[Polarization and Korean Democracy Series] ① What Does the “Silent” Center Want?

I. Introduction

This article focuses on the partisan confrontation and conflict, which have intensified following the political turmoil caused by President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law on December 3, 2024, and aims to analyze the political attitudes and characteristics of the ideological 'center' that stands apart from such partisan and ideological confrontations.

Political polarization and the adversarial party politics based on it led to an extreme confrontation between the two institutions of the presidency and the legislature in a situation of a minority party controlling the legislature. This ultimately led to the political deadlock, with the president resorting to the mobilization of the military and the legislature resorting to impeachment, another extreme measure. Although the National Assembly impeached the president, holding him responsible for the declaration of martial law, partisan confrontation has not subsided since then. Rather, political conflict surrounding the Constitutional Court's impeachment ruling is fiercely unfolding not only in political circles but also on the streets, with some extreme acts such as the storming of the court occurring. This article aims to examine whether Korean society has indeed experienced further intensification of partisan polarization through the martial law-impeachment incident.

The reason for this concern is that President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law was an unacceptable act, not only due to legal and procedural issues concerning its exercise of authority but also because it mobilized the military to neutralize the National Assembly. In this regard, the issue can be seen as a challenge to the constitutional order beyond partisan interests and a threat to Korean democracy. However, even after the lifting of martial law, "Yoon Suk-yeol" remains at the center of partisan conflict between the ruling and opposition parties, which has also led to fierce disputes and confrontations among supporters of each party. This is because, at least 'outwardly,' the politics of polarization that has divided Korean politics up to that point does not seem to have changed significantly, even after experiencing the martial law incident.

This article specifically examines whether the "Yoon Suk-yeol" issue is severely dividing our society based on ideology or partisanship after the martial law incident. This article pays particular attention to those who identify their ideological orientation as 'center.' While those with a centrist ideological stance may not be devoid of partisan preferences (Kang Won-taek 2007), their partisan loyalty and ideological intensity are likely to be lower compared to those who clearly express their bias toward one side of the ideological spectrum. Furthermore, their opinions and voices may not be well-represented in the intensely unfolding political debates between the two polarized sides. They may be passive in political participation or expressing their opinions, or they may be silenced by the loud and strong voices of the ideologically strong and active individuals located at the two extremes of the ideological spectrum (Noelle-Neumann 1974). However, if the distribution of political preferences in our society is a symmetrical unimodal distribution centered around the centrist voters, rather than a complete bimodal distribution where the entire population is divided into two camps on the ideological spectrum, then the centrist voters with a relatively 'quiet' stance will inevitably play a decisive role in public opinion trends on important issues and in determining election outcomes (Downs 1957).

In the context of real political confrontation, political attitudes are often distinguished as conservative and progressive, but the starting point of this article is that these dichotomous categories actually encompass diverse political attitudes. Even when divided into the broad categories of conservative and progressive, each category includes various sub-groups with different ideological directions and intensities. This perspective also emphasizes the need to move away from the conventional interpretation of Korean politics, which has excessively highlighted only the two opposing relationships within the outward appearance of partisan polarization, ignoring the diverse interests within. By focusing on the centrist group, this article aims to emphasize not only 'differences' and 'exclusion' but also 'similarities in perception' and 'possibility of compromise' in attitudes amidst partisan polarization. The data used here are the results of a web survey conducted by East Asia Institute (EAI) commissioned to Korea Research on January 22-23, 2025, targeting 1,514 individuals.

II. Ideology and the Martial Law-Impeachment Political Climate

First, we analyzed the perception of all respondents regarding the ongoing controversial declaration of martial law and the impeachment of the president. As shown in [Figure 1], the evaluation of President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law is negative. 72.7% of all respondents viewed the decision as "wrong." 58% of respondents responded that the declaration of martial law was a "very wrong act," indicating a strong critical stance. Only about 14% of respondents gave a positive evaluation of the martial law declaration. This suggests that regardless of partisan stance or ideological attitude, President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law is viewed very critically.

Meanwhile, on December 14, 2024, the impeachment motion against President Yoon Suk-yeol was passed with 204 votes in favor, 85 against, 3 abstentions, and 8 invalid votes out of a total of 300 members of the National Assembly. The Constitutional Court's final ruling is now pending. In this situation, the analysis of respondents' attitudes toward impeachment showed a high proportion of support. 64.5% of all respondents supported the impeachment of President Yoon. More than half of the respondents, 51.5%, responded that they "strongly support" the impeachment ruling. However, the proportion of those who opposed impeachment was also close to one-quarter, at 23.4%. Those who "strongly oppose" the impeachment ruling also accounted for 12.8%.

[Figure 1] and [Figure 2] effectively summarize the overall atmosphere of our society regarding the martial law incident. Firstly, the majority of respondents hold a negative view of the martial law declaration. The fact that three-quarters of all respondents evaluate it critically indicates that most citizens, regardless of ideology or partisan preference, consider it a wrong act. However, regarding "President Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment," while the proportion of support is relatively high, it is somewhat lower than the negative evaluation of the martial law declaration. Furthermore, the intensity and proportion of opposition are stronger and higher compared to the reaction to the martial law declaration. This difference highlights the root causes of the conflict surrounding this incident. Specifically, there are individuals who hold a 'contradictory position' of "the martial law declaration was wrong, but I oppose impeachment," and this is becoming a major cause of political conflict during the impeachment proceedings.

[Figure 1] Evaluation of the Martial Law Declaration

[Figure 2] Stance on Yoon Suk-yeol's Impeachment

Considering the polarized political situation thus far, one might expect differences in reactions to the martial law declaration or attitudes toward Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment based on partisan preferences. Taking this into account, we examined the differences in attitudes based on who respondents voted for between Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol in the 2022 presidential election. As shown in [Table 1], the analysis confirmed distinct differences in stances based on the preferred candidate. Regarding the martial law declaration, both groups of supporters responded that it was wrong. The median was 3, and Yoon Suk-yeol voters also showed a strong negative judgment with an average of 2.76, while Lee Jae-myung supporters showed a very strong negative attitude with 1.15. However, the difference in the averages between the two groups was also statistically confirmed.

However, regarding President Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment, a difference in direction emerged between the two groups. Lee Jae-myung voters showed a very strong supportive attitude with an average of 4.8 on a 1-5 scale, while Yoon Suk-yeol voters showed an average of 2.67, indicating a 'disagreement' direction slightly below the median of 3. The partisan conflict surrounding impeachment appears to stem from this difference.

Meanwhile, regarding President Yoon Suk-yeol's state administration, Lee Jae-myung supporters gave a very low evaluation with an average of 1.73 on a 10-point scale where 10 is the highest score. In contrast, Yoon Suk-yeol voters gave a generally moderate evaluation on a -10 scale.

As shown in [Figure 1] and [Figure 2] above, while the majority of citizens hold a negative view of the martial law declaration and a majority support the impeachment decision, there are significant differences in attitudes based on partisan stance.

Ultimately, the current political conflict can be seen as stemming from the partisan differences in attitudes toward Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment. This is because Yoon Suk-yeol voters, compared to the decisive Lee Jae-myung voters, show a somewhat opposing stance. Meanwhile, looking at [Table 1], although Yoon Suk-yeol voters appear to somewhat oppose the impeachment decision, the standard deviation is relatively large, indicating that diverse perspectives coexist within the group. While the average leans slightly towards opposing impeachment, the internal distribution is very diverse. Bearing this in mind, a linear regression analysis was conducted on the perceptions of Yoon Suk-yeol voters regarding martial law and impeachment. The results are summarized in [Table 2].

[Table 2] categorizes the independent variables into six categories: martial law declaration, trust in government institutions, favorability toward politicians, fairness of elections, political attitudes, and socioeconomic background. Among these, the four variables in the 'martial law declaration' category were all statistically significant. The higher the positive evaluation of the martial law declaration itself, and the more it was considered necessary for national security and order, and unavoidable due to the opposition party's non-cooperation, the higher the probability of opposing impeachment. Conversely, it was not found that the martial law declaration was perceived as being for the purpose of maintaining President Yoon's power. In other words, those who oppose impeachment include those who agree with martial law itself, as well as those who believe there were reasons that made the declaration of martial law unavoidable. In addition, favorability toward Yoon Suk-yeol and unfavorability toward Lee Jae-myung influenced the stance of opposing impeachment. However, attitudes toward the fairness of elections and trust in the National Election Commission, which President Yoon cited as a justification for the martial law declaration (i.e., 'election fraud'), were not statistically confirmed to influence the impeachment opposition stance of Yoon Suk-yeol voters in the 2022 election. Ultimately, the stance of opposing impeachment within the Yoon Suk-yeol voter group can be seen as related to a 'sympathetic' attitude toward the causes that led to the martial law incident, i.e., dissatisfaction with the opposition party.

However, looking at the average of Yoon Suk-yeol voters' stance on the impeachment decision in [Table 1] above, although it leans slightly towards opposing impeachment, the intensity is not considered very strong. Furthermore, the standard deviation of that group is relatively large, meaning that there are individuals within the group who hold diverse views on this matter. It is difficult to consider each group as internally homogeneous simply because they voted for Yoon Suk-yeol in the presidential election. This applies equally to Lee Jae-myung voters. Even if individuals identify themselves as conservative or progressive, there can be distinctions such as moderate conservative, hardline conservative, moderate progressive, and hardline progressive depending on the intensity, and there will also be those who consider themselves centrist.

With this in mind, we first divided the conservative and progressive groups into moderate and hardline categories, creating five sub-groups. The frequency distribution of the five groups, including the center, is shown in [Figure 3]. In the ideological distribution, the proportion of respondents who identified themselves as centrist was 46.4%, nearly half. Furthermore, the proportions of moderate conservatives and moderate progressives, and hardline conservatives and hardline progressives were almost equal. As can be seen in [Figure 3], the distribution of ideological groups shows a symmetrical unimodal distribution on the left-right axis.

[Figure 3] Ideological Distribution of Respondents

It is necessary to further subdivide the centrist ideology here. Even within the centrist ideology, it is difficult to assume a complete neutrality that does not lean towards any partisan side. As explained in directional theory, which explains voting behavior, the centrist point is not a neutral position devoid of any emotional response to issues or direction and intensity of preference (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). Even the most centrist voters must ultimately choose a candidate when they vote in an election, and in a polarized situation like recent Korean politics, they must ultimately choose one of the two partisan camps that they prefer even slightly more. Therefore, the characteristics of centrist voters were distinguished through their candidate choice in the 2022 presidential election.

[Table 3] shows very interesting results. 92.9% of hardline progressives voted for Lee Jae-myung, and 91.9% of hardline conservatives voted for Yoon Suk-yeol. 86.1% of moderate progressives and 79.1% of moderate conservatives voted for Yoon Suk-yeol. The overwhelming majority of those who clearly expressed their ideological orientation chose the candidate of their own camp. However, the choices of those who identified as centrist were almost evenly split between the two candidates: 49.1% voted for Lee Jae-myung, and 50.9% voted for Yoon Suk-yeol. The results in [Table 3] clearly illustrate the severity of polarization in our politics. Not only do those with clear ideological preferences overwhelmingly support the candidate of their party, but even those who identify as centrist are almost completely divided into two camps. The results in [Figure 3] and [Table 3] clearly show that Korean society is politically divided into two camps.

In this context, to understand the polarized partisan conflict during the martial law-impeachment political climate, it is necessary to examine how each ideological sub-group perceives the political leaders and the two major parties on the ideological spectrum. [Figure 4] and [Figure 5] present the average ideological positions of the two political leaders, Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung, and the two major parties, the People Power Party and the Democratic Party, categorized into hardline ideological groups, moderate ideological groups, and six sub-units of the center, for Yoon Suk-yeol voters and Lee Jae-myung voters, respectively.

As shown in [Figure 4], the hardline conservative group is located at a very extreme position with an average ideological value of 8.88. They perceive President Yoon Suk-yeol as a very extreme conservative, but their own ideological stance is even more extreme. However, the ideological distance they perceive from Yoon Suk-yeol is very close, at 0.15. In contrast, their perception of Representative Lee Jae-myung's ideological position is an average of 0.54, indicating that they consider him to be extremely progressive. Their ideological perception places the positions of the two political leaders at the extremes of the ideological spectrum. The distance between the People Power Party and the Democratic Party is also close to 7, although slightly closer than the ideological distance between Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung. With such perceptions, compromise or agreement between the two parties seems practically impossible.

In contrast, the moderate conservative group has a relatively moderate ideological position at 6.44, and the ideological distance they perceive between the parties is relatively closer, with Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung at 6 and the People Power Party and the Democratic Party at 5.32. They perceive their own ideological stance as more moderate than Yoon Suk-yeol or the People Power Party, for whom they voted. The ideological distance from Yoon Suk-yeol, whom they voted for, was 0.88, showing a difference from the 0.15 of the hardline conservatives.

Meanwhile, the centrist group (moderate conservatives) who voted for Yoon Suk-yeol perceive the ideological distance between the parties as even closer than the moderate conservatives. The ideological distance between Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung is 4.61, and between the People Power Party and the Democratic Party is 4.1. However, for the centrist group, the ideological distance from Yoon Suk-yeol is 1.93, and from the People Power Party is 1.82, indicating a considerable distance. This suggests that ideologically, there is a difference in stance from Yoon Suk-yeol or the People Power Party.

Interestingly, in all three sub-groups, the ideological positions of Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung are perceived as closer to the extremes than those of their respective parties. Both the People Power Party and the Democratic Party are perceived as having relatively more moderate stances than Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung. This suggests that the cause of political polarization is attributed to the two political leaders.

These characteristics are similarly confirmed among Lee Jae-myung voters. The average ideological value for the hardline progressive group is 1.09, placing them at a very extreme position. Considering that the average value for the hardline conservative group was 8.88, it can be seen that both hardline conservatives and hardline progressives are located at the extremes of the ideological axis. If individuals with such strong ideological stances lead, the political situation is bound to lead to extreme confrontation. Similar to the hardline conservative group, they also believe that Representative Lee Jae-myung's ideological position is at a very extreme point, but their own stance is even more extreme. Their perception of Representative Lee Jae-myung's ideological position is 1.39, placing him closest to them with an ideological distance of only 0.3. They believe that President Yoon Suk-yeol is located at a very extreme ideological position. Yoon Suk-yeol's average ideological value was 9.30. Just as hardline conservatives perceive Lee Jae-myung's position as 0.54, they also consider Yoon Suk-yeol's position to be extremely extreme. Their perception of the positions of the two political leaders places them at the extremes of the ideological spectrum, similar to the hardline conservative group. The distance between the People Power Party and the Democratic Party, as they perceive it, is 7.30, which is slightly closer than the ideological distance between Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung, but still considerable. As with the hardline conservative group, such perceptions make it difficult to expect compromise or consensus politics.

The moderate progressive group has an ideological position of 3.54. The average for the moderate conservative group is 6.44; based on the center point of 5, moderate conservatives are 1.44 to the right, and moderate progressives are 1.46 to the left. It can be seen that the average ideology of both moderate progressives and moderate conservatives leans towards the center. Similar to the moderate conservatives, the ideological distance perceived by moderate progressives between the parties is also relatively closer, with Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung at 6.12 and the People Power Party and the Democratic Party at 5.64. They also perceive their own ideological stance as more moderate than Lee Jae-myung or the Democratic Party, for whom they voted.

Meanwhile, the centrist group (moderate progressives) who voted for Lee Jae-myung perceive the ideological distance as even closer than the moderate progressives. The ideological distance between Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung is 3.98, and between the People Power Party and the Democratic Party is 3.91. However, the ideological distance from Lee Jae-myung has increased to 1.37, and from the Democratic Party to 1.24, compared to the previous two groups.

However, here too, it was perceived that the ideological positions of Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung are closer to the extremes than those of their respective parties. With the exception of the People Power Party in the case of the moderate progressive group (although the difference is only 0.06), in the other three cases, the People Power Party and the Democratic Party are perceived as having relatively more moderate stances than Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung. The perception that the political extremes are the two political leaders rather than the parties is also confirmed among Lee Jae-myung voters.

[Figure 4] and [Figure 5] clearly illustrate the characteristics of the polarized confrontation currently unfolding. The perspective on the political situation held by those with moderate or even moderate ideological stances, regardless of partisan support, is not difficult to characterize as extreme. In particular, for the centrist group, which constitutes 46.4% of the entire ideological distribution, the ideological evaluation converges towards the center, whether conservative or progressive. If their political attitudes and stances are followed, compromise or agreement between the two parties does not seem impossible. Ultimately, the current extreme confrontation and conflict can be attributed to the fact that hardline conservatives and hardline progressives, who hold more extreme positions than the centrist or moderate ideological groups, are leading the political debates and contentious issues. The proportion of hardline conservatives and hardline progressives is only 9.6% each, as shown in [Figure 3]. The fact that extreme positions, accounting for less than 20% of the total, are dominating the political landscape leads to intensified overall confrontation and conflict.

III. Political Issues and Characteristics of Ideological Sub-groups

From the discussion above, it is evident that even within the same category of supporting Yoon Suk-yeol or Lee Jae-myung, there are significant internal differences in how people view the political situation. The differences in perspective were particularly pronounced among the 'defensive' Yoon Suk-yeol supporters. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the attitudes of sub-groups with different ideological intensities within each party in the ongoing controversy surrounding martial law and impeachment.

[Table 4] summarizes the degree of agreement on the reasons for the martial law declaration, perceptions of 'election fraud' which has become a political controversy, and favorability toward the two political leaders, broken down by ideological sub-group. Among Yoon Suk-yeol voters, the analysis of variance for all items showed statistically significant differences. Regarding the two justifications for the martial law declaration, the degree of agreement decreased in the order of hardline conservative → moderate conservative → moderate conservative. Regarding the justification that martial law was for national security and order, there was a clear lack of agreement, and regarding the justification that it was due to the opposition party's non-cooperation, the average was below the median of 5.5. The same pattern was observed in perceptions of election fairness, and there was a significant difference in views compared to hardline conservatives regarding the 2022 general election, which has been a major controversy. Regarding favorability toward Yoon Suk-yeol, the average for hardline conservatives was 78.49, while that for moderate conservatives was 34.87. While moderate conservatives generally gave moderate evaluations, moderate conservatives gave low scores below 50. Regarding Lee Jae-myung, overall evaluations were very low, but the evaluation from moderate conservatives was relatively very high. The results in [Table 4] indicate that even among Yoon Suk-yeol voters, moderate conservatives show significant differences in political perceptions and judgments compared to hardline conservatives.

Meanwhile, for Lee Jae-myung voters, statistically significant differences were not observed in most items. Regardless of the ideological sub-group, trust in the fairness of elections was strongly evident, and favorability toward Yoon Suk-yeol was extremely low. An interesting point is the favorability toward Lee Jae-myung. While hardline progressives showed high favorability with 76.5 points, moderate progressives showed an average of 10 points lower at 66.27. And moderate progressives received a moderate evaluation with 51.79 points. Regarding the claim that martial law was declared due to the opposition party's non-cooperation, all three groups gave low scores, but moderate progressives showed a slightly higher degree of agreement. In the case of Lee Jae-myung voters, as indicated by the difference in favorability toward Lee Jae-myung, there were differences between hardline supporters and moderate supporters.

This time, we examined the differences in trust in major state institutions and favorability toward the two political parties based on the ideological intensity of sub-groups within the Yoon Suk-yeol voter and Lee Jae-myung voter groups, respectively. Trust in state institutions was examined because the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court, the National Election Commission, and the courts all played important roles during the martial law-impeachment political climate. The National Assembly initiated impeachment, the Constitutional Court is to rule on the impeachment, and the National Election Commission is the institution that President Yoon mobilized the military against amidst the 'election fraud' controversy. The courts are also a subject of political interest as they are handling Representative Lee Jae-myung's trial. For this purpose, a multinomial logistic analysis was conducted. The reference categories were the 'hardline conservative' and 'hardline progressive' groups. For the analysis, variables were selected and categorized into four groups. The first is the evaluation of Yoon Suk-yeol's emergency martial law incident. The second is trust in institutions, including the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court, the National Election Commission, and the courts. The third is favorability toward the two major parties. Finally, socioeconomic background variables such as age, education, assets, and income were included.

[Table 5] analyzes the differences in attitudes among the three ideological groups among Yoon Suk-yeol voters only. Compared to the reference category, 'hardline conservative,' moderate conservatives show differences in several variables. First, they had a higher negative evaluation of the martial law declaration. Also, among trust in state institutions, the National Election Commission, which is criticized by some conservative groups in relation to the 'election fraud' controversy, had relatively higher trust among moderate conservatives compared to hardline conservatives. Furthermore, favorability toward the People Power Party was lower than that of hardline conservatives, and negative sentiment toward the Democratic Party was also relatively lower. They were older and had higher education levels than hardline conservatives.

Meanwhile, for moderate conservatives, favorability toward the People Power Party was also lower compared to the hardline conservative group. The results in [Table 5] also show that moderate conservatives, who constitute 44.9% of Yoon Suk-yeol voters, hold different perceptions and judgments than hardline conservatives.

This time, the analysis was conducted in the same manner for Lee Jae-myung voters. The results are summarized in [Table 5]. Compared to hardline progressives, moderate progressives and moderate progressives showed relatively lower negative evaluations of the martial law declaration, which appears to be due to the extremely strong negative evaluation from hardline progressives. An interesting point for both moderate progressives and moderate progressives is that their favorability toward the Democratic Party is lower than that of hardline progressives.

In fact, there are not many issues during the martial law-impeachment phase that would cause significant disagreement within the progressive group. This is because they would generally agree that "the declaration of martial law was wrong and President Yoon Suk-yeol should be impeached." Nevertheless, the results in [Table 4] and [Table 6] confirm that there are notable differences in favorability toward Lee Jae-myung or the Democratic Party among the sub-ideological groups, which is noteworthy.

In conclusion, it is evident that there are very distinct differences in perspectives within the conservative group. 'Acknowledgement of the inevitability of martial law or opposition to impeachment' is merely the opinion of the hardline conservative segment within the conservative group, while moderate conservatives, and especially moderate conservatives, expressed clearly different stances. In the case of the progressive group, due to the nature of the issues, internal differences are less pronounced, but there are notable internal differences in favorability toward Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party.

IV. The “Silent” Center?

Even when broadly categorized as conservative or progressive, it has been confirmed that there are different perceptions and judgments about the current political situation depending on the ideological sub-group. However, it is generally the strong and extreme claims that lead political debates. So, why are the views and voices of the center not properly heard? Are they relatively passive in political participation or expressing their opinions?

To confirm these characteristics, we examined political efficacy and the level of engagement in political participation. Political efficacy is often explained in two dimensions: internal efficacy and external efficacy. Internal efficacy is "the subjective perception that one possesses the necessary resources and capabilities to influence political decision-making processes," and external efficacy is "an individual's attitude toward how well the government or political authorities listen to and respond to citizens' demands." If internal political efficacy is high, the likelihood of participating in political activities is high.

[Table 7] summarizes the analysis of internal efficacy by ideological sub-group. Regarding the statement "People like me cannot influence what the government does," relatively low efficacy was confirmed among moderate conservatives and moderate conservatives. Furthermore, regarding the item "I am well aware of what the important political issues in our society are," both moderate conservatives and moderate progressives showed the lowest efficacy. Ultimately, it can be said that the centrist group shows relatively low efficacy in relation to internal political efficacy, and particularly low efficacy was confirmed among moderate conservatives.

Low political efficacy is likely to lead to low political participation. In this regard, we analyzed the differences in participation in impeachment rallies, opposition rallies, and interest in political issues by ideological sub-group. As shown in [Table 8], in participation in rallies urging the impeachment of Yoon Suk-yeol, the average for moderate progressives was the lowest among the progressive groups, and in participation in rallies opposing the impeachment of Yoon Suk-yeol, the average for moderate conservatives was the lowest. Furthermore, in interest in political issues, the lowest values were confirmed among the centrist group, regardless of whether they were conservative or progressive. In other words, the centrist group has relatively low interest in politics and is relatively passive in political participation. Compared to other ideological groups, the centrist ideological group is relatively "quiet." It is precisely for this reason that their voices or opinions are not effectively reflected in political discussions, leading political debates to extremes or hardline stances.

V. Conclusion

This article began with skepticism about whether the strong and extreme claims emerging during the martial law-impeachment political climate actually reflect the polarized reality of our society. In other words, we questioned whether society is divided into two camps and whether everyone is bound by the logic of those camps, leading to the confrontation of strong claims and opinions.

To resolve these questions, we divided the conservative and progressive ideological groups into three sub-groups: centrist, moderate, and hardline, and examined the differences in political and ideological characteristics of each sub-group. The analysis confirmed that within the groups broadly categorized as conservative or progressive, there exist considerably differentiated views. In particular, within the conservative group, there was a substantial segment of moderate conservative voters whose views, perceptions, and evaluations were clearly different from those of hardline conservatives, and moderate conservatives also differed from hardline conservatives in various aspects. In the progressive group, due to the nature of the issues, internal differences were not as significant as in the conservative group, but differences were observed in favorability toward Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party among the sub-groups.

Although these different voices and opinions exist, and their proportion is even larger, the reason why extreme and hardline claims, rather than their moderate and rational arguments or opinions, dominate political discussions and debates is that, especially for the centrist group, internal efficacy is relatively weak, and interest in politics and political participation are low. Consequently, the claims of the "few but politically active" hardliners lead political discussions.

The recent incomprehensible public opinion poll results also appear to stem from "differences in participation." Instead of the passive centrist or moderate groups who refuse to participate, the views of the active hardliners are oversampled, leading to results that differ from the actual trend of public opinion. This results in a distortion of political decision-making by a minority.

Political discourse and processes dominated by extreme and hardline voices cannot be considered healthy democracy. It appears that the structure of political communication needs to be reformed to ensure that the voices of the silent, moderate, and rational majority can be properly reflected in the political discussion process.■

■ Kang Won-taekDirector, Institute for National Future Strategy, Seoul National University; Director, EAI Center for Democracy.

■ Responsible for and Edited by:Chae-rin Song, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr