[EAI Special Report] Taiwan Special Series ③_US-China Competition and the Taiwan Issue: A Korean Perspective

[Editor's Note]

In this special report, Moon Heung-ho, Professor of Chinese Studies at the Graduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University, explains the rise of the Taiwan issue and the corresponding strategies of the United States and South Korea. The author notes the US strategy of removing past self-imposed restrictions on Taiwan and enacting legal measures to promote relations with Taiwan. The US argues that it is checking China's hegemonic challenge, not Taiwan's independence. If the US expands its involvement in cross-strait relations and demands South Korea's participation, South Korea could find itself in a difficult position between the US and China. It is time to carefully examine the complexity and reality of cross-strait relations to make strategic choices.

I. Problem Statement

The emergence and evolution of the Taiwan issue are inextricably linked to US factors. The US has played a powerful behind-the-scenes role, from the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government to Taiwan to the ideological confrontation across the Taiwan Strait, the maintenance of the status quo for mutual benefit and prosperity, and the conflict over unification and independence. In this regard, the essence of the Taiwan issue is the 'love-hate triangle' among the US, China, and Taiwan, and it is the US, not China or Taiwan, that has driven the changes in their relationship.

The rise of the Taiwan issue is a natural consequence of the US shifting its strategy toward China to one of competition and pressure. For a long time, the US has internally recognized Taiwan as a 'de facto sovereign state' separate from its acknowledgment of "One China" and its diplomatic relations with China, maintaining "strategic ambiguity" to avoid provoking China. Since the Trump administration, US policy toward Taiwan has transitioned from a non-political and non-governmental matter to a major national foreign and security strategy. Particularly, as the Biden administration expands its pressure front against China on a multilateral level based on alliances of values, ideology, and technology, Taiwan has already become 'one of America’s most reliable partners'.

As the US-China hegemonic competition transcends a simple bilateral relationship, the international sensitivity and ripple effects of the Taiwan issue have significantly increased. This foreshadows that the Taiwan issue will change in close connection with the regional order in the Asia-Pacific. In particular, South Korea and Japan, which have been influenced by the origins and evolution of the Taiwan issue and maintain alliance relationships with the US, cannot remain unaffected by the US-led readjustment of the Taiwan issue.

With this in mind, this paper aims to: first, analyze the US's strategic intentions, specific policy directions, and inherent limitations in expanding the Taiwan issue into a major political, security, and economic matter of international concern. An objective review of this is a prerequisite for establishing our optimal response strategy. Second, it examines South Korea's strategic choices and South Korea-Taiwan relations in the context of the evolving Taiwan issue. Of course, the limitation of this analysis is that the rise of the Taiwan issue has been triggered by the broader trend of US-China hegemonic competition, and South Korea's options are extremely limited between the confronting US and China.

II. US Policy Shift on Taiwan and Its Limitations

The new US policy toward Taiwan begins with "quickly abandoning the self-serving hope that China will peacefully resolve the Taiwan issue"⑴ and "boldly removing self-imposed restrictions" in relations with Taiwan⑵. This implies that the US will interpret and apply the agreements related to Taiwan stipulated in the 'three joint communiques,' the foundation of US-China relations, more flexibly from its own perspective.

Indeed, the US is already reviewing sensitive issues such as Taiwan's sovereignty, defense commitments, arms sales, and diplomatic contacts, while simultaneously preparing legal measures to promote relations with Taiwan. For example, through the 'TAIPEI Act' (Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act), it provides multifaceted support for Taiwan's advancement on the international stage. It has also declassified the "8.17 Communique" of 1982, which stipulated the gradual reduction of arms sales to Taiwan, President Reagan's memorandum, and two telegrams sent by Secretary of State George Shultz and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to James Lilly, the de facto US representative in Taiwan, thereby criticizing China's failure to keep its promises and its 'habit of distorting' facts.⑶

These US actions aim to justify the policy shift by emphasizing that China itself has provided the reasons necessitating the revision of US Taiwan policy. In particular, the US judges that the agreement in the "Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China" (1972) and the "Normalization Communique" (1979) stating that "the normalization of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China is in the interest of all countries in the Asia and Pacific region and in the world"⑷ has been significantly undermined by China. Therefore, the US is pursuing a new policy based on the 'Taiwan Relations Act' (TRA), which stipulates the necessity of "providing Taiwan with arms of a defensive character" and "maintaining the capacity in the region to resist any resort to a force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, or the welfare of the people on Taiwan"⑸, rather than the three joint communiques.

In this way, the US, with a sense of self-reflection for having neglected the Taiwan issue for a long time, is making it clear that it intends to develop relations with Taiwan as an independent relationship, not as a 'subset' of US-China relations. However, it remains uncertain whether these US policies will achieve their intended results or maintain their momentum. In particular, the biggest question is whether the US can truly force a change in relations that goes beyond the One China principle. The One China principle is a UN resolution from 50 years ago that the US cannot unilaterally abandon on the grounds of China's non-compliance. Furthermore, as long as the One China principle is fundamentally maintained in the international community, the US's policy shift toward Taiwan, the elevation of Taiwan's international status, and the expansion of its diplomatic space are bound to face limitations. For instance, Taiwan's bid to participate as an observer in the 2021 World Health Assembly (WHA), which was closely watched as a test case for expanding Taiwan's participation in international organizations, failed.⑹ The reality that Taiwan, recognized as a model country in COVID-19 containment, could not even obtain observer status at the World Health Assembly (WHA), a representative non-political international organization, clearly demonstrates that expanding Taiwan's public diplomatic space is by no means easy, despite the US's full support.

III. South Korea's Strategic Choices

The scene at the May 21, 2021, press conference following the South Korea-US summit, where President Biden told President Moon Jae-in, who was asked about the Taiwan issue, "Good luck," symbolically illustrates South Korea's awkward position on the Taiwan issue. It is not easy for South Korea to find the optimal response to the Taiwan issue, a core matter in the US-China hegemonic competition. At that time, South Korea had no choice but to seek strategic options through an objective review of the unique nature of cross-strait relations and the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait, as mentioned by President Moon.

1. Objective Review of the Unique Nature of Cross-Strait Relations

The uniqueness of cross-strait relations lies in the fact that, despite the One China principle asserting Taiwan as an inalienable part of China, there effectively exists another China or one Taiwan. This is a discrepancy between universal international principles and reality, and the source of conflict surrounding Taiwan's sovereignty, unification, and independence. Another unique aspect of cross-strait relations is that China and Taiwan have continuously expanded the boundaries of win-win cooperation by circumventing ideological barriers. For example, the '1992 Consensus',⑺ which agreed to acknowledge "One China" but use different designations, served as a driving force for expanding cross-strait economic and people-to-people exchanges to a level almost equivalent to that between two countries.

However, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan, which cherishes Taiwan's unique identity and aspires for independence, views this very negatively. In particular, the current President of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen, who came to power in 2016, has not even mentioned the '1992 Consensus' despite continuous pressure from China. From the perspective of 'pro-independence' advocates (臺獨) who identify themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, the fundamental solution to the Taiwan issue is for Taiwan to become an independent sovereign state. Furthermore, with the US recently distinguishing between Taiwan and China as democratic and communist regimes, respectively, and showing a stance of reconsidering the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty⑻, cross-strait conflict is intensifying.

Historically, South Korea has had neither the will nor the capacity to intervene in the ideological confrontation and conflicts over unification and independence between China and Taiwan. However, the situation changes when US factors are involved. Once the US expands its involvement in cross-strait relations and demands participation in any form, South Korea's position will become increasingly difficult. In such a situation, an objective diagnosis of the current state of cross-strait relations must precede any hasty statements or strategic choices. For example, is Taiwan independence achievable? Can Taiwan's economic growth be sustained even if cross-strait economic exchanges are severed? Does the US have the will and capacity to commit to the end for Taiwan's recovery of sovereignty and return to the international community? Regrettably, my opinion on these questions is that all are either impossible or negative. A sober consideration of these points will naturally lead to the scope of possibilities for South Korea's strategic choices.

2. Prioritizing Peace and Stability in the Taiwan Strait

Another issue South Korea must consider is whether the military posturing by the US and China will ultimately lead to an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. China has increased its military displays toward Taiwan since the election of Tsai Ing-wen, whom it perceives as an incorrigible independence advocate. Especially after the Hong Kong situation spread to anti-China sentiment in Taiwan and signs of intervention by external forces like the US appeared, China has deployed its air force, navy, and marine corps and even mentioned the possibility of using force. However, at this stage, China's military displays are a warning against Taiwan's secessionist tendencies and US complicity. The resolution of the Taiwan issue signifies the 'completion of the revolution' for the Chinese Communist Party, which celebrated its 100th anniversary. Especially for Xi Jinping, who is obsessed with consolidating power by abolishing the constitutional term limits, the Taiwan issue is a national task that cannot be compromised. Therefore, while he must show a firm resolve to defend Taiwan, going beyond that would be burdensome. Aside from military confrontation with the US, international public opinion toward China has been deteriorating since the Hong Kong incident and the COVID-19 pandemic, and the domestic situation is not entirely favorable either. Xi Jinping's strong desire for the successful hosting of the 2022 Winter Olympics is also high. For him, who wishes to remain in power, the extreme use of force would be too risky a gamble.

Of course, China's restraint will depend on the extent of Taiwan's secessionist tendencies and US complicity. First, the will of the Taiwanese people for self-determination and its feasibility are separate matters. Having experienced much, they are well aware of the risks of excessively provoking China. Among the 'three noes' policy advocated by former President Ma Ying-jeou – no unification, no independence, and no use of force – 'no use of force,' which signifies the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait, remains a paramount task for the Taiwanese people. No political leader in Taiwan would take this lightly. Thus, both China and Taiwan clearly recognize the negative consequences of armed conflict, which serves as an internal factor for maintaining restraint and composure.

Meanwhile, the US strategic goal is not Taiwan's independence but to check China's hegemonic challenge. Therefore, there is no reason for the US to excessively encourage Taiwan's independence movement and provoke China more than necessary, nor is the US's ability to suppress an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait in its initial stages what it used to be. Moreover, regardless of the US's intentions, crisis management mechanisms between China and Taiwan to prevent armed conflict are still in operation. In this context, just as we prioritize peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula in all our domestic and foreign policies, we must use the advantages and disadvantages of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as a primary criterion for strategic choices. We should not be swept up by the surrounding atmosphere, exaggerate the possibility of armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait, or overestimate our capacity for intervention. Furthermore, since the security situation in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula has been sensitively and interactively linked with US and China factors since the Korean War, they are in an inseparable relationship. The reason why an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait is not merely a fire across the sea for us is evident.

IV. Conclusion

As the world's attention is focused on the US-China hegemonic competition and military displays in the Taiwan Strait, the unique characteristics and realities of cross-strait relations are being underestimated. Cross-strait relations involve not only non-negotiable political and security issues. Cross-strait trade has increased significantly even during the COVID-19 pandemic, which has almost severed people-to-people exchanges. Hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese have formed families with spouses from mainland China, and several times that number are engaged in economic activities in China. Moreover, the majority of Taiwanese still desire a peaceful maintenance of the status quo, rather than unification or independence. Ultimately, they are not unwilling to be independent but are realistically assessing the barriers. Witnessing the setbacks in Hong Kong, they have confirmed the fallacy of "One Country, Two Systems," but a sober voice is also growing louder, stating that Taiwan's future cannot be solely entrusted to the US. Due to the sudden resurgence of COVID-19, President Tsai's approval ratings, which boasted of her success in epidemic control, have plummeted, and the opposition Kuomintang party is launching political attacks, advocating for 'united front cooperation' to introduce Chinese vaccines.

All these circumstances vividly illustrate the complex and subtle cross-strait relations, which are one yet two, and two yet one. It is a structure that cannot be responded to by focusing on only one aspect. We must proceed with caution after carefully examining the characteristics and realities of cross-strait relations. This must include measures to promote existing South Korea-Taiwan relations. In particular, if there are unnecessary restrictions that we have imposed on our relations with Taiwan out of excessive consideration for China, they should be improved. Of course, the process of pursuing this should be gradual, at a practical level of correcting improper practices and restoring legitimate authority, rather than an aggressive approach focused on maximizing national interests.

⑴ Stilwell, David R. 2020. “The United States, Taiwan, and the World: Partners for Peace and Prosperity.” U.S. Department of State (The Heritage Foundation Remarks). (August 31).

⑵ Pompeo, Michael R. 2021. “Lifting Self-Imposed Restrictions on the U.S.-Taiwan Relationship.” U.S. Department of State (Press Statement). (January 9).

⑶ A recently declassified memorandum from President Reagan (August 1982) states that "the reduction of arms sales to Taiwan is absolutely conditioned upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of Taiwan-PRC differences, and therefore the quality and quantity of arms provided to Taiwan depend entirely on the threat posed to Taiwan by China." American Institute in Taiwan. 1982. “Declassified Cables: Taiwan Arms Sales & Six Assurances (1982).” American Institute in Taiwan.

⑷ American Institute in Taiwan. 1972. “U.S.-PRC Joint Communique (1972); Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (Normalization Communique, 1979).” American Institute in Taiwan.

⑸ American Institute in Taiwan. 1979. “Taiwan Relations Act, Section 2: 5~6.” American Institute in Taiwan.

⑹ 國際組織司. (2021). “台灣未獲邀出席第74屆「世界衛生大會」線上會議，外交部長吳釗燮及衛生福利部長陳時中共同表達我國嚴正不滿立場“ 中華民國外交部 版權所有. (May 24).

⑺ The core of the '1992 Consensus' is the basic agreement between China and Taiwan on 'One China, respective interpretations' (一個中國, 各自表術). This means that under the premise of acknowledging 'One China,' China uses the designation 'People's Republic of China,' and Taiwan uses 'Republic of China,' with mutual recognition.

⑻ That is, the US distinguishes between its own 'One China policy' and China's 'One China principle.' Specifically, it emphasizes that while China asserts sovereignty over Taiwan through the One China principle, the US has not taken a clear stance on the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty. This implies that the US will not intentionally accept China's claims of sovereignty over Taiwan as is.

■ Author: Moon Heung-ho (文興鎬)) Professor of Chinese Studies at the Graduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Hanyang University and has served as a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy and a visiting professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Oregon. His research areas include Chinese politics/diplomacy/security, North Korea-China relations, and cross-strait relations. He has served as president of the Korean Association for Contemporary Chinese Studies and as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Unification, and Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. He is currently leading a mid- to long-term research project with the overarching theme of "Building a Cooperative Network in East Asia and a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula." His major works include "The Taiwan Issue and Cross-Strait Relations," "China's Foreign Strategy and the Korean Peninsula," "A History of Korea-Taiwan Relations 1949-2012," and "East Asian Common Prosperity and Peace on the Korean Peninsula."

■ Responsible and Edited by: Baek Jin-kyung EAI Director of Research

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) j.baek@eai.or.kr