[EAI Special Report] A Message to the Presidential Transition Committee's Foreign Affairs and National Security Team ②_Closely Link North Korea Policy with Foreign Policy

I. Challenges in Establishing and Deciding North Korea Policy

A new major trend is emerging that influences South Korea's North Korea policy decision-making system. The international environment for North Korea policy has changed due to intensifying conflict and competition between the US and China. Perceptions of North Korea and prospects for unification, among other aspects of inter-Korean relations, are also changing. In particular, changes in perception between generations are acting as a significant driving force. As South Korea's national power has grown, there are increasing calls for South Korean diplomacy to pursue a broader national interest, particularly a diplomacy of advanced nations that leads international norms, rather than a narrow national interest.

First, US-China relations are rapidly evolving into a conflict and competition over the core and strategic interests of both countries. Amidst US-China conflict, the North Korean nuclear issue was a matter based on the consensus of the US, China, and the international community, concerning the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, as US-China relations become increasingly tense, broader and more fundamental geopolitical issues, such as the future of North Korea, the situation on the Korean Peninsula after denuclearization, and the future of the ROK-US alliance, have begun to be deeply involved. North Korea is advancing its intercontinental ballistic missiles through multiple missile launch tests in 2022. If North Korea acquires the capability to directly strike the US mainland, a significant change will occur in the security landscape not only between North Korea and the US but also in Northeast Asia. With the US-Russia conflict reaching its peak due to the situation in Ukraine, the strategic solidarity between China and Russia has also emerged as an important variable. If North Korea withdraws its nuclear and missile moratorium in the future and begins full-scale nuclear and missile test launches, additional sanctions by the United Nations (UN) will depend on the attitudes of China and Russia. As conflicts between great powers escalate, the possibility of weakening international consensus on the North Korean nuclear issue is increasing.

In the medium to long term, even if North Korea is denuclearized and a peace regime is established on the Korean Peninsula, various policy challenges will remain. If a peace regime is established, will inter-Korean relations improve in all aspects? Will South Korea's influence over North Korea be strengthened and North Korea-US relations improve? Will China's influence over North Korea decrease? Will the rationale for strengthening the ROK-US alliance's combined military power weaken in this process? Will South Korea's momentum to participate in the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy decrease? Regional geopolitical issues related to the North Korean nuclear issue and the Korean Peninsula peace process are becoming increasingly important. Amidst the intensifying calculations of interests by surrounding countries, including the US and China, regarding North Korea policy and the future of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea must strategically establish a close link between North Korea policy and foreign policy.

Second, as the division has prolonged and heterogeneity between North and South Korea has expanded, perceptions of the costs of division and the necessity of unification are changing. While there is still national consensus on the necessity of unification, perceptions of the benefits and prospects of unification are gradually changing. In particular, the perception of North Korea among generations who have had no opportunity to build a collective identity with North Korea is, in fact, determined by negative factors such as the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korean provocations, and poor economic conditions. Negative perceptions of the costs of unification, such as the economic burden of unification costs and heterogeneity with North Korea, have increased. Changes in perceptions of identity between North and South Korea will have a significant impact on future North Korea policy. North Korea policies that ultimately aim for unification, those that focus on peaceful coexistence, and those that even leave open the possibility of two states have significant differences. Future North Korea policy must be made into a multifaceted policy that actively reflects changes in civil society's perceptions and future prospects, while also being able to lead them.

Third, as South Korea's national power and influence have grown, discussions are increasing that South Korea should pursue a diplomacy of advanced nations that exerts greater influence on the international community. This means pursuing diplomacy that influences the establishment of multilateral rules and norms in various parts of the international community, beyond a narrow definition of national interest. When establishing North Korea policy, while the national interest of peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula is important, it is linked to the argument that North Korea policy should serve greater purposes such as nuclear non-proliferation, peace in Northeast Asia, promotion of US-China cooperation, and the establishment of a multilateral regime in Northeast Asia through support for North Korea. When South Korea pursues North Korea policy for the sake of strengthening its national power, it cannot be denied that surrounding countries may feel anxiety and the need for containment towards South Korea, which already possesses considerable national power. North Korea policy that considers the prospect of South Korea pursuing advanced nation diplomacy that contributes to the international community, along with a peaceful Korean Peninsula and ultimately a unified Korea, is necessary.

II. Problems with the North Korea Policy Decision-Making System

Considering the rapidly changing policy environment, the following points should be noted regarding the North Korea policy decision-making system, and areas where it has been insufficient: First, the issue of whether a systematic policy establishment and execution system capable of realizing the president's will on North Korea policy has been put in place. There is no doubt that the president's thoughts and will are paramount in North Korea policy. A systematic and organized decision-making and execution process is necessary to implement the president's intentions. It is a fact that loyalty to the president and expertise on policy issues have often been in conflict. Policies have tended to be driven by individuals and ministries with high loyalty rather than by the responsible ministries with expertise, and problems have arisen in the subsequent implementation process.

Second, the issue of the comprehensiveness and scope of participation in the North Korea policy decision-making process. When setting the overall direction and content of North Korea strategy and nuclear strategy, there is often a lack of bottom-up consensus within the government. Policies are announced based on decisions centered around the president and key personnel in the Blue House, and sometimes the responsible departments and ministers are not even aware of these decisions at the time of announcement. Negotiations on North Korea and diplomatic negotiations are frequently conducted with a focus on the Blue House's main concerns. This process leads to policies that reflect partial concerns rather than the overall strategic content, and sometimes the original intentions are distorted or not fully understood.

Third, the issue of inter-ministerial competition surrounding North Korea policy. While competition between policy departments on North Korea policy can be healthy, excessive competition can lead to mutual checks and balances. In particular, competition can arise between ministries with different types of responsibilities in North Korea policy. Competition and conflict can also occur between policy departments and intelligence departments. Due to the difficulty in obtaining information related to North Korea, problems of insufficient information and information monopoly by each department arise, and communication between departments becomes difficult due to the secretive nature of North Korea policy. Furthermore, as policies may be operated with a focus on ministries prioritized by the president, the scope of government-wide efforts may be limited.

Fourth, the issue of insufficient consideration for medium- to long-term policies and insufficient coordination with broader foreign policy. While negotiations with North Korea are central to North Korea policy, diplomacy with interested parties such as the US and China is crucial. Furthermore, the transmission of core policy content to the international community, and cooperation processes among various ministries such as the Ministry of Unification, the National Intelligence Service, and the Ministry of National Defense, as well as future planning for a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, are essential. Insufficient regular comprehensive consultations within the Blue House can make close coordination and consultation between North Korea, foreign, and defense policies difficult. Additionally, since North Korea policy must be continuously coordinated with overall foreign policy, there must be a medium- to long-term planning body capable of continuously re-evaluating and reconsidering the North Korea policy paradigm. It is necessary to evaluate whether sufficient efforts have been made to contribute to policy formulation by systematizing private sector participation committees, advisory bodies, and academic-government-research cooperation.

III. Proposals for North Korea Policy Direction and Decision-Making System

1. Complementing and Strengthening the President's Policy Direction

The overall direction and philosophy of North Korea policy are determined by the president. North Korea policy has been an important election agenda since the presidential election and cannot be completely free from the domestic political framework of progressives and conservatives. When the president takes office and formulates and executes policy, efforts to complement and modify the policy direction presented during the election, and to adapt it to the changing international and Korean Peninsula situations, are essential. Changing the framework of North Korea policy presented during the election campaign can be a domestic political burden.

For a conservative government, key policy elements may include pursuing inter-Korean relations based on reciprocity, promoting inter-Korean relations with North Korean denuclearization as a prerequisite, and maintaining and strengthening deterrence against North Korea and economic sanctions. Even if the door for dialogue with North Korea is kept open, negotiations for North Korean denuclearization will be difficult unless active consideration for North Korea's regime security and practical measures for a peace process are prepared. The policy must be concretized before the government's inauguration to implement a policy that appropriately combines deterrence, sanctions, and engagement.

The internal organization of the Blue House, each ministry, and advisory committees that can support the president's policy direction are important. Depending on the president's decision, North Korea policy can be operated under a cabinet system or a presidential aide system. Both systems have their own advantages and disadvantages, so careful selection is important. In the case of a cabinet system, competition and differences of opinion between ministries may exist, similar to the bureaucratic decision-making model, and the individual minister's opinion may become more important. The aide system directly reflects the president's intentions, but it has the difficulty that responsibility ultimately rests with the president.

The president's North Korea policy is determined through the election campaign and the transition committee. In this process, efforts are needed to set the direction based on objective information and through responsible consensus-building. Due to the nature of election campaigns, there are difficulties such as a lack of objective information or distortion of rational decision-making. Evaluating the policy performance of the previous administration accurately, and sufficiently complementing the premises and approaches of flawed policies, are tasks that must be undertaken during the transition process, and public consensus and agreement must be obtained.

Advisory committees with diverse and efficient opinions that the president can utilize are also important. Advisory committees are important for communication with civil society and expert groups, and for promoting the government's position, and efficient and proactive operation is necessary. To comprehensively and systematically reorganize the president's policy agenda, a bottom-up review of each policy area immediately after taking office could be considered. Objective review by a core group composed of government officials and experts would help complement policy content beneficial for a five-year term.

2. Comprehensive Planning of North Korea Policy and Foreign Policy

The next government will be the first to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue and inter-Korean relations within a full-blown conflict structure between the US and China. The Biden administration has framed the North Korean nuclear issue as an issue of cooperation with China, but it is true that the possibility of such US-China cooperation is diminishing amidst escalating US-China conflict. North Korea also perceives the current international political situation as a new Cold War and appears to be formulating long-term strategies by leveraging the US-China competition structure to its advantage. Additional UN sanctions on North Korea's nuclear and missile test launches are also expected to become increasingly difficult amidst the confrontation between the US and China-Russia, and China is likely to pursue multifaceted support for North Korea while being increasingly wary of North Korea's weakening. The next government will face the challenge of linking its North Korea strategy with its foreign policy strategy in a changed international environment.

It is important to reflect in the policy-making process the fact that North Korea policy is closely related to US-China relations, diplomacy with surrounding great powers, and regional diplomacy, beyond the dimension of inter-Korean relations. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Peace and Cooperation Bureau, the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of National Defense, and the National Intelligence Service are all important institutions involved in North Korea policy, the National Security Office of the Blue House can be considered the institution that oversees the entirety of North Korea policy and makes decisions based on all aspects. It will be necessary to have a working-level organization capable of responding to changes in US-China relations and an organization responsible for North Korea and nuclear strategy, fostering close cooperation and joint planning.

To conduct effective negotiations with North Korea, negotiations must be approached with coordinated policies with surrounding countries. It is necessary to establish South Korea's position and coordinate views on the definition of North Korean denuclearization, the importance of North Korean denuclearization in the international non-proliferation regime, the importance of the North Korean nuclear issue distinct from great power competition, the relationship between denuclearization and the peace process, and discussions on UN sanctions against North Korea. In particular, if negotiations with North Korea are conducted without coordination with the US and China on all matters related to the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korea will try to exploit the differences in views between these countries to broaden its strategic room for maneuver.

In terms of the policy decision-making system, the Moon Jae-in administration had first and second secretaries responsible for defense and security, and foreign affairs and unification, respectively, which was a system of planning policy through consultations among personnel dispatched from each ministry. It is necessary to oversee the respective ministries' areas of responsibility, respond to changing situations, and plan new North Korea policies. Therefore, rapid situation analysis and policy planning under the National Security Office will be required.

These responses are often difficult for the working-level departments dealing with North Korea. To decide North Korea policy while analyzing changes in the diplomatic environment, such as changes in US-China relations, a department focused on situation analysis is needed. Within the National Security Office, it may be difficult for a department dedicated to analysis, evaluation, and planning to survive without engaging in working-level tasks. However, the importance of policy planning must be repeatedly emphasized, and a planning department that is distanced from working-level tasks or policy execution processes, or planning activities for each policy agenda, must be guaranteed.

3. Securing a Healthy Linkage between Civil Society, Domestic Politics, and North Korea Policy

North Korea policy is a policy planned and executed in close relation to public opinion and domestic politics. It is a policy issue that forms the core of domestic progressive-conservative conflict, and public opinion reacts very sensitively to North Korea policy. While it would be desirable for North Korea policy to pursue national interest, peace on the Korean Peninsula, and unification separately from domestic political considerations, it is more realistic to consider how to establish a connection with domestic politics.

In reality, departments within the National Security Office responsible for North Korea, defense, and security do not have active and close exchanges of opinions and cooperation with the offices of political affairs, public communication, and civil society under the Presidential Secretariat. It is necessary to strive for close mutual communication between the departments of the Presidential Secretariat and the departments of the National Security Office to accurately grasp changing public opinion and to foster productive competition in domestic political discourse regarding the policies being pursued.

In particular, as the gap in opinions among generations within the country regarding North Korea policy rapidly widens and the views of younger generations on North Korea and unification are rapidly changing, civil society and public relations work are also linked to North Korea policy. It is necessary to project the goal of establishing a cooperative relationship between North Korea policy, civil society, and domestic politics into the North Korea policy decision-making process.

4. Establishing a Consistent North Korea Policy Across Administrations

South Korea adopts a five-year single-term presidential system, and pursues North Korea policy within a two-party competitive structure of progressives and conservatives, which poses a problem regarding the continuity of North Korea policy. While it was thought that North Korea policy would change with changes in the ruling party, continuity in North Korea policy also exists. Based on military deterrence and defense against North Korea, policies consistent with international economic sanctions against North Korea have been pursued. At the same time, efforts have been made to develop inter-Korean relations and pursue a peace process on the Korean Peninsula through continuous dialogue and compromise with North Korea. Although there are differences between parties in the approach and philosophy of pursuing unification, most have jointly strived for a path of peaceful and gradual unification, reducing the economic gap between North and South Korea through development as a member of the international community.

The domestic and international perception that North Korea policy changes with changes in the South Korean government has the effect of reducing the efficiency of five-year term policies and shortening the actual policy implementation period. If both parties pursue policies that reflect the consistent perception and direction of the South Korean people regarding North Korea policy, there can be more continuity than differences. The South Korean people still generally consider unification an important goal and, despite conflicts with North Korea, value continuous dialogue and compromise.

To ensure continuity, the government needs to formally announce to the domestic and international communities the overall direction, policy vision and principles, and policy content of North Korea policy to be pursued during its five-year term. While there have been instances of governments publishing policy content in documents or books by the Blue House and relevant ministries, these have varied in format, content, and systematicity. In foreign countries, legislatures often legally require the publication of important foreign policy directions, leading governments to consider the impact beyond their term more carefully. Furthermore, documents containing the organized policy content attract significant international attention, provide a clear understanding of the South Korean government's views, and facilitate the identification of continuity between governments. It is necessary to move towards a direction where policy content accumulates and continuity is secured by gradually establishing by law the publication of strategic documents at the Blue House level, beyond the current white papers published by foreign affairs and security ministries, and the publication of documents on medium- to long-term plans that extend beyond the current term.

5. Efforts to Broaden the Fundamental Understanding of North Korea Policy in South Korea

As the North Korean nuclear issue has persisted for 30 years, the scope of overall problem recognition regarding the Korean Peninsula, inter-Korean relations, and the future of North Korea has continuously expanded. This is because the North Korean nuclear issue is not merely limited to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or the dismantling of North Korean weapons, but is directly linked to the issue of North Korea's regime security, peaceful coexistence between a denuclearized North and South Korea, and the establishment of a peace regime. South Korea's perspective, which inevitably considers the future status of North Korea as a political entity and inter-Korean relations comprehensively, is not necessarily the same as that of surrounding countries.

The United States tends to view the North Korean nuclear issue from the perspective of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and China seeks to gain diplomatic advantages in the context of US-China conflict and the rise of regional powers by strengthening relations with North Korea, its only ally. To consider the multidimensional issues embedded in the North Korean nuclear issue and implement them as policy, it is crucial to coordinate perceptions with important countries regarding North Korea policy. This goes beyond coordinating short-term issues and is related to fundamental issues such as the division of the Korean Peninsula and the future of North Korea.

It is difficult for the government, which must focus on short-term important issues, to simultaneously undertake this task on a two-track basis. Rather, the foundation for perceptual coordination should be laid by activating track-two strategic dialogues among expert groups and strengthening public diplomacy by the government. The government has shown many shortcomings in managing systematic and effective track-two dialogues by consuming policy resources on handling short-term issues. A multidimensional strategic dialogue is needed that reflects the government's position while accommodating the diverse positions of surrounding countries and proposing alternatives. Even for track-two strategic dialogues, internal coordination is necessary to accurately convey South Korea's position through constant coordination with the government.

It is common for South Korean expert groups or think tanks to fail to coordinate qualitatively effective strategic dialogues with surrounding countries, and the government often fails to gain policy advantages from such cooperation. The waste of policy resources and the sending of inconsistent policy messages through overlapping strategic dialogues by various groups should also be reduced. The government must make efforts to lay the foundation for North Korea policy by establishing a systematic track-two strategic dialogue system.■

■ Author: Jeon Jae-seong_Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies and Professor at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works and edited volumes include "Threats of War and Peace Between North and South Korea" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Managed and Edited by: Lee Seung-yeon_EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr