Editor's Note

EAI is publishing a special report series as part of its ongoing, long-term research on US-China competition and the role of middle powers like South Korea. Professor Lee Dong-ryul predicts that the US's offensive based on democracy and human rights, and China's response pursuing the re-universalization of Chinese civilization, could lead to a fierce competition between the two countries.

I. Trends in the US's Offensive on Values and Ideology Towards China

The confrontation between the US and China escalated to its worst state during the Trump administration, starting with trade and eventually expanding into the realms of values, ideology, and political systems. The US's offensive on values and ideology was not limited to the Trump administration. The US has often used value and ideological issues as a tool to check and pressure China, but this has not been a consistent policy stance. During the Cold War, and even immediately after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 following the normalization of US-China relations, the US attempted economic sanctions and containment targeting a form of peaceful revolution in China. Even after that, the US continued to raise issues of human rights in China, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and consistently employed a strategy of linking them to the annual extension of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. However, US economic sanctions through human rights issues have lacked consistency and sustainability, and have unfolded fluidly according to changes in bilateral relations.

The offensive and pressure against China during the Trump administration were on a different level than before. Firstly, the scope and intensity of the US offensive were unprecedented. The Trump administration launched a strong, comprehensive pressure campaign on Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan – issues that are Achilles' heels for China's national integration, regime stability, and legitimacy. For example, the US Congress passed a series of sanctions bills, such as the "Tibetan Travel Facilitation Act (2018)", the "Tibetan Policy and Support Act (2020)", and the "Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (2020)", to pressure China. Bills imposing sanctions on foreign individuals and entities that undermine Hong Kong's autonomy and financial institutions that transact with them, such as the "Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (2019)" and the "Hong Kong Autonomy Act (2020)", were also passed by Congress. President Trump also issued "Executive Order 13936" to terminate the special treatment granted to Hong Kong in response to the enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law.

The Trump administration extended its offensive into areas that could be perceived as crossing red lines by China, including the Xi Jinping and Communist Party system. For instance, Secretary of State Pompeo criticized President Xi Jinping as a 'true believer in the failure of totalitarianism' and urged US allies and the Chinese people to cooperate with the US to change the Communist Party and overthrow the regime. Furthermore, the Trump administration's comprehensive offensive against China, which occurred as China's national strength was rapidly catching up to the US, suggested the potential for expansion into a full-blown power competition.

II. The Biden Administration's Offensive Against China Centered on Human Rights, Democratic Values, and International Norms

Several signs indicate that the offensive on values and ideology towards China will continue under the Biden administration. The Biden administration has presented a principle of strengthening value-based diplomacy and has clearly expressed its intention to host a "Global Summit for Democracy" in its first year, inviting leaders from around the world. The Biden administration has signaled its intention to continue pressuring the Xi Jinping authoritarian regime by mobilizing international cooperation, including that of its allies. During the high-level Anchorage meeting between the US and China, Secretary of State Blinken, unusually, raised issues of Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan from the outset of the meeting to pressure China. In April, the US State Department released new guidelines to further encourage exchanges between US government officials and Taiwanese officials, directly provoking China, which claims the issue of Taiwan is interference in its internal affairs.

However, given the high-intensity, comprehensive, and all-encompassing offensive against China during the Trump administration, the extent to which the Biden administration will continue the precedent set by its predecessor is a focal point of interest. It appears unlikely that the Biden administration will launch a comprehensive and all-encompassing offensive against China across all domains, particularly targeting its political system, as the previous administration did. The Biden administration has clearly indicated that it fundamentally views China as a threat to democratic values and the rules-based international order. Therefore, it is expected to continue its offensive and pressure against China more clearly and specifically on issues related to these domains.

Indeed, the Biden administration is focusing on the human rights and religious oppression of the Uyghur ethnic group in Xinjiang, pressuring China through economic sanctions. In January 2021, the US government banned the import of cotton and tomato products from Xinjiang, citing forced labor of Uyghurs. Given that the US imported approximately 12 trillion won worth of Chinese cotton last year, this ban could inflict economic damage on China if it continues. John Kerry, the US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, also pressured China by considering sanctions on solar panels and renewable energy components from Xinjiang suspected of using forced labor.

In March, when the European Union (EU) sanctioned senior Xinjiang public security officials for their involvement in human rights abuses against Uyghurs, the US joined in solidarity. In April, the US State Department released the "2020 Report on International Religious Freedom," criticizing China's oppression of Uyghur Muslims and describing the "vocational training centers" in Xinjiang as effectively operating as "outdoor prisons," seeking to garner international support. Furthermore, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced sanctions against Yu Hui, a former senior official in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, known to be involved in the persecution of Falun Gong, and his family, including a ban on entry into the United States. This marked the first time the US government imposed sanctions on a Chinese official based on the Falun Gong issue.

Notably, the Biden administration issued an executive order targeting major Chinese technology companies. The list of 59 sanctioned companies includes telecommunications equipment manufacturer Huawei, CCTV manufacturer Hangzhou Hikvision, China's largest semiconductor manufacturer SMIC, China's top three telecommunications companies, as well as the manufacturer of the stealth fighter jet J-20, Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), and state-owned oil company China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and state-owned nuclear power company China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), encompassing key industries and advanced technology sectors. The Biden administration aims to build international solidarity to curb the development of China's advanced technology sector by prominently advocating for human rights and democratic values.

In summary, the Biden administration is not continuing the direct, wave-like offensive against China's political system and Communist Party that was pursued by the previous Trump administration. However, by focusing on issues such as China's lack of democracy and human rights abuses, and employing sanctions, it is indirectly exposing the vulnerabilities of the Chinese system. Through this, the Biden administration seeks to foster solidarity with free democratic nations that share human rights and democratic values, and indirectly expand anti-China movements within China and internationally. Furthermore, the US aims to delay or deter China's development and its pursuit of overtaking the US.

III. Gains and Losses from the US Offensive on Values and Ideology Towards China

The Biden administration is currently continuing its offensive against China primarily by focusing on human rights issues in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. To date, the Biden administration's focused offensive against China has allowed it to maintain the initiative and an advantage in bilateral relations, and this advantage is expected to be maintained. Furthermore, it has shown success in restoring the solidarity of the Western bloc, including the EU, Australia, and Canada, through the intermediary of human rights issues. In other words, for the Biden administration, the domain of values and norms is suitable for pressuring China at a relatively low cost compared to other domains.

Nevertheless, challenges remain for the Biden administration. First, while advocating for values such as human rights and democracy in its offensive against China, debates may arise regarding the purpose of this offensive and its feasibility. The US strategy of seeking fundamental change in the Chinese Communist Party system or improvement in human rights issues through the issues of Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang is unlikely to be realized in practice. Although China strongly protests, claiming infringement of its core interests, it already possesses internal control and resilience regarding these regions and issues. While these issues may damage China's national image and act as obstacles to its rise through international cooperation, triggering changes in China's values and system will be difficult in the short to medium term. Instead, the US pressure on these issues is perceived as "interference in internal affairs," stimulating support for the Communist Party system and internal cohesion due to heightened nationalism within China.

In conclusion, while the US can achieve certain results by consistently employing values and ideology over the long term to pressure the Communist Party system, it faces the burden of consuming significant resources and costs. In the short to medium term, there is a possibility of falling into a dilemma of escalating conflict and confrontation with China without achieving the intended outcomes. In particular, for the US pressure on China to be effective, it is crucial to create and sustain international anti-China solidarity. To achieve this, the US will need to mobilize far more resources and costs than during the Cold War era. For example, despite the US ban on imports of Xinjiang cotton, Japanese companies like Muji and Uniqlo still use Xinjiang cotton, indicating that the anti-China sanctions alliance may not be smooth. Furthermore, unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China has a high probability of surpassing the US in economic power in the future, making it difficult for the US to maintain a sustained advantage in the competition for expanding influence through economic resources.

Like previous Democratic administrations, a challenge for the Biden administration is whether it can sustain the political effect of 'beating up on China' in the early stages of its term. In particular, given the numerous domestic challenges facing the Biden administration, it may be difficult to sustain the value-based offensive against China, which offers limited direct economic benefits and efficacy, over the long term while consuming resources and costs. While the US has a clear advantage in pressuring China through values and norms, maximizing its practical effect hinges on its ability to sustain high-intensity pressure over the long term. Realistically, the conflict in the domain of values and norms may shift to competition and conflict in trade, technology, finance, and even military domains, potentially weakening the current pressure based on human rights and democracy.

IV. China's Response and Expected Damages

China assesses that the Biden administration's offensive against China will continue, with the aim of deterring or delaying China's rise in national strength and expansion of international influence to prevent challenges to the US. Furthermore, China is concerned that the Biden administration will continue to pressure China through issues related to Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, damage China's international image, and use this as a basis to rally allies and form an anti-China international coalition.

From the perspective of the Xi Jinping government, which is undertaking a new endeavor of strengthening a personalized authoritarian regime, there are not many means to counter the US offensive against the Communist Party system, and the space for compromise is also limited. Especially with the crucial political event of the 20th Party Congress in 2022 approaching, which will determine the long-term rule of the Xi Jinping regime, sensitivity towards regime stability and legitimacy is high, and flexibility in responding to external pressure may decrease. Therefore, China is concerned and wary of the US offensive based on human rights and democracy spilling over to Xi Jinping and the Communist Party system.

China anticipates that the US offensive and competition will intensify under the Biden administration, primarily in five areas: science and technology, international norms, values, security, and finance. Nevertheless, China argues that the Biden administration should not repeat the mistakes of the Trump administration, particularly its offensive against the Chinese system. From China's perspective, due to the fundamental vulnerabilities of the Communist Party system itself, the more it counterattacks on this issue, the more it risks exposing the system's weaknesses to the international community. Unlike in economic fields such as finance, advanced technology, and trade, China has limited means to counterattack when faced with offensives on its system and values, and it will be difficult to secure an advantage in the short to medium term.

If the value offensive, including human rights issues, does not escalate into direct pressure on the political system, the damage to China may not be fatal and could be manageable. Firstly, the issues of Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, publicized internationally as human rights abuses, have significantly damaged the image and reputation of the Xi Jinping government, causing disruptions to international multilateral cooperation such as the Belt and Road Initiative and posing long-term constraints on securing global leadership. Internally, political burdens and instability factors may increase, leading to increased costs for regime consolidation and control.

Although China publicly responds sensitively to issues concerning Hong Kong and Xinjiang, categorizing them within its core interests of sovereignty, security, and development, it is no longer vulnerable in terms of sovereignty and security as it was in the past. While only the US can inflict direct and fatal damage to these core interests, it is unrealistic to expect the US alone to cause a crisis for the Communist Party system. China is concerned and wary of the US leading the offensive against its political system and the growing international consensus and participation in it.

Against this backdrop, the Xi Jinping government is seeking to respond to the Biden administration's value offensive, including human rights issues, in three main directions, but faces significant cost burdens and damages in the process. First, it maintains a stance of not backing down in the face of confrontation by counterattacking the US offensive. It appears to be strongly and preemptively responding to US offensives, countering human rights with human rights and sanctions with sanctions, to prevent the US offensive from expanding to issues concerning its political system.

For example, following the "2019 Report on US Human Rights Abuses" released by the State Council Information Office in March 2020, China released the "2020 Report on US Human Rights Abuses" in March 2021.[1] In the 2020 report, China pointed to issues such as gun violence, wealth disparity, high healthcare costs, racial discrimination, and the human rights of women and children in the US. China also criticizes the US State Department's "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" for being based on its narrow understanding of human rights and for arbitrarily distorting the human rights situations of countries that do not align with its strategic interests. In April, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also presented "America's Five Major Human Rights Problems" to counterattack. Specifically, it presented colonialism, racism, warmongering, interventionism, and double standards as US human rights issues, advising the US to first address and improve its own human rights issues before attacking other countries, and accusing the US of using human rights as a tool to maintain its hegemony.

Furthermore, China is also imposing sanctions against the US. When the US, EU, UK, and Canada announced sanctions citing human rights abuses against Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China retaliated with its own sanctions. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced sanctions against 10 individuals, including five EU parliament members and members of parliament from the Netherlands, Belgium, and Lithuania, and four institutions, for infringing upon China's sovereignty and national interests and spreading false information. Sanctions were also announced against Gail Manchin, Chair of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (and wife of Senator Joe Manchin), and Vice Chair Tony Perkins. These sanctions include bans on entry into mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau, prohibition of transactions with Chinese citizens and institutions, and freezing of assets within China.

However, China is also facing significant damage due to its retaliatory sanctions. The European Parliament passed a resolution by an overwhelming majority stating that it would not ratify the investment agreement until China lifts its retaliatory sanctions against European individuals. China had successfully concluded an investment agreement with the EU after nearly seven years of effort, and was particularly satisfied with this diplomatic achievement amidst US pressure. Therefore, China is bewildered by the unexpected counterattack from the EU.

Second, under US pressure, the Xi Jinping government is focusing more on internal consolidation and regime cohesion. China views the essence of US-China competition as a competition in economic strength and social governance capabilities. This implies that stabilizing the rule of the Communist Party is crucial, and strengthening internal cohesion and capacity building will be prioritized.

For the Xi Jinping government, 2021 marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party and is a crucial point for a mid-term evaluation of whether the "Chinese Dream" vision will be realized. It is also a very important year for finalizing the coordination regarding the reappointment of General Secretary Xi Jinping ahead of the 20th Party Congress in 2022. China has historically tended to attempt to resolve or stably manage external instability and uncertainty when facing important domestic political schedules. Therefore, China aims to minimize the expansion of conflict and confrontation with the US and focus on internal regime consolidation and management to secure long-term regime legitimacy and stability.

By framing the US human rights offensive as an unilateral and groundless 'beating up on China' and 'interference in internal affairs' aimed at hindering China's rise, it is focusing on stimulating the patriotism of the people, promoting internal cohesion and unity, and restoring support for the Communist Party, which was damaged by the COVID-19 crisis. For example, President Xi frequently emphasizes that to realize the "Chinese Dream," it is essential to follow the Chinese path (中國道路), the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, promote the national spirit centered on patriotism and the spirit of the times centered on reform and innovation (改革創新) – the Chinese Spirit (中國精神), and consolidate the collective strength of the Chinese people – the Chinese Power (中國力量).

At the third Central Xinjiang Work Symposium (中央新疆工作座談會) held in September, President Xi Jinping emphasized the need to "unite the people in the Xinjiang region, solidify the consciousness of the Chinese nation, and promote socialist core values through the sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang," stressing integration through "sinicization." Following the enactment of the "Hong Kong National Security Law" in 2019, China passed the "Decision of the National People's Congress on the Improvement of the Electoral System of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" in 2021, demonstrating a strong will not to yield on issues of sovereignty related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang. This involves preparing laws and systems to ensure that the legislative council is dominated by so-called "patriots," effectively strengthening Hong Kong's integration into China through legal and institutional reforms.[2]While the nature of the two sessions can be interpreted in terms of domestic politics, they also carry the meaning of conveying the strong will of the Chinese leadership to the US.

Furthermore, China's Global Times published the results of its own opinion poll, criticizing the Pew Research Center's survey, which indicated a strengthening negative perception of China in developed countries after COVID-19, as distorted by Western media and politicians seeking to highlight China's shortcomings. According to the Global Times survey, 78% of respondents felt that China's international image had actually improved in recent years (see Figure 1). The US was most frequently cited as the bilateral partner that would have the greatest impact on China (47.5%), followed by Russia (33.8%) and the European Union (EU, 27.7%). The survey also presented findings such as 65.6% viewing the Trump administration critically, while only 11.6% held a critical view of US sports leagues like the NBA, suggesting a message that while Chinese people oppose US hegemony, they do not hold negative perceptions of Americans.[3] This indicates that the Xi Jinping government is keenly monitoring the formation of negative international public opinion towards China. In other words, it is crudely refuting the potential for negative international public opinion to influence domestic sentiment and damage trust in the Communist Party system. However, it also shows that China is wary of anti-American sentiment among its citizens.

Within China, netizens have launched boycott campaigns against global companies such as H&M, Nike, New Balance, and Converse, which have been criticized for human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Chinese stars who were active as promotional models for the sports apparel brand Nike have announced the suspension of their modeling activities, and the Swedish global fashion brand H&M is facing the risk of being expelled from China.

China is also strengthening internal controls by promoting patriotism and nationalism, deepening ideological education in communism, and controlling social media. In February 2020, Beijing hosted a large-scale mobilization meeting for Party history learning and education, emphasizing the traditions, history, and legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. The internal control and ideological education promoted by the Xi Jinping government will continue until the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, scheduled to be held in late 2022. China will incur additional costs due to the strengthening of internal security and control in regions with signs of internal instability and unrest, such as Hong Kong and Xinjiang. The deployment of public security forces and increased control in response to the Hong Kong protests will already lead to increased economic and social costs.

However, while leveraging US pressure for regime cohesion and stability and circumventing it may have some effect on the crisis management of the Communist Party system, it does not constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for regime maintenance. The Xi Jinping government must achieve concrete results that meet the heightened expectations of the Chinese people, particularly a substantial improvement in the "quality of life for all" (美好生活), to overcome challenges such as the COVID crisis, US pressure, international suspicion and vigilance, and difficulties in securing new growth engines. Therefore, the cost burden for economic recovery may significantly increase.

Third, in response to the US offensive, China is also pursuing an indirect strategy of expanding its circle of friendly countries externally to deter the formation of an international anti-China coalition. Unlike the US, China does not have allies and has limited means to secure support beyond economic cooperation and assistance. For example, it seeks to deter participation in the US-led international coalition pressuring China by providing economic assistance utilizing the existing Belt and Road Initiative network. In this case, China faces the paradox of the Belt and Road Initiative, which was initially intended to be a new growth engine for China, potentially becoming a drain on China's economic resources.

The Xi Jinping government is imposing economic sanctions on countries that join the US-led offensive against China's political system. For instance, it has imposed economic sanctions on Australia and Canada, and is pressuring Taiwan through economic sanctions and military exercises. As a result, China is incurring economic losses and intangible losses such as a deterioration of its external image.

China emphasizes diplomacy to promote international understanding of the Chinese Communist Party and socialism with Chinese characteristics as one of its seven major diplomatic tasks for 2021. In line with this, President Xi Jinping ordered on June 1, during the 30th collective study session of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, to strengthen efforts to promote China's image and national strength internationally. President Xi stated, "In the new situation, it is important to strengthen international communication capabilities" and "We must create an external media environment that is commensurate with China's overall national strength and international status and is conducive to reform and development."[4] As early as 2018, China integrated major state-run media outlets such as China Central Television (CCTV), China National Radio (CNR), and China Radio International (CRI) to launch "Voice of China," a state-run media outlet directly managed by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in an effort to shape international public opinion. This collective study session reiterated the importance of influential international media. Key messages that China intends to disseminate to the international community include Chinese civilization, China's development perspective, multilateralism, and a fair international order. This suggests an effort to prepare for a long-term competition in values and norms with the US.

Specifically, China intends to engage in a form of public diplomacy by proactively promoting and fostering understanding of China's political system and values among developing countries in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. This will entail significant expenditure burdens for public diplomacy to secure the legitimacy of the Chinese system. Indeed, China's foreign affairs-related expenditures have shown a continuous annual increase since 2003. In particular, expenditures at the end of Xi Jinping's first term in 2017 ($8 billion) increased by two-thirds compared to the end of Hu Jintao's term in 2012 ($5.2 billion) (see figure).[5] In 2018, it increased by another 15% to $9.5 billion.[6]

Nevertheless, the proportion of diplomatic expenditure in China's total government expenditure is not large, standing at 0.26% as of 2017. The main categories of Chinese government expenditure are social security and employment (23.7%), public health (23.3%), and education (18.1%), suggesting that diplomacy is not a policy priority. This could imply that China still has room to increase its diplomatic spending. However, on the other hand, the Xi Jinping government faces domestic tasks that require substantial expenditure, such as the comprehensive realization of a moderately prosperous society (2021), Made in China 2025, Healthy China 2030, military modernization, environmental pollution control, and educational reform. Therefore, continuously increasing diplomatic expenditure could pose a significant burden, especially since it prioritizes budget allocation for building a social safety net for regime stability.

V. Outlook

1. Outlook for 2030

The background of the rapid deterioration of US-China relations to its worst state includes structural factors of power competition, as well as domestic political factors in both countries. In the short to medium term, domestic political and economic factors in both the US and China can directly and indirectly influence the fundamental trend of power competition between the two countries. The US and China will maintain a trend of fierce competition and confrontation on the surface. However, on the other hand, both countries will face considerable domestic political fatigue, resistance, and economic burdens in sustaining direct conflict and confrontation with high risks due to complex domestic political and economic situations. Therefore, the Biden administration is likely to continue a low-intensity offensive through human rights and democracy issues, which carry relatively low sensitivity and burden of conflict while demonstrating American identity. The offensive against China based on human rights and democracy can be used as a useful card until the Biden administration stabilizes domestically.

As long as the Biden administration continues its offensive, the Xi Jinping government will have no choice but to respond defensively, making it difficult to resolve or compromise on the confrontation and conflict surrounding values and ideologies. Thus, a tedious state of confrontation may persist. However, this itself will not become the core area of conflict and competition between the two countries. First, unlike the Trump administration, the Biden administration is currently refraining from direct offense against the Chinese Communist Party system, thus avoiding crossing a certain 'red line.' If the conflict and confrontation surrounding human rights and democracy do not escalate into systemic confrontation, it will not become a decisive factor driving the bilateral relationship to ruin. Nevertheless, if the confrontation in this area continues, both countries will inevitably suffer tangible or intangible damages, albeit to varying degrees. In particular, China is likely to suffer greater damage than the US. For China, the intangible damages, such as to its national image and reputation, and the rigidity resulting from intensified domestic social control, are considerable. If prolonged, it could burden China's rise schedule and cause disruptions.

The nature of the confrontation and conflict surrounding values is primarily unfolding in the form of public opinion warfare and sanctions and retaliation through economic means. Therefore, the front lines of conflict are likely to be complexly intertwined with conflicts and competition in other areas, such as trade, technology, and finance.

2. Outlook for 2040

While value conflicts may not become a decisive factor driving US-China relations to ruin, if the Biden administration's offensive is prolonged, it could lead to a deepening of fundamental distrust between the two countries, acting as a major obstacle to the restoration of cooperation. It could also lead to the chronicization and structuralization of confrontation between the two countries. Furthermore, if value conflicts and confrontations are prolonged and worsen, they could stimulate and escalate competition and confrontation in other areas, further intensifying the conflict between the two countries.

For example, an offensive on human rights issues could lead to economic sanctions, further exacerbating confrontations and competition in the financial and high-tech sectors. In particular, regarding Taiwan, which is central to China's sovereign interests, the risk of escalating military tensions and accidental clashes cannot be ruled out due to the prolonged value conflict and deepening strategic distrust. The current ruling Democratic Progressive Party government in Taiwan has a strong independence inclination, and the Trump administration significantly increased arms sales to Taiwan. China is also responding with military drills in the Taiwan Strait, making the tension level higher than ever before. Historically, both the US and China have been cautious about the possibility of armed conflict over Taiwan and have shown a tendency for mutual restraint to some extent. Nevertheless, if military confrontation and tensions escalate, the possibility of conflict arising from unintended accidents cannot be dismissed.

3. Outlook for 2050

As the timeline for China's rise approaches 2050, the conflict over values and ideologies may shift from the current pattern of US offensives and Chinese responses to a phase of intense competition between the two countries. China has a long-term plan to promote the values of Chinese civilization as universal values globally, in other words, it is long-term preparing for the re-universalization of Chinese civilization. If China's rise proceeds as planned, China will ultimately have to solve the task of securing global leadership and value standards while maintaining the Communist Party system. To prepare for this, China is likely to highlight Chinese civilization as an alternative value rather than socialist ideology. In short, in the long term, China may seek to secure the legitimacy of the Communist Party's rule by promoting the superiority of Chinese civilization and engaging in a competition of values and civilizations with the United States, with the Communist Party leading this endeavor.

President Xi Jinping has already signaled his intention to strengthen the regime's identity and legitimacy through the dissemination of cultural discourse, stating that "Cultural identity is the deepest identity, the root of national unity, and the soul of national harmony." Not only the Chinese Communist Party but also Chinese intellectuals and academics are actively engaged in a discourse of civilization that re-evaluates the values of Chinese civilization. It is noteworthy that Yang Jiechi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, stated at the Anchorage US-China high-level meeting that "The US has its American-style democracy, and China has its Chinese-style democracy," arguing that most countries do not recognize American values as international values. ■

(Figure 1. Public Opinion Survey on China's International Image)

(Figure 2. Trend of China's Foreign Affairs Expenditure)

[1]"2019 Report on US Human Rights Violations" Xinhua Net (March 13, 2020). https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1661036024908643874&wfr=spider&for=pc(Accessed March 10, 2021); "2020 Report on US Human Rights Violations" Xinhua Net (March 24, 2021) https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1695100509665933460&wfr=spider&for=pc(Accessed March 25, 2021).

[2]"Premier Li Keqiang's Government Work Report (Excerpt)" People's Daily Online (March 6, 2021). http://lianghui.people.com.cn/2021npc/n1/2021/0306/c435267-32044082.html(Accessed March 6, 2021)

[3]The state-run Global Times reported that the results were based on a survey of 1,945 adults aged 18-69 in 16 major Chinese cities, including Beijing and Shanghai, from December 11-17. "Chinese rational on China-US ties: GT poll," Global Times (2020/12/26) https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1211038.shtml

[4]"Xi Jinping Emphasizes Strengthening and Improving International Communication Work and Presenting a True, Three-Dimensional, and Comprehensive China at the 30th Collective Study Session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee," "Communist Party Net" (June 1, 2021) http://www.12371.cn/2021/06/01/ARTI1622531133725536.shtml

[5]Markus Herrmann and Sabine Mokry, China Races to Catch Up on Foreign Affairs Spending, "The Diplomat." (August 09, 2018). https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/china-races-to-catch-up-on-foreign-affairs-spending/

[6]Charles Clover and Sherry Fei Ju, "China’s diplomacy budget doubles under Xi Jinping," Financial Times (MARCH 6 2018) https://www.ft.com/content/2c750f94-2123-11e8-a895-1ba1f72c2c11

■ Author: Lee Dong-ryulDirector of the EAI China Research Center. Professor at Dongduk Women's University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University's School of International Studies and has served as President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies, currently serving as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and ethnic minority issues. His recent research includes "China's Strategy and Role in Korean Peninsula Denuclearization and Peace Process," "Evolution and Current Implications of China's Foreign Policy Discourse Since the 1990s," "Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemmas of the Xi Jinping Administration's 'Maritime Power' Vision," "Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea," and "China's Territorial Disputes" (co-authored).

• Managed and Edited by : Pyo Kwang-minSenior Research Fellow, EAI
  
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