[Polarization and Korean Democracy Series] ③ Who Supports Martial Law?

I. Introduction

On December 3, 2024, President Yoon Suk-yeol declared a state of emergency martial law. This was an unprecedented measure in the history of Korean democracy and served as a catalyst for further deepening political uncertainty and social conflict. The debate surrounding the imposition of martial law went beyond a mere policy judgment, raising fundamental questions about the core principles of democracy and the governance of the state. While some argued that martial law was an unavoidable choice in a time of national crisis, others regarded it as a grave challenge that undermined the constitution and democratic procedures.

This study analyzes the factors associated with public attitudes toward the declaration of martial law, focusing on the question, "Who supports martial law?" In particular, it examines how support for martial law is related not only to simple political stances or ideological orientations but also to more complex social and political factors. This study investigates the relationship between socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, and education level, political attitudes toward the government and democracy, and affective polarization toward political parties and leaders, and support for martial law. Through this, it seeks to explore the context in which attitudes toward emergency measures like martial law are formed in Korean society.

This study aims to contribute to understanding how democracy and authoritarian governance are discussed in Korean politics, beyond simply identifying the characteristics of martial law supporters. First, by analyzing the differences in support for martial law across specific social strata or political orientations, it examines whether emergency measures like martial law tend to be more tolerated by certain groups. Second, by examining the relationship between attitudes toward democracy and support for martial law, it investigates whether dissatisfaction with democracy operates as a justification for undemocratic measures. Finally, by analyzing the relationship between affective polarization and support for martial law, it assesses how emotional politics relates to perceptions of democracy.

This study suggests that extreme political measures like martial law are not solely determined by the decisions of those in power but become possible when there is a receptive social context. A deeper understanding of the discussions surrounding the sustainability of democracy in Korean society and an analysis of how citizens' political attitudes are formed regarding measures like martial law will provide important implications for the future development of democracy.

This study is composed of four chapters. Chapter 1 analyzes the relationship between socio-demographic factors, political orientations, and support for martial law. It examines how support for martial law varies according to variables such as gender, age, education level, region, ideological orientation, and party affiliation.

Chapter 2 analyzes the relationship between attitudes toward a strong government and democratic procedures, and support for martial law. It assesses the association between attitudes toward parliamentary checks and balances, perceptions of leadership authority, and beliefs in procedural democracy, and support for martial law.

Chapter 3 examines the relationship between attitudes toward democracy and support for martial law. It explores how the perception of democracy as the best system, or the view that dictatorship might be better depending on the situation, is linked to support for martial law.

Chapter 4 analyzes the relationship between affective polarization and support for martial law. It assesses whether stronger like or dislike for political parties and leaders increases support for martial law, and whether affective polarization functions to justify authoritarian rule over democratic values.

The purpose of this study is to diagnose the current state of Korean democracy and to provide foundational data for discussions aimed at strengthening the stability of democratic institutions in the future.

II. Support for Martial Law by Socio-demographic Factors and Political Orientation

1. Support for Martial Law by Gender and Age Group

[Figure 1] Support for Martial Law by Gender and Age Group

[Figure 1] shows the degree of support for martial law by gender and age group. The upper graph shows the distribution of males and females, and the lower graph shows the distribution by age group. The X-axis represents the evaluation of the martial law declaration, ranging from 1 (very wrong) to 5 (very right). Moving left indicates stronger opposition to martial law, and moving right indicates stronger support. The Y-axis represents the relative distribution of individuals within each group who provided a specific response; a higher graph indicates a greater number of people who chose that response.

The upper graph compares the degree of support for martial law between men and women. Overall, both men and women show negative attitudes toward the declaration of martial law, with the highest response rate appearing at "very wrong (1)." In other words, there is no significant gender difference, and the overwhelming distribution of opposition to martial law is commonly observed in both groups.

The lower graph shows the degree of support for martial law by age group. Younger age groups (18-29, 30-39) show a clear tendency to strongly oppose martial law, with responses concentrated at "very wrong (1)." In contrast, as age increases, negative reactions somewhat diminish, and particularly among those aged 60 and above (60-69, 70+), the proportion of those who evaluate martial law positively increases.

2. Support for Martial Law by Residential Region and Education Level

[Figure 2] shows the distribution of support for martial law by residential region and education level. The top of the graph shows the degree of support for martial law by residential region. Negative evaluations of martial law are overwhelmingly dominant in all regions, but there are subtle differences between regions. In particular, the "very wrong (1)" response is most concentrated in the Gwangju-Jeolla region, with almost no positive evaluations of martial law. In contrast, the proportion of respondents who positively evaluate martial law is relatively higher in the Daegu-Gyeongbuk and Busan-Ulsan-Gyeongnam regions compared to other regions. That is, although opposition to martial law is still the majority in these regions, the distribution of respondents who hold favorable views toward martial law is higher than in other regions.

[Figure 2] Support for Martial Law by Residential Region and Education Level

The bottom of the graph shows support for martial law by education level. There is a tendency for opposition to martial law to strengthen as education level increases, with respondents who have completed a doctoral program or higher showing the highest proportion of "very wrong (1)" responses. Conversely, respondents with a high school education or less tend to have a relatively higher proportion of positive evaluations of martial law compared to other education groups. However, regardless of education level, negative evaluations of martial law remain dominant overall.

The results in [Figure 2] suggest that attitudes toward martial law may vary to some extent depending on residential region and education level, but it is difficult to interpret these as decisive factors. While opposition to martial law is strong in all regions and education levels, it can be considered to the extent that the proportion of respondents who positively evaluate martial law is relatively higher in specific regions (Daegu-Gyeongbuk and Busan-Ulsan-Gyeongnam) or education levels (high school graduate or less).

3. Support for Martial Law by Political Orientation

[Figure 3] shows the distribution by ideological orientation and party affiliation. First, the top of the graph shows the degree of support for martial law according to the respondents' ideological orientation (progressive, moderate, conservative). Progressive respondents tend to strongly oppose martial law, with an overwhelming number of "very wrong (1)" responses, and the proportion of responses decreases drastically as it moves toward positive evaluations (4, 5).

[Figure 3] Support for Martial Law by Ideological Orientation and Party Affiliation

For conservative respondents, not only is support for martial law relatively high, but it is also noteworthy that their attitudes toward martial law are not concentrated in a specific range (e.g., score 1) but are evenly distributed across all ranges (1-5). While most of the cases analyzed so far showed a clear concentration of opposition to martial law at score 1, this concentration phenomenon disappeared among conservative respondents, and a certain proportion of positive evaluations of martial law appeared. This suggests that support for martial law is relatively high among conservative respondents, and at the same time, it indicates the possibility that attitudes toward martial law may appear more diverse than simply divided into opposition or support.

The bottom of the graph shows the degree of support for martial law according to the respondents' party affiliation. Supporters of the Democratic Party of Korea tend to strongly oppose martial law, with an overwhelming number of "very wrong (1)" responses. Supporters of the Cho Kuk Innovation Party, the Reform Party, and the Progressive Party show similar patterns, generally exhibiting a similar level of opposition to martial law as Democratic Party supporters. In contrast, supporters of the People Power Party have a higher proportion of positive evaluations of martial law compared to supporters of other parties, particularly showing a relatively high response rate in the 4-5 score range (support). However, even among People Power Party supporters, opposition to martial law was not completely excluded, and a certain number of responses appeared in the 1-3 score range. In other words, People Power Party supporters tend to support martial law more strongly, but it is also evident that diverse opinions exist within this group.

III. Does the Desire for a Strong Government Lead to Support for Martial Law?

Korean democracy is being shaken amidst a political impeachment crisis, and political uncertainty has increased since President Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment proceedings. The President's side and some members of the ruling party are delaying post-impeachment measures by raising issues of legal procedure, and some citizens who support them argue that the imposition of martial law was an unavoidable measure. Their logic aligns with the idea that the president should be able to freely manage state affairs without parliamentary checks. In reality, people who believe that parliamentary checks should not be excessive for the government to exercise strong leadership may tend to support martial law more. Therefore, this chapter aims to analyze how attitudes toward government authority and democratic procedures are linked to stances on martial law. To this end, respondents were asked whether they believe: △ the government has difficulty achieving great things if it is subject to parliamentary checks, △ the president should push forward with policies despite parliamentary opposition, △ political leaders can disregard existing procedures to achieve their goals, and △ the government can disregard laws in times of national crisis.

[Figure 4] Perception of Strong Government and Leadership, and Support for Martial Law

[Figure 4] shows that individuals who believe the government should exercise strong leadership tend to have more positive attitudes toward martial law. First, respondents who agreed with the statement "It is difficult for the government to carry out important tasks if it is subject to excessive parliamentary checks" had a high proportion of positive evaluations of martial law. In particular, those who "strongly agreed" showed a high distribution in the 4-5 score range (support for martial law), while conversely, respondents who value parliamentary checks tended to strongly oppose martial law.

A similar pattern appears in responses to the statement, "The president should push forward with policies he or she deems necessary despite parliamentary opposition." Those who believe the president should make strong decisions (strongly agree, somewhat agree) tended to strongly support martial law, while those who believe parliament should not be ignored (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree) strongly opposed martial law. These results suggest that an attitude favoring strong leadership is likely to be linked to attitudes toward martial law. Those who emphasize the leader's strong leadership over parliamentary checks tend to view martial law as a more legitimate measure, while those who value democratic procedures and checks and balances tend to perceive martial law as a clear violation of democracy.

[Figure 5] Perception of Democratic Procedures and Support for Martial Law

[Figure 5] shows that individuals who believe the government can disregard existing procedures to achieve its goals or resolve crises tend to support martial law relatively more. Respondents who agreed with the statement "Leaders can disregard existing procedures to achieve their goals" had a high proportion of positive evaluations of martial law, with those who "strongly agreed" showing a relatively high distribution in the 4-5 score range (support for martial law). However, respondents who believe procedures should not be disregarded strongly opposed martial law, with responses concentrated at "very wrong (1)."

A similar pattern is observed in the question, "The government can disregard legal procedures to resolve a crisis." The less emphasis individuals place on procedural democracy, the higher the proportion of those who support martial law. However, what is noteworthy here is that even among respondents who believe it is sometimes necessary to disregard existing procedures, a significant number still oppose martial law. This clearly indicates that not necessarily believing in disregarding procedural democracy does not automatically lead to supporting martial law. This contrasts with the stronger impact that attitudes toward legislative checks and balances (questions 1 and 2) had on support for martial law.

These differences suggest that the preference for strong leadership over procedures alone may not be a sufficient condition for justifying martial law. In other words, some respondents, while believing it is necessary to disregard democratic procedures in certain situations, tend not to accept the extreme measure of martial law. This suggests that support for martial law may not stem solely from a preference for a "strong government" but may be more deeply related to an attitude that views parliamentary checks negatively.

IV. Does Greater Dissatisfaction with Korean Democracy Lead to Support for Martial Law?

What is the relationship between perceptions of democracy and attitudes toward emergency measures like martial law? Generally, individuals who strongly trust democracy are more likely to reject undemocratic measures such as martial law. Conversely, those who do not necessarily believe democracy is the best system, or who are highly dissatisfied with the way democracy operates in Korea, may evaluate martial law more positively. To confirm this, this chapter analyzes the relationship between respondents' preference for democracy and their satisfaction with Korean democracy, and their support for martial law. Preference for democracy was measured through questions asking whether respondents believe ① democracy is always better than any other system, ② dictatorship may be better than democracy in certain situations, or ③ they are indifferent to democracy and dictatorship. Additionally, satisfaction with democracy was assessed by asking "How well do you think Korean democracy is currently functioning?" (on a scale of 1 to 10). Now, let's examine the impact of these perceptions of democracy on support for martial law through [Figure 6].

[Figure 6] Attitudes Toward Democracy and Support for Martial Law

The upper graph in [Figure 6] shows the relationship between respondents' preference for democracy and support for martial law. The most striking point is that respondents who believe democracy is always better than any other system show a strong opposition to martial law, with responses concentrated at "very wrong (1)." In other words, individuals with a firm belief in democracy perceive martial law as a clear undemocratic measure. In contrast, for those who responded "dictatorship may be better than democracy depending on the situation," attitudes toward martial law are more varied, with a certain proportion of responses appearing in the 4-5 score range (support for martial law). This suggests that individuals who lack conviction that democracy is the best system are more likely to accept martial law as an option.

Furthermore, the distribution of respondents who answered, “It doesn't matter whether it's democracy or dictatorship,” shows a similar pattern to those who answered, “Dictatorship is better depending on the situation.” This group shows fewer responses opposing martial law (1 point) than the group preferring democracy, and their attitudes toward martial law are distributed more neutrally overall. This indicates that while they do not hold strong beliefs in democracy, they are not actively supporting martial law either. An interesting point is that it cannot be ruled out that these respondents were not simply indifferent to the political system, but chose the neutral option (“It doesn't matter whether it's democracy or dictatorship”) to avoid directly expressing that “dictatorship might be better.” That is, it suggests that they hold a reserved attitude toward democracy, but their actual position may not be significantly different from one that tolerates dictatorship.

The lower graph shows the relationship between satisfaction with the current functioning of Korean democracy and support for martial law. The most distinct pattern is that the more dissatisfied respondents are with democracy, the higher the proportion of those who support martial law. Their responses at "very wrong (1)" decrease, and there is a relatively high distribution in the 4-5 score range (support for martial law). This suggests that individuals who feel the current democratic system is not functioning properly are more likely to consider emergency measures like martial law as an alternative.

Interestingly, some respondents who are very satisfied with democracy (score 10) also evaluate martial law positively. While individuals with high satisfaction with democracy generally tend to oppose martial law, some exhibit an attitude that accepts martial law. These results can be interpreted in two ways. First, it is possible that because they believe democracy is functioning well, they accept martial law as a legitimate and justifiable measure. That is, due to high confidence in the current system, they view martial law as an appropriate response to resolve political crises. Second, they may be individuals who are satisfied with formal democracy but believe that strong leadership decisions are necessary in certain situations. This could be linked to an attitude that supports democratic principles but also believes that democratic procedures can be temporarily suspended in times of national crisis.

These findings provide interesting implications, as it is expected that dissatisfied individuals with democracy would support martial law, but it is also noteworthy that some individuals satisfied with democracy may accept martial law as a justifiable measure. In other words, support for martial law does not solely stem from dissatisfaction with democracy but can be interpreted differently depending on how democracy itself is viewed.

V. Does Greater Affective Polarization Lead to Support for Martial Law?

Political polarization in Korean society manifests as strong emotional confrontation beyond mere differences of opinion. In particular, as like and dislike for specific political parties or leaders are extremely divided, this affective polarization may also influence attitudes toward emergency measures such as martial law. This chapter analyzes the relationship between affective polarization toward political parties and figures, and support for martial law.

To this end, affective polarization was measured in two ways. First, polarization toward political parties was measured by asking respondents to rate their favorability toward the Democratic Party and the People Power Party on a scale of 0 to 100, and then calculating the difference between the two parties to create an index between -100 and 100. A score closer to 100 indicates someone who strongly supports the Democratic Party and dislikes the People Power Party, while a score closer to -100 indicates someone who supports the People Power Party and dislikes the Democratic Party. Second, polarization toward political figures was measured similarly by assessing favorability toward Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol, and then calculating an index between -100 and 100 based on the difference between these two variables. 100 represents someone who strongly supports Lee Jae-myung and dislikes Yoon Suk-yeol, and -100 represents the opposite.

[Figure 7] Affective Polarization Toward Political Parties and Support for Martial Law

[Figure 7] shows the relationship between affective polarization toward political parties and support for martial law. The most prominent feature is that as affective polarization intensifies, attitudes toward martial law become more sharply divided. Respondents who have high favorability toward the Democratic Party and strongly dislike the People Power Party (groups with polarization index close to 100) tend to strongly oppose martial law, with an overwhelming number of "very wrong (1)" responses. Conversely, among respondents who support the People Power Party and dislike the Democratic Party (groups with polarization index close to -100), the proportion of positive evaluations of martial law increases, and responses in the 4-5 score range (support for martial law) show an increasing trend.

What is particularly noteworthy is that respondents with a polarization index close to -100 show almost no responses of strong opposition to martial law (scores 1-2). This is a unique pattern not found in other graphs examined previously. While the analysis of support for martial law by party affiliation showed that a considerable number of People Power Party supporters opposed martial law, the analysis of affective polarization reveals that respondents who strongly dislike the Democratic Party, rather than simply supporting the People Power Party, tend to support martial law more strongly. This suggests that not just supporting a particular party, but extreme animosity toward the opposing party may be more closely linked to attitudes toward accepting emergency measures like martial law.

[Figure 8] Affective Polarization Toward Political Figures and Support for Martial Law

[Figure 8] shows how affective polarization toward political leaders (Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol) is related to support for martial law. Similar to party polarization, strong like and dislike for specific figures tend to sharply divide attitudes toward martial law.

Respondents who strongly support Lee Jae-myung and dislike Yoon Suk-yeol (groups with polarization index close to 100) show a pronounced tendency to strongly oppose martial law, with an overwhelming number of "very wrong (1)" responses. Conversely, among respondents who support Yoon Suk-yeol and dislike Lee Jae-myung (groups with polarization index close to -100), the proportion of positive evaluations of martial law increases, with a clear upward trend in the 4-5 score range (support for martial law).

What is particularly noteworthy, similar to party polarization, is that among respondents with a polarization index close to -100 (the group that strongly supports Yoon Suk-yeol and dislikes Lee Jae-myung), there are almost no responses opposing martial law (scores 1-2). This suggests that beyond simply preferring a particular leader, strong dislike for the opposing politician may be more deeply connected to an attitude that justifies strong measures like martial law.

Affective polarization toward political parties and leaders appears to be closely related to attitudes toward emergency measures, going beyond mere differences in political preference. The results examined in this chapter confirm that rather than simply supporting a particular party or political figure, strong dislike for the opposing party or politician is more deeply connected to an attitude that justifies martial law. In particular, even if one supports the People Power Party, if their animosity toward the Democratic Party is not strong, they may not unconditionally support martial law. However, for respondents who strongly dislike the Democratic Party, the likelihood of accepting martial law as a justifiable measure significantly increased.

This implies that attitudes toward emergency measures like martial law are not determined solely by ideological orientation or party affiliation, but can become more entrenched with stronger stances as political animosity and emotional confrontation deepen. In other words, it suggests that political polarization has a high probability of changing perceptions of democratic procedures beyond mere differences of opinion. These results indicate that as affective polarization intensifies in Korean politics, attitudes that prioritize strong order over democratic procedures may be reinforced, and this is likely to be more pronounced in times of political crisis.

VI. Conclusion

This study explored the factors related to support for martial law by analyzing public attitudes surrounding President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law on December 3, 2024. The analysis confirmed that socio-demographic factors, political attitudes, perceptions of democracy, and affective polarization are closely related to support for martial law. In particular, while opposition to martial law was generally dominant among socio-demographic variables, some groups (e.g., older age groups) showed more positive evaluations of martial law compared to other groups. Furthermore, individuals who prefer a strong government, those dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy, and those with strong affective polarization toward specific parties or political leaders tended to evaluate martial law more positively.

These results suggest that emergency measures such as martial law are more likely to be justified not merely as legal or political decisions, but when there exists a societal attitude and political context that accepts them. In particular, as political polarization intensifies, support for martial law tends to be sharply divided, implying that perceptions of democratic procedures and the rule of law can be shaped not simply by institutional issues but within emotional and affective confrontations. This study contributes to understanding how democracy and authoritarian governance compete in Korean politics and is expected to serve as important data for analyzing the sustainability of democratic procedures and citizens' political attitudes in the future. ■

■ Park Beom-seop, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Soongsil University.

■ Contact and Editing:Song Chae-rin, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr