[EAI Special Report] A Wishlist for the Presidential Transition Committee's Foreign Affairs and National Security Team ⑤_Restructure the Conventional Trade Control Tower

I. Environmental Changes and Challenges in the Trade Sector

Trade policy encompasses all policies aimed at maximizing a nation's trade interests, including those related to the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor between countries, as well as the establishment of international norms and institutions and strategies for related international negotiations. Recently, various countries are discussing new trade strategies and governance changes to respond to rapid economic environmental shifts such as the US-China tech hegemony competition and global supply chain restructuring, the spread of global inflation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the emphasis on climate change response, the expansion of the digital economy, and the strengthening of protectionism and economic security. Various changes in international relations are occurring, including the escalating conflict between Russia and Western countries over Ukraine's pursuit of NATO membership, in addition to the existing US-China conflict.[1]Various changes in international relations are occurring, including the escalating conflict between Russia and Western countries over Ukraine's pursuit of NATO membership, in addition to the existing US-China conflict.

In this rapidly changing environment, effective trade policy is crucial for the Korean economy, which has pursued economic growth through exports and has a high degree of external dependence. This requires not only simple negotiations between countries but also effective redesign of multi-layered governance, including rectifying imbalances between domestic industrial sectors, cooperation and coordination among responsible departments, and coordination of stakeholders, as well as cultivating policy capabilities. It is time for the new administration to redesign trade governance to be anticipatory and agile, enabling proactive identification and strategic utilization of changes in the rapidly changing and unstable international relations and the green and digital trade environment.

1. Strategic Response Strategy for Maximizing Integrated National Interest Amidst Growing Complex External Economic Issues

As issues surrounding trade expand beyond traditional areas like exports and investment to encompass complex equations involving US-China tech hegemony competition, global supply chain restructuring, environmental issues such as climate change response, and even human rights issues, multifaceted analysis and comprehensive responses are required. Furthermore, as issues that are not confined to individual domains like economics or security increasingly become intertwined like two sides of the same coin, there is a growing need for high-level strategic judgment at the national level that considers various perspectives such as security, environment, and human rights in trade response positioning. Therefore, it is necessary to pursue "maximization of national interest" by preparing more meticulous response strategies and measures from various perspectives for these complex global external economic trade issues.

2. Building a Resilient Network to Counter Protectionism, Economic Security Enhancement, Regionalization, and Bloc Formation

Following the advancement of trade liberalization in the 1990s, the spread of "Just-in-time (JIT)" systems, which prioritize supply chain efficiency, led to the development of global value chains. However, recently, supply chain disruptions in certain regions or for specific items have caused production delays in the overall supply chain, leading to the emergence of "Just-in-case (JIC)" systems. Korea also experienced the importance of this during the urea solution shortage in 2021. Furthermore, disruptions in production for various industries, including the automotive industry, due to semiconductor shortages have highlighted the need for preparedness, emphasizing stable supply chain security and supply chain resilience.

This has ultimately shifted the focus from economic efficiency and international division of labor to "economic security." In other words, the global division of labor system, which was built on global supply chains, has transformed into regionalization, bloc formation, and protectionism, with intensified conflicts arising from security, values, trade, and economic interests, and attempts to exclude competitors from supply chains. The Biden administration will also pursue a "friendshoring" strategy to reorganize supply chains dependent on China into those centered around allies, excluding China, along with policies to promote reshoring within the US. Therefore, our government needs a strategic cooperative body that is not easily swayed by external shocks through the establishment of strong tie networks with key trading nations. Additionally, network management with redundancy is required. In other words, trade strategies and governance systems that respond to this are necessary.

3. Responding to New Trade Norms Amidst the Transition to a Digital and Green Economy

Policies in each country for the transition to a digital and green economy are bringing about changes in the trade sector. The recent weakening of the multilateral trading system has led to situations where individual countries unilaterally apply their own laws to other nations. Unilateral application of domestic laws enacted without multilateral or bilateral agreements will lead to trade friction between countries. First, following the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economic structure is changing in line with the digital transformation due to the spread of non-face-to-face culture. E-commerce, centered around global shopping platforms, is changing, and cross-border transactions of digital goods and services are rapidly increasing. As the digital economy and digital trade expand, the importance of digital trade, where countries seek to establish international norms favorable to them regarding data, a crucial commodity in the digital economy, is growing. Regarding personal information, regulations like the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and digital taxes previously introduced by European countries are acting as barriers. We face the challenge of establishing international norms favorable to Korea in the newly emerging field of digital trade. The US and Japan recently signed and enacted a digital trade agreement (January 2020), and bilateral and regional multilateral agreements such as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) are being concluded to lead the digital economy.[2] Therefore, it is urgently necessary for Korea, which has strengths in the digital industry, to establish international norms favorable to itself through bilateral and multilateral cooperation in digital trade.

Another challenge is the green trade sector in response to climate change. The European Union's draft legislation for the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), released this year, has become a starting point significantly impacting international trade. If other affected countries take retaliatory measures or if each country establishes its own national environmental policies to achieve its carbon neutrality goals, conflicts between nations may arise. Furthermore, recent carbon neutrality declarations by various countries to achieve climate transition goals, the various regulations between countries to achieve these goals, and even the RE100 initiative, where global companies like Apple and Amazon have declared 100% renewable energy use, have become important issues in trade. In addition, the rapid growth of the green industry and the carbon border adjustment are expected to cause various changes and conflicts in the trade environment, necessitating effective response strategies.

II. Problems with Current Trade Governance

1. Fragmentation Due to Overlapping Functions and Silos Between Ministries Limits Swift and Systematic Response

The importance of security in the trade sector is increasing due to the competition surrounding US-China tech hegemony, global supply chain restructuring, and the strengthening of protectionism. The government's governance system needs to effectively respond to these changes and trends in the trade sector. Currently, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) is in charge of overall trade policy through its Trade Minister's Office. During the Kim Dae-jung administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade handled trade affairs, but during the Lee Myung-bak administration, industry and trade were integrated into the Ministry of Knowledge Economy. During the Park Geun-hye administration, trade negotiation and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) functions were transferred to MOTIE, making it the department in charge of overall trade. There has been continuous discussion about which department should be in charge. Traditionally, if trade is handled by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, trade-related tasks such as export and import regulations centered on domestic industry can be carried out more efficiently. On the other hand, if trade is handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is an advantage in comprehensively considering external factors such as negotiations with foreign countries, diplomacy, and security (Koo Min-kyu, Choi Byung-sun 2019; Jeong Byung-hwa, Park Hyung-joon 2016; Ko Bo-min 2018).

Due to the specialized nature and importance of trade work, trade organizations have existed as independent entities within their respective ministries. Currently, trade affairs are not solely handled by the Trade Minister's Office within MOTIE. Approximately 30% remain with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[3]and the Ministry of Economy and Finance also performs trade functions under its External Economic Affairs Bureau and Tariff Policy Division. This leads to overlapping responsibilities between ministries. The Ministry of Economy and Finance currently has six divisions under its External Economic Affairs Bureau, and the "Trade Policy Division," which also exists in MOTIE, is located there. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a Deputy Minister for Multilateral Economic Affairs and a Deputy Minister for Economic Diplomacy, and bilateral economic diplomacy countries exist with the East Asia Economic Diplomacy Division and the North America and Europe Economic Diplomacy Division under its purview. This overlaps with the functions of the Multilateral Trade Division within MOTIE's New Trade Strategy Office, the Americas Trade Division and the Europe Trade Division within the Trade Policy Bureau, and the Northeast Asia Trade Division and the New Southern Trade Division within the Trade Cooperation Bureau. Furthermore, as the trade environment becomes more complex with digital trade and green trade, there are many instances of overlapping work between departments. Recently, regarding climate change and green trade, the responsibilities of MOTIE, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the Ministry of Environment all overlap. Additionally, regarding digital trade, many departments, including MOTIE, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Korea Customs Service, the Korean Intellectual Property Office, the Ministry of Science and ICT, and the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, are involved in related work.

This overlap of responsibilities among trade-related departments and the absence of a central coordinating body lead to inefficiencies due to high transaction costs in the trade sector, which requires a unified voice and coordination. Furthermore, this fragmented approach limits swift responses to new trade issues due to duplicated work and delays.

2. Need for a Permanent Central Coordinating Organization to Anticipate and Respond to the New Trade Environment

Responding to the aforementioned economic security, digital trade, climate change and green trade, and the advent of mega FTAs requires close cooperation and coordination among decentralized departments. However, silos between ministries still exist. Complex factors influence trade. Furthermore, while mutual cooperation and overall trade negotiations should be conducted from the perspective of maximizing national interest, in Korea, coordination is not well-managed due to power struggles between ministries. Although various related committees and the Ministerial Conference on External Economic Affairs exist to coordinate them, cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and economic ministries is insufficient. Therefore, to respond comprehensively and strategically to various economic and security issues that have recently gained importance, a "Meeting on External Economic Security Strategy" was launched in 2021, with key participants including the Deputy Prime Minister, major economic ministries, foreign affairs and security ministries, the National Intelligence Service, the National Security Council (NSC), and key secretaries from the Presidential Office. However, there are issues with the lack of a permanent support organization and regularized meetings. Furthermore, the roles and relationships between the Ministerial Conference on External Economic Affairs and the Meeting on External Economic Security Strategy are not well-defined.

Regarding trade-related network governance, representative bodies include the Domestic Countermeasures Committee for Trade Treaties, the Private Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations, the Trade Promotion Committee, and the Trade Policy Forum, all chaired by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy. However, the problem is that while the head of the "network operating organization," the Trade Minister's Office, is the Trade Minister's Office chief, the chairpersons of key decision-making bodies for trade policy, such as the "Trade Promotion Committee," "Trade and Industry Forum," and "Domestic Countermeasures Committee for Trade Treaties," are the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy. This limits the role of the Trade Minister's Office chief and also restricts MOTIE's ability to negotiate for maximum national interest in trade negotiations, as it focuses on the outcomes of the trade sector. Furthermore, there is functional overlap among the committees, and the administrative capacity of MOTIE's Trade and Industry Bureau, which oversees the work of these committees, is also duplicated.

3. Need to Enhance Professional Competencies of Trade Personnel and Overcome the Disconnectedness of Global Networks

Trade ministries must engage with various stakeholders in the international and domestic industries, as well as central and local governments. Trade administration for these stakeholders requires consultation and coordination within and between ministries, and with stakeholders, through diversification of communication mechanisms (Ko Bo-min 2018). This requires expertise in trade administration, and this expertise includes not only basic job competencies but also consistency in job duties and maintenance of specialized positions. However, Korea's current civil service system is primarily based on rotational assignments. Consequently, even within MOTIE, rotational assignments occur between industry and energy trade, and due to rotational assignments, trade experts cannot be cultivated. Trade positions are less preferred by civil servants compared to other fields due to the required expertise and the demanding nature of the work[4]relative to the compensation provided. Currently, the Trade Minister's Office is attempting to enhance expertise in trade by implementing a professional civil servant system and a system for recruiting individuals with private sector experience, but the compensation level is lower than in the private sector[5]and there are few incentives for promotion, making it difficult to recruit talented individuals and leading to a high turnover rate. Thus, the low continuity in positions and frequent job rotations result in weaker domestic networks compared to competing countries. Therefore, there is a need to design a new personnel management system and compensation structure that enables specialization of trade personnel and long-term tenure in their positions. Recent examples, such as Samsung appointing former US Ambassador to Korea Mark Lippert as Vice President to oversee government relations for its North American subsidiary, and POSCO signing a consulting contract with a firm including former Secretary Stephen Biegun to strengthen its network in the US, demonstrate the importance of managing domestic networks in trade policy.

III. Direction for Redesigning Trade Policy Governance

1. Strategic Direction of New Trade Policy

"Global Standards and Rules Setter in the New Trade Environment"

"Central Hub Role as Coordinator and Mediator in International Trade Relations Networks"

Due to changes in global supply chains and the rise of protectionism, international trade relations will likely be characterized by bilateral agreements based on strict reciprocity driven by resource dependence and strategic choices, rather than traditional multilateral agreements. Furthermore, a "friendshoring" strategy will likely dominate, where supply chains are built within economic alliances linked to security through multilateral agreements among key allies. In international relations, not only in trade but also in diplomacy, relationships between countries are networks, and the position and capabilities within these networks can hold significant power. This refers to one's position within the network structure, not simply possessing certain resources. Moreover, building these strategic networks should first involve creating a redundant connection structure that enhances resilience against various shocks. Second, it should involve building strong connections that are not easily broken even by significant shocks, forming strong bilateral ties. This will help mitigate uncertainty and manage various risks in the rapidly changing environment. Furthermore, this role as a central player and mediator will enable us to set standards and order in the new trade world in a way that is favorable to us.

<Figure 1> Korea's Global Trade Agreement Network

To achieve this, the Republic of Korea must be in a position to influence many countries by forming a star network with a high degree of connectivity through numerous bilateral relationships, based on core resources such as cutting-edge technologies that all countries need. In the figure above, Korea is represented by the red color in the center, forming bilateral agreements with various countries and building a strong, small-world-like network. The clusters of pentagons in the figure represent small-world networks like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In other words, to settle into the new global value chain following the restructuring of global supply chains, we should join the US-led Quad. We must maximize the practical benefits of participation in the transition process of Quad Plus into a multilateral cooperation body that replaces the Quad. Furthermore, by joining networks like ASEAN, we should act as an intermediary between the networks of our allies. Through this proactive strategy of building networks, by positioning ourselves strategically within these networks and allocating resources, we can leverage Korea's enhanced national standing to act as a rule setter in the new trade field and establish international norms favorable to us. This will be effective in areas where the demand for establishing international norms is increasing, such as green trade, digital trade, and standards for science, technology, and new industries. Furthermore, based on this, it will be possible to expand the FTA network in new markets and pursue accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) under conditions that maximize national interest.

2. Principles for Redesigning Trade Policy Governance

To respond to recent complex trade issues, an organization to coordinate economic security policies is needed. The current government has established the "Meeting on External Economic Security Strategy" chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, involving ministers from economic, foreign affairs, and security ministries, and the standing members of the National Security Office. In addition, the Presidential National Security Office is also adding related functions. However, comprehensive and proactive strategic preparation is needed rather than reactive responses after an incident occurs. A new blueprint for trade policy must be developed to systematically respond to the recent trade environment and paradigm shifts, and responses should be made accordingly (Son Yeol, Choi Soo-yi 2018).

Japan, for instance, has organized its response system to carry out integrated and strategic responses. In April 2020, it established an economic division within the National Security Secretariat (similar to our NSC) to expand economic security organizations and personnel, and in 2021, the Kishida cabinet established an economic security minister and operates it as a central economic security organization. Under the goal of increasing "strategic autonomy" in vulnerable areas of the Japanese economy and strengthening "strategic indispensability" in advantageous areas, the Liberal Democratic Party's Policy Research Council established a "New International Order Creation Strategy Headquarters" last June, which formulated a blueprint for economic security strategy. In our case, too, medium- to long-term strategic planning is necessary to prepare for and lead the new trade order. The current Meeting on External Economic Security Strategy is an ad-hoc committee that primarily responds to current issues, thus requiring an organization for proactive strategic planning and international network management in response to economic security and new trade changes.

Specifically, this requires strategies based on scientific evidence. To this end, an organization is needed to manage and utilize a trade digital platform that can leverage big data and artificial intelligence (AI) through the establishment of databases for various trade and foreign country-related data. In the short term, a system is needed to database all treaty and agreement information, as well as related domestic and international information, which is currently handled by each department. If building a platform using the external network is difficult due to security reasons, it should be built on the government's internal network and utilized for trade strategy. In a digital platform government, all government tasks should be uploaded to the cloud and utilized. The establishment of such a diplomatic and trade platform will increase the efficiency of network management and enable comprehensive management. It will allow for effective utilization and management of functions currently dispersed across diplomacy, trade, and other institutions. This can serve as an important asset and basis for managing international trade and agreement networks, as mentioned earlier, thus necessitating the establishment of such an organization.

Synthesizing these points, the principles for designing the new administration's trade governance can be presented as follows:

1) Establishment of anticipatory and strategic organizations for proactive response

2) Establishment of agile organizations for swift and continuous response to the new trade environment

3) Strengthening of control tower functions capable of substantive policy coordination and convergence

4) Establishment of an organization with strong resilience to domestic and external trade shocks

5) Establishment of an integrated response system that approaches complex trade issues from the perspective of overall national interest

6) Establishment of a governance system with smooth communication and high understanding with domestic and international stakeholders

3. Proposed Design for New Trade-Related Organizations

To implement the principles of trade government organization design for the new administration, the issue of where to place current trade-related ministries arises. Since trade negotiation tasks involve both industrial and diplomatic aspects, the placement of trade functions within the government has been a subject of discussion at the start of each administration. The first argument is that the Trade Minister's Office should be placed under MOTIE, as it is now, to engage in trade negotiations with industrial expertise. This is based on the reasoning that when MOTIE handles trade, tasks such as market expansion and response to import regulations can be carried out more efficiently based on knowledge and expertise in the industry, which is the content of trade, and by closely understanding the impact of trade.

The second argument is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have overall authority for trade, as in the past Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and negotiate trade not merely as a trade matter but from the perspective of security and national strategy. This is because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expertise in negotiation and bargaining with foreign countries, and trade can be organically handled with other external subjects such as diplomacy and security (Koo Min-kyu, Choi Byung-sun 2019; Kim Yoon-kwon 2017; Ko Bo-min 2018). These arguments stem from the differences in expertise and networks held by each ministry. While the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, with its strength in domestic industrial networks, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with its strength in overseas networks, clash over which network is more important in trade, in reality, the focus should be on how to connect these two networks to create synergy. The third argument, as an alternative to the conflict between these two ministries, is the establishment of an independent trade representative office, similar to the United States, where the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy is not the final representative of the trade-related organization, but the Minister of Trade Representative Office is the highest responsible person and coordinator of trade governance, overseeing trade policy (Son Yeol et al. 2017). Furthermore, considering the recent changes in trade issues, there are arguments that it should be placed under the President or the Prime Minister for practical coordination and immediate response. This can be summarized in the following table.

<Table 1> Advantages and Disadvantages by Type of Trade Organization

As presented in <Table 1>, considering the advantages and disadvantages, each approach has its pros and cons, making it difficult to determine a single correct direction. The core of organizational design should be to leverage the strengths of both systems and mitigate their weaknesses. Furthermore, a governance system that reflects the principles of new administration trade governance design discussed earlier must be established. The new trade governance must be an organization with the expertise and complexity of the existing trade policy process, as well as agility, foresight, and resilience. The establishment of a new independent trade organization that embodies all the aforementioned principles could be ideal. However, in reality, establishing a new independent trade organization may face uncertainties, such as the time required for organizational consolidation to respond swiftly to the rapidly changing new trade environment, and the potential for the advantages of the industrial and diplomatic types to diminish while their disadvantages increase. Furthermore, realistically, establishing an independent department would require more specialized personnel and organization than the current Trade Minister's Office, necessitating a ministerial-level position. Therefore, there are practical limitations as the government cannot simply increase its size indefinitely. Next, the current MOTIE-led system requires change due to the importance of economic security and the challenges in responding to it. However, completely transferring the current Trade Minister's Office from MOTIE to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reverting to the past Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, also requires time for the chemical integration of civil servants, and since specialized personnel have not yet been trained and secured, the aforementioned problem of expertise is not resolved. Therefore, the new government needs a strategic and phased approach to functional linkage and cooperative management. Furthermore, it is necessary to enhance capabilities by increasing personnel related to economic security in all relevant departments and to improve specialized expertise by establishing new departments.[6]

To this end, first, the external economic overall control function of the Ministry of Economy and Finance should be transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which should then serve as the overall control tower for related matters. The role of the US Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment (overseeing economic growth, energy, and the environment) is closely linked to new trade issues. Under the Second Secretary, there are the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB), the Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR), the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), as well as the Office of the Science and Technology Advisor (STAS) and the Office of the Chief Economist (OCE). Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs also needs to be reorganized into a matching department to cooperate and respond with the US, a key diplomatic partner. The current Second Deputy Minister's office consists of the Deputy Minister for Economic Diplomacy, the Deputy Minister for Multilateral Diplomacy, and the Ambassador for Climate Change, but it lacks the capacity to deal with new trade-related fields. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen capabilities by establishing new departments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for economics, climate and environment, energy, science and technology, digital transformation, and public cultural diplomacy. Second, the establishment of an organization within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to comprehensively manage and utilize a digital diplomatic and trade platform for conducting evidence-based diplomatic and trade policies is required. In other words, a related organization should be created so that all external treaties and external information mentioned earlier can be gathered on this platform, comprehensively analyzed, and utilized for negotiations and trade policy. Third, the current Ministerial Conference on External Economic Affairs and the Meeting on External Economic Security Strategy should be unified and operated as the Meeting on External Economic Security Strategy. Its secretariat should also be located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which oversees trade, to provide support. Fourth, it is necessary to establish a Trade Strategy Committee or an External Economic Security Strategy Committee under the President, composed of the public and private sectors, experts, and key ministries. This organization should facilitate communication and knowledge sharing among various experts and industries, and foster mutual understanding to develop comprehensive trade strategies, from addressing current issues to preparing for the future. The chairperson should be granted the role of Presidential Special Advisor for Economic Security or Trade Policy, responsible for actively synthesizing related issues and countermeasures and presenting them for presidential decision-making.

The principle of designing the new administration's trade-related governance is to abolish or redesign the currently scattered, unorganized, and fragmented organizations and committees to build an efficient and effective trade governance system. However, the principle of redundancy is also very important, as appropriate overlap and competition between ministries can create a resilient organization, so this also needs to be considered.■

Referencias

Kang, Kyung-joo. 2022. “La presencia de diplomáticos con insignias de Samsung Electronics ha aumentado en la era de la Nueva Guerra Fría.” <Hankyung Economy>. 20 de febrero.

Ko, Bo-min. 2018. “Análisis de la historia de la transformación de la organización de administración comercial de Corea.” *Estudios de Comercio Internacional*. Vol. 23, No. 4, 23-42.

Ko, Bo-min. 2019. “Análisis de la gobernanza comercial: centrado en casos nacionales de Corea.” *Revista de Estudios Comerciales*. Vol. 44, No. 6, 55-67.

Kim, Gyu-pan. 2021. “Estado actual de la implementación de la estrategia de seguridad económica de Japón y sus implicaciones.” *KIEP World Economy Today*. Vol. 21, No. 20.

Kim, Yoon-kwon. 2017. “Un estudio sobre la coherencia de las funciones y la organización del gobierno en respuesta a los cambios en el entorno administrativo y la demanda administrativa.” *Informe de Investigación de KIPA 2017-11*. Instituto Coreano de Administración Pública.

Ministerios relacionados en conjunto. 2022. “Estrategia de implementación de política económica exterior para 2022 del Comité de Asuntos Económicos Exteriores.” 25 de enero.

Koo, Min-kyo, Choi, Byung-sun. 2019. *Economía Política y Derecho del Comercio Internacional*. Seúl: Pak Young Sa.

Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas. 2021. “Celebración de la Primera Reunión Estratégica de Seguridad Económica Exterior y resultados clave de la discusión.” 18 de octubre.

Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas. 2021. “Celebración de la Segunda Reunión Estratégica de Seguridad Económica Exterior y resultados clave de la discusión.” 7 de noviembre.

Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas. 2021. “Celebración de la Tercera Reunión Estratégica de Seguridad Económica Exterior y resultados clave de la discusión.” 27 de diciembre.

Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas. 2022. “Celebración de la Cuarta Reunión Estratégica de Seguridad Económica Exterior y resultados clave de la discusión.” 14 de febrero.

Kim, Heon-joo. 2021. “La Reunión Estratégica de Seguridad Económica Exterior es una diplomacia de 'kimchi'... ¿Puede funcionar correctamente?” <Seoul P&N>. 25 de octubre.

Sohn, Yeol, Lee, Jae-min, Koo, Min-kyo. 2017. “Rediseño del sistema de implementación de la política comercial del próximo gobierno de Corea: Propuesta de establecimiento de un departamento de nivel ministerial.” East Asia Institute. 19 de abril.

Sohn, Yeol, Choi, Soo-ee (Eds.). 2018. “La guerra comercial entre Estados Unidos y China se está expandiendo, ¿hacia dónde va Corea?: Es necesario preparar un plan de política comercial basado en un nuevo paradigma.” East Asia Institute. 8 de agosto.

Oh, Se-kyung. 2021. “Estado actual de la implementación de la estrategia de seguridad económica de Japón y sus implicaciones.” *World Economy Today*. Korea Development Institute for Trade and Industry.

Jeong, Byung-hwa, Park, Hyung-joon. 2016. “Un estudio comparativo de casos internacionales de organizaciones de negociación comercial: Aplicación del método de análisis de prototipos de conjuntos difusos.” *Sociedad Moderna y Administración*. Vol. 26, No. 4, 119-140.

Cho, Tae-yul. 2021. “[Global Focus] No se ve el panorama general de la estrategia de seguridad económica.” <Maeil Business Newspaper>. 21 de diciembre.

Choi, Young-ji. 2022. “Los tres temas clave del comercio para el próximo año son la cadena de suministro, lo digital y el cambio climático.” <Edaily>. 20 de diciembre.

Choi, Won-yeop. 2021. “Anuncio de la conclusión del primer Acuerdo de Asociación Digital de Corea-Singapur (DPA), el primer acuerdo de comercio digital de nuestro país.” Comunicado de prensa del Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Energía. 15 de diciembre.

[1] “En el ‘Foro de Perspectivas del Entorno Comercial Global 2022’, organizado por el Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Energía y la Cámara de Comercio e Industria de Corea, se presentaron la cadena de suministro, lo digital y el cambio climático como los tres temas clave del comercio para 2022 (Choi, Young-ji 2022).”

[2] “Corea también realizó esfuerzos para establecer normas globales de comercio digital al firmar el Acuerdo de Asociación Digital Corea-Singapur (KSDPA) en diciembre de 2021 (Choi, Won-yeop 2021).”

[3] El Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores lleva a cabo trabajos comerciales en la Oficina de Derecho Internacional, la Oficina de Asuntos Económicos Internacionales, la Oficina de Diplomacia Económica Bilateral y la Oficina de Diplomacia Climática, Ambiental y Científica.

[4] “El trabajo comercial actual requiere especialmente idiomas y experiencia, como los asuntos internacionales. Por otro lado, en comparación con las competencias necesarias, no se puede considerar que sea un trabajo muy preferido por los funcionarios encargados. Se requieren competencias administrativas comerciales superiores a las básicas en las negociaciones exteriores, y las negociaciones internas con la Asamblea Nacional, otros ministerios y las partes interesadas son aún más complejas y arduas. De hecho, el entorno de la administración comercial, a diferencia de lo que parece desde fuera, tiene muchas dificultades internas, ya que los funcionarios se ven acosados por la Asamblea Nacional, las asociaciones y otras partes interesadas en el país, al mismo tiempo que son objeto de controversia por parte de los medios de comunicación, y también están sometidos a presiones profesionales por parte de los negociadores de los países comerciales en el extranjero (Ko, Bo-min 2018, 36).”

[5] Principalmente, los abogados internacionales y los abogados reciben una remuneración inferior en comparación con otros bufetes de abogados que requieren contratación de personal con experiencia profesional.

[6] Los ministerios del gobierno japonés están solicitando la ampliación de personal dedicado a la seguridad económica o la creación de nuevos departamentos de seguridad económica en sus solicitudes presupuestarias para 2022. El Ministerio de Economía, Comercio e Industria solicitó 63 empleados adicionales para fortalecer los sistemas de control de exportaciones existentes y mejorar los derechos de propiedad intelectual; el Ministerio de Finanzas solicitó personal adicional para fortalecer la revisión y el monitoreo posterior de las restricciones de inversión extranjera de acuerdo con la enmienda de la Ley de Divisas; el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores solicitó personal para la recopilación y análisis de información, y la construcción de ciberseguridad para prevenir la fuga de tecnologías sensibles; el Ministerio de Educación, Cultura, Deportes, Ciencia y Tecnología solicitó la construcción de un sistema de cooperación para monitorear la fuga de tecnología con universidades e instituciones de investigación; y el Ministerio de Asuntos Internos y Comunicaciones solicitó personal para el análisis de la cadena de suministro en relación con cables submarinos y 5G. La Agencia de Servicios Financieros tiene la intención de fortalecer el sistema de supervisión de las instituciones financieras desde la perspectiva de la seguridad, estableciendo una “Oficina de Seguridad Económica” para fortalecer la supervisión de las instituciones financieras en cuanto a los proveedores de equipos relacionados con el sistema, las contramedidas contra ciberataques en los sistemas centrales y el sistema de gestión de la información de transacciones financieras. En lugar de una integración en un solo ministerio, se está intentando priorizar el fortalecimiento de las capacidades de todos los ministerios relacionados de manera integral (Kim, Gyu-pan 2021).

■ Autor: Park, Hyung-joon_Profesor del Departamento de Administración Pública y de la Escuela de Posgrado de Administración Pública de la Universidad Sungkyunkwan. Obtuvo un doctorado en Administración Pública en la Universidad Estatal de Florida, EE. UU., y actualmente se desempeña como Director del Instituto de Investigación de Gobernanza de la Universidad Sungkyunkwan y Secretario General de la Asociación de Administración de Asia (AGPA). Ha sido miembro del Comité de Investigación de la Asociación Internacional de Ciencias Administrativas (IIAS), miembro electo y presidente del Comité de Investigación de la División de Internacionalización de la Asociación Estadounidense de Administración Pública, miembro operativo de la Red de Políticas Asia-Pacífico (AP-PPN), presidente del Comité de Cooperación Internacional de la Asociación Coreana de Administración Pública, presidente del Comité de Investigación y presidente del Comité de Internacionalización de la Asociación Coreana de Políticas Públicas, y director del Centro de Gobernanza del Instituto de Estudios de Asia Oriental. Sus áreas de especialización incluyen la evaluación de políticas, el análisis del cambio de políticas, el diseño de políticas, la gobernanza colaborativa, las políticas regulatorias y la innovación gubernamental. Ha recibido el Premio Mosher, el premio a la mejor tesis de la Asociación Estadounidense de Administración Pública. Sus publicaciones recientes incluyen *Collaborative Governance in East Asia: Evolution Towards Multi-stakeholder Partnerships* (coautor, 2020), *2020 Korean Identity* (coautor, 2020), *Solving Social Problems Together: Cases of Conflict and Cooperation* (coeditor, 2019), *Conditions for Presidential Success in 2017* (coeditor, 2017), y *Korean Politics and Government* (coautor, 2020).

■ Gestión y Edición: Lee, Seung-yeon_Investigador de EAI

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