[Polarization and Korean Democracy Series] ⑩ Political Reform in the Era of Polarization

The impeachment process that followed President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law on December 3, 2024, clearly illustrates the extent of polarization in Korean politics. First, it is necessary to recall that most presidents who served after 1987 have faced judicial risks after their terms. Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Park Geun-hye were impeached by the National Assembly, and President Park Geun-hye was removed from office by a Constitutional Court ruling. Presidents Roh Tae-woo and Lee Myung-bak were detained, and Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung had their children imprisoned. President Yoon Suk-yeol is also almost certain to be impeached for declaring martial law without proper conditions.

However, unlike the impeachment process of President Park Geun-hye in 2016, the conservative and progressive factions appear to be consolidating their positions today. Despite the anti-democratic and authoritarian nature of the decree, which aimed to paralyze the legislature and prohibit all political activities, the voices asserting the legitimacy of the martial law declaration and the illegitimacy of the impeachment are unexpectedly strong. Furthermore, a significant portion of those opposing impeachment do not share trust in the electoral system, which is fundamental to democracy. The political situation, divided into two camps hostile to each other, is not unique to Korea. Many democracies are seriously concerned about issues such as the decline of democracy, the rise of populism, and the regression to authoritarianism due to deepening polarization. While the phenomena are similar, the causes and manifestations differ by country, meaning that prescriptions for democratic recovery are not shared. This article examines the current state of polarization at the voter level in Korea and assesses whether political reforms, including constitutional amendments, can be effective in overcoming polarization.

Analysis of online survey data (n=1,514) collected in January 2025 revealed interesting characteristics in the nature of affective polarization at the voter level. Overall, negative emotions toward the political establishment are high, with a significant proportion feeling disgust toward the opposing party/politicians and anger toward their own party/politicians. According to social psychology theory, disgust is an emotion driven by avoidance motivation and tends to target its object for annihilation. Conversely, anger is driven by approach motivation and tends to view its object as open to improvement. This finding suggests that the characteristics of polarization inherent at the current voter level in Korea must consider an affinity for extreme choices such as 'annihilation of the opponent'.

Furthermore, evaluations of the president's qualities were sharply divided by party affiliation. A tendency to value strong leadership and firm principles was prominent among supporters of the People Power Party, while a tendency to value cooperation and communication skills was prominent among supporters of the opposition parties. The problem is that these differences are also reflected in opinions on political reform. Supporters of the People Power Party show a marked opposition to constitutional amendments that would change the current presidential system and to political reforms aimed at distributing presidential power. Meanwhile, supporters of the Democratic Party strongly oppose reforming the current National Assembly system. These results imply that even if there is dissatisfaction with the political system of the Sixth Republic established in 1987 and a consensus on the need for reform at the voter level, the wall of polarization cannot be overcome when it comes to specific measures. In terms of order, the mitigation of polarization should precede political institutional reform, and before pointing out institutional problems, it is urgent to identify issues at the level of politicians, parties, and voters and find ways to resolve them.

I. Polarization

Political polarization can be divided into 'ideological polarization at the politician (National Assembly member) level' and 'ideological polarization and affective polarization at the voter level.' Ideological polarization at the voter level is distinct from the concept of partisan sorting. Ideological polarization refers to a phenomenon where the proportion of voters with moderate political views decreases, and party support that aligns with voters' ideological leanings increases. Partisan sorting, on the other hand, refers to a situation where party support aligning with voters' ideological leanings increases without a change in the proportion of voters with moderate views. According to existing research, the polarization observed at the Korean voter level is closer to partisan sorting than ideological polarization. However, traces of affective polarization have been confirmed at the Korean voter level, as supporters of conservative parties increasingly feel negatively toward progressive parties, and vice versa. Nevertheless, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that affective polarization is intensifying over time or that its severity is significant.

This article focuses on the content of polarization rather than its temporal changes, relying on an analysis of cross-sectional data conducted during the impeachment crisis in January 2025. The feeling thermometer, which measures affective polarization toward politicians or parties, is commonly used as a measurement tool. The distribution of the feeling thermometer (0-100 degrees) for the two major parties, the Democratic Party and the People Power Party, and their respective presidential candidates in the last election, Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung, is shown below, divided by party affiliation.

[Table 1] Feeling Thermometer for Parties and Politicians

As expected, the feeling thermometer patterns for supporters of the Democratic Party and the People Power Party are distinctly different. For supporters of the Cho Kuk Innovation Party, the feeling thermometer for the Democratic Party and Lee Jae-myung is not generally low, but the pattern for the People Power Party and Yoon Suk-yeol is similar to that of Democratic Party supporters. Respondents with no party affiliation or who support minor parties have generally negative feelings toward both major parties and Yoon Suk-yeol/Lee Jae-myung. While it is confirmed that Democratic Party supporters dislike the People Power Party/Yoon Suk-yeol to a significant degree, and People Power Party supporters dislike the Democratic Party/Lee Jae-myung to a significant degree, it is difficult to conclude that affective polarization at the voter level is severe, as it is not easy to determine whether this has intensified or eased compared to the past.

Therefore, we will examine the content of affective polarization. Additional questions were asked to respondents who gave a score of 50 or below (negative emotion) on the feeling thermometer. Respondents were asked to choose whether the negative emotion they felt was closer to anger or disgust. Anger is an emotion based on approach motivation, and it arises when there is a possibility of improvement in the opponent's behavior. In other words, anger does not arise when one realizes that their emotions cannot change the opponent's behavior or that they cannot resist the opponent's backlash. Disgust, on the other hand, is an emotion based on avoidance motivation and arises when there is no expectation of improvement in the opponent's behavior. Disgust is an emotion that wishes for the object to disappear. Thus, if a Democratic Party supporter feels anger toward Yoon Suk-yeol, it can be seen as an expression of belief that there is room for improvement in Yoon Suk-yeol's behavior to align with their preferences, by accepting their anger. If a People Power Party supporter feels disgust toward Lee Jae-myung, it is an expression of the desire for Lee Jae-myung, a politician with no room for improvement, to disappear from the political scene. Despite being the same negative emotion, anger is more conducive to mitigating polarization than disgust. If voters' anger is replaced by disgust, dialogue and compromise between different camps will become impossible.

A regression analysis was performed to identify the characteristics of respondents who chose disgust instead of anger among those who expressed negative emotions, and the results are summarized below. (Regression coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals are reported.) The main independent variables included the respondent's gender, age, political ideology, and party affiliation, while control variables included the feeling thermometer toward parties and politicians, and the respondent's income, assets, and region of residence (based on 7 regions).

[Table 2] Negative Emotions Toward Parties and Politicians

Democratic Party supporters, compared to those with no party affiliation, feel anger rather than disgust toward the Democratic Party. Similarly, People Power Party supporters tend to feel anger rather than disgust toward the People Power Party, compared to those with no party affiliation. In a similar vein, People Power Party supporters tend to feel anger rather than disgust toward Yoon Suk-yeol, compared to those with no party affiliation. However, supporters of the Cho Kuk Innovation Party feel disgust rather than anger toward Yoon Suk-yeol, compared to those with no party affiliation. There is no difference in negative feelings toward Lee Jae-myung among party supporters. (Interestingly, men feel disgust rather than anger toward both the Democratic Party and the People Power Party compared to women. Also, it is significant that respondents aged 18-59 feel anger rather than disgust toward the Democratic Party compared to respondents aged 70 and older.)

II. Presidential Qualities

Opinions on presidential qualities are sharply divided by party affiliation. Compared to respondents with no party affiliation, supporters of the People Power Party demand strong leadership and clear political ideology and philosophy from the president, unwavering in the face of opposition from the opposition parties and public opinion. In contrast, compared to respondents with no party affiliation, supporters of the Democratic Party demand communication skills with the public and the ability to cooperate with opposition parties from the president. (Interestingly, voters with high levels of affective polarization believe that all four mentioned presidential qualities are necessary. Here, the affective polarization variable is calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference between the feeling thermometers for the two major parties divided by their sum.)

[Table 3] Responses on Presidential Qualities

III. Constitutional Amendment and Political Reform

Efforts are underway to resolve political polarization in Korea through political institutional reform. However, the lack of public consensus on the direction of this reform is an obstacle. Supporters of the People Power Party tend to oppose constitutional amendments that would change the current presidential system, compared to respondents with no party affiliation. Similarly, supporters of the People Power Party oppose the distribution of presidential power. This contrasts with supporters of the Democratic Party, the Cho Kuk Innovation Party, and the Reform Party, who support the distribution of presidential power, compared to respondents with no party affiliation. Meanwhile, supporters of the Democratic Party hold a negative view on reforming the National Assembly electoral system.

[Table 4] Responses on Constitutional Amendment and Political Reform

IV. Conclusion

The affective polarization currently observed at the Korean voter level appears to be based on disgust—an emotion that excludes and avoids the opposing camp—rather than anger, which presupposes contact with the opposing camp. This suggests that the nature of political polarization in Korea has a greater potential to amplify conflict than to resolve it, as the emotion of disgust ultimately aims for the annihilation of the opponent.

Meanwhile, the differing views on political reform based on party affiliation are also a cause for concern. Some argue that decisive action, including reforms to the so-called 'imperial presidency' and constitutional amendments, can cure the chronic ills of Korean politics by moving beyond the 1987 system. However, current supporters of the People Power Party hold negative views on changing the presidential system and distributing presidential power. Supporters of the Democratic Party are negative about reforming the National Assembly electoral system. This indicates that they are projecting their current advantageous positions for their respective support bases even in discussions about political institutional reform. In this situation, it is highly likely that all political reform proposals will be judged based on political stances. Given that even the evaluation of courts and judges, which should be free from political judgment, is already being judged based on political stances, achieving consensus on constitutional amendments and political institutional reform will be a distant prospect. ■

■ Ha Sang-eung, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Sogang University.

■ Managed and Edited by:Song Chaerin, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr