[EAI Presidential Election Panel Survey] ② The Choice of Defectors: Why Was the Grand Ruling Party with 180 Seats Judged in Two Years?

1. The Grand Ruling Party with 180 Seats Judged in Two Years

In the 21st general election in 2020, the Democratic Party of Korea achieved a landslide victory for the third consecutive time, following the presidential election in 2017 and the local elections in 2018, demonstrating that the '20-year ruling theory' was not an unrealistic goal. Until the mid-term of the Moon Jae-in administration, the pattern of power alternation between ruling and opposition parties every ten years since democratization was observed, and the next presidential election was scheduled to be held five years after the Democratic Party's assumption of power. Given that the incumbent administration and ruling party maintained high approval ratings for state affairs and an overwhelming advantage in party support, securing a continuation of their term was perceived as a manageable task.

However, the Democratic Party of Korea, which had achieved a landslide victory with 180 seats, exceeding the threshold for constitutional amendment, suffered a crushing defeat by a significant margin in the April 7, 2021 by-elections held in Seoul and Busan within less than a year. Less than two years later, on March 9, 2022, they had to hand over power in the presidential election. Conversely, the People Power Party, whose affiliated president was impeached due to public resistance and which had to face criticism for judging the opposition party instead of the ruling party during the Moon Jae-in administration, unexpectedly regained power after only five years.

The grand ruling party with 180 seats was reduced to the target of public judgment in a short period of two years. What enabled the People Power Party, which had been criticized for 'obstructionism,' 'ideological excess,' and 'hate speech politics' without crossing the 'river of impeachment,' to re-emerge as the ruling party? This article argues that the emergence of "defectors from the Democratic Party" who supported the Democratic Party in the last general election but withdrew their support after the April 7 by-elections, as revealed by an analysis of the EAI Korean Election Panel Survey (KEPS 2022) data conducted twice before and after the election, dismantled the pro-Democratic Party voter coalition and led to the victory of candidate Yoon Suk-yeol. Furthermore, it aims to empirically present the core factors that led these individuals to withdraw their support from the Democratic Party and switch to supporting candidate Yoon in the election within just two years.

2. The Main Actors in the Dismantling of the Impeachment Coalition: The Emergence of Defectors

One of the most effective methods for analyzing rapid shifts in voters' political support is to trace the factors behind changes in political attitudes, focusing on the groups where changes in party attitudes (a key determinant of political attitude formation) have occurred. By comparing the 'vote retention' group, which maintains support for a party before and after a shift in voter party support, with the 'vote transfer' group, which switches support, it is easier to understand the reasons for the dismantling and reorganization of existing voter-party support coalitions. Vote defection can be further classified into 'demobilization' (defection to non-partisanship or undecided status) and 'conversion' (defection to support for another party) (Hawley and Sagarzazu 2012, Norpoth and Rusk. 2007).

From the 2017 presidential election to the 2020 general election, the overwhelmingly pro-Democratic Party political landscape that emerged from the Candlelight Protests and the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye was based on a new voter coalition that combined the Honam + non-TK regional alliance, the 20s-50s generation alliance (excluding those aged 60 and above), and a combination of progressive and moderate voters (excluding conservatives). The author refers to this as the 'Impeachment Voter Political Coalition' for convenience. The dismantling of the previous conservative party-dominant structure, based on a large bloc of conservative voters, and the emergence of the pro-Democratic Party 'Impeachment Political Coalition' were primarily driven by the division within the (former) Saenuri Party's support base, which had reached 40-50%. This period was a key point in explaining the birth and consolidation of the Impeachment Political Coalition, marked by a comparison between 'remaining conservatives,' who maintained their support for the Saenuri Party and its successors (Liberty Korea Party, United Future Party) even during the impeachment process, and 'defector conservatives,' who withdrew their support from conservative parties.[1]

[Figure 1] Changes in Party Support Rates (%) During the Formation and Dismantling Phases of the Impeachment Political Coalition

(1) Formation Phase of the Impeachment Political Coalition (February 2016 - April 2020) (2) Dismantling Phase After the General Election (July 2020 - March 2022)

Figure 1-(1) shows that the Saenuri Party's (conservative party) support rate, which had shown an overwhelming advantage until the 20th general election in 2016 when the Impeachment Political Coalition was formed, lagged behind the Democratic Party by 20% to 40%p between 2017 and 2020 during the impeachment process and the local and general elections under the Moon Jae-in administration. However, Figure 1-(2), which shows the changes in party support rates after the 2020 general election, reveals a decline in the Democratic Party's support rate from the 40%-50% range to the 30% range. Conversely, the support rate for the Liberty Korea Party and the United Future Party, predecessors of the People Power Party, which had remained at 10%-25%, recovered to exceed 30% and approach 40% around the April 7, 2021 by-elections. The reorganization of the pro-Democratic Party voter landscape into a balanced two-party competition was completed during the 20th presidential election campaign in 2021-2022. Ultimately, the dismantling of the Impeachment Political Coalition began with the division of Democratic Party supporters, who had previously exceeded 40% and gave the Democratic Party 180 seats, into 'Remaining Democrats' and 'Swing Democrats' during the by-elections and the presidential election. As the Impeachment Political Coalition entered its dismantling phase, the focus of analysis shifted from 'swing conservatives' to 'swing Democrats,' and understanding this group is expected to provide clues to understanding the factors behind the victory of candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, who won a close contest in this presidential election.

3. The Voting Intentions of Swing Democrats: Insights from the EAI Presidential Election Panel Survey

➀ Three out of ten proportional vote supporters for the Democratic Party in the general election withdrew their support

Table 1 presents the cross-tabulation results of the proportional party vote in the 21st general election and the current party support from the first wave of the presidential panel survey (January 12-15) to classify respondents into Remaining Democrats and Swing Democrats based on our panel survey results. Among the respondents who supported the Democratic Party of Korea for proportional representation in the general election, 39% of the analysis subjects (901 people) supported the Democratic Party of Korea. Respondents who stated they voted for the United Future Party at the time accounted for 26% (234 people) of the total analysis subjects. Among those who voted for the Democratic Party of Korea in the general election (350 people), 71% (249 people) were classified as 'Remaining Democrats,' who still supported the Democratic Party as of January. The remaining 29% (101 people) were classified as 'Swing Democrats,' who withdrew their support from the Democratic Party; 15% defected to non-partisanship (demobilization defectors), and the remaining 14% converted their support (8% to the People Power Party, 4% to the Justice Party, 2% to the People's Party, and 1% to other parties).[2]

In contrast, 82% (193 people) of those who voted for the United Future Party's proportional representation party at the time maintained their support for its successor, the People Power Party, recording a higher vote retention rate than the ruling party. Moreover, among the 317 People Power Party supporters at the time of the first survey (35% of the total analysis subjects), 124 people (39%) who were not among the 193 vote retention supporters (61%) were classified as newly acquired People Power Party supporters after the general election. This means that approximately four out of every ten current People Power Party supporters are new conservatives acquired after the general election. On the other hand, for the Democratic Party, 75% (249 people) of the 333 supporters at the time of the first survey were stable supporters who had maintained their support since the general election's proportional vote, with only 25% (84 people) being new Democratic Party supporters acquired after the general election. As the number of swing Democrats exceeded that of swing conservatives, and the People Power Party held an advantage in attracting new supporters, the ruling party's dominance in party support ratings disappeared, and a two-party competitive structure was formed.

[Table 1] Cross-tabulation of Proportional Party Vote in the 21st General Election and Party Support at the Time of the First Survey

➁ Who are the Swing Democrats and Remaining Democrats? 20s-30s/Gyeongin/Moderate Conservatives Led the Defection

Which groups among the supporters of the incumbent ruling party in the general election, who gave it 180 seats, experienced concentrated defections? We analyzed the demographic composition (by generation, region, and ideological orientation) of the 350 supporters who voted for the Democratic Party of Korea in the 2020 general election. By comparing the generational, regional, and ideological composition of the 'Swing Democrats' and 'Remaining Democrats' at the time of the first survey with the composition of the Democratic Party of Korea supporters in the 2020 general election, we can identify which generations experienced concentrated defections and retention.

Firstly, by generation, the proportion of 20s was 13% and that of 30s was 17% among those who voted for the Democratic Party of Korea in the general election, while it was around 20-25% for those aged 40 and above. This indicates that the 20s-30s generation already constituted a smaller proportion of supporters compared to other generations even in the 20th general election.[3]However, comparing the generational composition of Swing Democrats and Remaining Democrats reveals a significant increase in the proportion of the 20s-30s generation among Swing Democrats (24% each) compared to 2020. Conversely, the proportion of the 20s-30s generation in the Remaining Democrats group was lower than in 2020, while the proportion of those in their 40s-50s and 60s and above exceeded the 2020 supporter composition ratio. This suggests that the Democratic Party's support base among those in their 40s and above showed strong retention tendencies, while the 20s-30s generation exhibited stronger defection tendencies.

[Table 2] Composition Ratios of Swing Democrats and Remaining Democrats by Generation, Region, and Ideological Orientation

Regionally, compared to the composition ratio of supporters in 2020, the proportion of respondents from the Gyeongin region and Daegu/Gyeongbuk was higher than average among Swing Democrats. For Remaining Democrats, the proportion of residents in the Honam region exceeded the 2020 proportion. The composition ratios for Seoul/Chungcheong/Busan-Ulsan-Gyeongnam showed no significant difference compared to 2020. In terms of ideological orientation, the proportion of moderates and conservatives significantly increased among Swing Democrats compared to 2020. Conversely, the proportion of progressives, who constituted the majority (52%), increased among Remaining Democrats compared to 2020. This implies that while the majority of moderates and a portion of conservatives, along with progressives, leaned towards supporting the Democratic Party in the 2020 general election, a significant portion of moderates and conservatives defected in the presidential election, leading to the Remaining Democrats being reorganized around progressives. In summary, these results indicate severe defections from the 20s-30s generation, the Gyeongin region, and among moderate voters.

➂ The Main Driver of Yoon Suk-yeol's Victory: The Shift in Votes of Ahn Cheol-soo Supporters, Led by Swing Democrats

Before examining the voting intentions of the Remaining Democrats and Swing Democrats, let us first look at the overall shift in voters' intentions. Utilizing the panel survey's characteristic of tracking the same respondents, we will examine the changes in presidential candidate support among the 1,104 respondents who participated in both the first survey in January and the second survey conducted immediately after the election. In the first survey in mid-January, 36% responded they would vote for candidate Lee Jae-myung, 35% for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol (who had regained support by campaigning on 'abolishing the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family' and 'additional deployment of THAAD'), and 12% for candidate Ahn Cheol-soo, indicating a close race within the margin of error. In the second survey conducted immediately after the election, following the withdrawal of Ahn Cheol-soo due to the merger, Lee Jae-myung's support rose to 45%, an increase of only 9 percentage points from the first survey, while Yoon Suk-yeol's support rose to 48%, an increase of 13 percentage points from the first survey, resulting in a reversal.

[Figure 2] Changes in Presidential Candidate Support Among All Respondents (1,104 people): Survey Waves 1-2

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The reversal in support rates between the first and second surveys is not statistically significant. What is noteworthy is that the Remaining Democrats and Swing Democrats are groups that overwhelmingly supported the incumbent ruling party and candidate Moon Jae-in in the general election just two years prior and the presidential election five years prior, respectively. Not only did they overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party together in the general election, but these two groups were also homogeneous in their overwhelming support for candidate Moon Jae-in. Figure 3 shows that in the 2017 presidential election, the proportion of those who supported candidate Moon Jae-in was 90% for Remaining Democrats and 83% for Swing Democrats, with no significant difference.

However, their voting choices in the current presidential election are starkly contrasted. In Figure 4, among the Remaining Democrats, 86% expressed their intention to vote for candidate Lee Jae-myung, 3% for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, and 4% for candidate Ahn Cheol-soo in the January survey. In the actual vote, 89% voted for candidate Lee Jae-myung, an increase of 3 percentage points from the first survey. For candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, support increased by 5 percentage points to 8%, absorbing support from candidate Ahn Cheol-soo. This confirms that support for Lee Jae-myung, the Democratic Party's presidential candidate, remained strong.

[Figure 3] Support for Candidate Moon Jae-in in the 2017 Presidential Election (%) Among Remaining Democrats and Swing Democrats

The changes in support rates between the first and second surveys among Swing Democrats in Figure 5 are interesting. In the first survey, 26% of Swing Democrats indicated they would vote for candidate Ahn Cheol-soo, 25% for candidate Lee Jae-myung, and 22% for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, indicating a highly dispersed voting intention among Swing Democrats. After candidate Ahn Cheol-soo withdrew, 44% of Swing Democrats responded they voted for candidate Lee Jae-myung, and 45% voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol. While Lee Jae-myung's support increased by 19 percentage points from 25% to 44%, Yoon Suk-yeol's support increased by 23 percentage points from 22% to 45%. Within the margin of error, the support rates for Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol among Swing Democrats were reversed. This clearly demonstrates that the shift in votes of Swing Democrats, who had previously chosen Democratic Party candidates in the past presidential and general elections but withdrew their support in the current presidential election, played a crucial role in Yoon Suk-yeol's victory in a razor-thin contest.

[Figure 4] Changes in Presidential Support Among Remaining Democrats (249 people) (%) [Figure 5] Changes in Presidential Support Among Swing Democrats (101 people) (%)

4. What Caused the Defection of Swing Democrats?

➀ Perception of the Moon Jae-in Administration: Remaining Democrats View it as Successful, Swing Democrats Have Ambivalent Evaluations

The most significant difference between the Remaining Democrats, who showed overwhelming support for candidate Lee Jae-myung in the current presidential election, and the Swing Democrats, who showed more than half their support defecting, lies in their evaluation of the Moon Jae-in administration. When asked to rate the Moon Jae-in administration's performance on a scale of 0-100, Remaining Democrats gave an average score of 77, while Swing Democrats gave a lukewarm score of 52 ([Figure 6]). When asked about their agreement with statements on COVID-19 containment, the comprehensive real estate tax, and the need to judge the Moon Jae-in administration on a scale of 0 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), the differences become clearer. Remaining Democrats showed strong agreement with the statement 'COVID-19 containment was successful' (7.8 points) and tended to strongly deny the statements 'the comprehensive real estate tax is excessive' (3.6 points) and 'this presidential election is a referendum on the Moon Jae-in administration' (2.5 points). However, Swing Democrats generally agreed with the statement 'COVID-19 containment was successful' (5.8 points) but also tended to accept the statements 'the comprehensive real estate tax is excessive' (5.7 points) and 'this is an election to judge the Moon Jae-in administration' (5.4 points). Swing Democrats are contrasted with Remaining Democrats in that they exhibit ambivalent attitudes, acknowledging both the achievements and failures of the Moon Jae-in administration.

[Figure 6] Presidential Performance Evaluation Scores for President Moon Jae-in (0 Very Poor - 100 Very Good) Among Remaining Democrats and Swing Democrats

[Figure 7] Scores on Election Perceptions and Specific Policy Evaluations (0 Strongly Disagree - 10 Strongly Agree) Among Remaining Democrats and Swing Democrats

➁ Dislike of Both Candidates: Swing Democrats' "Both Sides" Stance Divided Votes

In terms of emotional attitudes towards the candidates of both camps, Remaining Democrats exhibit strong partisan tendencies. When measuring candidate/party favorability on a scale of 0-10, Remaining Democrats showed highly favorable attitudes towards President Moon Jae-in (7.9 points), candidate Lee Jae-myung (7.5 points), and the Democratic Party of Korea (6.8 points), while showing strong dislike towards candidate Yoon Suk-yeol (1.8 points), the People Power Party (1.7 points), and party leader Lee Jun-seok (1.5 points). In contrast, among Swing Democrats, while President Moon Jae-in's favorability was relatively high (5.3 points), favorability towards candidate Lee Jae-myung (4.2 points) and the Democratic Party of Korea (4.0 points) fell below the midpoint. Although dislike of the president was also present compared to Remaining Democrats, the negative sentiment towards candidate Lee Jae-myung suggests it contributed to the vote defection. However, dislike towards opposition candidates/parties/leaders was also considerable. Candidate Yoon Suk-yeol received 3.7 points, the People Power Party 3.4 points, and party leader Lee Jun-seok 3.2 points, indicating lower favorability. Among Swing Democrats, excluding President Moon Jae-in's favorability, the remaining candidate/party favorability scores were within the margin of error, suggesting the coexistence of dislike towards both sides. This explains the lukewarm sentiment towards President Moon Jae-in, candidate Lee Jae-myung, and the Democratic Party among Swing Democrats after the general election, which led to Lee Jae-myung's support rate being significantly lower than that of Remaining Democrats. Concurrently, while a Hankook Ilbo poll in February showed Swing Democrats coalescing around Yoon Suk-yeol, creating a favorable situation for him, the final result being a close contest suggests that a significant portion of them returned to supporting Lee Jae-myung, thus balancing the race (Hankook Ilbo, 2022/02/22).

[Figure 8] Emotional Favorability Towards Leaders and Parties of Both Camps (0-10 points) Among Remaining Democrats and Swing Democrats

➂ Impact of Negative Issues: Swing Democrats Focused on Real Estate/Daejang-dong vs. Remaining Democrats Focused on Kim Keon-hee's Allegations/Shamanism Controversy

What factors intensified the ambivalent stance of Swing Democrats? Let's examine the impact of negative issues that swayed the election campaign competition between the two candidates. When asked to identify factors influencing their candidate choice, with two multiple-choice responses allowed, Remaining Democrats overwhelmingly cited 'Kim Keon-hee's false resume and stock manipulation allegations' (55% of total responses) and 'candidate Yoon Suk-yeol's shamanism controversy' (34%). In contrast, only 12-15% cited 'real estate policies' and 'Daejang-dong development suspicions,' which negatively impacted the incumbent ruling party and candidate Lee Jae-myung. On the other hand, 37% of Swing Democrats cited 'failure of the Moon Jae-in administration's real estate policies,' 30% cited 'Daejang-dong development suspicions,' and 25% cited 'the merger between candidates Yoon Suk-yeol and Ahn Cheol-soo.' Responses citing 'Kim Keon-hee's false resume and stock manipulation allegations,' which were the primary concern for Remaining Democrats, were half that, at 25%, and the 'shamanism controversy' was only around 10%.

[Figure 9] Issues Influencing Candidate Choice (Top 1+2 Overlapping Responses, % by Number of Respondents) for Remaining Democrats and Swing Democrats

From the perspective of the incumbent ruling party, to prevent defections among Swing Democrats and mitigate the narrative of judging the administration, it would have been crucial to focus on actively apologizing for and diagnosing the causes and presenting solutions for the 'real estate issues' and 'Daejang-dong suspicions,' which were the primary reasons for Swing Democrats' withdrawal of support. However, the Democratic Party's negative campaigning focused on the concerns of Remaining Democrats. Moreover, instead of addressing the 'Kim Keon-hee's false resume and stock manipulation allegations,' which were the biggest points of dissatisfaction, they became bogged down in the 'shamanism controversy' or the so-called 'Julie's debate,' failing to appeal to either Remaining Democrats or Swing Democrats.

[Table 3] Voted Candidate and Reasons for Choosing That Candidate (%)

When asked about the criteria for selecting their candidate among the 1,050 respondents who reported voting, 64% of the 494 who supported candidate Lee Jae-myung cited ability and experience, indicating that governance capability is Lee Jae-myung's strength. However, only 1% cited moral issues, the source of negative campaigning, as a reason, clearly highlighting this as a weakness. Nevertheless, the intensification of negative campaigning close to the election likely acted as a factor hindering the recovery of support from Swing Democrats.[4]

5. Conclusion: After the Dismantling of the Impeachment Political Coalition, What Order Will Emerge?

This analysis explored the reasons behind the 180-seat grand ruling party's transition to a target of power change within two years, focusing on the voting behavior of Swing Democrats who supported the incumbent ruling party in the last general election but subsequently withdrew their support. Swing Democrats, predominantly from the 20s-30s generation, the Gyeongin region, and with moderate tendencies, maintained a relative sense of favor towards President Moon Jae-in but simultaneously harbored sentiments of judging the administration due to the failure of real estate policies. Although candidate Lee Jae-myung demonstrated strengths in governance capabilities, and the controversies surrounding candidate Yoon Suk-yeol's shamanism and the 'Julie' allegations during the election may have helped rally Remaining Democrats, they likely did not contribute to recovering the support of Swing Democrats. When the Daejang-dong scandal and ethical issues surfaced, the governance capability narrative was suppressed, consequently having a negative effect on candidate Lee Jae-myung. In early January, the first survey confirmed a close race between Lee and Yoon among Swing Democrats, and this competitive dynamic could not be overcome in the final results; instead, it failed to create a lead in support.

This article focused on summarizing the key characteristics of Swing Democrats' voting behavior and empirically examining, at a hypothetical level, the factors that may have led to the Democratic Party's defeat. However, the question of under what voter landscape the new administration's governance and the upcoming local and general elections will unfold remains a matter of intense interest. In answering this question, the trajectory of Swing Democrats is likely to emerge as the biggest variable. This is because their future path is uncertain: whether they will return to supporting the Democratic Party, be absorbed into the new ruling party's support base, or maintain a precarious balance as seen in this election. To predict the future course of state affairs and the emergence of new voter political coalitions after the dismantling of the Impeachment Political Coalition, in-depth research on the changing perceptions and policy preferences of Swing Democrats will be necessary. This is why the analysis of Swing Democrats in this presidential election should not be treated as a one-off study. ■

References

Kim Eun-ji. 2022. “Why Did You Vote and Why Didn't You Vote, Diligent Voter?” <SisaIN> No. 758 (March 24, 2022).

Hankook Ilbo. 2022. “Lee Jae-myung’s Crisis Lies with ‘Defecting Democrats’… Disappointed with the Moon Administration, They Rally Behind Yoon Suk-yeol” (2022/03/22)

Hankook Ilbo. 2022. “Lee Jae-myung’s Lack of Morality 70.4%, Yoon Suk-yeol’s Lack of State Capacity 69.8%” (2022/01/01)

Jeong Han-wool. 2021. “Analysis of the April 7 By-elections: The Unification Variable and the Democratic Party of Korea’s Weaknesses: In Seoul, if the polls are tied, the opposition prevails in actual voting.” <A Calm Election Study ➀> (2021.3.16.)

______. 2020. “The 21st General Election from the Perspective of Judging the Ruling and Opposition Parties and the Dilemma of Conservative Innovation.” . 1-20 (2020.5.8.).

Jeong Han-wool & Kang Woo-chang. 2017. “Cracks in the Conservative Base: Causes and Consequences of the Emergence of the Swing Conservative Base.” Edited by Kang Won-taek, <The Changing Korean Voter 6: Candlelight Protests, Impeachment Crisis, and the 19th Presidential Election>. Seoul: East Asia Institute

Hawley, George and Inaki Sagarzazu. 2012. “Where Did the Votes go? Reassessing American Party Realignment via Vote Transfers between Major Parties from 1860 to 2008.” Electoral Studies 31, 726-739.

Norpoth, Helmut, and Jerrold G. Rusk. 2007. "Electoral Myth and Reality: Realignments in American Politics." Electoral Studies 26, 2: 392-403.

[1] For an explanation of voter behavior changes in the last three general elections from the perspective of 'defecting conservatives' and 'remaining conservatives,' please refer to (Jeong Han-wool 2020; Jeong Han-wool & Kang Woo-chang 2017).

[2] This panel survey did not include a question about party support during the general election period, so a proportional representation party at the time is used as a proxy for the party supported at the time. Of the 1,104 respondents who participated in both the first (January 11-14) and second surveys (March 10-15), 901 responses were classified after excluding 203 individuals who stated they were not eligible to vote, refused to respond, or could not recall. In cross-tabulations of party support at the time of the general election and current party support from the Hankook Ilbo/Hankook Research New Year Survey (December 2021) and the Presidential Election Poll (February 2022), 35-40% of Democratic Party supporters at the time of the general election were classified as defecting Democrats. While this could be due to differences in wording between the proportional representation party and party support questions or differences in timing, considering the effect of rallying behind candidate Lee Jae-myung towards the end of the election, it is highly probable that some of the defecting Democratic voters rallied behind candidate Lee Jae-myung. However, this report focuses on comparing with the remaining Democratic voters rather than precisely estimating the scale of defecting Democrats.

[3] In fact, for the 20s and 30s age group, exit polls from the 2020 general election showed a high support rate of around 60% for the Democratic Party of Korea, which might lead one to believe there was no significant defection. However, according to age-specific voter turnout rates released later, the turnout rate for the 20s and 30s was significantly lower compared to those in their 60s and above, indicating that while there was not a large number of voters switching parties, there was a considerable number of voters who abstained from voting. The phenomenon of young voters switching parties was particularly evident in the April 7 by-elections (Jeong Han-wool 2021).

[4] While candidate Lee Jae-myung showed an advantage in state capacity, public opinion polls throughout the presidential election campaign consistently indicated that evaluations of his morality were neck-and-neck or even showed negative sentiment towards candidate Lee Jae-myung (Hankook Ilbo 2022/01/01; Kim Eun-ji 2022).

■ Author: Jeong Han-wool_A survey analysis specialist and research designer at Hankook Research. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from Korea University. He served as Deputy Director of the EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center, Deputy Director of the Security Policy Center, and Secretary-General. His main research areas include elections and generational politics, national identity and security perceptions, and CSR research. His major publications (co-authored) include "Men in Their 20s," "Women in Their 20s," "Market and Democracy in the Age of Inequality," and "The Park Geun-hye Phenomenon."

■ Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun_EAI Research Fellow

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