[Polarization and Korean Democracy Series] ⑧ Everyday Communication, SNS, and Affective Polarization

The declaration of martial law by the President on December 3rd shocked and alarmed many citizens. Whether the declaration of martial law constitutes an act of state or an illegal rebellion is a matter yet to be judicially determined. However, examining the events leading up to and following the declaration, it is clear that there is a cyclical, reinforcing relationship between the severe political polarization in South Korea and the declaration of martial law and the ensuing conflict. Two striking scenes from the martial law declaration process stand out. One is the meeting of State Council members with the President late at night in Yongsan. The State Council members, who were not officially convened but gathered upon urgent notification, expressed their dissent and earnestly pleaded with the President to reconsider, but he unilaterally declared martial law. The other is the meeting in the Yongsan underground operational command center with the Minister of National Defense and top military officials who had proposed or encouraged the declaration of martial law. Having shared a political perception for a long time and built conviction about the necessity of martial law, they moved with unified conviction to execute the martial law plan, which subsequently became the center of much controversy. The President ignored and avoided the former situation, where dissent was raised and discussion was needed, while pushing himself towards the latter situation, where opinions aligned and even reinforced each other.

In a democratic society, politics requires not only the guarantee of diverse opinions and claims but also the need to narrow differences or reach consensus through communication and deliberation (Habermas 1984). However, for efforts toward democratic communication and consensus to be possible, recognition of the other party in communication and deliberation is a prerequisite (Honneth 1995). The reason why political polarization, which is reaching severe levels globally, poses a significant threat to the normal functioning of democracy is that in polarized situations, individuals do not recognize each other as partners for dialogue, communication, or deliberation. In polarized situations, political rivals are viewed not as partners for communication and deliberation but as targets for eradication and elimination due to hatred or animosity. As polarization progresses, politics moves further away from consensus-building through communication and deliberation and closer to endless violent conflict filled with anger aimed at eliminating one's rivals. How can this process of polarization be reversed or at least slowed down? For those who consider polarization the greatest threat to contemporary democracy, this question is an unavoidable task.

The contrasting situations described above are quite instructive in relation to this question. In a polarized society, individuals can form relationships and communicate with diverse people. During this process, they may debate with those who hold different political stances and opinions, or they may associate only with those who share the same views, avoiding conflict and reinforcing their own positions. Engaging in discussions or debates with people holding different views can lead to a change in one's own stance. Furthermore, individuals have considerable leeway in choosing with whom they communicate and interact. Will one choose to engage with differing opinions, think openly through discussion, even if it is sometimes irritating and uncomfortable, or will one associate with people who echo one's own views and provide only confirming information, thus becoming increasingly closed off to oneself? On social media, which has become a primary channel for communication with those around us, these choices have not only increased but also become easier. While sociology posits homophily as a natural human tendency, excessive homophily that eliminates diversity and room for disagreement can lead to polarization towards extremism, as suggested by the concepts of confirmation bias or echo chambers.

This paper quantitatively verifies the points discussed above using survey data on citizens' political opinions and communication experiences. First, from the perspective of empirical understanding of reality, we examine how frequently citizens encounter political disagreements in their everyday communication, particularly through SNS, how often they experience conflicts arising from these disagreements, how often they have experienced relationships becoming distant due to political disagreements with those around them, and whether they have ever changed their political party affiliation. Additionally, we measure the degree of political polarization by the difference in favorability towards the political party they support and the party they oppose. Subsequently, we investigate whether the degree of political polarization differs based on the extent of political disagreement in everyday communication, the degree of conflict experienced over political opinions, and whether they have experienced a change in party affiliation.

I. The Reality of Political Communication Situations

It is a well-known fact that everyday communication has become active across all generations with the widespread adoption of online platforms and SNS. Concerns about the potential for biased communication have also increased, as biased communication and polarization are exacerbated when opportunities to encounter diverse opinions decrease. To what extent, then, do South Korean citizens currently encounter differing opinions on online platforms and SNS? How often do differences of opinion escalate into conflict? And to what extent do human relationships become strained as a result of these conflicts? This study aims to explore these questions through survey results.

Among the respondents, 72.7% reported visiting online communities frequently. Regarding the primary political orientation of these communities, 28% described them as centrist, while 16.6% and 18.6% identified them as progressive and conservative, respectively. The proportion of respondents who frequently visited neutral communities was highest among those in their 40s. The age groups most frequently visiting progressive communities were those in their 40s and 50s (26.9% and 27.6%, respectively), while those visiting conservative communities were predominantly in their 60s and 70s and above (23.6% and 39%, respectively).

Regarding the extent to which individuals encounter people with different political opinions on SNS chat rooms or social media, 59.3% responded that they do encounter such individuals, while 40.7% stated they do not. Individuals in their 20s (65.7%) and 40s (65.9%) were more likely to encounter people with differing political opinions compared to other age groups. Those with a college education or higher (61.2%) were also more likely to encounter differing opinions than those with a high school education or less (52.9%).

When asked if they had experienced severe conflict due to differences in political opinions in the chat rooms they participate in, 31.2% responded affirmatively, while 68.8% responded negatively. The proportion of those who experienced conflict due to political differences was lowest among those in their 20s (18.4%) and highest among those in their 40s (38.2%) and 70s and above (35.3%). The experience of conflict was more prevalent among those with progressive or conservative leanings than among centrists.

When asked if they had experienced relationships with close friends or colleagues becoming strained due to such conflicts arising from political differences, 24.3% responded affirmatively, while 75.7% responded negatively. The experience of relationships becoming distant due to political differences was least common among those in their 20s (13.3%) and most common among those in their 70s and above (35%). The proportion was particularly higher among professionals compared to other occupations, and higher among progressives than centrists, and higher among conservatives than progressives.

The political communication on online platforms and SNS, as indicated by the survey, shows that nearly 60% of individuals encounter opinions different from their own, that these clashes of opinion lead to conflict in slightly over 30% of cases, and that in slightly less than 25% of cases, conflicts and clashes of political opinion result in estrangement from close acquaintances. While these conflicts and the resulting distancing of relationships cause emotional exhaustion and stress, they also serve to prevent individuals from becoming entrenched in their own opinions and falling into political polarization.

II. Change in Party Affiliation

Many recent political events in South Korea have been so shocking that they have led to a withdrawal of existing support or trust. As political populism intensifies, policy consistency can weaken, and political polarization can fuel extremism, ultimately leading to skepticism about political support. In such circumstances, encountering differing opinions and experiencing conflict can create opportunities for citizens to re-examine their own views and potentially change their stances or opinions. Let us examine the extent of experience with changing political stances and affiliations, and the events or reasons that triggered these changes, using survey data.

Among the survey respondents, 31.3% reported having changed their party affiliation since 2015. Comparing by gender, the proportion was higher for men (33.1%) than for women (29.5%). By age group, the proportion was lower for those in their 70s and above (23.9%) and 20s (24.1%), and higher for those in their 40s (36.8%) and 50s (35.1%). Those with a conservative ideological orientation (25.4%) showed fewer changes in party affiliation, while those with a progressive orientation (35.1%) showed the most.

Examining the changes in party affiliation, from which party to which party, reveals the following. The table shows that 220 former supporters of the Democratic Party and 138 former supporters of the People Power Party changed their affiliation. Furthermore, 104 individuals switched to the Democratic Party, 116 to the People Power Party, and 108 to the Cho Kuk Innovation Party. Among the 220 who switched from the Democratic Party, 39.1% moved to the People Power Party and 34.5% to the Cho Kuk Innovation Party. Among the 138 who switched from the People Power Party, 42% moved to the Democratic Party and 24.6% to the Reform Party.

When asked for the reasons for changing their party affiliation, 42.1% of those who switched cited excessive extremism of the party, followed by 41% who were disappointed with the party's policies or platform. Disappointment with the party's morality (29.1%) and a change in personal views (26.1%) followed. For those who switched from the Democratic Party of Korea, disappointment with policies or platform (39.5%) and excessive extremism (39.1%) were the most cited reasons. For those who switched from the People Power Party, excessive extremism (58.7%) and disappointment with policies or platform (42%) were the most cited reasons. While disappointment with policies or platform was the main reason for those in their 20s and 40s-50s, excessive extremism was the main reason for those in their 30s and 60s and older. Furthermore, those with a college education or higher cited excessive extremism as the main reason, while those with a high school education or lower cited disappointment with policies or platform as the main reason. Comparing ideological leanings, those who identified as progressive cited disappointment with policies or platform, while those who identified as moderate or conservative cited excessive extremism as the main reason.

When asked about the events that triggered a change in party affiliation, the most frequently cited event was the recent declaration of martial law (34.5%), followed by the Cho Kuk scandal (31.6%) and the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye (27.6%). A comparison by age group revealed that those in their 20s and 40s cited the declaration of martial law, those in their 30s and 70s and older cited the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, and those in their 50s-60s cited the Cho Kuk scandal as the most significant trigger for changing their party affiliation. Looking at current party affiliation, 44.9% of those who switched to support the Democratic Party of Korea cited the declaration of martial law as the main trigger, while 41.4% of those who switched to support the People Power Party cited the Cho Kuk scandal as the main trigger. Interestingly, 44.4% of those who switched to support the Cho Kuk Innovation Party cited the Cho Kuk scandal as the main trigger.

III. Communication Situations, Changes in Party Affiliation, and Affective Polarization

How do the communication situations discussed earlier, particularly the opportunity to encounter political disagreements and the experience of political conflict and confrontation, affect changes in party affiliation or affective polarization? How does the experience of changing one's politically supported party influence political polarization?

First, let us examine the relationship between communication situations related to political opinions and changes in party affiliation. Among those who responded that they had opportunities to encounter political disagreements in chat rooms or social media, 33.7% had experienced a change in party affiliation, whereas among those who responded that they had no such opportunities, the rate of change was 27.7%. Among those who had experienced conflict due to differences in political opinions in chat rooms they participated in, 35.7% changed their party affiliation, while among those who had not, the rate was 29.2%. Among those who had become estranged from close acquaintances due to differences in political opinions, the rate of party affiliation change was 36.2%, while among those who had not, it was 29.6%. Both the opportunity to encounter disagreements in SNS chat rooms and the conflict arising from opinion clashes increase the likelihood of changing party affiliation.

Next, let us examine the relationship between communication situations related to political opinions, experience of changing party affiliation, and affective polarization.

Before proceeding, we will first explain the measurement and current status of affective polarization. Affective polarization refers to having stronger affinity or trust towards one's own group or affiliated group, while having strong aversion or distrust towards other groups. In politics, affective polarization can be measured by calculating the difference between the degree of favorability towards one's supported party and the degree of favorability towards the opposing party, each measured on a scale of 0 to 100. The figure below shows the distribution of affective polarization measured in this manner. The distribution ranges from 0 (no polarization) to 100 (complete polarization), and the distribution itself exhibits a polarized pattern, with fewer cases in the middle compared to the extremes. The average degree of polarization is 46.4, with a standard deviation of 31.1. A score of 0 for polarization likely indicates more cases of having aversion and distrust towards both parties rather than favorability and trust towards both. If we divide based on a difference in favorability of 70 points, the proportion of affective polarization is 26.9%, and if we divide based on 80 points, it is 14.9%.

First, let's examine the relationship between political communication situations and affective polarization. When political disagreements are encountered in chat rooms or social media, polarization is 29.1% based on the 70-point scale and 15.8% based on the 80-point scale, whereas when they are not encountered, the figures are 23.8% and 13.4%, respectively. When there is conflict over political opinions in chat rooms, polarization is 32.7% based on the 70-point scale and 19.1% based on the 80-point scale, whereas when there is no conflict, the figures are 24.4% and 12.9%, respectively. When there is experience of becoming estranged from close acquaintances due to political opinion conflict, polarization is 35.7% based on the 70-point scale and 20.3% based on the 80-point scale, whereas when there is no such experience, the figures are 24.1% and 13.1%, respectively. These results indicate that encountering political disagreements and intensifying political opinion conflicts increase affective polarization.

Finally, let's examine the relationship between the experience of changing party affiliation and affective polarization. When respondents reported having changed their party affiliation, the proportion of affective polarization was 19.7% based on the 70-point scale and 9.7% based on the 80-point scale. In contrast, when respondents had not changed their party affiliation, the proportions were 30.3% and 17.2%, respectively. The experience of changing party affiliation appears to reduce the likelihood of polarization in terms of party favorability.

The relationship between political communication situations, the experience of changing party affiliation, and affective polarization, as analyzed from the data above, is summarized in the figure below.

Communication situations in everyday chat rooms, such as having opportunities to encounter disagreements, experiencing conflict due to disagreements, or becoming estranged from acquaintances as a result, can have opposing effects on affective polarization. In one direction, if the experience of encountering disagreements and conflicts in political communication leads to diverse and complex thinking, sometimes even resulting in a change of party affiliation, this would lead to a mitigation of affective polarization. In the opposite direction, encountering disagreements and experiencing conflicts can solidify one's own views and increase emotional hostility towards the opposing side, thereby exacerbating polarization. Depending on which of these two possibilities is more dominant, polarization can either intensify or be mitigated.

IV. Implications of the Analysis Results

As discussed earlier, if the choices made in communication situations are closely related to polarization, the practical implications are clear. In the context of the recent declaration of martial law, the President encountered all types of communication situations: disagreement and conflict, as well as agreement and reinforcement. The refusal to seize the opportunity for reconsideration and deliberation offered by disagreement and conflict, and the sole focus on agreement and reinforcement, resulted in the intensification of extreme polarization.

South Korean society, in its process of compressed development, has rapidly achieved both industrialization and democratization. However, due to this compressed nature, many challenges remain unresolved. Particularly concerning democratization, individuals have fallen into emotional dogmatism rather than rational deliberation in their political judgments, and in communication, open dialogue and consultation have been neglected in favor of overwhelming the opposition with sheer power, leading to widespread polarization and extreme conflict.

Notably, SNS chat rooms and social media, which have facilitated communication and enabled dialogue with a larger number of people, carry inherent risks due to their potential to deepen biases in information acquisition and communication, despite their convenience. The recent situation in Korea suggests that individuals, public authorities, and political forces alike have succumbed to the devilish temptation to actively exploit these concerns and risks, rather than exercising caution and striving to mitigate harm, in order to increase support for their own positions and gain political advantage.

The concept of integrative complexity proposed by political psychologist Philip Tetlock offers significant insights in this regard (Conway et al. 2018). He defined integrative complexity as the extent to which leaders, in crisis situations in international relations, acknowledge the complex, multifaceted nature of the situation and communicate and make decisions by considering diverse information. Recent studies have applied this concept to online political communication (Jakob et al. 2023) and social polarization (Savage et al. 2021). In an environment and situation that increasingly lowers cognitive integrative complexity, leading individuals into black-and-white thinking, citizens must consistently maintain their cognitive integrative complexity.

If one is concerned about political polarization and believes that resolving it is crucial for strengthening democracy, one must not avoid or react emotionally to the discomfort of encountering disagreements and facing conflict. Instead, one should actively engage with situations of disagreement and conflict to deepen one's own thinking and strive to reduce errors or biases that oneself and the other party might fall into through active dialogue. The analysis presented in this paper does not imply that one party is more correct than another, nor does it necessarily mean that one must change their party affiliation. The crucial point is that the very act of engaging in thorough deliberation, to the extent of considering a change in party affiliation, and recognizing during the process that no party is perfect and that one supports the party with less severe problems among the options, offers a potential pathway to escape polarization. ■

References

Conway, Lucian, Peter Suedfeld and Philip Tetlock. 2018. “Integrative Complexity in Politics.” The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Habermas, Jurgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Boston: Beacon Press.

Honneth, Axel. 1995, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Jakob, Dobbrick, Timo Dobbrick, and Hartmut Wessler. 2023. “The Integrative Complexity of Online User Comments Across Different Types of Democracy and Discussion Arenas.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 28, 3: 580-600.

Savage, Sara, Emily Oliver, Ellen Gordon, and Lucy Tutton. 2021. “Addressing Social Polarization Through Critical Thinking: Theoretical Application in the “Living Well With Difference” Course in Secondary Schools in England.” Journal of Social and Political Psychology 9, 2: 490-505.

■ Han, Joon_ Director of the EAI Future Innovation Research Center. Professor of Sociology at Yonsei University.

■ Managed and Edited by:Song, Chae-rin, EAI Researcher

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