[Polarization and Korean Democracy Series] ⑤ 2016 and 2024: What Has Changed and How?

I. Introduction

The political instability in South Korea, triggered by President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law on December 3, 2024, entered a systemic crisis phase with the National Assembly's passage of the impeachment motion on December 14. This marks a recurrence of the political crisis that led to the candlelight vigils in 2016 due to state affairs manipulation and the subsequent impeachment of President Park Geun-hye the following year. However, unlike the political instability of 2016, which was resolved through the rule of law, the current situation has escalated into intense partisan polarization, leading not only politicians but also the general public into a fierce conflict over impeachment, culminating in the temporary, violent occupation of the court. Our democracy, long considered stable, is once again being shaken in a vortex of crisis.

The crises in our democracy, repeated within the short span of eight years between 2016 and 2024, present a superficially similar pattern of presidential impeachment due to dysfunctional state administration. However, public opinion trends show a slightly different picture. Specifically, while public opinion overwhelmingly favored the impeachment of the president in 2016, in the 2024 crisis, the gap between pro and con opinions has significantly narrowed from overwhelming support just before the impeachment.[1]Furthermore, in 2016, the approval rating of the ruling party at the time, the Liberty Korea Party, which plummeted to the 10% range immediately after the state affairs manipulation scandal broke, did not recover until just before the impeachment ruling. In contrast, in the current situation, the approval rating of the People Power Party, which had fallen to the low 20% range after the declaration of martial law, has rebounded to a level comparable to that of the Democratic Party. What has caused these differences?

This article aims to identify the differences and their origins by comparing the current crisis in our democracy with the situation in 2016. The focus is on whether the differences observed in similar environments during the two periods of democratic crisis are based on qualitative changes in voters' perceptions of fundamental democratic rules, such as election fairness and democratic values. It also examines how these differences are shaped by gender, age, ideology, and partisanship, and in which groups they are most pronounced. If changes in voter perceptions of democracy are driving the current situation, it can be understood as a serious malfunction of our democracy. Conversely, if the current changes are unrelated to shifts in voter perceptions of democracy, the differences in public opinion regarding impeachment and party support between 2016 and 2024 can be seen as temporary phenomena due to differing political environments in the two periods.[2]

II. 2016 vs. 2024: Party Ideological Distribution and Preference

Before examining perceptions of democracy, let us look at the differences in the political landscape between the two periods. [Figure 1] summarizes the ideological distribution of respondents according to their party support tendencies during the two periods. The results show several noteworthy facts. First, in both periods, the distribution of supporters for the Democratic Party and the People Power Party (Liberty Korea) is divided into progressive and conservative, and interestingly, the difference was more pronounced in 2017. Second, unlike the 2017 survey, the ideological spectrum of unaffiliated voters has relatively narrowed in the 2025 distribution, indicating that the two major parties have absorbed unaffiliated voters with moderate tendencies. Third, although it is difficult to consider it a major change, the distribution of party supporters with extreme ideological tendencies has increased in 2025 compared to 2017. These changes appear to stem from the difference in party distribution between 2016, when significant third parties existed, and the present, when they do not.

[Figure 1] Ideological Distribution by Party

Note. Voter perception survey for the 2017 presidential election / EAI Polarization Survey 2025

The following tables present the results of respondents' preferences for parties and politicians during the two periods, categorized by party support, gender, and age group. [Table 1] shows the results of the 2017 survey, which, apart from differences based on party support, generally shows a consistent pattern of low preference for the then-ruling Liberty Korea Party and President Park Geun-hye. Preferences for the Democratic Party and then-candidate Moon Jae-in recorded positive figures among all groups except supporters of the Liberty Korea Party and respondents aged 60 and over, showing a significant difference from the preferences for the Liberty Korea Party and President Park Geun-hye.

The results for 2025, summarized in [Table 2], show a slightly different picture. While significant differences in preference based on party support are maintained, the preferences of unaffiliated voters show little difference across parties and politicians. When categorized by gender and age group, preferences for the Democratic Party and leader Lee Jae-myung were relatively high, but the difference was significantly smaller compared to 2017. Respondents aged 60 and over showed a higher preference for the People Power Party and President Yoon Suk-yeol. It is also noteworthy that preferences for both parties and politicians remained at negative levels.

[Table 3] and [Table 4] present the preferences by gender and age group for the two periods. The results for 2017, summarized in [Table 3], do not differ from the previous findings, but the 2025 survey shows interesting changes. The 2017 results show a pattern where preference for the Liberty Korea Party and Park Geun-hye increases with age, while preference for the Democratic Party and Moon Jae-in decreases, which was generally observed regardless of gender. In contrast, the results summarized in [Table 4] add differences based on the respondent's gender to that pattern. Specifically, for women, the age effect pattern of increasing preference for the People Power Party (Yoon Suk-yeol) and decreasing preference for the Democratic Party (Lee Jae-myung) is generally maintained. However, male respondents showed a non-linear pattern where preferences for parties and politicians became similar among those in their 20s and 30s and those aged 60 and over. This indicates a conservative shift among young men in their party and political preferences.

III. 2016 vs. 2024: Perceptions of Election Fairness and Democracy

Do the differences in party and political preferences between 2016 and 2024 extend to perceptions of fundamental democratic principles? To investigate this, we first examined respondents' perceptions of election fairness. The charts below present the results of the 2017 and 2025 surveys on election fairness, analyzed by party support and by gender and age group.[3]

First, in the 2017 presidential election voter perception survey, the perception of election fairness was overwhelmingly positive. Differences based on partisanship were found; supporters of the Democratic Party had a higher perception of election fairness than supporters of the Liberty Korea Party, but even among Liberty Korea supporters, over 80% responded that the elections were fair.

Note. How fair do you think the monitoring and enforcement activities of the National Election Commission were regarding this election? (2017 Presidential Election Voter Perception Survey)

In contrast, the results of the 2025 survey show a greater divergence in perceptions of election fairness depending on party support. While the overall perception of fairness in the 2022 presidential election was predominantly positive, about 40% of People Power Party supporters expressed negative opinions, and this figure exceeded 30% among unaffiliated respondents. This trend is even more pronounced in the responses regarding the 2024 general election. Although there was no significant difference in the overall perception of fairness, the gap in fairness perception widened significantly based on party support. More than half of People Power Party supporters held negative perceptions of election fairness, and the gap among Democratic Party supporters widened to over 40 percentage points, a significant increase from the 12 percentage points in the 2022 presidential election. Considering that the outcomes of the two elections differed by party, these results indicate a widening gap between winners' and losers' perceptions of election fairness compared to the past.

What about the results categorized by gender and age group? As the following charts show, the 2017 survey did not reveal significant differences in perceptions of election fairness by gender and age group. While negative evaluations were relatively higher among respondents aged 60 and over, the difference is not considered large. However, the 2025 survey results show distinctive differences. In the 2022 presidential election, except for female respondents in their 20s, there were no significant differences in perceptions of election fairness by gender and age. However, regarding the fairness of the 2024 general election, perceptions were low among respondents in their 20s and 30s and those aged 60 and over. These changes are concerning as they represent a shift in perception regarding election fairness, a fundamental rule of democratic games. However, it is important to note that a majority of respondents still hold positive perceptions of election fairness.

Next, we examined changes in respondents' perceptions of the democratic system between the two survey periods.[4] First, the results of the 2017 survey show no differences in perceptions of the democratic system based on party support. Among both party supporters and unaffiliated voters, positive evaluations of democracy were overwhelmingly dominant, and this pattern was similarly confirmed when considering gender and age.

Note. Democracy is flawed, but it is still better than any other form of government (2017 Presidential Election Voter Perception Survey)

In contrast, the results of the 2025 survey show a significant divergence in perceptions among respondents based on partisanship. While the overall perception of democracy among all respondents is generally positive, the fact that about 30% of People Power Party supporters responded that "dictatorship is better than democracy depending on the situation" is a result not seen before. Furthermore, the perceptions of unaffiliated voters regarding democracy are also highly significant; the weakening belief in the democratic system and the nearly 20% cynical perception of the political system are causes for concern.

The chart below examines this by considering gender and age. The weakening positive perception of the democratic political system is particularly pronounced among men in their 20s and 30s. This group has the lowest perception that "democracy is always better than any other system" and a relatively high perception that "dictatorship is better than democracy depending on the situation." This is a stark contrast to the high perception of democracy among women in the same age group.

Where do these changes originate? While more detailed analysis is needed, one hint from the survey results of the two periods can be found in the satisfaction with Korean democracy. The following chart and table summarize respondents' answers regarding satisfaction with democracy in the two periods, categorized by party support, gender, and age group.

First, the results of the 2017 survey, summarized in the chart, indicate that satisfaction with Korean democratic politics was not very positive. Nevertheless, the differences in responses based on party support were not significant, and the negative perception of democratic politics was not a major cause for concern as it was driven by unaffiliated respondents, which is a common phenomenon for those without a preferred party. When considering gender and age, there were almost no differences between groups. However, an interesting gender difference was observed among younger respondents, with women reporting lower satisfaction than men in this age group.

The results of the 2025 survey, summarized in [Table 5], show some differences compared to the past. Overall, satisfaction was high among respondents in their 30s and 40s, while satisfaction was relatively low among men in their 20s and women aged 60 and over. In light of the current situation, it is noteworthy that the satisfaction levels by gender among respondents in their 20s have reversed compared to 2017. Young men, in particular, show the lowest satisfaction with democracy compared to other groups. Furthermore, unlike the 2017 results, there were differences in satisfaction based on partisanship, with respondents supporting the Democratic Party showing relatively higher satisfaction than those supporting the People Power Party. Although unaffiliated respondents still had the lowest satisfaction, the significant difference in satisfaction with democracy based on partisanship, unlike in the past, is a notable result.

IV. Conclusion

This article has examined the differences and their origins by comparing the current crisis in our democracy with the situation in 2016. The review revealed that while the two periods of democratic crisis were situationally similar, the 2016 period was limited to differences in preferences for parties and politicians based on partisanship. In contrast, the current crisis shows a qualitative difference in that it goes beyond partisan preference differences to include changes in voters' perceptions of democracy, such as election fairness and democratic values. While these changes are not yet significant enough to shake overall perceptions, the subtle shifts in voter perceptions of democracy indicate that our democracy is currently experiencing serious malfunctions and could face a systemic crisis if left unaddressed.

Simply put, the groups with negative perceptions of our current democracy are those dissatisfied with its functioning, primarily young male voters. They view not only election fairness but also the democratic political system with skepticism. However, negative perceptions of democracy are a minority even within these groups, and there is no significant difference in their stance on martial law and impeachment compared to other groups, so a catastrophic situation for democracy is not to be feared. Moreover, although not detailed in the main text, regarding presidential qualities, while there are differences based on party support, communication with the public and cooperation with the opposition party are considered the most important qualities regardless of gender or age group, suggesting that our democracy still has sufficient room to overcome the current difficulties. However, to achieve this, irrational incitement based on partisanship must be restrained, and conflicts and dissatisfaction with democracy must be managed within the institutional framework of democracy, requiring greater consensus and effort from parties and politicians. ■

■ Yoo Sung-jinProfessor, School of Liberal Arts, Ewha Womans University.

■ Managed and Edited by:Song Chae-rin, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr