[EAI Special Report] The Future of US-China Competition and South Korea's Strategy II_② US Pressure on China's Regime: Background, Characteristics, and Outlook

Editor's Note

In this Special Report, Lee Dong-ryul, Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies and Professor at Dongdeok Women's University, explains the background and causes of conflict in the US pressure on China's regime, presents the outlook and challenges of the Biden administration's pressure on China's regime, and suggests the implications of this US-China competition for South Korea. The author states that South Korea is vulnerable to the impact of US-China conflict due to the specificity of the Korean Peninsula issue and emphasizes the need to strengthen strategic flexibility and explore options to maximize national interests depending on the situation amidst intensifying US-China competition.

※ The following is an excerpt. Please refer to the attached file above for the full text.

1. Introduction

The confrontation between the United States and China, which began with trade, has escalated to the realm of systems and ideologies, leading to the worst-case scenario. The US offensive against China's system and ideology was not limited to the Trump administration. During the Cold War, and immediately after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the US attempted a peaceful revolution through an economic blockade of China. Even after the end of the Cold War, the strategy of linking the annual extension of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to China's human rights, Xinjiang, and Tibet issues has been sustained.

Nevertheless, the Trump administration's pressure on China's system was on a different level than before. Firstly, the scope and degree of the US offensive were unprecedented. It is also special in that it unfolded in a context of power competition as China's national strength has caught up to the US. China is also bewildered by the US's unexpected, all-out, high-intensity pressure. Even as the conflict with the US expanded from trade to technology, exchange rates, etc., China maintained that the conflict with the US was neither a hegemonic competition nor a power competition. However, in the process of exchanging accusations over responsibility for COVID-19, the US launched a full-scale offensive against China's communist system and core interests, leading to voices of concern in China about entering the initial stage of power competition with the US, a 'new Cold War.' Despite this, from China's perspective, there is a dilemma that the more it responds to issues concerning its system, the more it exposes the inherent vulnerabilities of the Chinese system to the international community. Furthermore, unlike in economic fields such as trade, finance, and high technology, China does not have many means to retaliate, nor is it easy to gain an advantage in a confrontation of systems and values.

Will the confrontation of systems between the US and China continue under the Biden administration? Traditionally, US Democratic administrations have emphasized human rights, democracy, and global norms in their foreign policy. President-elect Biden has stressed that he will realize these values through cooperation with liberal democratic countries and allies, and participation in multilateralism. This suggests that conflict over systems and values with China will be unavoidable under the Biden administration. Especially from the perspective of the Xi Jinping government, which is undertaking a new endeavor to strengthen a personalized authoritarian system, there are not many means to counter the US offensive against the communist system, and there is also limited room for compromise.

In response to the US offensive, China is focusing on indirect responses, strengthening internal cohesion and control, and externally focusing on diplomacy to expand its circle of friendly nations and deter the formation of an anti-China international united front. In other words, while strongly protesting the US's pressure on its system, China is striving to avoid escalating the situation into a phase of systemic competition as much as possible, while focusing internally on consolidating its system and securing the legitimacy of its rule. Ultimately, following the Trump administration, whether the future Biden administration will intensively and continuously pressure China's systemic vulnerabilities, despite US difficulties, and to what extent China realistically perceives this as a systemic threat, will be a crucial variable in the future of bilateral relations.

■ Author: Lee Dong-ryul_ Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies. Professor at Dongdeok Women's University. He obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from the School of International Studies at Peking University and served as the President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies. He is currently a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and minority issues. Recent research includes "China's Strategy and Role in the Denuclearization and Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula," "Evolution and Current Implications of China's Foreign Policy Discourse Since the 1990s," "A Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemma of Xi Jinping's 'Maritime Power' Initiative," "Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea," and "Territorial Disputes of China" (co-authored).

■ Management and Editing: Baek Jin-kyung EAI Researcher and Head of Research Division

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) j.baek@eai.or.kr

[EAI Special Report] is a report planned and edited by compiling commentaries on specific topics and the results of research meetings. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in the reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not related to EAI and solely represent the author's personal views.