[EAI Special Report] A Plea to the Presidential Transition Committee's Foreign Affairs and National Security Team ①_Establish a Dedicated Organization for US-China Relations

I. Challenges in the US-China Relations Policy Decision-Making System

As the world prepares to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic over the past two years, competition to secure leadership in the post-COVID world order is expected to intensify, centered around the United States and China. Consequently, the foreign affairs and national security environment that the new government, set to launch in May, will face is likely to serve as the starting point for long-term challenges that Korean diplomacy must overcome. This implies that the new government's foreign affairs and national security policies should not merely be limited to the five-year term of the administration but should lay the foundation for future Korean foreign policy strategies. To this end, a mid- to long-term strategy and preparedness based on an understanding and meticulous analysis of US-China relations, which will be the most critical variable in the reorganization of the future world order, are urgently needed. Changes in the policy decision-making system for US-China relations, capable of responding to shifts in the foreign affairs and national security environment, are also necessary. First, we will examine the deepening of US-China strategic competition, the increasing complexity of foreign affairs and security, and the accelerating politicization of foreign affairs and security as challenges that the US-China relations policy decision-making system must overcome.

1. Deepening US-China Strategic Competition

The first challenge is the deepening of US-China strategic competition. The United States is showing active responses to overcome the crisis of its relative decline in status and capacity as the leading power that has guided the world order. In contrast, China has declared its ambition to become the leading global power by 2050, based on the modernization of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Of course, there is no need to view US-China strategic competition as the beginning of a new Cold War.[1]In the future, US-China relations are likely to exhibit a complex interplay of competition, cooperation, and conflict depending on the issue and specific matter (Brookings Institute 2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2021). Therefore, a comprehensive analysis is needed to meticulously examine the diverse characteristics of competition and cooperation that both the US and China will demonstrate in each issue area, while simultaneously viewing their organic relationship within a broader framework and preparing for it.

The problem also lies in the fact that the region where competition and conflict between the US and China will appear most directly and acutely is likely to be the Asian region, where the Korean Peninsula is located. As conflicts between the two countries intensify, pressure on allies and neighboring countries will undoubtedly increase. Furthermore, in some cases, China is likely to pursue various coercive policies targeting US allies and neighboring countries rather than directly confronting the US. Therefore, for South Korea to survive amidst the turbulent currents of deepening US-China strategic competition, mid- to long-term analysis and preparedness regarding the complex flow and changes in US-China relations are necessary.

2. Increasing Complexity of Foreign Affairs and Security

Second, the complexity in the fields of foreign affairs and security is further accelerating. Not only traditional security threats such as military threats but also various non-traditional security threats like climate change, pandemics, and energy are rapidly increasing in visibility and impact. The US-China trade dispute, Japan's export restrictions, and the urea solution crisis demonstrate the increasing complexity where multi-layered issues are closely linked and interact in foreign affairs and security matters. The South Korean Supreme Court's ruling led to a military security issue concerning the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) between South Korea and Japan, and subsequently to a trade dispute between South Korea and Japan, including Japan's export restrictions. This implies that foreign affairs and security policies based on the differentiation between hard politics and soft politics may now be losing their relevance.

Therefore, to understand the dynamics of US-China strategic competition and to pursue policies for US-China relations that will lead to South Korea's future survival and prosperity, a complex approach is needed that can anticipate and coordinate the organic relationships across various arenas such as economy, technology, norms, and military affairs. There is a risk of provoking China by strengthening the ROK-US alliance or pursuing participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). Emphasizing South Korean foreign policy and security principles based on values and norms such as democracy and human rights can be an effective hedging strategy (Kim Heon-jun 2021). The necessity of values- and norms-based diplomacy is also significant in pursuing a like-minded country coalition, one of the response strategies to minimize the risk and damage of China's economic coercion (Son Yeol 2022). A complex approach is urgently needed not only in analyzing and forecasting US-China relations but also in establishing and pursuing our policies on US-China relations.

3. Accelerating Politicization of Foreign Affairs and Security

Third is the issue of deepening polarization in domestic politics, which arises from the increasing linkage between domestic politics and foreign affairs and security issues. With the increasing visibility of foreign affairs and security issues due to the development of various forms of media, the linkage between foreign affairs and security matters and domestic political issues has significantly increased. Simultaneously, the politicization of foreign affairs and security is intensifying due to the deepening ideological and partisan polarization in domestic politics. As the gap between ideological and partisan preferred policies on major foreign affairs and security issues widens, policy instability also increases. When core foreign affairs and security issues, which should not be approached with partisan confrontation, factional logic, or political engineering calculations, are swayed by domestic political logic, situations that are not at all helpful for realizing national interests can arise. The politicization of foreign affairs and security is expected to intensify further. Discussions and preparations are needed to minimize the possibility of fatal misjudgments arising from domestic political gains and losses in the process of making and implementing key US-China relations policies.

II. Problems in the US-China Relations Policy Decision-Making System

1. Necessity of Mid- to Long-Term Strategy Development

The deepening of US-China strategic competition is a core issue for which both short-term responses to current events and mid- to long-term strategies based on analysis of trends are desperately needed. However, the current US-China relations policy decision-making system is severely lacking in the environment for developing mid- to long-term strategies. The competition between the US and China to lead the reorganization of the world order after the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to become more visible from the beginning of the new administration's term. Therefore, the new administration's foreign policy vision and policy decisions regarding US-China relations should not aim solely for the smooth governance of the five-year administration but should serve as the starting point for a long-term foreign policy strategy concerning key variables that will have a profound impact on the future of the Korean Peninsula. This is why efforts must be directed towards mid- to long-term analysis and long-term strategic planning of US-China relations.

Furthermore, the various foreign affairs and security issues arising from US-China strategic competition require the establishment of firm principles and issue-specific approaches. Therefore, it must be clearly communicated to both the US and China that policy decisions are based on core values and norms, not on short-term gains for each issue (Kim Heon-jun 2021). South Korea must be perceived by both countries not as a nation that wavers between the US and China, reacting erratically based on immediate interests, but as a nation that adheres to its own principles. To this end, the development and continuous pursuit of a mid- to long-term foreign affairs and security strategy for US-China relations are necessary. Organizational capacity must also be established to contemplate and prepare for US-China strategic competition with a long-term perspective and sustained effort.

2. Urgency of Establishing a Complex Analysis System and Response Capacity

Complex analysis and response capabilities also need improvement. In the US-China relations policy decision-making process, the conditions for an integrated approach and analysis concerning the linkage between trade and security issues, the connection between non-traditional security issues and alliance diplomacy, and the interconnections and complexity among various issue areas such as military, economy, technology, norms, science, environment, and health are significantly lacking. For example, the regional bureau-centric organizational structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tends to be more suited for micro-analysis and fragmented responses rather than for a holistic view of US-China relations unfolding in multi-layered and multi-faceted ways. This also exacerbates the first problem of a lack of mid- to long-term strategy for core foreign affairs and security issues that require long-term approaches, comprehensive analysis, and policy stability, such as US-China strategic competition. It is urgent to strengthen mid- to long-term strategies, as well as comprehensive and complex analysis and response capabilities, in the US-China relations policy decision-making system.

3. Concentration of Authority in the Blue House and Policy Discontinuity

The discontinuity of foreign affairs and national security policies, including those concerning US-China relations, due to the concentration of authority in the Blue House is also a problem. The task of viewing various foreign affairs and national security issues within a broader framework and formulating our foreign affairs and national security strategy has strongly tended to be driven by the Blue House. In a situation where an integrated approach beyond the scope of each ministry's responsibilities is required due to the increasing interconnectedness between issue areas and diplomatic agendas, the Blue House's role in coordinating ministries is clearly necessary. However, this leads to the problem of increased discontinuity in foreign affairs and national security policies. In the current Blue House-centric system, there is a persistent risk that the short-term interests of the administration will be prioritized over the nation's mid- to long-term interests. This is because policy decisions by the Blue House on foreign affairs and security issues are inevitably difficult to completely detach from domestic political calculations and considerations. With the deepening of political polarization and the politicization of foreign affairs and security, the problem of discontinuity in US-China relations policy is likely to worsen due to the acceleration of ideological divisions and partisan conflicts surrounding key foreign affairs and security policies. The temptation to unconditionally criticize and reject the core policies of previous governments, which has appeared with each change of administration, will also increase. Efforts are needed to ensure the stability and continuity of mid- to long-term strategies for navigating the challenging foreign affairs and security environment of US-China strategic competition.

III. Recommendations for the US-China Relations Policy Decision-Making System

1. Establishment of a Dedicated Organization for US-China Relations

The new administration's policy decision-making system for US-China relations must be capable of overcoming the challenges of the foreign affairs and national security environment, including the deepening of US-China strategic competition, the increasing complexity of foreign affairs and security, the politicization of foreign affairs and security, and their acceleration. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a dedicated organization that can analyze the long-term trends and changes in US-China relations, a key variable in the reorganization of the post-COVID world order, from a comprehensive and complex perspective, develop mid- to long-term strategies for US-China relations based on this analysis, and ensure their continuity and stability. To this end, in addition to departments responsible for US and Chinese foreign affairs and national security policy, a dedicated organization is needed to exclusively analyze the dynamics and trends of US-China relations and focus on developing mid- to long-term strategies based on this analysis.

To understand the complexity of international relations today, it is as important to understand the character of relationships between actors as it is to understand the characteristics of the actors themselves (Avant, et al.). If the US and China are key actors in the reorganization of the international order and the East Asian regional order in the future, then understanding the capabilities, domestic politics, and foreign affairs and security strategies of these two countries is important, but so is understanding the character and trends of the relationships between them. Furthermore, it is necessary to understand not only the bilateral relationship between the US and China but also the network of relationships that the US and China are forming, how these networks are connected, and where South Korea is positioned within these networks. This is why a dedicated organization for US-China 'relations' is needed, which can overcome the limitations of the current regional bureau-centric organizational structure.

2. Securing a Comprehensive, Whole-of-Government Approach System

The policy decision-making system for US-China relations, including the dedicated organization for US-China relations, must be capable of complex and comprehensive approaches and analysis. To this end, it is necessary to secure a whole-of-government approach system. The increasing complexity of foreign affairs and security and the deepening of US-China strategic competition necessitate multi-layered analysis and close inter-agency collaboration that transcends departmental boundaries. When foreign affairs and security issues arise, the approach of each government ministry and department handling micro-level, fragmented responses according to their respective duties, or responding through temporary collaboration, is bound to have limitations. In cases where inter-agency interests conflict, there is a high possibility that even their respective expertise will be eroded. Therefore, the dedicated organization for US-China relations, for the purpose of developing and pursuing mid- to long-term strategies for US-China relations, needs to include experts not only in foreign affairs and security but also in trade, industry, science and technology, energy, and other fields. This is because it must encompass a comprehensive and complex perspective on various issues arising from US-China strategic competition, such as military security, economic security, technological hegemony, non-traditional security issues like energy and health, and competition over values and norms.

3. Guaranteeing the Authority and Autonomy of the Dedicated Organization

The authority and autonomy of the dedicated organization for US-China relations must also be guaranteed. Given the importance of US-China relations policy and mid- to long-term strategy, access to the President for the dedicated organization for US-China relations is also necessary. Furthermore, the dedicated organization must secure the temporal and operational conditions to focus on analyzing US-China strategic competition and developing mid- to long-term strategies, without being bogged down by immediate tasks or the need to produce results. For mid- to long-term strategy development and whole-of-government responses, participants from each field must be able to voice their ministry's position while also facilitating inter-agency cooperation for the pursuit of comprehensive and complex analysis. Above all, the dedicated organization for US-China relations must be guaranteed autonomy from the Blue House and other partisan interests. This is also a way to ensure the continuity and stability of mid- to long-term strategies for US-China relations.

There are various ways to establish a dedicated organization. Possible options include establishing it as a bureau or division within a government ministry such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, utilizing existing committees such as advisory committees or establishing a new US-China Relations Committee, establishing a new ministry dedicated to US-China relations, or establishing a whole-of-government organization or a standing consultative body utilizing the National Security Council, among others.

Recently, a task force-type Strategic Coordination Support Team was operated within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to exclusively handle US-China conflict, but unfortunately, its impact was not significant.[2]As seen in this case, if a dedicated organization for US-China relations is located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other government ministries, there will be difficulties in coordinating inter-agency interests, but more importantly, it is highly likely to have clear limitations in terms of access to the President, the ultimate policy decision-maker. Utilizing advisory committees or policy planning committees may have the advantage of facilitating the active participation of private experts, but it is likely to have similar limitations as establishing a new bureau within a ministry. Establishing a new ministry would be the most effective option, but it would be practically difficult to realize at the beginning of a new administration's term. Establishing a whole-of-government department or standing consultative body dedicated to US-China relations, centered around the National Security Council, would have advantages in terms of comprehensive and complex analysis and response capabilities, but it would likely have the disadvantage of high policy discontinuity.

IV. Conclusion

As the complexity of foreign affairs and security increases and the politicization of foreign affairs and security intensifies, it is paradoxically necessary for analysis and policy decisions on key variables that will determine the nation's future and the direction of the new world order, such as US-China relations, to be made free from the influence of ideological confrontation and partisan interests. This is also why the dedicated organization for mid- to long-term foreign affairs and security strategy for US-China relations must be guaranteed autonomy, along with comprehensive and complex analysis and whole-of-government approach and response capabilities. However, the improvement of the US-China relations policy decision-making system may be more about operational issues than about reorganizing organizational structures or institutional changes themselves. This implies that the President's strong will and determination are the starting point and the key to the substantive change and development of the US-China relations policy decision-making system. A mid- to long-term strategy for US-China relations may pose political burdens in the short term. This is because it may conflict with the government's governance objectives or incur significant domestic political and social backlash or costs. The temptation to choose an easier path to navigate the immediate challenges of US-China strategic competition may also be strong. However, if we continue to insist on easy solutions based on short-term, fragmented interests and partisan gains whenever foreign affairs and security issues arise due to US-China strategic competition, it is evident that we will face even greater crises in the long term. Strong will and determination from the new administration are needed regarding the necessity and justification of developing and pursuing mid- to long-term strategies to overcome the challenges facing the US-China relations policy decision-making system. ■

<References>

Kim Dong-hyun. 2020. “Expansion and Institutionalization of a Dedicated Foreign Ministry Organization Based on Judgment of Prolonged US-China Conflict.” <Yonhap News>. July 14.

Kim Heon-jun. 2021. “Values and Norms Diplomacy: South Korean Diplomacy Amidst the US-China Clash over Human Rights and Democracy.” East Asia Institute. September 24.

Son Yeol. 2022. “The New Administration's Economic Security Strategy: Five Tasks for Responding to 'Economic Coercion'.” East Asia Institute. March 10.

Avant, Deborah, Martha Finnemore, and Susan Sell. 2010. Who Governs the Globe?

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3.

Brookings Institute. 2021. “Readout from the Biden-Xi virtual meeting: Discussion with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.” November 16. Washington DC, U.S.A.

Christensen, Thomas. 2021. “There Will Not Be a New Cold War.” Foreign Affairs. March 24.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2021. “President Xi Jinping Had a Virtual Meeting with US President Joe Biden.” November 16.

[1]Christensen explains that the US-China strategic competition is unlikely to become a new Cold War due to the absence of an ideological confrontation structure between the two countries, the lack of a bloc-based alliance conflict structure, and the difficulty of economic bloc separation due to globalization (Christensen 2021).

[2]The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it had institutionalized a dedicated organization for US-China relations by establishing the Strategic Coordination Division under the Director-General for Foreign Policy Planning in 2020 (Kim Dong-hyun 2020).

■ Author: Moon Yong-il_Assistant Professor, University of Seoul. After completing his bachelor's and master's degrees in Diplomacy at Seoul National University, he obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from George Washington University. He then served as an assistant professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, before currently holding the position of Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Seoul. His major research includes "Cause Lawyering and Movement Tactics: Disability Rights Movements in South Korea and Japan," "The Drafting and Frame Competition of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities," "South Africa's Nuclear Norm Diplomacy," "South Africa's Denuclearization Implementation and Verification," and "The Politicization of Political Polarization and the Constitutional Court in Bulgaria." He has also co-authored works such as <A New Northeast Asian Order and the Future of the Korean Peninsula>.

■ Managed and Edited by: Lee Seung-yeon_EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr