[EAI Special Report] To the Presidential Transition Committee's Foreign Affairs and National Security Team ④_Policy Toward Japan: Overhaul Blue House Diplomacy

I. Challenges in Policy Toward Japan

The new Yoon Suk-yeol administration faces the critical task of resolving the virtually paralyzed relationship between South Korea and Japan. Currently, dialogue channels between the governments, including summit meetings, are barely functioning, economic transactions have decreased, and exchanges at the public level are blocked. Due to emotional confrontations over historical issues, the two governments are caught in a vortex of distrust, hesitating to cooperate with each other, undervaluing each other's strategic value, and often treating each other antagonistically.

The public is expressing fatigue with the prolonged strained relations. According to the 2021 joint South Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO, South Korean public opinion supports improving and cooperating in the stagnant South Korea-Japan relationship. As many as 45% of the public expressed the opinion that confrontation should be overcome in a future-oriented manner, and 28.8% believe that at least political confrontation should be avoided, indicating an overwhelming majority of 74.6% perceive the need to move beyond the current confrontational phase (<Table 1>).

<Table 1> Stance South Korea and Japan Should Take in Their Relations with Each Other (2021)

Source: East Asia Institute (EAI)-Genron NPO, South Korea-Japan Perception Survey (2021)

Meanwhile, the international situation facing South Korea also calls for the restoration of relations and cooperation with Japan. As the US-China strategic competition expands across various sectors, the convergence of interests between South Korea and Japan is increasing, and so are the incentives for cooperation. Amidst this, the United States, as a key pillar of its Indo-Pacific Strategy, emphasizes cooperation among its allies, highlighting the importance of cooperation between South Korea and Japan. The "Indo-Pacific Strategy" released by the White House in February explicitly mentioned the improvement of South Korea-Japan relations and identified trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan as one of the ten core lines of effort, expanding its scope beyond existing North Korean nuclear countermeasures to serve as a major mechanism for regional peace and prosperity. It promotes trilateral cooperation and South Korea-Japan cooperation in areas ranging from regional security, such as security cooperation for stability in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait, support for ASEAN centrality, and enhancement of supply chain stability and resilience, to economic and technological fields, such as advanced technology development and regional infrastructure support.

In response to these domestic and international demands, President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol promised to improve South Korea-Japan relations during his presidential campaign, vowing to usher in a "Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Declaration 2.0 era." This partnership declaration, announced in 1998, proposed cooperation tasks across various fields, including politics, security, economy, culture, and climate change/environment, while acknowledging history and looking toward the future. To implement such comprehensive cooperation anew, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration must ① possess concrete policies and methodologies, ② have the communication skills to shape public opinion and gain parliamentary support for its policies, and ③ effectively utilize the knowledge and assets of relevant organizations within the government. The transition committee must seek and prepare a response posture that achieves a trinity of policy, communication, and organizational utilization regarding Japan.

II. Review of the Moon Jae-in Administration

1. Policy Review

The first task for the transition committee's foreign affairs and national security division is a thorough review of existing policies toward Japan. Transition committees have often tended to act like occupying forces, focusing on differentiating themselves from the policies of the previous administration. Even when new policy brands are introduced, the substance often remains largely unchanged. Therefore, it is problematic for campaign pledges made within the limited timeframe of an election campaign to displace existing policies and become the policies of the next administration. The transition committee must thoroughly review existing policies, changing what needs to be changed and retaining what should be inherited, to enrich and refine the content of its pledges. The starting point is a thorough verification of the achievements and failures of the Moon administration's diplomacy toward Japan.

The keyword of the Moon Jae-in administration's policy toward Japan was "Two-track diplomacy." The Park Geun-hye administration, by directly targeting the comfort women issue and refusing summit meetings with Japan unless specific measures were taken, adopted what could be called "one-track diplomacy," leading to a freeze in overall bilateral relations. President Moon Jae-in, learning from this, clearly recognized the need to avoid a situation where the entire bilateral relationship freezes due to historical issues and pursued "two-track diplomacy," separating historical issues from security and economic cooperation matters to improve relations. However, on the historical track, the administration effectively hollowed out the 2015 South Korea-Japan agreement on comfort women and consistently took a hardline stance, such as supporting the Supreme Court's ruling on compensation for forced labor. On the cooperation track, disagreements arose regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, and the administration responded lukewarmly to regional cooperation initiatives led by Japan, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Indo-Pacific Strategy, citing Japan's leadership role. Furthermore, when the Abe administration, dissatisfied with the South Korean government's response to the forced labor ruling, abruptly imposed export controls on three key semiconductor materials, the Moon administration retaliated, engaging in tit-for-tat trade retaliation and expanding the conflict to security issues, thus driving the two-track diplomacy to a state of collapse.

The primary responsibility for this state of collapse lies with the Abe administration's revisionist view of history and its handling of historical issues based on that perspective. However, this was a known reality, and the two-track diplomacy strategy should have been formulated with this in mind. The problem is that it was nearly impossible to practically separate historical issues from other matters, fighting over historical issues while simultaneously pursuing cooperation in security, economy, culture, and other specific areas. The Moon administration moved in this direction, and consequently, the negative perception of Japan, exacerbated by the comfort women dispute, hindered cooperation on specific issues. In essence, we learned that cooperation on specific issues is possible when historical conflicts are managed to some extent, and conversely, trust can be built through cooperation on specific issues, which can then lead to a more cooperative approach to historical conflicts.

Two-track diplomacy is merely a methodology for managing and improving South Korea-Japan relations; the Moon administration's policy toward Japan lacked clear objectives. The question, "What is the purpose of improving relations?" lacked a satisfactory answer. This can be attributed, first and foremost, to an underestimation of Japan's strategic importance. As Japan's economic standing relatively declined, the economic incentives for South Korea's trade with Japan also relatively decreased, and its strategic importance in security matters also diminished. In particular, the Moon administration, which prioritized inter-Korean relations and the Korean Peninsula peace process as its primary foreign policy objectives, perceived Japan's strategic role as minor and even as a spoiler.

When the incentives for functional cooperation are low, the likelihood of historical conflict increases. This is also why the Moon administration effectively hollowed out the comfort women agreement, delayed follow-up measures, and virtually neglected diplomatic responses to the Supreme Court's forced labor ruling.

However, by downgrading Japan's strategic value, South Korea incurred unexpectedly significant diplomatic burdens. Distancing itself from Japan weakened trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan on North Korea and negatively impacted South Korea-US relations. Furthermore, it restricted South Korea's regional diplomatic scope. As Japan-led regional cooperation mechanisms such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership emerged as central pillars for regional development, security, and trade cooperation, South Korea's room for maneuver was reduced by distancing itself from Japan. This was a consequence of underestimating Japan's strategic importance.

2. Review of Communication Capabilities

The second task for the transition committee is a rigorous evaluation of the leader's leadership and communication skills. The President is not only the appointing authority who selects competent experts for appropriate positions but also acts as a diplomat on the front lines of South Korea-Japan diplomacy. This is because South Korea-Japan relations are significantly influenced by public opinion, and the leader's communication, actions, and image play a crucial role in shaping that opinion. During his campaign, President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol criticized the current strained South Korea-Japan relations as a result of the Moon Jae-in administration's excessive focus on domestic politics in handling bilateral relations, and pledged to approach relations with Japan pragmatically. Let us first examine the aspect of domestic communication, namely, cooperation with the National Assembly and opposition parties, and the process of shaping public opinion.

President Moon Jae-in, whether intentionally or unintentionally, stood at the forefront of diplomacy toward Japan. The Blue House and the ruling party in South Korea, which led the hardline response, cannot escape responsibility for the bilateral relationship deteriorating beyond separation and control over the past five years. In particular, since publicly vowing to nullify and renegotiate the comfort women agreement during his presidential campaign in 2017, the President (Blue House) directly issued statements on key issues such as negative assessments of the comfort women agreement and official remarks on historical issues, all underpinned by intense anti-Japanese nationalism.

The Moon Jae-in administration, judging that Japan under Shinzo Abe, a historical revisionist, was becoming increasingly right-wing, strengthened identity politics against Japan's right-wing shift. The Blue House and the ruling party continuously expressed strong anti-Japanese sentiments through slogans such as "No Japan," "No Abe," and "An Unshakable Nation" in response to the Japanese government's retaliatory measures following the Supreme Court's forced labor ruling. The term "native Japanese collaborators" (to-chak waegu) even emerged. As a result of the strong exclusive nationalism being expressed politically, diplomacy toward Japan became a subject of domestic political contention.

A public opinion poll conducted in November 2021 by the East Asia Institute and Korea Research shows a sharp division in public opinion on South Korea-Japan relations between conservative and progressive camps. As shown in <Table 2>, conservative voters prioritize "future-oriented cooperation" (45%) over "finding a solution to historical issues" (25%) as the top priority for the next administration's policy toward Japan, while progressive voters prioritize "finding a solution to historical issues" (53%) over "future-oriented cooperation" (23.8%). Similar to the starkly divided opinions on North Korea and US policy between conservatives and progressives, policy toward Japan has also become a subject of political contention.

<Table 2> Ideological Polarization of Foreign Policy

Source: East Asia Institute, "Conditions for Presidential Success & Perceptions of New Administration's Foreign Policy Proposals" Survey (2021)

The ideological and domestic political framing of foreign policy, with the President and the Blue House acting as the primary messengers, has had a significantly negative impact on Japanese public opinion. According to the 2020 South Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey, while the favorability rating of the Japanese public towards South Korea was 26%, the favorability rating towards President Moon Jae-in was only around 1%. When the other country's public expresses strong dislike towards one's own leader, diplomacy (especially public diplomacy) towards that country faces considerable challenges. In the same year, the positive evaluation of the Moon Jae-in administration's policy toward Japan among Japanese people was 2.8%, while the negative evaluation was 57.3% (for comparison, the positive evaluation of the Abe administration's policy toward South Korea among South Koreans was 5.4%, and the negative evaluation was 78.4%).

3. Review of Organizational Capacity and Function

Third, it is necessary to evaluate the capacity and function of government organizations dealing with Japan. It is important to examine whether the President has properly understood and effectively utilized the vast government organizations he leads in pursuing policies toward Japan. This includes reviewing whether the limitations of a "Blue House government" in Japan policy were exposed, the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the responsible ministry, and the relationship with civil society.

The President's direct involvement in foreign affairs signifies the Blue House's leadership in diplomacy. When the Blue House formulates major policies and ministries execute them, the policy authority of the cabinet and ministers is reduced. In the Moon Jae-in administration, the Blue House's National Security Office, as the control tower for foreign affairs and national security policy, went beyond coordinating policies among ministries to lead major policy decisions and even engaged in direct diplomatic negotiations depending on the issue. During the Park Geun-hye administration, the Chief Secretary to the President led the comfort women agreement through secret negotiations with Japan, and in the Moon Jae-in administration, the Blue House National Security Office and the Civil Affairs Senior Secretary's Office have been responsible for handling comfort women and forced labor issues. High-level negotiations to resolve diplomatic conflicts after the forced labor ruling and the announcement of the termination of the GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement) were led and announced by the Blue House. While it is understandable for the Blue House to engage in negotiations with North Korea, which cannot be considered a diplomatic relationship, the Blue House directly engaging in negotiations with Japan instead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is highly controversial.

As the Blue House increasingly takes the lead in foreign policy, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the responsible ministry, merely executing it, decisions are made with limited information signals. When the President distances himself from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he manages, and relies on Blue House aides for decision-making on South Korea-Japan relations and policies toward Japan, he faces significant obstacles in interpreting the signals he receives. This is largely due to the political nature of the Blue House organization. Blue House aides are fundamentally tasked with assisting the President and are sensitive to his approval ratings. Many of its key members are often former campaign staff. After the election, they enter the Blue House and conduct an "eternal campaign." When major foreign policy issues are judged through the prism of public support, significant distortions can occur. Instead of approaching South Korea-Japan relations with a long-term perspective—a century-long plan—or understanding their multifaceted and complex nature encompassing history, economy, security, and climate change, decisions are dominated by the short-term popularity/approval ratings that the policies might generate.

Under a Blue House-led system, policy accountability declines. The power of the Blue House, which depends on the President's personal trust rather than institutional authority, is inherently arbitrary, closed, and lacks clear lines of responsibility. In the case of the 2015 comfort women agreement review, it is difficult to ascertain responsibility afterward, as instructions were given not only through written documents but also via phone calls. This can be seen as contrary to the principles of responsible politics and democratic diplomacy.

Finally, when work is concentrated in the Blue House, it leads to an overload of work, resulting in a focus on short-term responses or missed opportunities for timely action. Following the Supreme Court's forced labor ruling in October 2018, the South Korean government failed to establish a clear position on Japan's requests for diplomatic consultations and mediation by a third party, leading to a breakdown in bilateral relations due to the Abe administration's retaliatory export control measures. Furthermore, the lack of responsible government response after the review of the comfort women agreement and the dissolution of the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation can also be cited. The concentration of policy decision-making power in the Blue House resulted in inaction, which led to diplomatic difficulties. In summary, while the Blue House exercised excessive authority relative to its organizational capacity, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, despite its considerable organizational capacity, suffered from under-empowerment and under-utilization.

III. Six Policy Recommendations

1. The first task for the new administration and the transition committee regarding policy toward Japan is to establish the basic direction and goals. The "Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Declaration 2.0" proposed by the new administration is a principled declaration of "future-oriented cooperation based on correct historical perception." To concretize this, the new administration should set a common goal of jointly shaping the future and a new order in the region with Japan, and adopt a strategy of restoring lost mutual trust by pursuing exchanges and cooperation with an attitude of resolving common challenges at a regional and global level, not just at a specific bilateral level, while seeking progress in resolving historical issues.

2. The new administration should resolve the two major historical issues, namely the comfort women and forced labor issues, early in its term. Regarding the comfort women issue, it should maintain a stance of respecting the past agreement and proceeding with follow-up measures. For the forced labor issue, instead of demanding an apology from Japan, it would be desirable to declare that there will be no further monetary demands.

3. The new administration should be prepared to proactively engage in future-oriented cooperation initiatives. Bilateral cooperation agendas in the region span various issue areas such as security, trade, investment, development, advanced technology, climate change, energy, and culture. These are largely related to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. Key areas for cooperation between South Korea and Japan include addressing actions that threaten the rules-based regional order, the North Korean nuclear issue, attempts to alter the status quo by force, economic coercion, defending the free trade system, human rights, advanced technology development, and ensuring supply chain resilience. Among these, South Korea's accession to the CPTPP and cooperation in Quad Plus are particularly important issues that will serve as benchmarks for future bilateral cooperation, requiring careful coordination with Japan.

4. The President should pursue policies toward Japan with an emphasis on cooperation with the opposition party and national consensus. The government and the President can build the political support necessary for leadership through thoughtful communication on major foreign policy issues, fostering cooperation from the opposition party and national unity. Conversely, when political division and confrontation arise, policy failures are inevitable. At the heart of this is the sentiment of exclusive nationalism, which, while sometimes serving the positive function of mobilizing national capabilities, also has the negative effect of severely undermining the autonomy of foreign policy and hindering pragmatic approaches. The President and the government must demonstrate the political leadership to overcome the temptation of anti-Japanese nationalism. This can be achieved through leveraging private sector capabilities and by reforming the policy decision-making system.

5. Private sector knowledge and networks should be utilized. To reduce the existing anti-Japanese and anti-Korean sentiments in both countries and restore trust, the new administration must actively enlist the power of the private sector to move beyond exclusive nationalistic identities. Efforts should be made to build mutual trust and broaden the scope of public understanding and empathy by accumulating experiences in private-level historical dialogues and joint historical development. Within such spaces, both countries can move beyond a self-centered view of history or a narrow perspective of understanding the other country solely through bilateral relations or matters related to their own country, and create opportunities to view the other from various perspectives and construct complex identities for mutual coexistence.

6. Above all, the authority of the Blue House in diplomacy toward Japan must be reduced and its coordinating function strengthened. The new administration should delegate the authority for policy decisions and negotiations toward Japan to the responsible ministry, and the Blue House should reorganize and operate to focus more on its core secretarial functions. As pointed out earlier, policy toward Japan is closely linked not only to bilateral relations but also to US-China relations, South Korea-US relations, regional diplomacy, and economic diplomacy. The Blue House should be reorganized to serve as a control tower, coordinating policies among responsible ministries, rather than directly leading policy. In particular, direct diplomatic negotiations by the Blue House should be limited in scope. For handling historical issues, an appropriate policy decision-making structure must be established. An organic governance system should be created among the responsible ministry, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, other relevant ministries, civil society organizations, the Blue House National Security Office, and the Civil Affairs Senior Secretary's Office.■

■ Author: Son Yeol_President of EAI, Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. His research areas include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, with T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, with Jan Melissen), “South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking,” The Pacific Review (2019), 32, 6, <South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy> (2017, co-edited), <South Korea's Choices After the Crisis: Global Financial Crisis, Order Transformation, and South Korea's Economic Diplomacy> (2020, co-edited), and (2020, co-edited).

■ Managed and Edited by: Lee Seung-yeon_EAI Researcher

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