[EAI Special Report] Taiwan Special Series ⑥_Strategic Implications and Mid- to Long-Term Prospects of the Taiwan Strait Issue

[Editor's Note]

In this special report, Seol In-hyo, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, analyzes the US-China military strategies surrounding Taiwan and predicts changes in the military balance between the two countries in the short and mid- to long-term for each possible scenario. Both the United States and China have defined Taiwan as a non-negotiable interest. Furthermore, to prepare for future contingencies, both countries are strengthening their forces and combat readiness, mobilizing military power, and demonstrating their resolve to defend Taiwan. The author argues that given the strategic nuclear weapon balance between the US and China, the likelihood of the Taiwan issue escalating into actual military conflict is low, and even if an accidental clash occurs, it is likely to be resolved through negotiation. However, the author adds that the possibility of conflict in Taiwan cannot be entirely ruled out.

1. Introduction

The US-China relationship, which began to rapidly deteriorate after 2019 during the latter half of the Trump administration, continues to experience significant conflict under the Biden administration, which took office in 2021. Tensions surrounding Taiwan are particularly escalating, causing concern. The 'one China policy' concerning the Taiwan issue has been the cornerstone of bilateral relations since normalization. Indeed, many actions previously considered 'red lines' by US-China relations experts during the Trump administration, such as official visits by high-ranking officials to Taiwan, have been carried out, and a similar trend continues under the Biden administration.

The escalating tensions surrounding Taiwan indicate that both countries perceive the strategic competition as serious enough to warrant a fundamental redefinition of their relationship. The relative decline of the United States, evidenced by various indicators, and the steady, albeit gradual, rise of China, resulting in a narrowing gap in economic and national power between the two countries, are the fundamental causes of the escalating and sustained conflict, and are therefore likely to persist in the future. Taiwan, due to its strategic importance, will remain one of the critical points where the two countries could clash, making it crucial to accurately define its strategic significance.

This report will analyze the strategic intentions of both the US and China regarding Taiwan and, through military strategy analysis, will outline potential scenarios for the development of events in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Subsequently, it will assess the changes in the military balance in the short and mid- to long-term under each scenario. Finally, the conclusion will define the strategic implications of the Taiwan issue within the context of US-China relations based on these assessments.

2. Likelihood and Projected Development of a Taiwan Contingency

1) Strategic Intentions and Likelihood of Conflict between the US and China

At present, Taiwan holds an indispensable strategic value for both the US and China. China perceives Taiwan as an inseparable part of its territory and defines unification with Taiwan as a core task of the Chinese Communist Party. It is the most crucial stage and task in realizing the 'Chinese Dream' and cleansing the humiliating past, as advocated by the Xi Jinping leadership. In this regard, if it becomes apparent that unification with Taiwan is virtually impossible, such as through the normalization of diplomatic relations between the US and Taiwan, ahead of Xi Jinping's third term in 2022, it would inflict a fatal political blow that would be difficult to tolerate.⑴

Traditionally, Taiwan has been perceived by the United States as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' for pressuring and managing China. Moreover, the US currently defines a 'free and open Indo-Pacific' as the desired goal for the region, and Taiwan's independence has emerged as a key element symbolizing this. If Taiwan's independence is denied, US security commitments to its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region and globally would be called into question. Historian Niall Ferguson has assessed that the loss of Taiwan by the United States would be an event comparable to Britain's loss of the Suez Canal, which effectively marked its decline as a hegemonic power.⑵

In conjunction with these strategic intentions of both countries, a series of events since 2019, during the latter half of the Trump administration, have acted as factors increasing the possibility of conflict surrounding Taiwan. Both the US and China, anticipating intensified competition, are strengthening their actions to define Taiwan as a non-negotiable interest and demonstrate their resolve to defend it. This trend is leading to more assertive military posturing and bolder military actions. Both sides (China vs. US/Taiwan) are strengthening their forces, mobilizing military power, and enhancing combat readiness to prepare for future contingencies, making the uncertainty of outcomes, should an event occur, higher than ever before.

This uncertainty is highly likely to intensify in the present and future, with the continuous introduction of advanced weapons amidst fierce US-China competition. In this process, where the strong intentions of both sides clash and military demonstrations and displays are conducted to express these intentions, the possibility of 'accidental conflict' is continuously expanding. Paradoxically, both countries are enhancing their combat readiness to prevent this, creating a vicious cycle where the possibility of conflict is actually increasing.

Considering the strategic perceptions, judgments, and recent trends between the US and China as described above, it is true that the possibility of military conflict surrounding Taiwan is significantly heightened. However, at the same time, the following points need to be considered. First, both sides are continuing their efforts and exercising caution to avoid military conflict. Second, the Biden administration has many issues to cooperate on with China, making it quite possible that it will seek to stabilize US-China relations at a manageable level after a significant escalation of tensions. Economic cooperation, in particular, will become more prominent in the post-pandemic era. Third, and most importantly, in the event of a conflict between the two countries, no one can guarantee the outcome, and the possibility of escalation to nuclear war cannot be ruled out.

Therefore, both sides must exercise extreme caution throughout the entire process. Consequently, if an actual conflict occurs, there is a significant possibility that they will realize the destructive potential of the consequences and seek an early compromise, shifting the situation towards efforts to prevent conflict. Thus, the possibility of conflict between the US and China must be judged comprehensively and with a balanced consideration of these factors, and changes in its relative likelihood must be continuously monitored.

2) US-China and Taiwan Military Strategies and Scenarios for a Taiwan Contingency

To accurately predict the likelihood, development, and outcome of a Taiwan contingency, it is necessary to project the course of events in detail should such an event occur. This requires an overview of the military strategies of China, the United States, and Taiwan.⑶First, China's military objective is to effectively control Taiwan and achieve unification. To this end, the ultimate goal will be to land on Taiwan Island and secure control. However, depending on the situation, the objective may be to achieve substantial control that can influence Taiwan's political will or to secure military dominance by occupying some islands, such as Kinmen, thereby establishing military control.

To achieve these objectives, the People's Liberation Army will first aim to block US intervention, then destroy or overwhelm Taiwan's air and naval forces, and subsequently land/assault Taiwan Island via air and sea to complete military control. The subsequent objective will be to maintain a blockade of Taiwan to prevent the international community, including the United States, from challenging the altered status quo.

To achieve these military and non-military objectives, China will likely maximize its combat readiness in a covert manner and rapidly and efficiently mobilize all its land, sea, air, and strategic forces in a surprise attack. This will involve the utilization and demonstration of 'anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities' to block and impede US access and maneuver, as is well known. For Taiwan, it will aim to achieve its objectives rapidly by concentrating overwhelming force in a surprise attack, sequentially utilizing forces from the Eastern Theater Command facing Taiwan and support forces from other theaters.

Taiwan's objective is to maintain its independence and possess the ability to deter and prevent subjugation by the Chinese Communist Party against its will, with the support of the United States. The ultimate guarantee for this is expected to be the acquisition of military power and the restoration of diplomatic relations and a mutual defense treaty between the US and Taiwan. The subordinate objectives of the Taiwanese military to achieve this are to detect Chinese military movements early through early warning systems, and to delay Chinese infiltration, landing, and subversion operations to buy time for US intervention.

It will strive to maintain air and sea superiority to block Chinese forces, impede and block Chinese landing attempts, and conduct ground combat and resistance operations if a landing occurs. If China succeeds in occupying Taiwan Island, the remaining forces will conduct a joint landing operation with the US to recapture Taiwan Island. Finally, it will aim to possess strategic bombing capabilities against key industrial areas, large dams, and Beijing to deter or retaliate against Chinese attacks.⑷

The United States' objective is to maintain the status quo. This means ensuring Taiwan enjoys independence and is not subjugated by China. It also aims to prevent a situation where China possesses the capability and readiness to fully subjugate Taiwan and effectively control it. To this end, the US will first support the strengthening of Taiwan's military capabilities to enable it to resist and delay until US support forces arrive. Second, it will demonstrate US resolve and capability to prevent miscalculation by China. Third, in case of contingency, it will dispatch reinforcement forces to conduct air and sea battles, among other operations, to deter China's landing on Taiwan. Finally, if a landing occurs, it will conduct a joint landing operation with the Taiwanese military and allied forces to recapture Taiwan Island.

Considering the military strategies of China, Taiwan, and the United States as described above, three plausible scenarios can be envisioned. The first is the 'conventional invasion and occupation scenario.' This scenario involves China utilizing psychological warfare, cyber and space warfare, and other information operations, along with its air force, navy, strategic bombers, and ground-launched missile strike capabilities, to gain air and sea superiority in the Taiwan Strait and transport landing forces and airborne assault forces via sea and air to land and attempt to occupy Taiwan.

The second scenario is the 'hybrid warfare scenario.' The core of this scenario is that it begins with a conflict below the level of military engagement, making it difficult for the US to intervene. Second, it aims to weaken Taiwan's combat capabilities and achieve political objectives through various non-military activities. Third, it enhances the effectiveness of non-military pressure by utilizing partial use of military force or the threat of full-scale use. The general course of development would be a political crisis triggered by clashes in the civilian domain (e.g., collisions involving merchant ships), followed by cyber and electronic warfare targeting key facilities and military assets within Taiwan, and internal guerrilla warfare, creating a situation where Taiwan is effectively incapacitated and has no choice but to surrender.

The third scenario is the 'surprise limited strike scenario.' This scenario involves China demonstrating a firm resolve against US military and non-military support for Taiwan and rapidly seizing 'strategic footholds' that would enable swift subjugation of Taiwan in a contingency. Some islands belonging to Taiwan, located close to mainland China, would be targets. Through this, China would demonstrate its willingness to take significant risks regarding the Taiwan issue. In this case, the US would have to attempt a landing and recapture operation in conjunction with Taiwan, but would have to operate under militarily disadvantageous conditions due to proximity to mainland China, and would face the risk of escalation if an attack on mainland China becomes unavoidable in a contingency.

3. Assessment of Military Balance in a Taiwan Contingency: Short- and Mid- to Long-Term

1) Criteria for Assessing Military Balance

It is very difficult to rigorously assess the military balance between the US and China. However, various methods of assessing military balance have been employed, and expert evaluations have been accumulated, allowing for a general assessment by synthesizing these. Furthermore, it is not impossible to generally predict the occurrence of an event, given that China would likely only proceed if it could anticipate a success rate of over 70%.⑸

[Figure 1] China-Taiwan Military Balance⑹

The military balance between China and Taiwan has tilted overwhelmingly in China's favor, as shown in [Figure 1], due to China's military rise and the modernization of the People's Liberation Army. Prior to the Trump administration, US military support for Taiwan was limited to a level that could deter Chinese aggression. As a result, Taiwan's military vulnerability has continuously increased due to China's growing military capabilities.

However, Taiwan's geographical advantages are also acknowledged. Due to the mountainous terrain of Taiwan Island, the landing points for its occupation are limited to about 15% of the total land area. Taiwan has concentrated its military bases in these areas, making Chinese landings effectively deterred.⑺To fully control Taiwan, which possesses a considerable standing army and reserve forces, heavy weaponry such as armored vehicles and troops must be landed. This requires complete control of the air and sea. This is because a large number of transport ships and aircraft, which are slow and vulnerable to attack, must be operated.

2) Short-Term Military Balance Assessment

Based on a comprehensive analysis of expert assessments conducted to date, the likelihood of China using military means to achieve its political objectives regarding Taiwan remains very low. This is because, in all three scenarios mentioned above, China does not yet demonstrate overwhelming superiority. In particular, the occupation of Taiwan Island through 'conventional warfare' remains highly unlikely. Securing complete air and sea superiority and transporting large numbers of troops and equipment, with resistance from the Taiwanese military and support from the US, is a very difficult task.

Hybrid warfare and surprise limited strikes are assessed to have a relatively higher probability of success. However, hybrid warfare has a high degree of uncertainty due to the difficulty of objectively assessing the success probability of individual operations, and consequently, it entails significant risks. 'Surprise limited strikes' have the highest probability of success among the three methods, but their political effect is limited. At the same time, as the conflict would take place close to China, the likelihood of US intervention is relatively low, but if intervention occurs, it could lead to direct conflict between the US and China, thus carrying high inherent 'risks'.

Therefore, the possibility of China intentionally launching military operations against Taiwan in the present and near future is considered very low. However, the possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. In particular, the possibility of accidental conflict still exists and is increasing as military tensions escalate. Furthermore, once a conflict breaks out, both the US and China are likely to escalate the crisis to a certain level without yielding. This is because showing weakness in such a situation would have a profound impact on the global perception of the US-China military balance. Therefore, if such a situation arises, China is likely to attempt to achieve its political objectives by resorting to one of the aforementioned three scenarios.

Another possibility is that China, viewing the future military balance pessimistically, may be forced into a situation where it has no choice but to resort to military means. That is, if China anticipates losing complete military control over Taiwan due to future US military support and the completion of its military network in the Indo-Pacific region, it may take a gamble despite the risks. Even if the US resolve regarding Taiwan is strong, it is unlikely to compare to China's perception of Taiwan as part of its territory. China may make a risky choice, despite a low probability of success, under the belief that the US will eventually yield at the last moment.

3) Mid- to Long-Term Military Balance Assessment

Assessing the mid- to long-term military balance at this point is even more challenging. This is because it requires comprehensively predicting future changes in the national power of both countries and their defense budgets, the realization of new weapon systems and operational concepts, and the extent of cooperation between China and Russia, as well as cooperation from US allies and partners. However, considering the national power potential of both countries and the strategic importance of Taiwan, it is highly probable that efforts by both sides to maintain the military balance will continue, and a general balance is likely to be maintained.

Assuming this, the characteristics of future warfare systems are noteworthy. The US and China are currently engaged in fierce competition to be the first to implement new methods of warfare utilizing the technologies of the emerging Fourth Industrial Revolution. The competition between the two countries, which will continue until around 2050, is based on the idea that whoever dominates future warfare first will win.⑻

Future warfare utilizing the new technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution aims to replace a significant portion of the process from reconnaissance and surveillance to decision-making and targeting with 'artificial intelligence.' Due to enhanced sensor and precision strike capabilities, the importance of striking first will continue to increase. The 'competition of distance' will gradually transform into a 'competition of time and speed.' Consequently, in the event of military conflict, crisis escalation will occur more rapidly, and crisis management will become an increasingly difficult problem.

As we move into the future, if regional conflicts occur and new methods of warfare, such as those seen in the Gulf War or the Iraq War, are demonstrated, and if political leaders gain a better understanding of the characteristics of warfare described above, the planning of war and military activities surrounding Taiwan may become more cautious. However, if they become overconfident in their enhanced military capabilities and develop a false belief that victory can be achieved in a short period, the possibility of achieving political objectives through military means cannot be ruled out.

4. Conclusion: Strategic Implications of the Taiwan Issue

Due to the strategic nuclear weapon balance between the superpowers, the likelihood of the Taiwan issue escalating into actual military conflict is very low, and even accidental conflicts are likely to be resolved through early negotiations. This is because if a Taiwan contingency occurs, the possibility of direct conflict between the US and China is too high. The South China Sea, which has a relatively higher possibility of breaking out into actual conflict and being contained as a regional dispute without US intervention, is considered to have a higher likelihood of actual conflict.

However, the possibility of military conflict in Taiwan cannot be entirely ruled out, and preventing such an event should be a key element of the new regional military order to be established amidst future US-China competition. This is because if the unbridled escalation of tensions and competition of wills between the two countries continues, the possibility of accidental conflict can never be ruled out. Given the strategic importance and status of the Taiwan issue, once a conflict erupts, it is unlikely that either side will yield. Yielding would be interpreted as a lack of confidence, and a lack of confidence would likely be interpreted as a negative assessment of the military balance.

If an accidental conflict occurs under these circumstances, especially if actual military engagement between the US and China takes place, it is highly likely to spiral out of control. No one will be able to predict or plan the subsequent events with high certainty. This is not solely because both countries possess nuclear weapons. It is because, considering the military strategies of both countries, the situation is structured in a way that makes nuclear war inevitable.

In the case of the United States, it would have no choice but to strike China's strategic command facilities to overcome its numerical disadvantage. These are located on mainland China. If these are struck, or if a strike is imminent, China is likely to launch an attack on nearby US military bases. China may expect that the US will not use nuclear weapons while employing powerful attacks to deter the US.

Political negotiations may be attempted at any stage. However, the outlook is further darkened by the fact that modern and future warfare is inherently a 'competition of speed.' In the future, with the completion of space- and air-based sensor systems and the widespread use of hypersonic weapons, it will be possible to strike all forces on the battlefield in real-time. Consequently, who makes the decision to strike first becomes the key to victory, which is why efforts are being made to replace a significant portion of the strike systems with artificial intelligence. This is the essence of 'decision-centric warfare,' which is discussed as the core of future warfare.⑼

This 'transformation of the battlefield structure' will make crisis management even more difficult in the event of a US-China military conflict. Therefore, accurate recognition of the 'military risks' as well as the 'strategic importance' of the Taiwan issue must become a core theme in the process of establishing a new military order in the future. This is a subject that not only the US, China, and Taiwan, but all countries in the region and the world must pay attention to and strive for. ■

⑴ Richard Hass & David Sacks, "American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous: To Keep the Peace, Make Clear to China That Force Won’t Stand," Foreign Affairs, 2020. 9. 2.

Niall Ferguson, "A Taiwan Crisis May Mark the End of the American Empire," Bloomberg, 2021. 3. 22.

The military strategies of the U.S., China, and Taiwan concerning the Taiwan Strait can be largely predicted through the weapon systems they possess and the patterns of their military exercises. Various studies by military experts on this matter have been produced, and this paper synthesizes these studies. Robert Blackwill & Philip Zelikow, "The United States, China and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War," CFR Special Report No. 90. 2021. 2; Samson Ellis, "Here's What Could Happen if China Invaded Taiwan," thejapantimes, 2020. 10. 8; Tim Willasey-Wilsey, "The Question: Why Would China Not Invade Taiwan Now?," Military Review, Sep-Oct, 2020; Admiral James A. Winnefeld, U.S. Navy (Retired), and Michael J. Morell, "The War That Never Was?," Proceedings, 2020. 8; Park Chang-hee, “An Assessment of the PLA’s Information Warfare Capabilities: Focusing on the Case of an Attack on Taiwan,” 『Military Review』 Vol. 105, March 2021.

Lee Hsi-min and Eric Lee, "Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, Explained," The Diplomat, 2020. 11. 3.

The core question is whether China's People's Liberation Army possesses the capability to achieve a swift victory in a Taiwan contingency. Tim Willasey-Wilsey, 2020. p. 8.

Niall McCarthy, "The Military Imbalance In The Taiwan Strait," Statista, 2021. 4. 14.

J. Michael Cole, “How Taiwan Can Defend Its Coastline Against China,” The National Interest, 2019. 6. 30.

The military competition between the United States and China is unfolding as a race to achieve future warfare capabilities. Seol In-hyo, “Structural Context of Military Innovation: Analysis and Prospects of U.S.-China Military Innovation Competition,” in *The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Emerging Military Security*, Seoul: Hanul Publishing Group, 2020.

Bryan Clark, Daniel Patt & Harrison Schramm, “Mosaic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems to Implement Decision-Centric Operations,” CSBA Online Report, 2020. 2.

■ Author: Seol In-hyo (薛仁曉) Senior Researcher, Center for Security Strategy Research, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. Graduated from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, and earned a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University. Served as a Visiting Researcher at the University of Maryland's CIDCM, a Visiting Researcher at Seoul National University's Institute for Global Studies, a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Yonsei University, and an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. Worked as a Visiting Fellow at the National Defense University's INSS in the U.S. in 2017, served as a director for the Defense Division of the Korean Association of International Studies, and as a policy advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Served as the head of the Defense Issues Team at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses from 2017 to 2020. Major publications include *Peace on the Path to Unification* (Parkyoungsa, co-authored, 2019), *The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Emerging Military Security* (Hanul Academy, co-authored, 2020), and *What Changes if North Korea Becomes a Nuclear State* (Social Science Academy, co-authored, 2020). Articles include “Deterring North Korea with Non-Nuclear High-Tech Weapons: Building a “3K+” Strategy and Its Applications,’(KJDA, 2018)“, ‘The Past and Present of the UN Command: Historical Development of the UN Command and Key Issues During the Transition to a Peace Regime’(Military, 2018), and ‘The Rise of Non-Traditional Security Threats and Measures for ROK-U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation’(Journal of Korean-Japanese Military Culture Research, 2021).

■ Responsible Editor: Baek Jin-kyung Research Director, EAI

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) j.baek@eai.or.kr