[EAI Special Report] To the Presidential Transition Committee's Foreign Affairs and National Security Team ②_Closely Link North Korea Policy with Foreign Policy

I. Challenges in Establishing and Deciding North Korea Policy

A new major trend is emerging that influences South Korea's North Korea policy decision-making system. The international environment for North Korea policy has changed due to intensifying conflict and competition between the US and China. Perceptions of North Korea and prospects for unification, encompassing inter-Korean relations as a whole, are also shifting. Notably, intergenerational shifts in perception are acting as a significant driver. As South Korea's national power has grown, there are increasing calls for South Korean diplomacy to pursue a broader national interest, particularly a diplomacy of advanced nations that leads international norms, rather than a narrow definition of national interest.

First, US-China relations are rapidly evolving into a pattern of conflict and competition over each nation's core and strategic interests. Amidst US-China conflict, the North Korean nuclear issue was a matter based on the consensus of the US, China, and the international community, concerning the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, as US-China relations become increasingly confrontational, broader and more fundamental geopolitical issues, such as the future of North Korea, the situation on the Korean Peninsula after denuclearization, and the future of the ROK-US alliance, have begun to intervene deeply. North Korea has been advancing its intercontinental ballistic missiles through multiple missile test launches since 2022. If North Korea acquires the capability to directly strike the US mainland, a significant shift will occur not only in North Korea-US relations but also in the security landscape of Northeast Asia. With the US-Russia conflict reaching its peak due to the situation in Ukraine, the strategic solidarity between China and Russia has also emerged as an important variable. If North Korea withdraws its moratorium on nuclear and missile tests and proceeds with full-scale nuclear and missile test launches, further sanctions by the United Nations (UN) will be determined by the attitudes of China and Russia. As conflicts between great powers escalate, the possibility of weakening international consensus on the North Korean nuclear issue is increasing.

In the medium to long term, even if North Korea is denuclearized and a peace regime is established on the Korean Peninsula, various policy challenges will remain. If a peace regime is established, will inter-Korean relations improve in all aspects? Will South Korea's influence over North Korea be further strengthened, and will North Korea-US relations improve? Will China's influence over North Korea decrease? Will the rationale for strengthening the ROK-US alliance's combined military power weaken in this process? Will South Korea's impetus to participate in the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy diminish? These regional geopolitical issues related to the North Korean nuclear problem and the Korean Peninsula peace process will become increasingly important. As the calculations of interest among surrounding countries, including the US and China, intensify regarding North Korea policy and the future of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea must strategically establish a close link between its North Korea policy and foreign policy.

Second, as the division lengthens and heterogeneity between North and South Korea expands, perceptions of the costs of division and the necessity of unification are changing. While national consensus on the necessity of unification still exists, perceptions of its benefits and prospects are gradually changing. In particular, the perception of younger generations, who have had no opportunity to build a collective identity with North Korea, is indeed determined by negative factors such as the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korean provocations, and the poor economic situation. Negative perceptions of the costs of unification, such as the economic burden of unification costs and the heterogeneity with North Korea, have increased. Changes in perceptions of identity between North and South Korea will significantly impact future North Korea policy. A North Korea policy that ultimately aims for unification, a North Korea policy focused on peaceful coexistence, and a North Korea policy that even leaves open the possibility of two states will differ greatly. Future North Korea policy must be multifaceted, actively reflecting changes in civil society's perceptions and future prospects, while also being capable of leading them.

Third, discussions are increasing regarding the need for South Korea to pursue an advanced nation's diplomacy that exerts greater influence on the international community as its national power and influence grow. This means engaging in diplomacy that influences the establishment of multilateral rules and norms in various parts of the international community, beyond a narrow definition of national interest. When formulating North Korea policy, while national interests such as peace on the Korean Peninsula and unification are important, it is argued that North Korea policy should serve broader objectives, such as nuclear non-proliferation, peace in Northeast Asia, promoting cooperation between the US and China, and establishing a Northeast Asian multilateral regime through support for North Korea. However, when South Korea pursues North Korea policy for the sake of enhancing its national power, it cannot be denied that neighboring countries may feel uneasy and perceive a need for containment towards South Korea, which already possesses considerable national power. Therefore, North Korea policy must consider the prospect that a peaceful Korean Peninsula, and eventually a unified Korea, will contribute to the international community through advanced nation diplomacy.

II. Problems with the North Korea Policy Decision-Making System

Considering the rapidly changing policy environment, the following points highlight areas that require attention and have been insufficient in the North Korea policy decision-making system to date. First, there is the issue of whether a systematic policy formulation and implementation system exists to realize the President's will regarding North Korea policy. There is no doubt that the President's thoughts and will are paramount in North Korea policy. A systematic and organized decision-making and execution process is necessary to implement the President's intentions. It is true that loyalty to the President and expertise on specific policy issues have often been in conflict. Policies have tended to be driven by individuals and ministries with high loyalty rather than by the responsible departments with expertise, leading to problems in the subsequent implementation process.

Second, there is the issue of the comprehensiveness and scope of participation in the North Korea policy decision-making process. When setting the overall direction and content of North Korea strategy and nuclear strategy, there is often insufficient bottom-up consensus-building within the government. Policies are announced based on decisions made by the President and key personnel in the Presidential Office, and sometimes even the responsible departments and ministers are unaware of these decisions at the time. It is also frequent for North Korea negotiations and diplomatic engagements to proceed based on the key concerns of the Presidential Office. This process can lead to policies that reflect partial concerns rather than the overall strategic content, and the original intentions may be distorted or insufficiently understood.

Third, there is the issue of inter-ministerial competition surrounding North Korea policy. While competition among policy departments regarding North Korea policy can be healthy, excessive competition can lead to mutual checks and conflicts. In particular, North Korea policy can generate competition among ministries with different types of responsibilities. Competition and conflict can also arise between policy departments and intelligence agencies. Due to the difficulty in obtaining information related to North Korea, issues of information scarcity and monopolization by individual departments can occur, and communication between departments becomes difficult due to the secretive nature of North Korea policy. Furthermore, inter-ministerial efforts may be limited as policies can be driven by ministries prioritized by the President.

Fourth, there is the issue of insufficient consideration for medium- to long-term policies and inadequate coordination with broader foreign policy. While negotiations with North Korea are central to North Korea policy, diplomacy with interested parties such as the US and China is crucial. Furthermore, conveying the core content of policies to the international community and cooperation among various ministries, including the Ministry of Unification, the National Intelligence Service, and the Ministry of National Defense, for future planning of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula are essential. Insufficient regular and comprehensive consultations within the Presidential Office can hinder close coordination and consultation among North Korea, foreign, and defense policies. Additionally, since North Korea policy must be continuously coordinated with overall foreign policy, there must be a medium- to long-term planning body capable of continuously re-evaluating and reconsidering the paradigm of North Korea policy. An evaluation is needed on whether sufficient efforts have been made to contribute to policy formulation through the systematization of private sector participation committees, advisory bodies, and academic-governmental collaborative research.

III. Recommendations for North Korea Policy Direction and Decision-Making System

1. Complementing and Strengthening the President's Policy Direction

The overall direction and philosophy of North Korea policy are determined by the President. North Korea policy has been an important electoral agenda since presidential elections, and it cannot be entirely free from the existing domestic political framework of progressive and conservative ideologies. Upon becoming President and formulating and implementing policy, efforts to complement, revise, and adapt the policy direction presented during the election campaign to the changing international and Korean Peninsula situations are essential. Changing the framework of North Korea policy presented during the election campaign can be politically burdensome domestically.

For a conservative government, key policy elements may include pursuing inter-Korean relations based on reciprocity, advancing inter-Korean relations with North Korea's denuclearization as a prerequisite, and maintaining and strengthening deterrence against North Korea and economic sanctions. Even if the door for dialogue with North Korea is kept open, negotiations for North Korea's denuclearization will be difficult unless active attention is paid to North Korea's regime security and practical measures for a peace process are prepared. The government must concretize its policies before its inauguration to implement a policy that appropriately combines deterrence, sanctions, and engagement.

The organizational structure within the Presidential Office, various ministries, and advisory committees that can support the President's policy direction is crucial. Depending on the President's decision, North Korea policy can be managed under a cabinet system or a presidential aide system. Both systems have their strengths and weaknesses, making careful selection important. In a cabinet system, inter-ministerial competition and differing opinions may exist, similar to bureaucratic decision-making models, and the individual minister's views may gain greater importance. In a presidential aide system, the President's intentions are directly reflected, but there are difficulties in attributing responsibility solely to the President.

The President's North Korea policy is determined through the election campaign and the Presidential Transition Committee. During this process, efforts are needed to establish a policy direction based on objective information and responsible consensus-building. Due to the nature of election campaigns, there are inherent difficulties such as a lack of objective information or distorted rational decision-making. Accurate evaluation of the previous administration's policy achievements and thorough supplementation of flawed policy premises and approaches are also tasks to be undertaken during the transition period, and efforts must be made to gain the consensus and agreement of the entire nation.

Advisory committees with diverse and efficient opinions that the President can utilize are also important. Advisory committees are crucial for communication with civil society and expert groups, and for promoting the government's stance. It is necessary to pursue efficient and proactive operation. To comprehensively and systematically reorganize the President's policy agenda, a bottom-up review of each policy area immediately after taking office could be considered. Objective reviews conducted by a core group comprising government officials and experts can help refine policy content beneficial for a five-year term.

2. Comprehensive Planning of North Korea Policy and Foreign Policy

The next administration will be the first to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue and inter-Korean relations within a full-fledged US-China conflict structure. The Biden administration has framed the North Korean nuclear issue as an issue for cooperation with China, but it is true that the possibility of such US-China cooperation is diminishing amidst escalating US-China tensions. North Korea also perceives the current international political situation as a new Cold War and appears to be strategically positioning itself to leverage the US-China competition for its own benefit and to formulate long-term strategies. Further UN sanctions against North Korea's nuclear and missile test launches are also expected to become increasingly difficult amidst US-China-Russia confrontation, and China is likely to pursue multifaceted support for North Korea while being increasingly wary of North Korea's weakening. The next administration faces the challenge of linking its North Korea strategy with its foreign strategy in this altered international environment.

It is important to reflect in the policy decision-making process the fact that North Korea policy extends beyond the dimension of inter-Korean relations to closely involve US-China relations, diplomacy with surrounding great powers, and regional diplomacy. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of National Defense, and the National Intelligence Service are all important institutions involved in North Korea policy, the National Security Office of the Presidential Office can be considered the ultimate body responsible for overseeing and deciding on the entirety of North Korea policy. It will be necessary to have a working-level organization capable of responding to changes in US-China relations and an organization responsible for North Korea and nuclear strategy, fostering close cooperation and joint planning.

To engage in effective negotiations with North Korea, it is necessary to approach negotiations with a coordinated policy among surrounding countries. It is necessary to establish and coordinate South Korea's positions on the definition of North Korea's denuclearization, the importance of North Korea's denuclearization within the international non-proliferation regime, the significance of the North Korean nuclear issue distinct from great power competition, the relationship between denuclearization and the peace process, and discussions on UN sanctions against North Korea. In particular, if negotiations with North Korea are conducted without coordination with the US and China on all matters related to the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korea will exploit the differences in views between these countries to broaden its strategic room for maneuver.

In terms of the policy decision-making system, the Moon Jae-in administration had First and Second Secretaries responsible for defense security and foreign affairs and unification, respectively, which was a system for planning policy through consultations among personnel dispatched from each ministry. It is necessary to oversee the respective ministries' areas of responsibility, respond to changing circumstances, and plan new North Korea policies. To this end, rapid situation analysis and policy planning under the National Security Office will be required.

These responses are often difficult for the working-level departments dealing with North Korea policy. To make decisions on North Korea policy while analyzing changes in the diplomatic environment, such as shifts in US-China relations, a department focused on situation analysis is needed. Within the National Security Office, a department dedicated to analysis, evaluation, and planning may face a challenging environment where it is difficult to sustain itself without engaging in direct implementation. However, the importance of policy planning must be repeatedly emphasized, and a planning department that maintains a distance from implementation or policy execution, or planning activities for specific policy agendas, must be guaranteed.

3. Securing a Healthy Linkage between Civil Society, Domestic Politics, and North Korea Policy

North Korea policy is a policy planned and executed in close relation with public opinion and domestic politics. It is a policy issue that forms the core of domestic progressive-conservative conflict, and public opinion reacts very sensitively to North Korea policy. While it would be ideal for North Korea policy to pursue national interest, peace on the Korean Peninsula, and unification independently of domestic political considerations, it is more realistic to consider how to establish a connection with domestic politics.

In reality, the departments within the National Security Office responsible for North Korea, defense, and security do not engage in sufficiently close exchanges of opinions and cooperation with the Senior Secretariats for Political Affairs, Public Communication, and Civil Society under the Presidential Secretariat. Efforts are needed to foster active mutual communication between the various secretariats within the Presidential Secretariat and the various departments within the National Security Office to accurately grasp changing public opinion and to facilitate productive competition in domestic political discourse regarding the policies being pursued.

Especially in a situation where the gap in opinions within South Korea regarding North Korea policy is rapidly widening between generations, and the views of younger generations on North Korea and unification are rapidly changing, civil society and public relations efforts are also linked to North Korea policy. It is necessary to project the goal of establishing a cooperative relationship between North Korea policy, civil society, and domestic politics into the North Korea policy decision-making process.

4. Establishing Continuity in North Korea Policy Across Administrations

South Korea adopts a five-year single-term presidential system, and North Korea policy is pursued within a two-party competitive structure between progressives and conservatives, leading to issues concerning the continuity of North Korea policy. While it was assumed that North Korea policy would change with each change in the ruling party, continuity in North Korea policy has also existed. Based on military deterrence and defense against North Korea, policies consistent with international sanctions against North Korea have been pursued. Simultaneously, efforts have been made to develop inter-Korean relations and pursue a peace process on the Korean Peninsula through continuous dialogue and compromise with North Korea. Although there are differences between parties in the approach and philosophy towards unification, most have jointly strived for a path towards peaceful and gradual unification, where North Korea itself develops as a member of the international community, reducing the economic gap between North and South and pursuing smooth unification.

The domestic and international perception that North Korea policy changes with each change of government in South Korea reduces the efficiency of policies within a five-year term and shortens the effective policy implementation period. If both major parties pursue policies that reflect a unified perception and direction of South Korean citizens regarding North Korea policy, there can be more continuity than differences. South Korean citizens generally still consider unification an important goal and value continuous dialogue and compromise with North Korea, despite conflicts.

To ensure continuity, the government needs to formally announce to both domestic and international audiences the overall direction, policy vision, guiding principles, and policy content of North Korea policy to be pursued during its five-year term. While there have been instances of governments publishing policy content in documents or books from the Presidential Office and relevant ministries, these have varied in format, content, and systematic coherence. In foreign countries, legislatures often legally require the publication of important foreign policy directions, compelling governments to consider the impact of policies not only within their term but also beyond. Furthermore, documents containing the organized policy content attract significant international attention, facilitate a clear understanding of the South Korean government's views, and aid in identifying continuity between administrations. It is necessary to move towards a direction where policy content accumulates and continuity is secured by establishing, through legislation, the publication of strategic documents at the Presidential Office level, exceeding the scope of the current foreign and security ministries' white papers, and publishing documents on medium- to long-term plans that extend beyond the current term.

5. Efforts to Broaden the Fundamental Understanding of North Korea Policy in South Korea

As the North Korean nuclear issue has persisted for 30 years, the scope of overall problem recognition concerning the Korean Peninsula, inter-Korean relations, and the future of North Korea has continuously expanded. This is because the North Korean nuclear issue is not merely limited to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or the dismantling of North Korean weaponry, but is directly linked to issues of North Korea's regime security, peaceful coexistence between a denuclearized North and South, and the establishment of a peace regime. South Korea's perspective, which is compelled to comprehensively consider the future status of North Korea as a political entity and inter-Korean relations, is not necessarily the same as that of surrounding countries.

The United States tends to view the North Korean nuclear issue primarily from the perspective of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while China seeks to gain diplomatic advantages in the context of US-China conflict and the rise of regional powers by strengthening relations with North Korea, its sole ally. To consider the multidimensional issues embedded in the North Korean nuclear problem and implement them as policy, coordinating perceptions with important countries regarding North Korea policy is crucial. This goes beyond coordinating short-term issues and is linked to fundamental problems such as the division of the Korean Peninsula and the future of North Korea.

It is difficult for the government, which must focus on short-term pressing issues, to simultaneously undertake this task through a two-track approach. Instead, the foundation for perception coordination should be laid through the revitalization of Track 2 strategic dialogues among expert groups and the strengthening of government public diplomacy. The government has shown many shortcomings in managing systematic and effective Track 2 dialogues, consuming policy resources on addressing short-term issues. Multi-dimensional strategic dialogues are needed that accurately convey South Korea's positions while accommodating the diverse positions of surrounding countries and proposing alternatives. Even for Track 2 strategic dialogues, internal coordination is necessary to accurately convey South Korea's positions through constant coordination with the government.

It is common for expert groups or think tanks within South Korea to fail to coordinate qualitatively effective strategic dialogues with neighboring countries, and the government often fails to gain policy advantages from such cooperation. Efforts should also be made to reduce instances where multiple groups conduct overlapping strategic dialogues, sending inconsistent policy messages or wasting policy resources. The government must strive to build a foundation for North Korea policy by establishing a systematic Track 2 strategic dialogue framework.■

■ Author: Jeon Jae-seong_Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies and Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His major research areas include international political theory, international relations history, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works and edited volumes include "Threat of War and Peace Between North and South Korea" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Managed and Edited by: Lee Seung-yeon_Researcher at EAI

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