Editor's Note

EAI is publishing a special report series as part of its long-term research on US-China competition and the role of middle powers like South Korea. Professor Kim Heon-jun predicts that values and norms, based on emotional factors such as public opinion, nationalism, culture, and civilization, possess potential explosiveness. If China's perceptions and attitudes do not change in this area, the conflict between the US-led democratic bloc and China will intensify.

I. US Offensive Strategies and China's Expected Damages

The US will employ two offensive strategies in the values and norms conflict. First, an offensive regarding China's severe human rights abuses. Second, an offensive targeting China's undemocratic political system. Focusing on these two strategies, this section will examine the objectives of the offensive, specific leverage points, and estimate the expected damages to China.

1. US Offensive Strategy: Offensive Regarding China's Severe Human Rights Abuses

1) Objectives

The US offensive on human rights has three objectives. First, to highlight the severe and systematic human rights abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang/Uyghur, ongoing since the Trump administration, thereby attacking the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Xi Jinping regime (Kim 2020). Second, to emphasize traditional human rights abuses such as the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the suppression of human rights lawyers, issues concerning the Dalai Lama and Tibet, Liu Xiaobo, dissidents in exile, freedom of religion, women's rights, and the suppression of civil society, thereby attacking the historical legitimacy of the CCP that Xi Jinping has recently emphasized. Xi Jinping has recently attempted to secure the CCP's historical legitimacy by emphasizing historical education through the establishment of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of Chinese History, highlighting the roles of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Xi Jinping. Third, to frame China as a country that disregards internationally agreed-upon universal human rights, thereby highlighting the image of an "unchanged China" even after its reform and opening up. This strategy aims to attack the legitimacy of China's pursuit of international leadership by emphasizing that a China that disregards norms domestically is a threat internationally.

2) Specific Leverage Points

There are three specific leverage points in the US human rights offensive. First, enacting human rights legislation against China in Congress and imposing sanctions on individuals through presidential executive orders. The US has already completed legislation concerning Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, including the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in November 2019, the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 in June 2020, and the Tibet Policy and Support Act of 2020 in December 2020. Given the Hong Kong Autonomy Act passed after the enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law in 2021, further legislation is possible depending on the severity of each issue. Furthermore, the Biden administration has maintained Trump's executive order on Hong Kong (The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization) and is proceeding with entry restrictions and financial sanctions against high-ranking officials related to Hong Kong and Xinjiang under the Magnitsky Act.

Second, import bans on Chinese companies directly involved in human rights abuses and recommendations for US multinational corporations to limit cooperation. In October 2019, the US banned imports from Chinese companies such as Dahua Technology and Hikvision, major surveillance equipment manufacturers, and AI firms like iFlytek and SenseTime, citing human rights abuses and surveillance of residents in Xinjiang. Subsequently, Trump banned imports from approximately 80 Chinese companies, citing arbitrary detention, forced labor, and involuntary collection and analysis of genetic information. The Biden administration has maintained these measures and, in April 2021, expanded them to Chinese supercomputing companies for reasons including the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The US has also strongly pressured US companies not to cooperate with Chinese companies in human rights abuses using advanced technologies such as supercomputing, artificial intelligence, facial recognition, and genetic analysis. In the past three years alone, Google, Microsoft, Thermo Fisher, Intel, and Nvidia have been targeted (Mozur and Clark 2021).

Third, the Biden administration has pursued international cooperation rather than unilateral criticism of China's human rights abuses. Recently, the US has issued joint statements with G7 countries when criticizing China's human rights record, such as the Hong Kong National Security Law. Furthermore, the joint statement following the US-Japan summit expressed "grave concern" over Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and the EU-G7 joint statement by foreign and development ministers specifically condemned human rights abuses in China, including in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. This indicates a high likelihood of concrete actions beyond mere condemnation. The stalled progress of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, import bans on goods produced by forced labor in Xinjiang such as cotton and apparel, and proposals for boycotting the Beijing Olympics are all feasible strategies.

2. US Offensive Strategy: Offensive Regarding China's Undemocratic System

1) Objectives

The offensive against China's undemocratic system has three objectives. First, to contrast Taiwan, which has maintained democracy for a long time and contributed to health, economy, and advanced technology, with China, which seeks to maintain its dictatorship, prolong Xi Jinping's rule, and exhibits aggressive international behavior, thereby attacking the legitimacy of the CCP regime. Second, to highlight the international threats posed by China's undemocratic system, such as hostage diplomacy, foreign infiltration and influence operations, hacking, and cyberattacks, which have recently caused controversy (Krejsa 2018; Walt 2021). Third, to emphasize that the economy and advanced technology of an undemocratic system ultimately lead to severe domestic human rights abuses and the export of similar models abroad, resulting in Digital Authoritarianism (Polyakova and Meserole 2019).

2) Specific Leverage Points

There are three specific leverage points to achieve these objectives. First, strengthening informal exchanges with Taiwan and enhancing Taiwan's international standing. Following Biden's inauguration, the US Ambassador to Palau visited Taiwan in March 2021, marking the first ambassadorial visit since the severance of diplomatic ties. In April 2021, while Climate Envoy John Kerry visited China, a US delegation visited Taiwan with a similar schedule. The delegation comprised influential figures such as Chris Dodd (former Democratic Senator), Richard Armitage (former Deputy Secretary of State under the Bush administration), and James Steinberg (former Deputy Secretary of State under the Obama administration). The US has also strengthened cooperation with Taiwan beyond diplomacy, in quasi-military and economic sectors. In February 2021, a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in maritime police matters was adopted with Taiwan, and the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the representative of the American Institute in Taiwan, who effectively serves as the de facto ambassador, attended the signing ceremony, expressing a commitment to quasi-military cooperation. Furthermore, in terms of advanced technology and economic cooperation, TSMC decided to increase its factories in the US and prioritize semiconductor supply after meeting with Biden regarding semiconductors. The US has also strived to enhance Taiwan's international standing. Biden invited a Taiwanese representative to his inauguration, allowing Taiwan's official participation for the first time since the severance of ties. In May 2021, the US Ambassador to France invited a Taiwanese representative to the embassy, and in the same month, the EU-G7 joint statement supported Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Health Assembly (WHA).

Second, highlighting the international threats emanating from the CCP regime. The US has recently criticized China's aggressive diplomatic behavior. Notable examples include hostage diplomacy targeting citizens of Australia, Canada, the US, and Japan; China's "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy" during the COVID-19 pandemic; retaliatory diplomacy against Australia; and the "14 demands" issued by the Chinese embassy (Cheng 2020; Kearsley, Bagshaw and Galloway 2020). Additionally, the US has exposed various illegal operations and influence activities conducted by China abroad (Larry and Schell 2018). Examples include infiltration and influence operations, hacking, and cyberattacks in the US, Canada, France, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. These also include surveillance and control of Chinese students abroad, operations by internet commentators known as the "50 Cent Party" (五毛黨), recruitment operations of professors and researchers under the "Thousand Talents Plan," and aggressive bribery strategies employed abroad (Li 2016; Zelikow, Edelman, Harrison, and Gventer 2020; Zweig and Kang 2020).

Third, actively countering the international strategies proposed by China based on its undemocratic system. China is currently promoting digital authoritarianism, glorifying suppression and control using advanced technology under the guise of order. In response, the US has elaborated on the concept of "open societies" in the EU-G7 joint statement. Furthermore, the US has criticized and countered China's international strategies through forums such as the UN Human Rights Council, the Quad, and US-China and US-South Korea summits. The US has also exposed how China threatens non-governmental organizations and diplomats who raise human rights issues in international bodies like the UN Human Rights Council, and how it suppresses their voices under the guise of legal procedures (Richardson 2020a; Feltman 2020). In January 2021, the US announced "US Support for Human Rights Defenders," pledging to protect them abroad.

3. China's Expected Damages

<Figure 1> Increase in US Lobbying Expenditures by Chinese State-Owned Media Enterprises

Source: Open Secrets (A civic organization for US lobbying information)

1) Tangible Damages

First, increased costs to promote China in response to US attacks on human rights and democracy. Currently, various Chinese state-owned media enterprises are registered as lobbying clients with the US Department of Justice, and their expenditures in the US have sharply increased since 2019 (Figure 1). Most of these costs were paid by China Global Television Network (CGTN) America, a US subsidiary of the Chinese state broadcaster CCTV (2020, $50,244,312). Furthermore, China spent $6.6 billion in 2018 to counter US and Western reporting, and $1 billion in 2019 on Confucius Institutes and other initiatives to promote China (The Economist June 14, 2018; May 24, 2019).

<Figure 2> Trends in Favorability and Unfavorability Towards China by Country (2020)

Source: Pew Research Center

Second, a surge in anti-China sentiment due to US attacks, a trend that is likely to continue. According to a 2020 Pew Research Center report on trends in anti-China sentiment, it has sharply deteriorated since 2018 (Figure 2). This aligns with findings from other polling organizations such as Gallup. Notably, since 2019, favorability and unfavorability towards China have fluctuated in many countries, including Australia, Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, and South Korea. Keeping these changes in mind, Xi Jinping emphasized the need to promote China through influential media and lead public opinion during a collective study session of the CCP Politburo on June 1, 2021.

Third, losses incurred by Chinese companies due to US import bans imposed by the Department of Commerce and export restrictions related to Xinjiang. The estimated damage so far is a loss of approximately 10% of total revenue for Chinese companies (Sanford Bernstein 2019). The potential losses from the yet-to-be-ratified EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and a boycott of the Beijing Olympics are expected to be larger. However, the estimated costs for these two scenarios are uncertain as they have not yet materialized.

2) Intangible Damages

First, when the US actively pursues human rights policies in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, there will likely be an increase in international asylum requests from Hong Kong democracy advocates, domestic human rights lawyers, and dissidents. Based on previous cases such as the Tiananmen Square Massacre, these individuals are likely to actively engage in anti-government movements in their host countries after seeking asylum and may even extend their activities to international platforms like the UN (Richardson 2020b). This will lead to damage to China's international image, a particularly sensitive issue for the country, resulting in intangible yet potentially fatal damage (Foot 2010).

Second, diplomatic costs incurred to counter US attacks on human rights and undemocratic systems and to garner support from other nations. China paid significant diplomatic costs to restore its image after the Tiananmen Square incident (Foot 2000). To regain its previous standing, China actively participated in multilateral diplomacy, increased its contributions to various international organizations, and significantly expanded Official Development Assistance (ODA), loans, and investments in bilateral diplomacy. A representative indicator of this is the increase in China's contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) and troop deployments (Figure 3).

<Figure 3> China's Increased Contributions to the UN and PKO Troop Support

Source: China Daily, Institute for Security & Development Policy (2018)

Third, US offensive actions may cause unintended damage to China. Firstly, if China attempts to replace the US or reform existing international institutions, other countries may suspect China of pursuing new hegemony (Lee and Sullivan 2019). Secondly, since establishing new norms is a difficult task, there is a possibility of failure midway, or China may be persuaded or pressured in the process, leading to backlash (Foot and Inboden 2016). Furthermore, if China compromises with the US on human rights and democracy to some extent, the compromised principles could incite domestic dissidents, ethnic minorities, or Hong Kong, potentially activating anti-government activities and increasing regime instability (Thomas 2001).

II. China's Offensive Strategies and US Expected Damages

China will employ two offensive strategies in the values and norms conflict. First, the formation and dissemination of a new vision to counter the US-led liberal international order. Second, a counter-offensive utilizing the weaknesses and failures of the US-led liberal international order. This section will examine the objectives of these offensives, specific leverage points, and estimate the expected damages to the US.

1. China's Offensive Strategy: Formation and Dissemination of a New Vision to Replace the US-Led Liberal International Order

1) Objectives

China's objectives in creating and disseminating a new international vision are threefold. First, to present a vision for a new international order based on China's economic strength, political stability, and successful response to COVID-19, thereby enhancing China's role and image as an international leader. Second, to expose the problems of the US-led liberal international order and attack the legitimacy of Biden's international leadership aimed at reviving it. Third, to secure a support base using China's economic power in response to the US's efforts to consolidate alliances and partnerships to contain China.

2) Specific Leverage Points

Three specific leverage points are used to achieve these objectives. First, developing and actively presenting a new vision for the international community (Mazarr, Heath, and Cevallos 2018; Rolland 2020b). Since Xi Jinping came to power, China has advocated "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" (中國特色社會主義) based on economic development and social stability. Recently, with the successful control of COVID-19, vaccine development, and efficient production of medical supplies, Xi Jinping has put forward concepts such as a "Community of Shared Future for Mankind" (人類命運共同體) and "Chinese Wisdom and Chinese Solutions" (中國智惠和中國方式) for resolving global issues. Notably, since 2021, China has emphasized the "tide of history" (歷史的潮流), signifying the decline of the West and the rise of China, in official forums (Yang 2020). This conviction, shared by some leaders following Trump and the COVID-19 pandemic, has shifted from discussions targeting domestic audiences to international platforms (Huang 2021).

Second, developing and presenting a Chinese model of human rights and democracy to counter US attacks on these issues. In February 2021, Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed "people's democracy" (人民民主) at the Lanting Forum, arguing that democracy is not limited to the American model and has no fixed template or correct answer. He promoted the Chinese model of people's democracy as contributing to human civilization by achieving social stability and effectively responding to crises, including COVID-19. Furthermore, at the UN Human Rights Council in the same year, Wang Yi presented "people-centered human rights" (以人民為中心的人權), emphasizing the particularity of human rights and the need for states to realize them according to their specific circumstances. He also stressed the importance of balanced development across various human rights domains, giving relative priority to the rights to survival and development, and economic, social, and cultural rights.

Third, securing and leveraging support from countries that back China in international politics. Since 2017, China has convened meetings to present its vision in opposition to the US. In December 2017, China hosted the South-South Human Rights Forum, inviting heads of state, ministers, international organization representatives, and scholars from approximately 70 developing countries in Asia and Africa. The forum adopted the Beijing Declaration, which included principles such as the right to development, resolution of issues through dialogue, and the particularity of human rights. Based on this, China initiated and passed the resolution "Promoting Mutually Beneficial Cooperation in the field of Human Rights" (A/HRC/37/L.36) at the UN Human Rights Council. Countries that have secured China's support in the human rights domain include Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.

2. China's Offensive Strategy: Counter-offensive Utilizing the Weaknesses and Failures of the US-Led Liberal International Order

1) Objectives

China's counter-offensive utilizing the weaknesses and failures of the liberal international order has three objectives. First, to expose the detrimental consequences of the US-proposed liberal international order, thereby revealing the dangers of the US-led order and attacking its international legitimacy. Second, to highlight various issues within the US, which advocates for human rights and democracy, thereby exposing America's limitations. Third, to create a gap between the ideals and reality of US foreign policy, thereby provoking partisan conflict over foreign policy issues within the US.

2) Specific Leverage Points

Three specific leverage points are used to achieve these objectives. First, exposing the past and present detrimental consequences of the US-led liberal international order. Through various channels, including media reports and official statements, China has consistently reminded the world that past US attempts to promote democracy and human rights have resulted in failure, leading to greater political instability and loss of life. Representative examples include the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war, the bombing of Libya, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and drone strikes in the Middle East such as in Yemen, as well as severe human rights violations during overseas military operations. China also criticizes the US support for democratic forces in the ongoing situation in Myanmar, arguing that it could cause regional instability. Conversely, it has attacked the legitimacy of US diplomacy by condemning the US's double standards, citing the UN Security Council's failure to adopt a resolution on the Israeli-Palestinian crisis due to US opposition (Wong 2021).

Second, attacking the legitimacy of the US by exposing human rights and democracy issues within the US. China has vehemently criticized US human rights issues in its annual "Human Rights Record of the United States," including violations of economic and social rights, poverty, gun violence, and racial discrimination. During recent events such as the Black Lives Matter protests, police brutality, social inequality, failures in COVID-19 response, controversies over election fraud, and the Capitol riot, China criticized that the human rights and democracy promoted by the US are not even properly implemented domestically. In contrast, China has promoted its successes in COVID-19 response, social safety and order maintenance, and poverty alleviation (Gill 2020; Rolland 2020a). In response to these Chinese attacks, recent calls within the US have argued for the swift resolution of these domestic human rights and democracy issues (Shattuck and Sikkink 2021).

Third, pointing out the discrepancy between US diplomatic rhetoric and its domestic human rights and democracy situation to highlight US double standards. China has, on various occasions, urged the US to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the US has not adopted. Furthermore, it has pointed out various domestic issues such as ethnic profiling, the delayed closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, and the separation of parents and children during the process of preventing large-scale illegal immigration from Central and South America. Specifically, China has highlighted similar issues within the US to those it criticizes and intervenes in other countries regarding human rights, thereby exposing US hypocrisy. For example, China has recently juxtaposed the Xinjiang internment camps with detention centers on the US border, and the Hong Kong protests with anti-racism demonstrations, emphasizing that these issues are not fundamentally different.

3. US Expected Damages

1) Tangible Damages

<Figure 4>

Source: US Department of State

First, increased US government budget to counter Chinese attacks. In response to China's actions, the US has increased its budget for public diplomacy and foreign aid (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs) since 2020 (Figure 4). The Biden administration's 2022 request includes a 12% increase in the State Department budget to $63.5 billion, with two of the six supporting factors being the objectives to "advance America's global standing and promote democracy and human rights" and "re-establish American moral leadership on refugee and humanitarian issues" (Kelly 2021). While this represents a cost to enhance America's image, it is a cost that would not have been incurred without China's aggressive offensive.

Second, damages resulting from the deterioration of Chinese public opinion and perception towards the US. A recent survey by the Global Times indicates a significantly high level of anti-American sentiment at 66.7% in 2020. Only 2.9% expressed favorability, while 27% were dissatisfied with US public policy, despite acknowledging strengths in science/technology and the rule of law (Figure 5). This anti-American sentiment narrows the scope for US foreign policy and limits the strategies it can employ.

<Figure 5> Global Times Survey Results, 2020

Source: Global Times (2020)

2) Intangible Damages

First, active US policies towards Taiwan violate the "One China" principle, and China has already designated Taiwan as a "red line" that must not be crossed through various channels, asserting it as a sovereign issue for China. Given the recent sharp increase in the proportion of the Taiwanese population identifying as Taiwanese (83.2% according to a Taipei Times poll on February 25, 2021), active US policies towards Taiwan risk provoking Chinese nationalism or unification sentiments (Mastro 2021).

Second, if the current policy toward China is maintained, U.S. companies will incur economic losses, which could exacerbate economic dissatisfaction among the middle class, a group prioritized by Biden. Aggressive anti-China diplomacy is highly likely to harm U.S. economic interests given the current economic situation. Companies such as Coca-Cola and Nike, whose exports rely on cotton, textiles, sugar, and tomatoes, have increasingly voiced opposition and lobbied against policies concerning Xinjiang (Swanson 2019). Similarly, Chevron, a joint venture partner with the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, has actively lobbied against sanctions on Myanmar, with which the U.S. is in confrontation (Vogel and Jakes 2021). Reflecting this, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has recently expressed significant concern over decoupling with China, advocating for corporate interests. While the Biden administration has so far maintained its foreign policy stance, it remains uncertain whether the government can withstand mounting corporate damages.

Third, China's assertiveness may create fissures in alliances and areas where interests do not align. China will likely exploit the United States' double standards and selective application of policies. Due to the nature of values and norms, it is difficult for the U.S. to maintain consistent policies, and China will seize this opportunity to persuade countries in Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South America, thereby challenging the legitimacy of U.S. leadership. Furthermore, the U.S. itself could face risks to its citizens due to China's hostage diplomacy. Australia, Canada, and Japan have already fallen victim to China's hostage diplomacy, and the U.S. has also recently experienced instances of its citizens being unjustly detained in China.

III. Aspects and Outcomes of U.S.-China Competition over Values and Norms

1. Expected Developments in the Short to Medium Term (by 2030)

As of 2021, the U.S.-China dynamic regarding values and norms is characterized by competition. While there was a rare instance of cooperation on global warming, with Xi Jinping attending the virtual climate summit hosted by the U.S. in April, this is an exception. Over the next decade, from the present until 2030, the conflict over values and norms between the U.S. and China is expected to intensify. This prediction is based on new trends emerging in both countries. Both the U.S. and China are undertaking novel approaches concerning values and norms. These shifts originated during the Trump administration, and with the advent of the Biden administration, new conflicts are overlapping and merging with existing ones without resolution. Based on this pattern, future conflicts are likely to escalate.

Firstly, since Biden took office, the U.S. has been actively building a coalition centered on values and norms to counter China. This will become clearer with the release of the ongoing National Security Strategy and the China Task Force Report. However, the contours are already visible in the Interim National Security Strategy Guidance released in March, as well as in interviews and articles by key figures like Kurt Campbell. One certainty is that the U.S. views conflicts over values and norms as closely intertwined with other domains such as trade, technology, and security. The linkage between trade and values/norms began during the Trump era, exemplified by actions against Huawei and import bans on companies involved in human rights abuses. Although Biden has reversed many Trump-era policies, he has continued the trade policies toward China. Furthermore, from the beginning of his term, Biden has forged new links between advanced technologies like semiconductors, batteries, and biotechnology, and values/norms under the guise of supply chain security. Investments and collaborations with Taiwan's TSMC, and South Korea's Samsung and SK, clearly indicate an intention to maintain advanced technology supply chains only with countries that share values and norms. Therefore, under the Biden administration, values and norms are not only emphasized in themselves but have become even more critical due to their close linkage with other issues.

In particular, values and norms will deepen the conflict because they provide the fundamental legitimacy for the U.S.'s policy toward China in trade and advanced technology. Values and norms possess a distinct autonomy separate from other domains. While they influence and are closely linked with military, security, economic, and technological spheres, conflicts over values and norms do not naturally resolve even if issues in other areas are settled. Recent U.S. trends show the creation of various multilateral and minilateral platforms, such as the Quad, U.S.-South Korea-Japan cooperation, the EU, and the G7, by linking values and norms, which will be used to contain China.

China is also approaching the situation differently in response to U.S. policies compared to the past. During the Trump administration, China's response to U.S. pressure was primarily defensive. In response to the "U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China," which signaled a shift in U.S. policy toward China, Beijing adopted a passive defense strategy. This involved issuing denials and criticizing U.S. hostile policies. Yang Jiechi, a member of the Politburo and director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, published a lengthy commentary in August of the same year, arguing that U.S. criticisms, including those targeting the Communist Party, constituted malicious attacks and interference in China's internal affairs. China also declared its firm defense of its core interests against such attacks. Furthermore, China urged the U.S. to cease interfering in its internal affairs and to foster a constructive relationship through dialogue and communication.

However, the current Chinese Communist Party leadership no longer appears to be avoiding value and norm conflicts but is actively engaging with them. Notably, the concepts of "people's democracy" and "people-centered human rights" introduced since 2021, coupled with Xi Jinping's vision of a "community of shared future for mankind," represent the values China promotes on the international stage. This is clearly a departure from a defensive strategy, demonstrating an effort to construct and project China's vision. More concerning is the trend of anti-American sentiment and nationalism that emerged following China's response to COVID-19 and Trump's anti-China offensive. Current Chinese public opinion supports and reinforces the leadership's assertive policy toward the U.S. The public statements and demeanor of Politburo member Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi following the Anchorage meeting exemplify this. China is also pursuing a highly assertive policy regarding Taiwan, which it considers a core national interest. In response to the U.S. sending an envoy and mentioning Taiwan in summit meetings with Japan and South Korea, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson warned against "playing with fire."

2. Expected Outcomes of Competition by 2050

Beyond 2030, the U.S. and China are expected to continue their conflict over values and norms, which will intensify as it becomes intertwined with trade, advanced technology, and security. While it is possible that the conflict over values and norms may subside if the U.S. and China find common ground and pursue cooperation in other areas, the repercussions of value and norm conflicts can linger due to the nature of these issues. Values and norms possess latent explosiveness rooted in emotional and affective factors such as public opinion, nationalism, culture, and civilization. Furthermore, they tend to be resistant to strategic calculations and are not easily changed, as they pursue consistency in both domestic and international politics. China's patriotic public opinion, which emerged in response to the U.S.'s COVID-19 response failures and Trump's anti-China offensive, and the U.S.'s anti-China sentiment that persists even after Biden's inauguration, clearly illustrate these characteristics of values and norms.

Ultimately, the U.S. and China are likely to reach a compromise after 2050, but this compromise will not be favorable to China. Currently, the U.S. possesses more numerous and effective strategies in the U.S.-China value and norm conflict, and China is at a disadvantage even when considering the potential damages for both countries. Moreover, China's new international vision as an offensive strategy is not guaranteed to succeed and risks being perceived as hegemonic pursuit (Hart and Johnson 2019). There is also a possibility that China's attempts to establish new norms will fail or backfire. An example of this occurred in 2006 when China strongly pushed its agenda during the transformation of the UN Commission on Human Rights into the UN Human Rights Council, but ultimately failed. This indicates that the vision and values China presents are not yet sufficiently attractive. The Soft Power 30 project, which ranks the soft power of 30 countries, shows China ranked 27th in 2019, a significant gap from the U.S. at 5th place.

Furthermore, another strategy, leveraging the weaknesses and failures of the U.S.'s liberal international order for counter-offensives, is also unlikely to succeed against the U.S. While counter-offensives can be cost-effective, they are unlikely to be effective as long as the U.S. continues to manage the international order relatively well. Moreover, this strategy fundamentally relies on U.S. missteps, limiting China's ability to target the U.S. at its desired time and in its preferred manner. Situations like the Myanmar crisis and the Israel-Palestine conflict in the first half of 2021, which exposed U.S. double standards, may favor China, but these are not situations China can create. Even if the U.S. initially showed a slow response, as in the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict, by supporting Israel, it quickly rectified the situation in response to domestic and international criticism, leaving China with few leverage points. The same applies to COVID-19 vaccines. China pointed out the discrepancy between U.S. values and actions by highlighting U.S. vaccine export controls, but the Biden administration quickly supported vaccine intellectual property waivers at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and supplied vaccines to India, South America, and South Korea, preventing China from sustaining its offensive.

Additionally, a reason for the U.S.'s advantage in the U.S.-China value and norm conflict is that the EU and its Asian allies are also taking a more active stance in line with U.S. actions. Recent events such as the 2+2 defense and foreign ministerial meetings with South Korea and Japan, the U.S.-Japan summit, the U.S.-South Korea summit, and the G7 Foreign and Development Ministers' meeting including the EU, demonstrate closer alignment between traditional allies like the G7, EU, South Korea, and Japan with the U.S. This trend is evident not only in military and security domains but also in economic trade, advanced technology, and health. This is because the U.S. is pursuing alliances and partnerships encompassing various activities on the international stage, including values and norms, supply chains, advanced technology, health, and human rights. The U.S. is attempting to consolidate existing alliances through diverse multilateral strategies. The EU-G7 joint statement represents a comprehensive vision for global governance. Given these trends, the current value and norm conflict is unlikely to be resolved easily. The conflict will become even more severe if it escalates to military confrontation.

For reference, the degree of alignment between the U.S. and its allies in values and norms is also related to China's future stance. Recent Chinese diplomacy has clearly exposed vulnerabilities in the realm of values and norms. Vaccine diplomacy and the use of medical supplies are prime examples. China's diplomatic pressure on countries like Paraguay, which has diplomatic ties with Taiwan, to break relations by leveraging vaccine supplies, revealed the superficiality of Chinese diplomacy. Although China is dominating agendas such as multilateralism, African development, and Palestine as the president of the UN Security Council, its backward perception of human rights and democracy, as demonstrated in the Myanmar crisis, has disappointed democratic nations. If China's perceptions and attitudes in this area do not change, the conflict between the camp promoting democracy led by the U.S. and China is expected to intensify. ■

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■ Author: Kim Hun-joonProfessor of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. He graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in International Relations and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota (Twin Cities). He has served as a visiting assistant professor at St. Olaf College and an associate professor at Griffith University. His main research areas include international norms and institutions, international human rights, and ethics. His recent works include "The Politics of Peaceful Power Transition" (2015, co-authored), The Massacres at Mt Halla: Sixty Years of Truth-Seeking in South Korea (Cornell University Press, 2014), and Transitional Justice in the Asia Pacific (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

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