[EAI Special Report] A Wishlist for the Presidential Transition Committee's Foreign Affairs and National Security Team ⑤_Restructure the Conventional Trade Control Tower

I. Environmental Changes and Challenges in the Trade Sector

Trade policy encompasses policies related to the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor between countries, as well as strategies for international negotiations and the establishment of international norms and systems. It covers all policies aimed at maximizing a country's trade interests. Recently, various countries are discussing new trade strategies and governance changes to respond to the rapid changes in the economic environment, such as the US-China technology hegemony, shifts in global supply chains, and the spread of global inflation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as new trade issues that differ from the past, such as the emphasis on climate change response, the spread of the digital economy, and the strengthening of protectionism and economic security.[1]Various changes in international relations are occurring, including the ongoing US-China conflict and the escalating conflict between Russia and Western countries, such as the US, over Russia's pursuit of NATO membership for Ukraine.

In this rapidly changing environment, effective trade policy is crucial for the Korean economy, which has pursued economic growth through exports and has a high degree of external dependence. This requires not only simple negotiations between countries but also effective redesign of multi-layered governance, including rectifying imbalances between domestic industrial sectors, cooperation and coordination between responsible departments, and coordination of stakeholders, as well as nurturing policy capabilities. It is time for the new administration to redesign trade governance to be anticipatory and agile, enabling proactive identification and strategic utilization of changes in the green and digital trade environment amidst these rapid and unstable changes in international relations.

1. Requirement for Strategic Response Strategies to Maximize Integrated National Interests Amidst Increasing Complex External Economic Issues

As issues surrounding trade expand beyond traditional areas such as exports and investment to encompass complex, multi-variable equations like US-China technology competition, global value chain (GVC) restructuring, environmental issues such as climate change response, and even human rights issues, multifaceted analysis and comprehensive responses are required. Furthermore, as issues where economy and security are closely intertwined like two sides of a coin, rather than remaining in separate domains of economy or security, are increasingly common, there is a growing need for high-level strategic judgment at the national level that considers various perspectives such as security, environment, and human rights in trade response positioning. Therefore, it is necessary to pursue "maximization of national interests" through the preparation of more meticulous response strategies and measures from various perspectives on these complex global external economic trade issues.

2. Building a Resilient Network to Counter Protectionism, Strengthening Economic Security, and Regionalization/Bloc Formation

Following the advancement of trade liberalization in the 1990s, the spread of "Just-in-time (JIT)" systems, which prioritize supply chain efficiency, led to the development of global value chains. However, recently, supply chain disruptions in certain regions or for specific items have caused production delays throughout the entire supply chain, leading to the emergence of "Just-in-case (JIC)" systems. Korea also experienced the importance of this during the urea solution shortage in 2021. Furthermore, production disruptions in industries such as the automotive sector due to semiconductor shortages have highlighted the need for preparedness, emphasizing the importance of securing stable supply chains and supply chain resilience.

This ultimately represents a shift from prioritizing economic efficiency and international division of labor to prioritizing "economic security." In other words, the global division of labor system, built through the development of global supply chains in the past, has shifted towards regionalization, bloc formation, and protectionism, with conflicts intensifying over security, values, trade, and economic interests, and attempts to exclude competing countries from supply chains. The Biden administration will likely pursue a "friendshoring" strategy, reorganizing supply chains dependent on China to be centered around allies, in addition to policies promoting domestic reshoring. Therefore, the Korean government needs a strategic cooperation system that is not easily shaken by external shocks through the establishment of strong tie networks with key trading nations. Additionally, management of redundant networks is required. In other words, trade strategies and governance systems are needed to respond to this.

3. Responding to New Trade Norms Amidst the Transition to a Digital and Green Economy

National policies for the digital transformation and the transition to a green economy are bringing about changes in the trade sector. The recent weakening of the multilateral trading system has led to individual countries unilaterally imposing regulations on other nations. Unilateralism in domestic law, enacted without multilateral or bilateral agreements, will lead to trade friction between countries. First, following the spread of non-contact culture after the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economic structure is changing in line with the digital great transformation. E-commerce, centered around global shopping platforms, is changing, and cross-border trade of digital goods and services is rapidly increasing. As the digital economy and digital trade expand, the importance of digital trade, where countries seek to establish international norms favorable to them regarding data, a crucial commodity in the digital economy, is growing. Regarding personal information, regulations like the European Union's (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), already in effect, and digital taxes adopted by European countries are acting as barriers. We face the challenge of establishing international norms favorable to Korea in the newly developing field of digital trade. Recently, the US and Japan signed and enacted a digital trade agreement (January 2020), and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) are examples of bilateral and regional multilateral agreements being formed to lead the digital economy.[2]Therefore, it is urgently necessary for Korea, which has strengths in the digital industry, to establish favorable international norms through bilateral and multilateral cooperation in digital trade.

Another challenge is the green trade sector in response to climate change. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) legislative proposal recently released by the European Union has become a starting point significantly impacting international trade. If other affected countries retaliate or if each country establishes its own national policies for carbon neutrality goals, conflicts between nations may arise. Furthermore, recent carbon neutrality declarations by various countries to achieve climate transition goals, the various regulations enacted by countries to achieve these goals, and even the RE100 initiative, where global companies like Apple and Amazon have pledged to use 100% renewable energy, have become important issues in trade. In addition, the rapid growth of the green industry and the implementation of carbon border adjustments will cause various changes and conflicts in the trade environment, necessitating effective response strategies.

II. Problems with the Current Trade Governance

1. Limitations in Swift and Systematic Response Due to Fragmentation Caused by Overlapping Functions and Silos Between Departments

The importance of security in the trade environment is increasing due to competition over US-China technology hegemony, global supply chain restructuring, and the strengthening of protectionism. The trade sector also requires a government governance system that can effectively respond to these changes and trends. Currently, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) is in charge of overall trade policy through its Trade Minister's Office. During the Kim Dae-jung administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade handled trade affairs, but during the Lee Myung-bak administration, industry and trade were integrated into the Ministry of Knowledge Economy. During the Park Geun-hye administration, trade negotiations and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) functions were transferred to MOTIE, making it the overall trade management department. There has been ongoing discussion about which ministry should be in charge. Traditionally, if trade is handled by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, trade-related tasks such as export and import regulations centered on domestic industries can be carried out more efficiently. On the other hand, if trade is handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is an advantage in comprehensively considering external factors such as negotiations with foreign countries, diplomacy, and security (Koo Min-kyu, Choi Byung-sun 2019; Jeong Byung-hwa, Park Hyung-joon 2016; Ko Bo-min 2018).

Due to the specificity and importance of trade-related tasks, trade organizations have existed as independent entities within their respective ministries. Currently, trade affairs are not solely managed by the Trade Minister's Office within MOTIE. Approximately 30% remain within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[3], and the Ministry of Economy and Finance also performs trade functions under its International Economic Affairs Bureau and Customs Policy Division. This leads to overlapping responsibilities between ministries. For instance, the Ministry of Economy and Finance currently has six divisions under its International Economic Affairs Bureau, and MOTIE also has a "Trade Policy Division" that exists simultaneously. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has directors for multilateral economic coordination and economic diplomacy, and desks for specific countries handling economic diplomacy. Its East Asian Economic Diplomacy Division and North America-Europe Economic Diplomacy Division overlap in function with MOTIE's New Trade Strategy Office's Multilateral Trade Division, the Trade Policy Bureau's Americas Trade Division and Europe Trade Division, and the Trade Cooperation Bureau's Northeast Asia Trade Division and New South Asia Trade Division. Furthermore, with the increasing complexity of the trade environment, such as digital and green trade, there are many instances of overlapping responsibilities between departments. Recently, regarding climate change and green trade, responsibilities overlap among MOTIE, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the Ministry of Environment. Similarly, regarding digital trade, many departments, including MOTIE, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Korea Customs Service, the Korean Intellectual Property Office, the Ministry of Science and ICT, and the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, are involved in related tasks.

This overlap in responsibilities among trade-related departments and the absence of a central coordinating body lead to inefficiencies due to high transaction costs in the field of trade, which requires a unified voice and coordination. Furthermore, this fragmented approach limits swift responses to new trade issues due to duplicated efforts and delays.

2. Need for a Permanent Central Coordinating Body to Anticipate and Respond to the New Trade Environment

Responding to national-level challenges such as economic security, digital trade, climate change and green trade, and the emergence of mega FTAs requires close cooperation and coordination among decentralized departments. However, departmental silos still exist. Complex factors influence trade. Moreover, while cooperation and overall trade negotiations should be conducted from the perspective of maximizing overall national interests, in Korea, coordination is often hindered by inter-ministerial power struggles. Although various related committees and the Ministerial Conference on External Economic Affairs exist to coordinate them, cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and economic ministries is insufficient. Therefore, to comprehensively and strategically respond to the increasingly important economic and security issues, the "External Economic Security Strategy Meeting," comprising ministers from key economic, foreign affairs, and security ministries, the National Intelligence Service, the National Security Council (NSC), and key presidential aides, was launched in 2021. However, it suffers from a lack of a permanent support organization and regularized meetings. Furthermore, the roles and relationships between the Ministerial Conference on External Economic Affairs and the External Economic Security Strategy Meeting are not well-defined.

Regarding trade-related network governance, representative bodies include the Domestic Countermeasures Committee for Trade Treaties, the Private Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations, the Trade Promotion Committee, and the Trade Policy Forum, all chaired by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy. However, the problem is that while the head of the "Trade Negotiation Headquarters," the "network operating organization," is the Trade Minister, the chairpersons of key decision-making bodies for trade policy, such as the "Trade Promotion Committee," "Trade Industry Forum," and "Domestic Countermeasures Committee for Trade Treaties," are the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy. This limits the role of the Trade Minister and also the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy's focus on trade outcomes, thereby limiting negotiations for maximum national interest. Furthermore, there is functional overlap among these committees, and administrative redundancy exists within MOTIE's Trade and Industry Headquarters, which oversees the work of these committees.

3. Need to Enhance Professional Competencies of Trade Personnel and Overcome the Disconnectedness of Global Networks

Trade ministries must engage with diverse stakeholders from various industries, both domestically and internationally, as well as central and local governments. Trade administration for these stakeholders requires consultation and coordination within and between ministries, and with stakeholders, through diversified communication mechanisms (Ko Bo-min, 2018). This necessitates expertise in trade administration, which includes not only basic job competencies but also consistency in duties and professional maintenance of positions. However, Korea's current civil service system is fundamentally based on rotational assignments. Consequently, within MOTIE, rotational assignments occur between industry and energy trade, and due to rotational assignments, trade experts cannot be cultivated. Trade positions are less preferred by civil servants compared to the required expertise and the intensity of the work[4]due to the lack of special compensation. Currently, the Trade Minister's Office is attempting to enhance expertise in trade through a professional civil servant system and recruitment of individuals with private sector experience, but the compensation level is lower than in the private sector[5], and promotion incentives are limited, making it difficult to recruit talented individuals and leading to high turnover rates. The low continuity in positions and frequent reassignment of duties result in weaker domestic networks compared to competing countries. Therefore, there is a need to design a new personnel management system and compensation structure that enables the specialization of trade personnel and long-term commitment to their work. Recent examples, such as Samsung appointing former US Ambassador to Korea Mark Lippert as Vice President to oversee government relations for its North American subsidiary, and POSCO engaging a consulting firm associated with former Secretary Stephen Biegun for its US subsidiary to strengthen its network, demonstrate the importance of managing domestic networks in trade policy.

III. Directions for Redesigning Trade Policy Governance

1. Strategic Direction of New Trade Policy

"Global Standards and Rules Setter in the New Trade Environment"

"Central Hub Role as Coordinator and Mediator in International Trade Relations Networks"

Due to changes in global supply chains and the rise of protectionism, international trade relations will likely be dominated by bilateral agreements based on resource dependence and strategic choices, rather than existing multilateral agreements. Friendshoring strategies, which involve building supply chains within economic alliances linked to security among key allies through multilateral agreements, will also be prominent. In international relations, not just in trade but also in diplomacy, networks are crucial, and the position and capabilities within these networks can hold significant power. This refers not simply to possessing certain resources but to one's position within the network structure. Furthermore, the establishment of such strategic relationship networks should prioritize building redundant connection structures that enhance resilience against various shocks. Secondly, strong ties in bilateral relationships should be built to create robust connections that do not break even under significant shocks. This will help mitigate uncertainty and manage various risks in a rapidly changing environment. Moreover, this role as a central player and mediator will enable us to establish standards and order in the new trade world in a way that is advantageous to us.

<Figure 1> Korea's Global Trade Agreement Network

To achieve this, the Republic of Korea must be in a position to influence many countries by establishing a star network with high connectivity through numerous bilateral relationships, leveraging core resources such as cutting-edge technologies that all countries need. In the figure above, the red center represents Korea, which should establish bilateral agreements with various countries and build a strong, small-world-like network. The clusters of pentagons in the figure represent small-world networks like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In other words, to settle into the new global value chains following the restructuring of global supply chains, Korea should join the US-led Quad. During the transition of the current Quad Plus to a multilateral cooperation system replacing the Quad, efforts should be made to maximize practical benefits from participation. Furthermore, by joining networks like ASEAN, Korea should act as an intermediary between the networks of its allies. Through this proactive strategy of building networks, by strategically positioning and allocating resources within these networks, Korea can leverage its enhanced national standing to act as a rule setter in the new trade landscape, establishing international norms favorable to us. This will be effective in areas where the demand for establishing international norms is increasing, such as recent green trade, digital trade, and standards for science, technology, and new industries. Furthermore, based on this, it will be possible to expand the network of FTAs in new markets and pursue accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) under conditions that maximize national interests.

2. Principles for Redesigning Trade Policy Governance

To respond to the complex trade issues of recent times, an organization is needed to oversee the policy coordination of economic security. The government has recently established the "External Economic Security Strategy Meeting," chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs and attended by ministers from economic, foreign affairs, and security ministries, as well as the standing committee members of the National Security Office. Additionally, the Presidential National Security Office is expanding its related functions. However, comprehensive and proactive strategic preparation is needed rather than reactive responses after incidents occur. A new blueprint for trade policy must be developed to systematically respond to the recent changes in the trade environment and paradigm, and responses should be made accordingly (Son Yeol, Choi Soo-yi 2018).

Japan has organized its response system and is carrying out integrated and strategic responses. In April 2020, an economic division was established within the National Security Secretariat of the Prime Minister's Office (similar to our NSC) to expand economic security organizations and personnel. In 2021, the Kishida cabinet established an Economic Security Minister and is operating it as a central economic security organization. Under the goal of increasing "strategic autonomy" in Japan's vulnerable economic sectors and strengthening "strategic indispensability" in its advantageous sectors, the Liberal Democratic Party's Policy Research Council established a "New International Order Creation Strategy Headquarters" in June last year, which developed a blueprint for economic security strategy. Korea also needs medium- to long-term strategic planning to prepare for and lead the new trade order. The current External Economic Security Strategy Meeting is an ad-hoc committee that primarily responds to current issues; therefore, an organization is needed for proactive strategic planning and international network management concerning economic security and new trade changes.

Specifically, this requires strategies based on scientific evidence. To this end, the establishment of a trade digital platform that can utilize big data and artificial intelligence (AI) through the construction of databases for various trade and foreign country-related information is required, along with an organization to manage and utilize it. In the short term, a system is needed to database all treaty and agreement information currently handled by each department, as well as related domestic and international information. If a platform using the external network is difficult due to security reasons, it should be built on the government's internal network for use in trade strategy. In the digital platform government, all government operations should be uploaded to the cloud and utilized. The establishment of such a diplomatic and trade platform will increase the efficiency of network management and enable comprehensive oversight. It will effectively utilize and manage the functions currently dispersed across diplomacy, trade, and other institutions. This will serve as an important asset and basis for managing international trade and agreement networks, as previously mentioned, thus necessitating the establishment of such an organization.

Synthesizing the above, the principles for designing the new administration's trade governance can be presented as follows:

1) Establishment of an anticipatory and strategic organization for proactive response

2) Establishment of an agile organization for swift and continuous response to the new trade environment

3) Strengthening of control tower functions capable of substantive policy coordination and convergence

4) Establishment of an organization with strong resilience to domestic and external trade shocks

5) Establishment of an integrated response system that approaches complex trade issues from the perspective of overall national interest

6) Establishment of a governance system that facilitates smooth communication and understanding with domestic and international stakeholders

3. Proposed Design for New Trade Policy Organization

To implement the principles of trade government organization design for the new administration, the issue of where to place the current trade-related ministries arises. Since trade negotiation tasks involve both industrial and diplomatic aspects, the placement of trade functions in a ministry has been a subject of discussion at each government transition. The first argument is that the Trade Minister's Office should be placed under MOTIE, as it is currently, to engage in trade negotiations with industrial expertise. This is based on the reasoning that if trade is handled by MOTIE, tasks such as market expansion and response to import regulations can be carried out more efficiently based on knowledge and expertise in the industry, which is the content of trade.

The second argument is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have overall authority for trade, as in the past Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and conduct negotiations not merely at the trade level but from the perspective of security and national strategy. This is because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expertise in negotiation and diplomacy with foreign countries, and trade can be organically linked with other external issues such as diplomacy and security (Koo Min-kyu, Choi Byung-sun 2019; Kim Yoon-kwon 2017; Ko Bo-min 2018). These arguments stem from the differences in expertise and networks held by each ministry. While the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy emphasizes the strength of domestic industrial networks and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasizes external networks, the debate centers on which network is more important in trade. In reality, the focus should be on how to connect these two networks to create synergy. The third argument, as an alternative to the conflict between these two ministries, is the establishment of an independent trade representative office, similar to the United States, where the head of the trade representative office, rather than the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, would be the highest responsible person and coordinator for trade governance, overseeing trade policy. This further suggests that given the recent changes in trade issues, the organization should be placed under the President or the Prime Minister for effective coordination and immediate response. The following table summarizes these points.

<Table 1> Advantages and Disadvantages by Trade Organization Type

As presented in <Table 1>, considering the advantages and disadvantages, each approach has its merits and drawbacks, making it difficult to determine a single correct path. The core of organizational design should be to leverage the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of each system. Furthermore, a governance system that reflects the principles of new administration trade governance design, as discussed earlier, must be established. The new trade governance must possess agility and anticipatory capabilities and be a resilient organization, in addition to the expertise and complexity of the existing trade policy process. The ideal scenario would be the establishment of a new independent trade organization that embodies all the aforementioned principles. However, in reality, establishing a new independent trade organization may face uncertainties, such as the time required for organizational consolidation to respond swiftly to the rapidly changing new trade environment, and the potential for increased weaknesses while diminishing strengths of both industrial and diplomatic models. Furthermore, realistically, establishing an independent department would require more specialized personnel and a larger organization than the current Trade Minister's Office, posing practical constraints as the government's size cannot be arbitrarily increased. Next, the current MOTIE-led system requires change due to the importance of economic security and the challenges in responding to it. However, completely transferring the current Trade Minister's Office from MOTIE to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reverting to the past Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, would also require time for the chemical integration of civil servants, and since specialized personnel are not yet trained and secured, the aforementioned problem of expertise would not be resolved. Therefore, the new administration needs a strategic and phased approach to link functions and manage them collaboratively. Additionally, all departments involved in related tasks need to enhance their capabilities through increased personnel in economic security and establish new departments to improve related expertise.[6]

To this end, first, the overall external economic coordination function of the Ministry of Economy and Finance should be transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which should then serve as the overall control tower. The role of the US Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment is linked to recent trade developments. Under the Second Secretary, there are the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB), the Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR), and the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), in addition to the Office of the Science and Technology Advisor (STAS) and the Office of the Chief Economist (OCE). Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs also needs to be reorganized into a matching department to cooperate with and respond to the United States, a key diplomatic partner. The current Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and the Deputy Minister for Multilateral Diplomacy and Climate Change Ambassador, among others, are composed of relevant departments, but in reality, the capacity to deal with new trade-related fields is insufficient. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen capabilities by establishing new departments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for economics, climate and environment, energy, science and technology, digital transformation, and public cultural diplomacy, which are related to recent new trade issues. Second, the establishment of an organization within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is required to comprehensively manage and utilize a digital diplomatic and trade platform that can support evidence-based diplomatic and trade policy. That is, an organization should be created to collect all external treaties and related information on this platform, analyze it comprehensively, and utilize it for negotiations and trade policy. Third, the current Ministerial Conference on External Economic Affairs and the External Economic Security Strategy Meeting should be unified and operated as the External Economic Security Strategy Meeting. Its secretariat should also be located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which oversees trade, to provide support. Fourth, it is necessary to establish a Trade Strategy Committee or an External Economic Security Strategy Committee under the President, involving the public and private sectors, experts, and key ministries. This organization should facilitate communication and knowledge sharing among various experts and industries, and foster mutual understanding to develop comprehensive trade strategies, from addressing current issues to preparing for the future. The chairperson should be appointed as the President's Special Advisor for Economic Security or Trade Policy, responsible for comprehensively addressing related issues and measures and deriving decisions for the President.

The goal of designing the new administration's trade-related governance is to establish an efficient and effective trade governance system by abolishing or redesigning the currently fragmented, unorganized, and compartmentalized organizations and committees. However, the principle of redundancy is also very important, as appropriate overlap and competition between ministries can create a resilient organization, so this should also be considered. ■

<Список литературы>

Кан Гён Чжу. 2022. «Дипломаты с бейджами Samsung Electronics в эпоху новой холодной войны приобрели большое значение». <한국경제>. 20 февраля.

Ко Бо Мин. 2018. «Анализ истории изменений в корейской организации торговой администрации». 『국제통상연구』. Том 23, № 4, 23-42.

Ко Бо Мин. 2019. «Анализ торгового управления — на примере Кореи». 『무역학회지』. Том 44, № 6, 55-67.

Ким Гю Пхан. 2021. «Текущая ситуация и выводы по реализации стратегии экономической безопасности Японии». 『KIEP 오늘의 세계경제』. Том 21, № 20.

Ким Юн Гвон. 2017. «Исследование соответствия функций и организаций правительства изменениям в административной среде и потребностях». 『KIPA 연구보고서 2017-11』. Корейский институт государственного управления.

Совместное заявление министерств. 2022. «Стратегия реализации внешнеэкономической политики на 2022 год». 25 января.

Ку Мин Гё, Чхве Бён Сон. 2019. 『Политическая экономия и право международной торговли』. Сеул: 박영사.

Министерство экономики и финансов. 2021. «Проведение 1-го заседания Стратегического совета по внешней экономике и безопасности и основные результаты обсуждения». 18 октября.

Министерство экономики и финансов. 2021. «Проведение 2-го заседания Стратегического совета по внешней экономике и безопасности и основные результаты обсуждения». 7 ноября.

Министерство экономики и финансов. 2021. «Проведение 3-го заседания Стратегического совета по внешней экономике и безопасности и основные результаты обсуждения». 27 декабря.

Министерство экономики и финансов. 2022. «Проведение 4-го заседания Стратегического совета по внешней экономике и безопасности и основные результаты обсуждения». 14 февраля.

Ким Хон Чжу. 2021. «Стратегический совет по внешней экономике и безопасности — «отщепенцы» из Министерства иностранных дел... Смогут ли они должным образом функционировать?». <서울Pn>. 25 октября.

Сон Ёль, Ли Джэ Мин, Ку Мин Гё. 2017. «Перепроектирование системы реализации торговой политики для следующего правительства Кореи: предложение о создании специализированного министерского ведомства». Институт восточноазиатских исследований. 19 апреля.

Сон Ёль, Чхве Су И (ред.). 2018. «Торговая война между США и Китаем расширяется, куда движется Корея?: необходимость разработки плана торговой политики, основанного на новой парадигме». Институт восточноазиатских исследований. 8 августа.

О Се Гён. 2021. «Текущая ситуация и выводы по реализации стратегии экономической безопасности Японии». 『오늘의 세계경제』. Институт внешнеэкономической политики.

Чон Бён Хва, Пак Хён Чжун. 2016. «Сравнительное исследование организаций торговых переговоров между странами: применение метода нечетких идеальных типов». 『현대사회와 행정』. Том 26, № 4, 119-140.

Чо Тхэ Ёль. 2021. «[Global Focus] Отсутствует общая картина стратегии экономической безопасности». <매일경제>. 21 декабря.

Чхве Ён Чжи. 2022. «Три ключевых вопроса в торговле в следующем году: цепочки поставок, цифровые технологии, изменение климата». <이데일리>. 20 декабря.

Чхве Вон Ёп. 2021. «Объявление о заключении Соглашения о цифровом партнерстве между Кореей и Сингапуром (DPA) — первого в Корее цифрового торгового соглашения». Пресс-релиз Министерства торговли, промышленности и энергетики. 15 декабря.

[1] «На форуме «Прогноз глобальной торговой среды на 2022 год», организованном Министерством торговли, промышленности и энергетики и Корейской торговой палатой, три ключевых вопроса в торговле на 2022 год были представлены как цепочки поставок, цифровые технологии и изменение климата (Чхве Ён Чжи, 2022)».

[2] «Корея также прилагала усилия для создания глобальных норм цифровой торговли, заключив 21 декабря 2021 года Соглашение о цифровом партнерстве между Кореей и Сингапуром (KSDPA) (Чхве Вон Ёп, 2021)».

[3] Министерство иностранных дел осуществляет торговую деятельность через Департамент международного права, Департамент международной экономики, Департамент двусторонней экономической дипломатии и Департамент климатической и научной дипломатии.

[4] «Нынешняя торговая деятельность требует особых языковых и профессиональных навыков, таких как международная деятельность. Однако, по сравнению с необходимыми навыками, эта работа не является особенно предпочтительной для государственных служащих. Торговая администрация требует больше, чем базовых навыков в международных переговорах, а внутренние переговоры с Национальным собранием, другими министерствами и заинтересованными сторонами еще более сложны и утомительны. Фактически, торговая администрация сталкивается с множеством трудностей изнутри, в отличие от того, как это выглядит снаружи: государственные служащие страдают от Национального собрания, ассоциаций и других заинтересованных сторон внутри страны, одновременно становясь объектом критики со стороны СМИ, а также испытывают профессиональное давление со стороны переговорщиков стран-торговых партнеров за рубежом (Ко Бо Мин, 2018, 36)».

[5] В основном, международные юристы и юристы получают более низкую заработную плату по сравнению с другими юридическими фирмами, требуемыми для найма опытных специалистов.

[6] Государственные учреждения Японии в своих запросах на бюджет на 2022 год предусматривают увеличение числа сотрудников, занимающихся экономической безопасностью, или создание специализированных отделов экономической безопасности. Министерство экономики, торговли и промышленности запросило 63 дополнительных сотрудника для усиления существующей системы экспортного контроля и усиления защиты прав интеллектуальной собственности; Министерство финансов запросило увеличение числа сотрудников для усиления проверки иностранных инвестиций и пост-мониторинга в соответствии с поправкой к Закону об иностранной валюте; Министерство иностранных дел запросило увеличение числа сотрудников для сбора и анализа информации, построения кибербезопасности для предотвращения утечки чувствительных технологий; Министерство образования, культуры, спорта, науки и технологий запросило увеличение числа сотрудников для построения системы мониторинга утечки технологий с университетами и исследовательскими институтами; Министерство внутренних дел и коммуникаций запросило увеличение числа сотрудников для анализа цепочек поставок, связанных с подводными кабелями и 5G; Финансовое агентство планирует создать «Офис экономической безопасности» для усиления надзора за финансовыми учреждениями с точки зрения безопасности, включая поставщиков систем, меры кибербезопасности для основных систем и систему управления финансовыми транзакциями. Таким образом, вместо консолидации в одном министерстве, в первую очередь предпринимаются попытки усилить потенциал всех соответствующих министерств (Ким Гю Пхан, 2021).

■ Автор: Пак Хён Чжун_Профессор кафедры государственного управления и аспирантуры государственного управления Университета Сонгюнгван. Получил докторскую степень по государственному управлению в Университете штата Флорида, США. Является директором Исследовательского института государственного управления Университета Сонгюнгван и генеральным секретарем Азиатской ассоциации государственного управления (AGPA). Является членом Исследовательского комитета Международной ассоциации наук об управлении (IIAS), избранным членом и председателем Исследовательского комитета Международной ассоциации государственного управления (ASPA), членом управляющего комитета Азиатско-Тихоокеанской сети государственной политики (AP-PPN), председателем Комитета международного сотрудничества Корейской ассоциации государственного управления, председателем Исследовательского комитета и председателем Комитета по интернационализации Корейской ассоциации государственной политики, а также директором Центра управления Института восточноазиатских исследований. Области специализации: оценка политики, анализ изменений политики, разработка политики, совместное управление, регуляторная политика, государственные инновации. Получил премию Мошера за лучшую статью от Американской ассоциации государственного управления. Его недавние работы включают: 《Collaborative Governance in East Asia: Evolution Towards Multi-stakeholder Partnerships》(соавторство, 2020), 《2020 Identity of Koreans》(соавторство, 2020), 《Solving Social Problems Together: Cases of Conflict and Cooperation》(соредактор, 2019), 《2017 Conditions for Presidential Success》(соредактор, 2017), 《Korean Politics and Government》(соавторство, 2020).

■ Редактор: Ли Сын Ён_EAI 연구원

    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr