as individuals aged 15 to 29, and the Special Act on Support for Small and Medium Enterprise Manpower defines them as individuals aged 15 to 34. Several advanced European countries, the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the International Labour Organization (ILO) categorize individuals aged 15 to 24 as youth (Jeon Gyeong-sook et al., 2019).

Sociology, on the other hand, does not place significant emphasis on biological age, focusing instead on a series of events or social relationships experienced during the life course. It rather emphasizes the transition from adolescence to adulthood. Therefore, it defines this group as individuals who must navigate transitions from school to the labor market, from their family home to independent housing, and from their original family to a new family through marriage (Arnett and Carstensen, 1999).

Literature on electoral processes generally defines young voters by the transitional characteristics they experience. Accordingly, based on Article 15 of the Public Official Election Act, which stipulates the legal voting age, individuals aged 18 and above can be included. However, in Korean society, the age range considered 'youth' can vary depending on when the transition period is considered complete. The National Election Commission began to treat 19-year-olds, who were voting for the first time, separately during the 2007 presidential election process, and subsequently started to categorize voting behavior by age in five-year intervals up to age 34. In other words, it began to analyze the voting behavior of young people or youth by distinguishing between ages 19, 20-24, 25-29, and 30-34. Conversely, election candidates appear to consider individuals aged 19 to 34, as defined by the Framework Act on Youth, as youth in relation to youth employment pledges. Therefore, the definition of youth in Korean elections is not yet clear, and consequently, research on the electoral behavior of youth is also based on differing classification methods. Based on these perceptions, this study intends to compare and examine the characteristics revealed in the current presidential election, starting from voters who have reached the voting age up to those aged 34, rather than pre-defining the youth demographic.

The assessment that the electoral behavior of young voters in Korean society has been changing began after 2000. Therefore, [Table 1] first compares the changes in the number of young voters in the 2012, 2017, and the current presidential elections.

[Table 1] Changes in the Number of Young Voters

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

f2e34dd1a320d063

Source: Sample survey results from the National Election Commission for 2012 and 2017; Statistics Korea population statistics for 2022.

Looking at the changes in the number of registered voters in [Table 1], for those aged 24 and under, the number of registered voters increased after 2012 and then decreased by approximately 0.5 in the 2022 presidential election. In contrast, they not only showed a turnout rate of over 70% in the past two presidential elections but also achieved a high turnout rate of over 77% in the 2017 presidential election, which is nearly similar to the overall average turnout rate of 77.2% at that time. However, when the definition of young voters is expanded to include those aged 29 and under or 34 and under, the turnout rate shows a slight decrease. Considering the general theory in Western countries that turnout rates increase with age until old age and then decrease again, we can confirm that there is a difference in electoral participation between young people under 24, who are relatively less engaged in full-time job searching, and those over 24 in Korean society.

Precise data on the turnout rate of these young voters in the 2022 presidential election has not yet been compiled. However, it is unlikely that the trend of declining youth turnout will be reversed. As seen in collective terms like 'men in their 20s' and 'women in their 20s,' the high social interest in youth voting likely contributed to an increase in youth turnout in the 2022 presidential election. However, further analysis is needed to determine whether this expectation is limited to the under-24 youth demographic, or if it extends to the broader group commonly referred to as 'those in their 20s,' or even to the 34-year-old youth associated with candidates' youth policies.

2. What characteristics did young voters exhibit in the 2022 Presidential Election?

In the 2022 presidential election, young voters were specifically referred to as 'men in their 20s' and 'women in their 20s,' and were portrayed as a group with strong internal gender divisions, unlike other age groups. Therefore, in terms of ideological orientation, party support, and policy preferences, which are considered important factors in determining the political orientation of general voters, what characteristics did these young voters exhibit internally or in comparison to other age groups?

① The conservative tendency of young people is prominent among those aged 24 and under.

To examine the ideological orientation of young people in this presidential election, we categorized them in three ways. The first method is the traditional categorization, which separates those aged 18 and 19 who experienced their first election in this election, and then divides those in their 20s into 10-year units from 20 to 29. The second method considers the difference in turnout rates between young people under 24 and those 25 and older in the previous two presidential elections, and then limits the youth group to those aged 24 and under. The third method defines youth as those aged 34 and under, who are the target demographic for youth economic pledges.

[Figure 1] examines the differences in left/right ideological orientation across age groups categorized using the three methods described above. The panel survey data, conducted by EAI during the 2022 presidential election period, uses a scale of 0-10, where higher scores indicate a more conservative orientation. [Figure 1] generally shows that voters in their 40s are the most progressive in Korean society. Specifically, the ideological orientation of those in their mid-40s and mid-50s is similar to those simply categorized as being in their 40s. Second, excluding the elderly population aged 60 and over, young people in Korea are generally more conservative compared to other age groups. Particularly, when examining the figure categorized by age based on 24 years old, young voters aged 20-24 exhibit a strong conservative orientation. In contrast, the youth group defined up to age 34, which includes a large number of young people entering the job market after college graduation, is more progressive than the so-called '586 generation' (those in their 50s and older who were politically active in the 1980s).

[Figure 1] Average Left/Right Ideological Orientation by Age Group

Source: 2022 EAI Panel Survey Data

② Young people aged 24 and under support the People Power Party nearly three times more than the Democratic Party.

To ascertain the distribution of party support among young voters in this presidential election, we examined the distribution of party identification by age group. For the analysis of party identification, we used survey questions about whether respondents supported a political party and, if so, which one. [Figure 2] shows the distribution of party identification categorized by age group.

First, both the traditional categorization using 10-year age intervals and the categorization based on age 24 show that the proportion of individuals with party identification increases with age. Looking at the respondents who indicated no party affiliation, the left-hand graph, which follows the traditional categorization, shows that those in their 20s have the highest proportion of respondents with no party affiliation. However, this tendency towards non-partisanship among young people can be reinterpreted when examining the right-hand graph, which categorizes by age 24. In other words, the high proportion of 'no party affiliation' among young people in their 20s is due to the relatively larger number of unaffiliated individuals among those aged 25 and older. Up to age 24, the proportion of respondents with no party affiliation is lower than that of those in their 30s, 40s, and 50s. Therefore, compared to the traditional Western view (Converse, 1976) that accumulated experience and learning with age strengthen party attachment or identification, young people under 24 in Korean society can be considered a relative exception.

Second, young people aged 24 and under also tend to support the People Power Party more than the Democratic Party. The proportion of those aged 24 and under who support the Democratic Party is approximately 1.0% of all respondents, while the proportion supporting the People Power Party is about 2.8%. The reasons why young people under 24 in Korean society exhibit relatively strong party identification, and particularly strong identification with the People Power Party, which is considered a conservative party, warrant active follow-up research.

[Figure 2] Distribution of Party Identification by Age Group

Source: 2022 EAI Panel Survey Data

③ Young people aged 24 and under prioritize candidate pledges, while those aged 25 and older emphasize candidate personality, similar to older generations.

What was the most important factor for young people when choosing a candidate in this presidential election? Political science identifies party, candidate personality, pledges, electoral competition, and other contextual factors as important determinants of candidate choice. [Figure 3] shows that voters aged 18 and 19, who were voting for the first time in this election, considered candidate pledges most important and showed little interest in candidate personality or party affiliation.

Second, there are differences within the young demographic regarding the most important factor considered when choosing a candidate. The right side of [Figure 3] shows that young people aged 24 and under, similar to voters aged 18 and 19, prioritize candidate pledges. In contrast, young people aged 25 and older emphasize candidate personality. This differentiation is not apparent when the 20s are divided into traditional 10-year intervals. According to the traditional classification, it might be easy to interpret that those in their 20s prioritize candidate pledges. However, when young people are further segmented, those who value candidate pledges are under 24, while those aged 25 and older, who are largely entering the job market, emphasize candidate personality.

[Figure 3] Distribution of Reasons for Candidate Choice by Age Group

Source: 2022 EAI Panel Survey Data

④ In candidate selection, the younger demographic up to age 34 showed a strong tendency to support candidate Yoon Suk-yeol.

[Figure 4] Candidate Selection by Age Group

Source: 2022 EAI Panel Survey Data

Ultimately, how did the younger demographic choose their candidates in this presidential election? Whether using general age group divisions or divisions based on age 24, it can be observed that candidate Yoon Suk-yeol received more support from the younger demographic. However, examining the right-hand figure, which uses the age 24-based division, this support for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol among young voters is significant up to age 34. The fact that the voting rate for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol among those aged 35 to 44 was 6.3% suggests, when compared to the average support rate of 7.6% for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol among those in their 30s shown in the right-hand figure, that the support for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in their 30s was likely concentrated among those under 34 years of age.

Consequently, in this presidential election, South Korea's younger voters exhibit significant differences between those under 24 and those 25 and older. These differences manifest in ideology, party identification, and the factors considered important in the candidate selection process. Younger voters under 24 are more conservative ideologically and show a relatively stronger tendency to support the People Power Party. Furthermore, they tend to select candidates based on their policy pledges. Younger voters aged 25 and older, while sharing some tendencies with those under 24, exhibit a relatively weaker degree of ideological conservatism and a lower proportion of support for the People Power Party. They also show a stronger tendency to select candidates based on personal attributes. Particularly interesting is that despite the relatively strong conservatism and support for the People Power Party shown by younger voters under 24, those aged 25 and older were more inclined to choose candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the actual candidate selection. A more systematic analysis appears necessary to understand why this phenomenon occurred. However, based on political science theories, it can be cautiously hypothesized that younger voters under 24 may have had less political experience or learning, and consequently, their attachment to a political party may not have been strongly formed enough to translate into actual candidate selection. As a result, it is thought that they hesitated considerably in their final candidate choice due to factors other than the conservatism expressed in their words and thoughts. More rigorous analysis is needed to determine whether the current younger demographic under 24 in South Korea is indeed strongly conservative, and what factors influence the formation of their ideological orientation and political expression. ■

References

Jeon, Kyung-sook, Song, Young-ho, and Chae, Chang-kyun. 2019. A Survey on the Human Rights Situation of Young People in Poverty. National Human Rights Commission of Korea.

Bartels, M. M., and L. L. Carstensen. 1999. “Social-psychological theories and their application ot aging: from indiviudal to collective” In V. L. Bengtson and K. W. Schaie (eds.) Handbook of Theories of Aging. Springer Publishing Company.

Converse, P. E. 1976. Dynamics of Party Support: Cohort Analytical Party Identification. Sage Publication.

■ Author: Han, Jeong-hoon_ Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, and Director of the EU Center. He lectures on Korean politics, parliamentary and party politics, and comparative politics. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Rochester, New York, USA, and taught at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Soongsil University before joining Seoul National University. His primary research interests include electoral and parliamentary systems, party politics and parliamentary politics, and the politics of the European Union. He has published articles in numerous leading international and domestic journals, including European Union Politics, Journal of European Public Policy, Korea Observer, Contemporary Politics, and Korean Political Science Review.

■ Editor: Jeon, Ju-hyun_EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr