[EAI Special Report] A Wishlist for the Presidential Transition Committee's Diplomatic and Security Team ⑤_Restructure the Conventional Trade Control Tower

I. Environmental Changes and Challenges in the Trade Sector

Trade policy encompasses all policies aimed at maximizing a nation's trade interests, including those related to the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor across borders, as well as international negotiation strategies for establishing international norms and systems. Recently, various countries are seeking new trade strategies and discussing changes in governance to respond to the rapid changes in the economic environment, such as the US-China tech hegemony, shifts in global supply chains, and the spread of global inflation due to the COVID-19 pandemic. New trade issues are also emerging, including the emphasis on climate change response, the expansion of the digital economy, and the strengthening of protectionism and economic security.[1]Various changes in international relations are occurring, including the ongoing US-China conflict and the escalating conflict between Russia and Western countries over Ukraine's pursuit of NATO membership.

In this rapidly changing environment, effective trade policy is crucial for the Korean economy, which has pursued economic growth through exports and has a high degree of external dependence. This requires not only negotiations on trade between countries but also effective redesign of multi-layered governance, including rectifying imbalances between domestic industrial sectors, coordinating cooperation among responsible departments, and adjusting stakeholders, as well as cultivating policy capabilities. It is time for the new administration to redesign trade governance to be anticipatory and agile, enabling proactive and strategic utilization of changes in the rapidly evolving and unstable international relations and the green and digital trade environment.

1. Need for Strategic Response Strategies to Maximize Integrated National Interests Amidst Complex External Economic Issues

As issues surrounding trade expand beyond traditional areas like exports and investment to encompass complex, multi-variable equations such as US-China tech hegemony, global value chain (GVC) restructuring, environmental issues like climate change response, and even human rights, multifaceted analysis and comprehensive responses are required. Furthermore, as issues where economy and security are intertwined like the two sides of a coin increasingly emerge, the need for high-level strategic judgment at the national level, considering various perspectives such as security, environment, and human rights in trade response positioning, is growing. Therefore, it is necessary to pursue "maximization of national interests" by preparing more meticulous response strategies and measures from various perspectives for these complex global external economic trade issues.

2. Building a Resilient Network to Counter Protectionism, Economic Security, Regionalization, and Bloc Formation

Following the advancement of trade liberalization in the 1990s, the spread of "Just-in-Time (JIT)" systems, which prioritize supply chain efficiency, led to the development of global value chains. However, recently, supply chain disruptions in certain regions or for specific items have caused production delays throughout the entire supply chain, leading to the emergence of "Just-in-Case (JIC)" systems. Korea also experienced the importance of this during the urea solution shortage crisis in 2021. Furthermore, production disruptions in various industries, including the automotive sector, due to semiconductor shortages have highlighted the need for preparedness, emphasizing stable supply chain security and supply chain resilience.

This has ultimately shifted the focus from economic efficiency and international division of labor to "economic security." In other words, the global division of labor system, built through past global supply chains, has transformed into regionalization, bloc formation, and protectionism. Conflicts are intensifying over security, values, trade, and economic interests, and attempts to exclude competitors from supply chains are occurring. The Biden administration will likely pursue a "friendshoring" strategy, reorganizing supply chains dependent on China to be centered around allies, in addition to policies promoting domestic reshoring. Therefore, our government needs a strategic cooperative body that is resilient to external shocks by building strong ties with key trading nations. Additionally, management of redundant networks is required. In essence, a trade strategy and governance system that responds to these changes is necessary.

3. Responding to New Trade Norms Amidst the Transition to a Digital and Green Economy

National policies for the digital transformation and transition to a green economy are bringing about changes in the trade sector. As the recent multilateral trading system has weakened, individual countries have enacted relevant laws and unilaterally applied them to other nations. Unilateralism based on domestic laws enacted without multilateral or bilateral agreements will lead to trade friction between countries. First, following the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economic structure is changing in line with the digital great transformation due to the spread of non-face-to-face culture. E-commerce, centered around global shopping platforms, is changing, and cross-border trade of digital goods and services is rapidly increasing. As the digital economy and digital trade expand, the importance of digital trade, where countries seek to establish international norms favorable to them regarding data, a crucial commodity in the digital economy, is growing. Regarding personal information, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), already in effect, and digital taxes imposed by European countries are acting as barriers. We face the challenge of establishing international norms favorable to Korea in the newly evolving digital trade sector. Recently, the US and Japan signed and enacted a digital trade agreement (January 2020), and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) are examples of bilateral and regional multilateral agreements being formed to lead the digital economy.[2]Therefore, it is urgently necessary for Korea, which has strengths in the digital industry, to establish favorable international norms through bilateral and multilateral cooperation in digital trade.

Another challenge is the green trade sector in response to climate change. The European Union's proposed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) legislation this year has become a significant starting point impacting international trade. Other affected countries may retaliate, or conflicts may arise between nations if each country establishes its own environmental policies to achieve its carbon neutrality goals. Furthermore, various national regulations to achieve climate transition goals, along with corporate initiatives like RE100, where global companies such as Apple and Amazon have pledged to use 100% renewable energy, have become important issues in trade. In addition, the rapid growth of the green industry and carbon border adjustments will cause various changes and conflicts in the trade environment, necessitating effective response strategies.

II. Problems with the Current Trade Governance

1. Limitations in Swift and Systematic Response Due to Fragmentation Caused by Overlapping Functions and Silos Among Ministries

The importance of security in the trade sector is increasing due to the competition surrounding US-China tech hegemony, global supply chain restructuring, and the strengthening of protectionism. The government's governance system needs to effectively respond to these changes and trends in the trade sector. Currently, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), through its Office of International Trade, oversees trade policy. During the Kim Dae-jung administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade handled trade affairs. However, during the Lee Myung-bak administration, industry and trade were integrated into the Ministry of Knowledge Economy. Under the Park Geun-hye administration, trade negotiations and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) functions were transferred to MOTIE, making it the overall trade overseeing ministry. There has been continuous discussion about which ministry should be in charge. Traditionally, if trade is handled by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, trade-related tasks such as responding to export and import regulations centered on domestic industry can be carried out more efficiently. Conversely, if trade is handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is an advantage in comprehensively considering external factors such as negotiations with foreign countries, diplomacy, and security (Koo Min-kyo, Choi Byung-sun 2019; Jeong Byung-hwa, Park Hyung-joon 2016; Go Bo-min 2018).

Due to the specialized nature and importance of trade affairs, trade organizations have existed as independent units within their respective ministries. Currently, trade affairs are not solely managed by the Office of International Trade within MOTIE. Approximately 30% remain within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[3]The Ministry of Economy and Finance also performs trade functions under the Office of International Economic Affairs and the Directorate for Customs Policy. This leads to overlapping responsibilities among ministries. The Ministry of Economy and Finance currently has six divisions under its Office of International Economic Affairs, and MOTIE also has a "Trade Policy Division" that exists concurrently. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has Directors-General for Multilateral Economic Coordination and Economic Diplomacy, and economic diplomacy directors for bilateral economic relations with specific countries, including divisions for East Asian Economic Diplomacy and North American and European Economic Diplomacy. These roles overlap with the divisions within MOTIE's Office of International Trade, such as the Division of Multilateral Trade, the Divisions of Americas Trade and European Trade within the Trade Policy Bureau, and the Divisions of Northeast Asia Trade and New Southern Trade within the Trade Cooperation Bureau. Furthermore, with the increasing complexity of the trade environment, including digital and green trade, there are many instances of overlapping responsibilities between departments. Recently, regarding climate change and green trade, responsibilities overlap among MOTIE, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the Ministry of Environment. Similarly, for digital trade, many departments, including MOTIE, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Korea Customs Service, the Korean Intellectual Property Office, the Ministry of Science and ICT, and the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, are involved in related tasks.

This overlap in trade-related departmental responsibilities and the absence of a central coordinating body create inefficiencies due to high transaction costs in the trade sector, which requires a unified voice and coordination. Furthermore, these fragmented approaches lead to inefficiencies such as duplicated work and delays, limiting swift responses to new trade issues.

2. Need for a Permanent Central Coordinating Organization to Anticipate and Respond to the New Trade Environment

Responding to the aforementioned issues of economic security, digital trade, climate change and green trade, and the emergence of mega FTAs requires close cooperation and coordination among decentralized departments. However, departmental silos still exist. Complex factors influence trade. Moreover, while cooperation and overall trade negotiations should be conducted from the perspective of maximizing national interests, in Korea, coordination is often hindered by inter-ministerial power struggles. Although various related committees and the Ministerial Conference on External Economic Affairs exist to coordinate them, cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and economic ministries is insufficient. To this end, a "Strategic Dialogue on External Economic Security" was launched in 2021, comprising key economic, foreign affairs, and security ministries, the National Intelligence Service, the National Security Council (NSC), and key presidential office officials, with the Deputy Prime Minister as a primary member, to enable comprehensive and strategic responses to various economic and security issues that have recently gained importance. However, it suffers from a lack of a permanent support organization and regularized meetings. Furthermore, the roles and relationships between the Ministerial Conference on External Economic Affairs and the Strategic Dialogue on External Economic Security are not well-defined.

Regarding trade-related network governance, notable examples include the Committee on Domestic Measures for Trade Treaties, the Private Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations, the Trade Promotion Committee, and the Trade Policy Forum, all chaired by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy. However, the problem is that while the head of the "Network Operating Organization," the Office of International Trade, is the Commissioner of International Trade, the chairpersons of key trade governance bodies that make important trade policy decisions, such as the "Trade Promotion Committee," "Trade and Industry Forum," and "Committee on Domestic Measures for Trade Treaties," are the Ministers of Trade, Industry and Energy. This limits the role of the Commissioner of International Trade, and since MOTIE focuses on the outcomes of the trade sector, there are limitations in negotiating for maximum national interests during trade talks. Furthermore, there is functional overlap among these committees, and administrative redundancy exists within MOTIE's Office of International Trade, which oversees the work of these committees.

3. Need to Enhance Professional Competencies of Trade Personnel and Overcome the Disconnectedness of Global Networks

Trade ministries must conduct business with various stakeholders, including international and domestic industries, as well as central and local governments. Trade administration for these stakeholders requires consultation and coordination within and between ministries, and with stakeholders, through diversification of communication mechanisms (Go Bo-min, 2018). This necessitates expertise in trade administration, which includes not only basic job competencies but also consistency in duties and maintenance of specialized positions. However, Korea's current civil service system is fundamentally based on rotational assignments. Consequently, even within MOTIE, rotational assignments occur between industry and energy trade, and due to rotational assignments, trade experts cannot be cultivated. Trade positions are less preferred by civil servants compared to the required expertise and the intensity of the work.[4]Despite the high demand for expertise and the demanding nature of the work, the civil service compensation system does not offer special rewards, leading to low preference for trade positions. Currently, the Office of International Trade attempts to enhance expertise in trade by implementing a professional civil servant system and recruiting individuals with private sector experience. However, the compensation levels are lower than in the private sector,[5]and promotion incentives are limited, making it difficult to recruit talented individuals and resulting in a high turnover rate. This low continuity in positions and frequent job rotations lead to weaker domestic networks compared to competing countries. Therefore, there is a need to design a new personnel management system and compensation structure that enables trade personnel specialization and long-term tenure in their roles. Recent examples, such as Samsung appointing former US Ambassador to Korea Mark Lippert as Vice President to oversee government relations for its North American subsidiary, and POSCO contracting with a consulting firm associated with former Secretary Stephen Biegun for its US subsidiary to strengthen its network, illustrate the importance of domestic network management in trade policy.

III. Directions for Redesigning Trade Policy Governance

1. Strategic Direction of New Trade Policy

"Global Standards and Rules Setter in the New Trade Environment"

"Central Hub Role as Coordinator and Mediator in International Trade Relations Networks"

Due to changes in global supply chains and the rise of protectionism, international trade relations will likely be dominated by bilateral agreements based on strict reciprocity, driven by resource dependence and strategic choices, rather than existing international multilateral agreements. Furthermore, a "Friendshoring" strategy will be prevalent, building supply chains within economic alliances centered on key allies through multilateral agreements. In international relations, not only in trade but also in diplomacy, networks are crucial, and the position and capabilities within these networks can hold significant power. This refers not simply to possessing certain resources but to one's position within the network structure. Moreover, building these strategic networks should primarily involve creating redundant connection structures that enhance resilience against various shocks. Secondly, it should involve building strong, unbreakable ties in bilateral relationships that can withstand significant shocks. This allows for mitigation of uncertainty and management of various risks in a rapidly changing environment. Furthermore, the role of a central player and mediator will enable us to establish standards and order in the new trade world in a way that is favorable to us.

<Figure 1> Korea's Global Trade Agreement Network

To achieve this, the Republic of Korea must be in a position to influence many countries by establishing numerous bilateral relationships, forming a star network with high connectivity, centered on core resources such as cutting-edge technologies that all countries need. In the figure above, Korea is at the center (red), establishing bilateral agreements with various countries and building a small-world network with strong connections. The clusters of pentagons represent small-world networks such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In other words, to adapt to the new global value chains following the restructuring of global supply chains, Korea should join the US-centered Quad. During the transition of the current Quad Plus to a multilateral cooperation framework replacing the Quad, efforts should be made to maximize practical benefits from participation. Furthermore, joining networks like ASEAN will be necessary, positioning Korea as an intermediary between various allied networks. Through this proactive strategy of building networks, by strategically positioning and allocating resources within these networks, Korea can leverage its enhanced national standing to become a rule-setter in the new trade domain, establishing international norms favorable to us. This will be effective in areas where the demand for establishing international norms is increasing, such as green trade, digital trade, and standards for science, technology, and new industries. Furthermore, based on this, it will be possible to expand the network of new market FTAs and pursue accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) under conditions that maximize national interests.

2. Principles for Redesigning Trade Policy Governance

To respond to the complex trade issues of recent times, an organization is needed to oversee the policy coordination of economic security. The current government has established a "Strategic Dialogue on External Economic Security" chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, involving ministers of economic, foreign affairs, and security ministries, and the standing committee of the National Security Council, and is also adding relevant functions to the Presidential National Security Office. However, comprehensive and proactive strategic preparation is needed rather than reactive responses after incidents occur. A new blueprint for trade policy must be developed to systematically respond to the recent changes in the trade environment and paradigm, and responses should be made accordingly (Son Yeol, Choi Soo-yi 2018).

Japan, for instance, has organized its response system to carry out integrated and strategic responses. In April 2020, an economic unit was established within the National Security Secretariat (similar to our NSC) under the Prime Minister's Office, expanding economic security organizations and personnel. In 2021, the Kishida cabinet established an economic security minister and is operating it as a central economic security organization. The Liberal Democratic Party's Policy Research Council established a "Headquarters for Creating a New International Order" in June last year, which developed an economic security strategy blueprint aimed at enhancing "strategic autonomy" in vulnerable areas of the Japanese economy and strengthening "strategic indispensability" in advantageous areas. Korea also needs mid- to long-term strategic planning to prepare for and lead the new trade order. The current Strategic Dialogue on External Economic Security is an ad-hoc committee that primarily responds to current issues; therefore, an organization is needed for proactive strategic planning and international network management concerning economic security and new trade changes.

Specifically, this requires strategies based on scientific evidence. To this end, the establishment of a trade digital platform that can utilize big data and artificial intelligence (AI) through the construction of various databases on trade and foreign countries is needed, along with an organization to manage and utilize it. In the short term, a system is needed to database all treaty and agreement information, as well as related domestic and international information, which is currently handled by individual departments. If building a platform using external networks is difficult due to security concerns, it should be built within the government's internal network for use in trade strategy. In a digital platform government, all government tasks should be uploaded to the cloud and utilized. The establishment of such a diplomatic and trade platform will increase the efficiency of network management and enable overall control. It will allow for effective utilization and management of functions currently dispersed across diplomacy, trade, and other institutions. This can serve as an important asset and basis for managing international trade and agreement networks, as previously mentioned, thus necessitating the establishment of such an organization.

Synthesizing these points, the following principles for designing the new government's trade governance can be proposed:

1) Establishment of an anticipatory and strategic organization for proactive response

2) Establishment of an agile organization for swift and continuous response to the new trade environment

3) Strengthening of control tower functions capable of substantive policy coordination and convergence

4) Establishment of an organization with strong resilience to domestic and external trade shocks

5) Establishment of an integrated response system that approaches complex trade issues from the perspective of overall national interest

6) Establishment of a governance system with smooth communication and high understanding among domestic and international stakeholders

3. Proposed Design for a New Trade Policy Organization

To implement the principles for designing the new government's trade organization, the issue of where to place the current trade-related ministries arises. Since trade negotiation tasks involve both industrial and diplomatic aspects, the placement of trade functions within the government has been a subject of discussion at the start of each administration. The first option is to place the Office of International Trade under MOTIE, as is currently the case, arguing that it should engage in trade negotiations with industrial expertise. This is based on the reasoning that if trade is handled by MOTIE, tasks such as market expansion and response to import regulations can be carried out more efficiently based on knowledge and expertise in industry, the actual content of trade.

The second option is for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to have overall authority over trade, as in the past Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and to conduct negotiations not merely at the trade level but from the perspective of security and national strategy. This is because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expertise in negotiation and diplomacy with foreign countries, and trade can be organically handled with other external subjects such as diplomacy and security (Koo Min-kyo, Choi Byung-sun 2019; Kim Yoon-kwon 2017; Go Bo-min 2018). These arguments stem from the differences in expertise and networks held by each ministry. The debate centers on which network is more important in trade – the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy's strength in domestic industrial networks or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' strength in external networks. However, the real issue to consider is how to connect these two networks to create synergy. The third option, as an alternative to the conflict between these two ministries, is to establish an independent trade representative office, similar to the United States, where the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy is not the final representative of the trade-related organization, but the Minister of Trade Representative oversees trade policy as the highest responsible person and coordinator of trade governance. This further suggests that given the recent changes in trade issues, an organization under the President or the Prime Minister should be established for substantive coordination and immediate response. The following table summarizes these options.

<Table 1> Advantages and Disadvantages by Trade Organization Type

As presented in <Table 1>, each approach has its advantages and disadvantages, making it difficult to determine a single correct direction. The core of organizational design should be to leverage the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of both systems. Furthermore, a governance system that reflects the principles of designing the new government's trade governance, as discussed earlier, must be established. The new trade governance must possess agility and anticipatory capabilities and be a resilient organization, in addition to the expertise and complexity of the existing trade policy process. The ideal scenario would be to establish a new, independent trade organization that embodies all the aforementioned principles. However, realistically, establishing a new independent trade organization may face uncertainties, such as the time required for organizational consolidation to respond swiftly to the rapidly changing new trade environment, and the potential for diminishing the strengths and amplifying the weaknesses of both industrial and diplomatic approaches. Furthermore, realistically, establishing an independent department would require more specialized personnel and a larger organization than the current Office of International Trade, leading to limitations due to the inability to simply expand the government's size. Next, the current system led by MOTIE requires change due to the importance of economic security and the challenges in responding to it. However, completely transferring the current Office of International Trade from MOTIE to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reverting to the past Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, also requires time for the chemical fusion of civil servants, and the problem of expertise, as mentioned earlier, is not resolved because specialized personnel have not yet been trained and secured. Therefore, the new government needs a strategic and phased approach to link functions and manage them collaboratively. Furthermore, it is necessary to enhance capabilities by increasing personnel in economic security-related areas and establishing new departments in all relevant ministries to improve specialized expertise.[6]

To this end, first, the external economic coordination function of the Ministry of Economy and Finance should be transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, allowing it to serve as the overall control tower. The role of the US Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment is closely linked to recent trade developments. Under the Second Secretary of State, there are the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB), the Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR), the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), as well as the Office of the Science and Technology Advisor (STAS) and the Office of the Chief Economist (OCE). Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs also needs to be reorganized into a matching department to cooperate and respond with the US, a key diplomatic partner. The current Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs oversees economic diplomacy coordination, multilateral diplomacy coordination, and climate change ambassador, but lacks the capacity to deal with recent new trade-related fields. Therefore, it is deemed necessary to strengthen capabilities by establishing new departments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for economy, climate and environment, energy, science and technology, digital transformation, and public cultural diplomacy. Second, the establishment of an organization within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to comprehensively manage and utilize a digital diplomatic and trade platform for conducting evidence-based diplomatic and trade policies is required. In other words, a relevant organization should be created so that all external treaties and related information, as mentioned earlier, can be gathered on this platform, comprehensively analyzed, and utilized for negotiations and trade policy. Third, the current Ministerial Conference on External Economic Affairs and the Strategic Dialogue on External Economic Security should be unified and operated as a single Strategic Dialogue on External Economic Security. Its secretariat should also be located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which oversees trade, to provide support. Fourth, a Trade Strategy Committee or an External Economic Security Strategy Committee, involving the public and private sectors, experts, and key ministries, should be established under the President. This organization should facilitate communication and knowledge sharing among various experts and industries, fostering mutual understanding to develop comprehensive trade strategies, from addressing current issues to preparing for the future. The chairperson should be appointed as the President's Special Advisor for Economic Security or Trade Policy, responsible for comprehensively addressing relevant issues and countermeasures and deriving decisions for the President.

The principle of designing the new government's trade-related governance is to abolish or redesign the currently fragmented and unorganized organizations and committees and establish an efficient and effective trade governance system. However, the principle of redundancy is also very important, as appropriate overlap and competition between ministries can create a resilient organization, so this should also be considered.■

<References>

Kang, Kyung-joo. 2022. “Diplomats Wearing Samsung Electronics Badges in the New Cold War Era Have Increased Their Presence.” <The Korea Economic Daily>. February 20.

Ko, Bo-min. 2018. “Analysis of the Historical Changes in Korea's Trade Administration Organization.” *Journal of International Commerce and Trade*. Vol. 23, No. 4, 23-42.

Ko, Bo-min. 2019. “Analysis of Trade Governance: Focusing on Korean Domestic Cases.” *Journal of Trade Studies*. Vol. 44, No. 6, 55-67.

Kim, Gyu-pan. 2021. “Current Status and Implications of Japan's Economic Security Strategy Implementation.” *KIEP Today's World Economy*. Vol. 21, No. 20.

Kim, Yoon-kwon. 2017. “A Study on the Consistency of Government Functions and Organization According to Changes in the Administrative Environment and Administrative Demand.” *KIPA Research Report 2017-11*. Korea Institute of Public Administration.

Related Government Ministries Jointly. 2022. “External Economic Ministers’ 2022 External Economic Policy Implementation Strategy.” January 25.

Koo, Min-kyo, and Choi, Byung-sun. 2019. *The Political Economy and Law of International Trade*. Seoul: Pakyoungsa.

Ministry of Economy and Finance. 2021. “Holding of the 1st ‘External Economic Security Strategy Meeting’ and Key Discussion Results.” October 18.

Ministry of Economy and Finance. 2021. “Holding of the 2nd ‘External Economic Security Strategy Meeting’ and Key Discussion Results.” November 7.

Ministry of Economy and Finance. 2021. “Holding of the 3rd ‘External Economic Security Strategy Meeting’ and Key Discussion Results.” December 27.

Ministry of Economy and Finance. 2022. “Holding of the 4th ‘External Economic Security Strategy Meeting’ and Key Discussion Results.” February 14.

Kim, Heon-joo. 2021. “Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a ‘Side Dish’ in the External Economic Security Strategy Meeting… Can it Function Properly?” <Seoul Pn>. October 25.

Sohn, Yeol, Lee, Jae-min, and Koo, Min-kyo. 2017. “Redesigning the Trade Policy Implementation System for Korea's Next Government: Proposal for Establishing a Ministerial-Level Dedicated Department.” East Asia Institute. April 19.

Sohn, Yeol, and Choi, Soo-ee (Eds.). 2018. “The Widening US-China Trade War, Where is Korea Headed?: The Need to Develop a Trade Policy Blueprint Based on a New Paradigm.” East Asia Institute. August 8.

Oh, Se-kyung. 2021. “Current Status and Implications of Japan's Economic Security Strategy Implementation.” *Today's World Economy*. Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.

Jeong, Byung-hwa, and Park, Hyung-joon. 2016. “A Comparative Case Study of Trade Negotiation Organizations Across Countries: Application of the Fuzzy-Set Ideal Type Analysis Method.” *Modern Society and Administration*. Vol. 26, No. 4, 119-140.

Cho, Tae-yul. 2021. “[Global Focus] The Big Picture of Economic Security Strategy is Not Visible.” <Maeil Business Newspaper>. December 21.

Choi, Young-ji. 2022. “The Top 3 Key Trade Issues Next Year Are Supply Chains, Digital, and Climate Change.” <edaily>. December 20.

Choi, Won-yeop. 2021. “Announcement of the Conclusion of the Korea-Singapore Digital Partnership Agreement (DPA), Korea's First Digital Trade Agreement.” Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy Press Release. December 15.

[1] “At the ‘2022 Global Trade Environment Outlook Forum’ hosted by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy and the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the top three key trade issues for 2022 were presented as supply chains, digital, and climate change (Choi, Young-ji 2022).”

[2] “Korea also made efforts to establish global digital trade norms by signing the Korea-Singapore Digital Partnership Agreement (KSDPA) in December 2021 (Choi, Won-yeop 2021).”

[3] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' International Law Bureau, International Economic Affairs Bureau, Bilateral Economic Affairs Bureau, and Climate and Scientific Affairs Bureau handle trade matters.

[4] “Current trade affairs require particular expertise in areas such as international affairs and language. However, compared to the competencies required, it is not a particularly preferred task for public officials. Trade administration requires more than basic competency in external negotiations, and domestic negotiations with the National Assembly, other ministries, and stakeholders are even more complex and arduous. In reality, the field of trade administration, which is plagued by the National Assembly, associations, and other stakeholders domestically, becomes a target of media controversy, and negotiators from trading countries exert pressure externally, presents many difficulties from within, contrary to external perceptions (Ko, Bo-min 2018, 36).”

[5] The compensation level is generally lower than that of other law firms requiring experienced lawyers and attorneys for private sector recruitment.

[6] Japanese government ministries are requesting an increase in personnel dedicated to economic security or the establishment of new economic security departments in their FY2022 budget requests. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry requested an increase of 63 personnel for strengthening existing export control systems and intellectual property rights. The Ministry of Finance requested an increase in personnel for strengthening foreign investment screening and post-monitoring in accordance with amendments to the Foreign Exchange Act. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested an increase in personnel for information collection and analysis to prevent the leakage of sensitive technologies and for cybersecurity construction. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology requested an increase in personnel for building a surveillance cooperation system for technology leakage with universities and research institutions. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications requested an increase in personnel for supply chain analysis related to undersea cables and 5G. The Financial Services Agency plans to establish an “Economic Security Office” to strengthen the supervisory system for financial institutions from a security perspective, including the procurement sources of system-related equipment, countermeasures against cyberattacks on core systems, and the management system for financial transaction information. This indicates a priority on strengthening the capabilities of all relevant ministries rather than consolidating them into a single ministry (Kim, Gyu-pan 2021).

■ Author: Park, Hyung-joon_Professor, Department of Public Administration and Graduate School of Governance, Sungkyunkwan University. He holds a Ph.D. in Public Administration from Florida State University. He serves as the Director of the Sungkyunkwan University Institute for Governance Studies and the Secretary-General of the Asian Association for Public Administration (AGPA). He has served as a member of the Research Committee of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS), an elected member and Research Chair of the International Section of the American Society for Public Administration, an operating committee member of the Asia Pacific Policy Network (AP-PPN), Chair of the International Cooperation Committee of the Korean Association for Public Administration, Chair of the Research Committee and Internationalization Committee of the Korean Policy Studies Association, and Director of the Governance Center at the East Asia Institute. His research areas include policy evaluation, policy change analysis, policy design, collaborative governance, regulatory policy, and government innovation. He received the Mosher Award, the Best Paper Award from the American Society for Public Administration. His recent publications include *Collaborative Governance in East Asia: Evolution Towards Multi-stakeholder Partnerships* (co-authored, 2020), *2020 Korean Identity* (co-authored, 2020), *Solving Social Problems Together: Cases of Conflict and Cooperation* (co-edited, 2019), *Conditions for Presidential Success in 2017* (co-edited, 2017), and *Korean Politics and Government* (co-authored, 2020).

■ Editor: Lee, Seung-yeon_EAI Research Fellow

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