[EAI Series on Diagnosing Democratic Backsliding in Korea] ① Introduction: The Global Spread of Democratic Backsliding and Korea

I. The Global Spread of Democratic Backsliding

Since the late 2000s, the world has entered an era of regression marked by democratic decline. Two global reports on democracy, which garner attention from researchers and the media for their regime type classifications, are noteworthy. The first is the annual report published in March by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. The 2025 report surveyed 179 countries, assessing that the level of democracy enjoyed by individual citizens worldwide has regressed to 1985 levels, and by country, to 1996 levels (V-Dem Institute 2025). Scholars at the institute refer to the past 25 years as the "Third Wave of Autocratization." Regression is particularly pronounced in areas such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, clean elections, and the rule of law, with severe backsliding reported in Eastern Europe, South Asia, and Central Asia. As a result of this regression, in 2024, for the first time, the number of democratic countries (88) fell below that of autocratic countries (91), and 72% of the population in the surveyed regions now lives under authoritarian rule. Among democratic countries themselves, liberal democracies now number only 29, making them the smallest category among the four regime types—liberal democracy, electoral democracy, electoral autocracy, and closed autocracy.

The second is the Democracy Index report published annually in March by The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in the UK. The 2025 report analyzes that the average global democracy index score has been in continuous decline since 2010, showing a trend of regression particularly in civil liberties, electoral processes and pluralism, and the rule of law (Economist EIU 2025). As a result of this sustained regression, as of 2024, 'Full Democracies' constitute only 15% of the 167 surveyed countries and territories, representing 6.6% of the population. 'Flawed Democracies' number 46, accounting for 27.5% of the surveyed regions and 38.4% of the population. Combined, the two types of democracies, whether full or flawed, represent 43% of the total and 45% of the population. Meanwhile, 'Authoritarian Regimes' number 60, representing 35.9% of the surveyed regions and 39.2% of the population. The remaining 'Hybrid Regimes' comprise 36 countries, accounting for 20.6% of the surveyed regions and 15.7% of the population.

This global trend of a shrinking number of democratic countries has spurred research into democratic backsliding. A group of researchers has shifted focus from the rapid collapse of democratic systems through military coups, as seen in the past, to the process of gradual regression. This process has become entrenched within legal frameworks, gradually undermining democracy through elections. Here are a few representative studies. Bermeo categorizes democratic backsliding into three types (Bermeo 2016: 10). The first is 'promissory coups,' where elected governments are ousted under the justification of defending democratic legal order. The perpetrators of promissory coups promise to restore democracy through future elections. Representative examples include military coups in Thailand and Myanmar. In Myanmar, the military declared a state of emergency through a coup on February 1, 2021, and promised elections, but elections have not been held for five years. The second is 'executive aggrandizement,' where an incumbent elected government gradually weakens institutions that can check the executive branch to undermine opposition forces, without regime change. Typically, the executive first gains control of the legislature or judiciary and uses them to eliminate opposition. Most cases of backsliding in electoral democracies, including Turkey and Hungary, fall into this category. The third is the strategic 'election manipulation,' employing subtle methods different from past electoral fraud. These include various tactics such as not providing fair opportunities to candidates, obstructing media access, directing government funds exclusively to the ruling party's campaign, making voter registration difficult, or installing loyalists in election management committees. Of course, these methods often occur in combination.

Scholars in the V-Dem Institute network have produced research focusing on the processes of democratic backsliding and resilience. A prominent scholar, Lührmann, describes the progression of autocratization in stages. The first stage involves structural and contextual challenges that increase the risk of autocratization. During this phase, citizen discontent grows over economic crises, inequality, immigration issues, political polarization, and social media. If democratic parties or processes are lacking, and citizens' democratic norms are weak, it moves to the second stage, anti-pluralism. When anti-pluralist parties and leaders succeed in mobilizing voters and win elections, the onset of autocratization occurs. However, if checks and balances function, and opposition coalesces among citizens, civic groups, and political parties, regression can be reversed. If such resilience is absent, it leads to the final stage: democratic breakdown (Lührmann 2021).

In terms of resilience, the opposite of backsliding, it is distinguished between 'onset resilience,' which prevents autocratization from occurring, and 'breakdown resilience,' which prevents democratic collapse even when autocratization is underway. Research by Boese et al. analyzed 4,372 episodes in 64 democratic countries from 1900 to 2019 and found that, fortunately, autocracy did not occur in 98% of cases. However, once autocratization begins, the mortality rate of democracies is high, with only 19 cases, or 23%, avoiding democratic collapse. Interestingly, 60% of these 64 episodes occurred after the end of the Cold War, from 1993 onwards. This research statistically analyzed factors that aid democratic resilience, finding that judicial checks and balances, as the "last bastion" of democracy, are the most powerful factor in preventing backsliding and ensuring that it does not lead to democratic collapse. Economic development helps prevent the onset of backsliding, but once backsliding begins, there is no difference between economically developed and underdeveloped countries in halting it. This research also found that geographical proximity to other democracies and a long history of democratization experience helped in preventing backsliding and avoiding democratic collapse (Boese et al. 2021).

The case of Korea will be a highly significant subject for studying the global trends of democratic backsliding and resilience. The movements of backsliding and resilience are in antagonism. How the direction is shifted and how the forces in one direction are concentrated will make Korea a reference point in international research as a major case study.

II. Democratic Backsliding in Korea

The backsliding in an advanced democracy that captured global attention late last year occurred in Korea. As a leading democracy in Asia, the declaration of martial law was a shocking event for the international community. Following the lifting of martial law, Korea, through constitutional procedures, impeached the president and held new elections to form a new government. In this regard, it did demonstrate resilience by returning to democracy. However, the process left deep scars on Korean democracy, including large-scale protests by a divided public, disputes over legal procedures, and the first-ever riot in a courthouse. The aforementioned reports did not overlook this. The V-Dem Institute report reclassified Korea, which had been categorized as a liberal democracy since the early 1990s, as an electoral democracy (41st globally). The Economist report also downgraded Korea from a full democracy to a flawed democracy (32nd globally, 5th in Asia). While these reports have long praised Korea's electoral processes, pluralism, and civil liberties, they have consistently rated its political culture as very low.

While numerous factors contribute to the democratic backsliding in Korea, issues such as the president's autocratic powers, legislative paralysis due to inter-party confrontation, the politicization of the judiciary, and the judiciary's politicization are pointed out at the level of state power institutions. At the general societal level, political polarization, deepening social conflicts, the spread of disinformation, and the rise of minority extremist groups are cited. Simultaneously, there is considerable resilience to prevent backsliding. Above all, active citizen participation has been a source of resilience during political crises, and respect for the constitutional order has acted as a brake, setting limits on backsliding. Without the national pride associated with the Korean people's achievement of democratization, this restraining force against backsliding would not have emerged. Nevertheless, the martial law declaration late last year and the subsequent chaotic resolution process have sounded a serious alarm for scholars of Korean democracy.

The 'Diagnosing Democratic Backsliding in Korea' research series is an academic effort to respond to this alarm. This research started with the premise that an accurate diagnosis of democratic backsliding in Korea is necessary for effective solutions. Most discussions focused on institutional reforms, such as amending the constitution to change the power structure or revising election laws to overcome political polarization. However, it remains questionable whether these institutional reforms can truly change the behavior of political parties and politicians or improve political culture. Four scholars, with this concern in mind, decided to examine both institutions and behavior.

In the first installment of the series, 'Factors of Democratic Backsliding in the Korean Presidential System,' Professor Bae Jin-seok analyzes whether the recurring phenomenon of democratic backsliding in Korea stems from the presidential system's power structure. He diagnoses the constitutional crisis following President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of emergency martial law in 2024 as a complex outcome resulting from the structural characteristics of the presidential system, the asymmetrical development of political parties and civil society, and the political culture of Korean society. From an international comparative perspective, the Korean presidential system is not concentrated with power to the extent of being described as autocratic in terms of constitutional authority. However, the author analyzes that the president's ability to control legislation and administration through party nominations, budget, personnel appointments, and public opinion, along with presidential office-centered governance, a vertical political structure, political deadlock under a divided government, the rigidity of a single term, and conflicts of dual legitimacy, all function as factors of democratic backsliding in the Korean presidential system. Consequently, demands for institutional accountability and checks on presidential power are weak, political parties are reduced to electoral machines for the president, and citizens function merely as targets for emotional mobilization, leading to a solidified political landscape. The author proposes a dual strategy for institutional reform. First, for vertical power structure reform achievable without constitutional amendment, he suggests democratization within political parties, ensuring transparency in the nomination process, and expanding citizen participation. Second, for tasks requiring constitutional amendment, he proposes adjusting the balance of power between the president and the National Assembly, limiting emergency powers, and aligning election cycles. Emphasizing that institutions, structures, and political culture are interconnected, he stresses that eliminating factors of backsliding requires a combination of institutional redesign, practical action, and the dissemination of a democratic culture.

In the second installment, 'The Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Korea Before and After Martial Law,' Professor Kim Jeong views the constitutional crisis before and after martial law as a result of failing to adhere to informal norms generated by constitutional provisions, namely mutual tolerance and institutional restraint of power. The author states that President Yoon's invocation of emergency martial law was a result of the escalating interaction between the opposition party's successive impeachment motions against high-ranking government officials and the president's successive vetoes of legislation passed by the National Assembly. The author argues that the prolonged 'constitutional brinkmanship' by both sides made the president's declaration of emergency martial law a 'constitutional annihilation tactic' to resolve the deadlock. This choice of tactic was possible because, over the past half-century, conservative and progressive factions have polarized the 'national narrative' in their fierce electoral competition. Particularly over the last decade, the overlap between supporters of the two major parties has decreased, and emotional polarization has widened the emotional distance between them, leading political parties to shift their vote-gathering strategy from persuading centrist voters to mobilizing their base. This created conditions where the opposition party's constitutional brinkmanship and the president's constitutional annihilation tactic became viable electoral strategies. Due to these tactics by both camps, democratic norms requiring institutional restraint of power have largely collapsed. The author predicts that democratic backsliding in Korea appears unavoidable for the time being, as President Yoon's chosen martial law effectively lowered the political cost of destroying norms of mutual tolerance.

In the third installment, 'Korean Political Elites and Democratic Backsliding,' Professor Park Sun-kyung characterizes the crisis of Korean democracy as a 'crisis from above.' This means that the responsibility lies heavily with political elites who have escalated political conflicts and lost problem-solving capabilities, rather than with changes in public perception or behavior. To understand the behavior of political elites, the author employs Juan Linz's classification of 'committed democrats' and 'half-democrats.' She argues that there were a considerable number of politicians in the People Power Party who believed and spread claims of election fraud, and a very small number of politicians belonging to the same party who seemed to downplay the significance of the riot at the Western District Court, suggesting that 'half-democrats' were more prevalent in the then-ruling party. The author presents three main background reasons for the 'crisis of democracy from above.' First, the symptomatic cause: repeated defeats in general elections in the Seoul metropolitan area have reduced the influence of moderate politicians within the conservative party, leading to a situation where hardline politicians with regional bases dominate the party, thereby weakening its internal democratic self-purification function. Second, the reduction of bipartisan exchange and political learning opportunities: an analysis of parliamentary research groups confirms a decrease in bipartisan exchange and learning opportunities. Third, changes in the incentive structure: due to pressure from a small group of staunch supporters and biased media outlets, politicians have become more sensitive to the voices of a small extremist group rather than the majority of citizens. The author contends that 'half-democrats' have strengthened their position within the party by leveraging this situation since the emergency martial law.

In the fourth installment, 'The Crisis of Korean Democracy and Backsliding from Below?', Professor Kang Woo-chang also believes that recent democratic backsliding in Korea is 'from above' rather than 'from below.' The former refers to the strengthening or expansion of power by elites holding political power, particularly the head of the executive branch, while the latter occurs when citizens voluntarily do not accept democracy or do not provide normative support for the democratic system. The author analyzes Korean citizens' attitudes toward democracy using data from seven surveys conducted from 2003 to 2025. The results show that support for democracy in Korea has steadily increased and has not been significantly shaken even amidst recent political turmoil. Democracy has become the 'only game in town' in Korean society. However, men from the industrialization generation, men from Generation M (Millennials), and men from Generation Z showed a decrease in support for democracy and an increase in support for autocracy in the 2025 survey compared to previous surveys. Conversely, support for democracy increased among men from Generation X and women from Generations M and Z, resulting in no significant overall change in response rates. While support for democracy among men from Generation M and Z is relatively low, and a significant decrease occurred during the martial law period, still, about 60-70% support democracy. The author states that the firm support for democracy held by Korean citizens will be a valuable asset in overcoming backsliding from above.

III. Future Research Agendas

We hope this research series serves as a starting point for a more in-depth study of democratic backsliding in Korea. The impeachment of a president has occurred twice in eight years. This is a shameful fact for those who, looking only at the outward appearance of Korean democracy, coined terms like "K-Democracy." The conservative party must deeply reflect on the fact that both impeached presidents were from the conservative party and embark on major reforms and reconstruction. The progressive party must humbly accept criticism of legislative dictatorship, restrain its own power, and cooperate with rival parties. The independence of the judiciary is pointed out by all scholars of democratic backsliding as the "last bastion" that can prevent democratic regression. Therefore, careful consideration is needed to improve laws and systems that can free the judiciary from partisan interests. Mass protests, which have been the driving force behind democratic restoration during political crises, need to evolve from merely checking street mobilization after backsliding to developing into institutional political participation that prevents backsliding from occurring in the first place. The positions of ruling and opposition parties are bound to change, and public support is also bound to fluctuate, which is the essence of politics. Therefore, the political sphere must not be consumed by short-term partisan interests but must engage in long-term, bipartisan political reform to ensure that politics operates at a level befitting the people. We hope all of these become empirical research agendas.

Furthermore, attention must be paid to the global trend of democratic backsliding. Academically, comparative research is needed to discern the similarities and differences in democratic backsliding observed across countries, and it is also important to identify the conditions under which democratic restoration occurs and those under which it does not. We hope that 2025 will be the year for reversing the backsliding of Korean democracy and restoring it to a healthy democracy. ■

References

Bermeo, Nancy. 2016. “On Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of Democracy 27, 1: 5-19.

Boese, Vanessa A., Amanda B. Edgell, Sebastian Hellmeier, Seraphine F. Maerz, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2021. “How democracies prevail: democratic resilience as a two-stage process.” Democratization 28, 5: 885-907.

Economist EIU. 2025. “Democracy Index 2024: What’s wrong with representative democracy?” https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2024/ (Accessed: May 14, 2025.)

Lührmann, Anna. 2021. “Disrupting the autocratization sequence: towards democratic resilience.” Democratization 28, 1: 22-42.

V-Dem Institute. 2025. Democracy 2025: 25 Years of Autocratization - Democracy Trumped? March 2025. https://www.v-dem.net/documents/61/v-dem-dr__2025_lowres_v2.pdf (Accessed: May 14, 2025.)

■ Lee Sook-jong_Senior Fellow, East Asia Institute; Distinguished Professor, Sungkyunkwan University. Former Director, Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN).

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) hspark@eai.or.kr