[Polarization and Korean Democracy Series] ⑨ Polarization and Foreign Policy

I. Introduction

Domestic political polarization is leading to polarization in foreign policy. Partisan conflicts and disputes are being replayed over major foreign policy issues. This is a global phenomenon. In advanced countries in the United States and Europe, a series of phenomena such as heightened partisan animosity, political paralysis, and the rise of populism are occurring, and differences in perceptions of external threats and policy responses are widening among them. In the case of the United States, concerns about polarization have grown due to widening differences in views on major international issues between the Republican and Democratic parties and the increasing scope of policy shifts with changes in administration. Ultimately, in a 2018 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, experts cited domestic political polarization as the primary threat facing the United States.

Furthermore, for countries like Korea, with a divided nation, a geopolitical location surrounded by great powers, and an externally dependent economic structure, wise foreign policy formulation is crucial for national survival, as they are overwhelmingly influenced by international affairs. At a time when Korea faces international upheavals such as the Trump risk, great power strategic competition, and nuclear threats, it should be formulating and pursuing bipartisan grand strategies based on national interests, but instead, it is facing partisan pressure in domestic politics.

The analysis of a series of public opinion surveys (2021-2025) conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) can be summarized into the following seven key points.

First, while Korean diplomacy appears to have a bipartisan basis in its broad framework of centering on the ROK-US alliance, supporting an open international economic order, and actively engaging in international organizations as a member of the international community, there are clear partisan differences in specific policies. Regarding ROK-US policy, conservatives (supporters of the People Power Party) emphasize strengthening the ROK-US alliance, while progressives (supporters of the Democratic Party) prioritize building a horizontal ROK-US relationship. On North Korea policy, conservatives prioritize strengthening security posture, while progressives prioritize expanding inter-Korean exchanges. On Japan policy, conservatives emphasize future-oriented cooperation in functional areas, while progressives emphasize resolving historical issues.

Second, the degree of polarization in foreign policy varies by issue area. While polarization is generally increasing across the board, Japan policy and North Korea policy are significantly more polarized than other areas, whereas partisan differences are smaller in ROK-US policy. Interestingly, regarding China policy, partisan convergence is occurring due to the strong anti-China sentiment among the general public.

Third, the differences in policy stances between the two camps do not stem from fundamental differences in beliefs, values, or ideological systems regarding international politics, but rather from an extension of domestic political polarization. The tendency to oppose the other side's policies at the level of camp confrontation is directly reflected in international political issues. This means that obstructing or denigrating the achievements of the opposing side takes precedence over promoting common interests (national interests).

Fourth, as seen in the cases of North Korea and Japan policy, where polarization is high, both camps distinguish between good and evil, demonize the other as unpatriotic and immoral, and refuse meaningful political negotiation or compromise. As evidenced by terms such as pro-North Korea, anti-state forces, pro-Japan, native Japanese collaborators, and humiliating diplomacy, there is a growing tendency to judge foreign policy issues based on emotions and prejudices rather than rational thought.

Fifth, the division among the public revealed in this survey is largely attributable to the interests of camp leaders and political manipulation. Polarization among leaders transfers and spreads to their supporters, reinforcing public division (Bullock 2011). In extreme cases, they frame major policies as wedge issues to divide the public and force them to choose sides, thereby consolidating political support. The president, in particular, tends to ignore the opinions of competing factions and unilaterally pursue their own agenda based on the (blind) support of their own faction. This behavior undermines the democratic accountability of the government.

Sixth, domestic division not only weakens external negotiating power but also often leads to delayed decisions or stopgap measures. In foreign negotiations involving a two-level game, failure to secure domestic approval and support weakens negotiating power by failing to provide credible signals to the other party. The domestic division surrounding the introduction of THAAD between 2014-17 led to the controversial ROK-China agreement in 2017, significantly weakening Korea's negotiating power with China. Furthermore, amidst domestic division over the 2018-19 Supreme Court ruling on forced wartime labor, the government delayed follow-up measures and resorted to stopgap solutions, leading to a crisis in ROK-Japan relations.

Finally, if factional confrontation and division persist, the voices of the majority of moderates will be drowned out, making it difficult to expect the establishment of bipartisan foreign policy. Due to fundamental changes in the international order following the decline of American hegemony, the great confusion in the international economic order due to the retreat of globalization, the competition among nations over technological innovation led by AI, and the escalating threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles, Korea is more than ever in a situation that requires political consensus for the establishment of a 'consistent and sustained national strategy' or 'grand national strategy.' Institutional reforms to overcome polarization will be a key condition not only for the recovery of Korean democracy and democratic governance but also for enhancing Korea's external role and influence. The current discussions in the political sphere focus on reforming the imperial presidency. In parallel, political reforms are needed to draw out and represent the voices of the majority of moderates, which have been overshadowed by intensified partisan polarization. ■

II. Public Opinion and Polarization

Generally, polarization refers to the separation and intensification of political, social, economic views, emotions, behaviors, and interests among groups. Ideological polarization is a phenomenon where the ideological orientations of two groups diverge, and the middle ground shrinks. For example, it occurs when a group with conservative tendencies becomes increasingly distant from a group with progressive tendencies, and the proportion of moderate or unaffiliated voters decreases (Ha Sang-eung 2022, 330).

Conversely, when the proportion of moderate or unaffiliated voters remains the same, but party affiliation among voters is clearly divided, especially when supporters of a particular party have a strong dislike for the opposing party, it is called affective polarization or partisan polarization. In this case, polarization is determined by the degree of dislike for the other party, regardless of ideological differences based on specific issues (Ha Sang-eung 2022, 332).

Comparing the results of the "Survey on Conditions for Presidential Success" conducted by the East Asia Institute in October 2021 and the "Survey on Polarization Perception" conducted in January 2025, the distribution of public ideological orientations has not shown significant changes over the past four years. With progressives and conservatives at around 27% and 26% respectively, and moderates at 46%, ideological polarization was not evident ([Table 1]).

[Table 1] Ideological Landscape of Koreans: 2021 and 2025

Despite the near-absence of change in ideological orientations, more than half of the respondents expressed dislike towards the Democratic Party and the People Power Party. 54.1% of respondents expressed dislike towards the Democratic Party, with 25.7% showing strong dislike (below 10 on a 100-point scale). The People Power Party fared even worse, with 68.7% of respondents expressing dislike, and 40% showing strong dislike (below 10 on a 100-point scale). These figures represent an increase of over 10% compared to four years ago ([Table 2], [Table 3]).

Meanwhile, the dislike felt by supporters of the Democratic Party towards the People Power Party, and vice versa, is overwhelming. A staggering 93.3% of People Power Party supporters expressed dislike towards the Democratic Party, with strong dislike (bottom 10%) reaching 58.8%. The dislike of Democratic Party supporters towards the People Power Party is similarly high ([Table 4], [Table 5]). Furthermore, among respondents who expressed dislike, 44% stated their position as "disgusting, I don't want to see them in politics" regarding the Democratic Party, and 60.6% chose the same expression for the People Power Party ([Table 6]). A significant portion of respondents, around half, expressed strong emotional aversion, hoping for the removal of both parties from the political scene.

[Table 2] Party Favorability: Democratic Party

[Table 3] Party Favorability: People Power Party

[Table 4] Favorability of the Democratic Party by People Power Party Supporters

[Table 5] Favorability of the People Power Party by Democratic Party Supporters

[Table 6] Stance on Parties and Politicians

As such, polarization in Korea is manifesting as emotional reactions, specifically expressions of dislike, towards the opposing party, overlapping with party identity. This is evident in unconditional support for one's own party and leader, and unconditional opposition to rival parties and leaders. The problem is that polarization is emerging in major foreign policy issues in Korea, which should be pursuing national interests through bipartisan foreign policy.

III. Polarization and Foreign Policy

The recent attention given to political polarization in international relations studies stems from the issue of polarization in US foreign policy. Concerns have arisen that excessive polarization in American politics is diminishing US hegemonic influence and weakening its external negotiating power, international image, and soft power (Walt 2019). In this context, various studies have been conducted on topics such as the widening gap in perceptions and policies between Democrats and Republicans on major international issues, the institutional consequences of political polarization, and its impact on the effectiveness of foreign policy execution (Friedrichs and Tama 2024).

Polarization is a common phenomenon not only in the United States but also in Europe and advanced countries, and Korea is no exception. It is well-known that there have been internal conflicts in Korea regarding North Korea policy. However, generally, the Korean public and leaders appear to maintain bipartisan support for major foreign policy principles. The majority of conservatives and progressives, and supporters of the People Power Party and the Democratic Party, have no major disagreements on centering the ROK-US alliance as the core of security, supporting an open international economic order, and actively engaging in international organizations that address global issues.

Conversely, in specific policy areas, supporters of the two parties show significant differences in policy priorities. According to the East Asia Institute's 2025 survey results ([Table 7]), regarding ROK-US policy, conservatives (supporters of the People Power Party) emphasize strengthening the ROK-US alliance, while progressives (supporters of the Democratic Party) prioritize building a horizontal ROK-US relationship. 50.4% of the conservative camp cited alliance strengthening, compared to 26.6% of the progressive camp, a difference of 23.8 percentage points. On the other hand, 32.6% of the progressive camp and 9.8% of the conservative camp prioritized building a horizontal ROK-US relationship, a difference of 22.8 percentage points.

[Table 7] Issues to Prioritize in ROK-US Diplomacy: By Ideological Orientation

Regarding North Korea policy, conservatives prioritize strengthening security posture, while progressives prioritize expanding inter-Korean exchanges. 41.5% of the conservative camp cited strengthening security posture, compared to 17% of the progressive camp, a difference of 24%. On the other hand, for expanding inter-Korean exchanges, progressives accounted for 44.6% and conservatives 15.7%, a difference of 28.9 percentage points. Regarding a horizontal ROK-US relationship, 32.6% of the progressive camp and 9.8% of the conservative camp prioritized it, a difference of 22.8 percentage points ([Table 8]).

[Table 8] Issues to Prioritize in North Korea Diplomacy: By Ideological Orientation

In the case of Japan policy, conservatives emphasize future-oriented cooperation in functional areas, while progressives emphasize resolving historical issues. 55.5% of the conservative camp cited future-oriented cooperation, compared to 26.8% of the progressive camp, a difference of 28.7 percentage points. Meanwhile, for resolving historical issues, progressives accounted for 56.2% and conservatives 24%, a difference of 32.2 percentage points ([Table 9]).

[Table 9] Issues to Prioritize in Japan Diplomacy: By Ideological Orientation

Finally, regarding China policy, there is some convergence between conservatives and progressives. Both camps prioritize expanding economic exchanges, with conservatives at 28.1% and progressives at 33.6%, a narrow difference of about 5.5 percentage points. The second priority for both sides is fine dust/environment/climate change/infectious diseases, with conservatives at 22.6% and progressives at 23.6%. The third priority, responding to economic sanctions, also shows no significant difference at 19.7% and 20.8% respectively ([Table 10]). Both conservatives and progressives show strong dislike towards China, indicating a similar pattern.

[Table 10] Issues to Prioritize in China Diplomacy: By Ideological Orientation

Opinion on strengthening ROK-US-Japan military security cooperation, which is perceived to have public support, also shows considerable polarization. An overwhelming majority of conservatives (84.6%) support this, while progressives show significantly lower support at 55.1%, a difference of 29.5 percentage points. Opposition to this is higher among progressives at 32.9% and conservatives at 12.6%, a difference of 20.3 percentage points ([Table 11]).

[Table 11] Stance on Strengthening ROK-US-Japan Security Cooperation: By Ideological Orientation

Thus, the degree of polarization in foreign policy varies by issue area. While polarization is generally increasing across the board, Japan policy and North Korea policy are significantly more polarized than other areas, whereas partisan differences are smaller in ROK-US policy and almost non-existent in China policy.

Here, the differences in foreign policy stances between the two camps are unlikely to stem from fundamental differences in beliefs, values, or ideological systems regarding international politics. It is difficult to find an ideological common denominator that runs through the policies prioritized by the progressive camp supporting the Democratic Party: expanding engagement with North Korea, adjusting the relationship with the US to be more horizontal, emphasizing the resolution of historical issues with Japan, and expanding economic exchanges with China. Similarly, it is difficult to explain the policy preferences prioritized by supporters of the People Power Party—emphasizing deterrence against North Korea, strengthening the ROK-US alliance, prioritizing functional cooperation with Japan, and expanding economic exchanges with China—as being based on conservative ideology.

As described earlier, while polarization in Korea is referred to as conservative vs. progressive, it is understood not as an expansion of ideological gaps but as an expansion of emotional gaps between the two partisan camps, i.e., an increase in mutual dislike. Therefore, foreign policy preferences should be viewed as an extension of domestic political and partisan polarization. The policy preferences of the conservative camp are a critique and opposition to the policies of the rival government (Moon Jae-in administration), and the policy preferences of the progressive camp result from criticism and opposition to the policies of the rival government (Yoon Suk-yeol administration). This means that obstructing or denigrating the achievements of the opposing side takes precedence over promoting common interests (national interests).

Recent ROK-Japan relations, where polarization is prominent, show that partisan interests influence perceptions of Japan and preferences for Japan policy. Looking at the trend of public opinion over the past four years, the stance on the South Korean government's Japan policy (improving relations) has shifted from negative to positive among conservatives and from positive to negative among progressives ([Table 12]). For conservatives, it surged after President Yoon Suk-yeol proposed the so-called 'third-party compensation plan' in March 2023, leading to an improvement in bilateral relations, while for progressives, it showed a sharp decline starting in 2022 with the change of administration. In other words, support for and opposition to Japan-related issues vary according to partisan stance.

[Table 12] Stance on ROK-Japan Relations Improvement: By Ideological Orientation

Generational gaps are also evident in preferences for Japan policy. The 70s age group has sharply shifted to a supportive stance since 2024 regarding the South Korean government's efforts to improve relations, becoming the highest among all age groups ([Table 13]). Considering that the 70s have historically shown the most negative perception of Japan, this is a surprising change. Records from the "ROK-Japan Public Perception Survey" (2013-2023), jointly conducted by EAI and Genron NPO of Japan, show that the age groups leading the positive perception of Japan were the 20s and 30s, while the age group showing the most negative perception was those aged 70 and above (Son Yeol & Lee Jeong-hwan 2024). Conversely, the 40s age group shows the most negative perception of the government's Japan policy. This change can be interpreted as a result of partisan choice, as the 70s are the age group with the strongest support for the People Power Party, and the 40s are the age group with the largest support base for the Democratic Party.

[Table 13] Stance on ROK-Japan Relations Improvement: By Generation

The division among the public revealed in the surveys on ROK-Japan relations and Japan policy is structured around Democratic Party supporters vs. People Power Party supporters, or the progressive camp vs. the conservative camp, or the 40s vs. the 70s. Both camps are prone to negative partisanship, meaning opposition for opposition's sake, when the ruling party belongs to the opposing camp. This implies opposition based on the desire for the opposing camp to fail rather than achieve common goals (or national interests). For example, they understand and appreciate the value of improving ROK-Japan relations or enhancing ROK-US-Japan security cooperation, but they do not want these achievements to result in the success of the government (the opposing camp).

Conversely, leaders of the ruling party (the president) tend to ignore the opinions of competing factions and unilaterally pursue their own agenda based on the (blind) support of their own faction. For instance, the current government, in an effort to break the deadlock in ROK-Japan relations, proposed the third-party compensation plan and adopted a forward-looking stance, contributing to restoring government-level trust through a series of summit meetings. However, this was pursued unilaterally without consultation with competing factions, resulting in a contribution to public division.

IV. Conclusion

The ongoing political polarization in South Korea is not only a factor contributing to the decline of Korean democracy, the endorsement of authoritarianism (even dictatorship), the rise of populism, and the regression of governance and policy innovation, but it is also causing a division of public opinion surrounding foreign policy. The divided public opinion does not stem from differences in beliefs, values, or ideological systems regarding international politics, but rather from an extension of domestic partisan confrontation and division, which tends to be instigated by political elites. Confrontation among leaders transfers and spreads to their supporters, reinforcing public polarization, confrontation, and division.

Domestic division not only weakens external negotiating power but also often leads to delayed decisions or stopgap measures. Above all, if factional confrontation and division persist, the voices of the majority of moderates will be drowned out, making it difficult to expect the establishment of bipartisan foreign policy. Due to fundamental changes in the international order following the decline of American hegemony, the great confusion in the international economic order due to the retreat of globalization, the competition among nations over technological innovation led by AI, and the escalating threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles, Korea is more than ever in a situation that requires political consensus for the establishment of a 'consistent and sustained national strategy' or 'grand national strategy.' Institutional reforms to overcome polarization will be a key condition not only for the recovery of Korean democracy and democratic governance but also for enhancing Korea's external role and influence. Current discussions in the political sphere focus on reforming the imperial presidency. In parallel, political reforms are needed to draw out and represent the voices of the majority of moderates, which have been overshadowed by intensified partisan polarization. ■

References

Son Yeol. 2024. “ROK-Japan Relations Shaken by Political Polarization: Improvement in Relations and Public Division Revealed in 2024 Public Opinion Survey.” *EAI Issue Briefing*. East Asia Institute.

Son Yeol and Lee Jeong-hwan. 2024. *ROK-Japan Relations Through Public Opinion, 2013-2023*. East Asia Institute.

Ha Sang-eung. 2024. “Political Polarization at the Level of Korean Voters.” *Social Trends in Korea 2022*. Statistics Korea, Statistics Development Institute.

Friedrichs, Gordon and Jordan Tama, eds. 2024. Polarization and Foreign Policy: When Politics Crosses the Water’s Edge. London: Palgrave.

Walt, Stephen. 2019. “America’s Polarization is a Foreign Policy Problem.” Foreign Policy March 11.

■ Son Yeol_Director of EAI, Professor at Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies.

■ Contact and Editing:Song Chaerin, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr