[Trump's Return and American Series] V. Foreign Policy Prospects of the Second Trump Administration: Focusing on the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Elite

I. Implications of Trump's Re-election in 2024 and U.S. Foreign Policy

Throughout 2024, foreign policy experts focused on forecasting the outcomes and ripple effects of the U.S. presidential election, treating U.S. domestic politics as the primary variable and the international security environment as a constant. Contrary to the predictions of polling organizations, the election concluded with a clear victory for candidate Donald J. Trump, and experts are striving to understand this phenomenon. While the actions of various heads of state congratulating President-elect Trump and seeking common ground are notable, the dynamism of international politics is being highlighted, as seen in the sudden surge of rebel forces resisting the Assad regime in Syria.

The Republican president's victory in the 2024 election, rallied around the "Make America Great Again" (MAGA) movement, represented a triumph for anti-establishment promises and a victory for a closed agenda that rejected the opening of the U.S. market and unnecessary overseas projection of national power. While the candidate's attributes, the parties' campaign strategies, and demographic shifts in the support base were important, structural factors unfavorable to the incumbent played a significant role. This was part of a global trend of incumbents being replaced, amplified by inflation that spread after the pandemic. The author has argued for the need to re-examine the tradition of conservative nationalism within the Republican Party if Trump were to win the election (Kwon Bo-ram 2024). Specifically, the combination of nationalism, prioritizing U.S. national interests, and internationalism, which emphasizes foreign intervention as part of providing global public goods, will influence the direction and concrete outcomes of U.S. foreign policy. The second Trump administration will launch with the Republican Party controlling the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, thus securing institutional leverage for presidential policy initiatives. The Republican leadership mobilizes its base through anti-elitism and economic populism, and by appointing loyalists from the federal government down to state and local levels, thereby weakening any forces that could check the president. Furthermore, Trump's re-election has solidified the MAGA supporters as a mainstream force within the Republican Party, leading to a situation where movement politics, driven by external forces, dominates party politics (Son Byung-kwon 2024). The foreign policy of the first Trump administration aimed to dismantle the existing liberal international order, showing a strong tendency to reject international norms and institutions and to reshape free trade and alliance systems. With the preemptive assertion of the MAGA agenda, coupled with enhanced policy momentum, the likelihood of an interest-based America First policy, rather than one based on shared values, being projected in the second Trump administration has increased.

Based on this assessment, this paper forecasts the foreign policy of the second Trump administration by examining the foreign policy decision-making elite at the level of organizations, including the Republican Party, and national leadership, in addition to the individual variable of President Trump. Focusing on the Russia-Ukraine war, a high-priority international security issue facing the United States, it explores how the foreign policy decision-making elite might operate and derives implications for allies.

II. Composition of the U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making Elite

1. The Individual

Donald Trump, nominated for president by the Republican Party for three consecutive terms, is now a familiar figure to the public. If there is one difference in his 2024 campaign compared to 2016, it is his expressed willingness to respond to newly emerged international crises. Trump has repeatedly criticized the unnecessary loss of life caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, which began in February 2022, and has expressed his determination to achieve a peace settlement that aligns with U.S. national interests (Knickmeyer 2024).[1]He argued that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 exposed the vulnerability of the Biden administration, leading to a failure to deter Russia and causing instability in international security (Rashid 2024).[2]Furthermore, while Trump evaluated Putin's use of force as ingenious and effective, he emphasized that deterrence against Russia was effective during his term because the U.S. was respected (Dress 2022; Griffiths and Haltiwanger 2022),[3]and raised concerns about the strengthening of great power alliances and the nuclear arms race, which were exacerbated by the Biden administration's failure to deter. First, Trump warned that the alliance between Russia and China has strengthened over the past three and a half years, and with the addition of Iran and North Korea, they have reached a stage where they no longer need the assistance of other powers (Bloomberg July/16/2024).[4]He highlighted the destructive power of nuclear weapons and criticized the Biden administration's deterrence failure, pointing out that the use of nuclear weapons has become normalized through casual discussion, while the U.S.'s nuclear capabilities have not been adequately demonstrated (Trump 2024b).[5]Against this backdrop, Trump has consistently shown a negative attitude towards foreign intervention (restraint), particularly direct military intervention by U.S. forces. This is consistent with his history of publicly criticizing the Bush administration's Iraq War in 2003 and opposing the construction of democratic states abroad.

He also expressed his stance on aid to Ukraine and the method of punishing Russia. He criticized NATO's response and lack of support, arguing that the U.S. is excessively involved in international conflicts of low priority, wasting national resources (Trump 2024a).[6]He was also skeptical about the effectiveness of economic sanctions aimed at punishing Russia, emphasizing that proactive prevention through strong deterrence is more important than reactive measures.[7]He also claimed that Ukraine was able to mount an effective defense thanks to the weapons support he approved during his first term.[8]Trump emphasized peaceful resolution through negotiation, vowing to achieve a peace agreement within 24 hours through direct communication with Presidents Putin and Zelenskyy (Forest 2023).[9]During a presidential debate, when asked by the moderator how he would resolve the Russia-Ukraine war within a day, Trump responded that he would succeed in negotiations before his presidential term even began, based on his good relationship and respect for the two leaders (Schatz 2024).[10]While it is difficult to take politicians' election rhetoric at face value, Trump's aversion to bearing unnecessary costs or becoming entangled in war, coupled with the reduced burden of re-election, may fuel a strong desire to achieve accomplishments as a peacemaker rather than pursuing foreign policy adventures. In other words, he may delegate the management of domestic MAGA agendas, such as immigration and the economy, to loyalist officials and focus on creating foreign policy achievements through summit diplomacy.

2. The State

The goals of U.S. national strategy, namely national security strategy and defense strategy, which have been maintained with continuity by the U.S. leadership, have converged on containing China as the power gap between the U.S. and China narrowed faster than anticipated in the post-Cold War era. In particular, since the first Trump administration, China has been recognized as the primary military and economic threat to the U.S., and after a long period of discourse, the trajectory of U.S. grand strategy has been set towards contraction rather than expansion. During his term, Trump advocated for America First, demonstrating a will and behavior to reshape the U.S.-led liberal international order and weaken internationalism, multilateralism, and free trade. Nevertheless, the fundamental elements of the primacy-seeking grand strategy—military hegemony, security guarantees for allies, integration into international institutions and markets, and nuclear non-proliferation—were maintained. This can be attributed to the inertia of the U.S. leadership and the effective checks placed on the president by the establishment that dominates U.S. foreign policy decision-making (Porter 2018).

The international security environment facing the U.S. from 2025 onwards has the potential to alter the existing primacy-seeking strategy, in addition to domestic political conditions and the president's leadership capacity. Although the U.S. war on terror, which has lasted for over 20 years, has officially ended, various regional conflicts, including those in the Middle East, are still ongoing. The Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas war continue, significantly weakening the rules-based international order. With the return of geopolitics following the COVID-19 pandemic, China and Russia have grown closer, and competition among great powers to form alternative orders has intensified, leading the non-aligned Global South to gain political influence. Furthermore, as China's nuclear capabilities expand rapidly, the U.S. faces the burden of deterring multiple nuclear-armed great powers simultaneously. Meanwhile, in the Indo-Pacific region, the shift in the balance of power between the U.S. and China is moderating due to China's slowing economic growth, while the strategic competition between the two countries is intensifying. The U.S.-led grid-like alliance network is confronting China-led economic and security structures (Global Security Initiative: GSI, Global Development Initiative: GDI), forming a confrontation structure around the Korean Peninsula: U.S.-Japan-South Korea versus Russia-China-North Korea. Amidst these growing challenges to U.S. global leadership, domestic fiscal deficits are increasing, and political polarization is deepening, making democratic governance difficult.

The foreign policy orientation of the second Trump administration, stemming from this background, can be summarized as America First 2.0, securing primacy over China, and Peace through Strength, which is linked to the U.S. global alliance strategy. First, the 2024 Republican Party platform defines U.S. national interests as beginning with "the defense of the homeland, the people and the border, the Great American flag, and the God-given rights," and declares that U.S. foreign policy is conducted to protect the most essential U.S. national interests. The characteristic of America First 2.0 in the second Trump administration is the explicit statement that "we will act independently at times, according to our national interests" (Fleitz 2024).

China is the only competitor capable of challenging U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific and globally, and must be deterred. The U.S. is emphasizing the military threat posed by China, particularly the strengthening of its anti-access/area denial capabilities against Taiwan, thereby prioritizing resilience over economic efficiency under the guise of national security logic, and building a strategic foundation to win future long-term competition even at the cost of short-term gains. Furthermore, the U.S. is emphasizing the role and responsibilities of its allies to achieve these goals, and consequently, pressure such as de-coupling from China, which requires bearing current costs for uncertain future benefits, is expected to intensify for allies. In terms of military security, the U.S. is pursuing the integration of military and defense resources within the Indo-Pacific alliance to win strategic competition, pursuing military buildup, nuclear force expansion and modernization, and even attempting industrial resource integration, dedicating all efforts to enhancing the defense industry base through alliance cooperation (CSIS 2024). These changes indicate that the strategy of utilizing alliances is evolving through increased U.S. alliance roles, maximized utilization of alliance resources, and a division of nuclear-conventional security support with allies to reduce costs. In particular, while U.S. security support based on allied nuclear deterrence will continue, demands for allies to contribute more to conventional military security are expected to intensify (The Heritage Foundation 2023).[11]

The 2024 Republican Party platform also declares the development of the U.S. military into the world's most powerful and modernized, lethal force, emphasizing investment in advanced science and technology. The U.S. is particularly increasing its vigilance and developing various prescriptions for the possibility of simultaneous and strategic conflicts in more than two theaters (RAND Corporation, 2024). For example, the report "21st Century Peace Through Strength: A Generational Investment in the U.S. Military," led by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Roger Wicker, makes unprecedented recommendations, including a 5% increase in the U.S. defense budget and expansion of nuclear forces.

3. Organizations

Within the foreign policy decision-making elite, organizations, particularly political parties, play a role in coordinating and mobilizing their support bases through party platforms while pursuing power acquisition and majority status. Since Trump's initial nomination as an outsider in 2016 and his subsequent election as president, the Republican Party has transformed from a traditional conservative party into "Trump's party," partly constructed through his strategy of inciting and mobilizing the existing conservative base based on internal party control and personalization (Kim Yu-jin, Kang In-sun 2024). Although his position within the party weakened after failing to win re-election in 2020 and the Democratic Party's strong performance in the 2022 midterm elections, Trump passed through the primaries without significant difficulty this year and secured re-election. His victory has further consolidated the Republican Party around its ideological supporters who embrace MAGA, and individuals with MAGA leanings are being appointed to key positions within the party, Congress, and the federal government.

Although the MAGA faction appears to have become the mainstream of the Republican Party, various factions still coexist within the party, presenting distinct visions or policy preferences and prescriptions on major foreign policy issues. Conservative nationalists are generally cautious about deep engagement to preserve the American way of life and society, but a spectrum of foreign policy motivations can be observed, ranging from active interventionism to passive non-interventionism (Dueck 2019). On one end are the traditional Republican factions with a conservative interventionist inclination, who are willing to bear the burden of providing global public goods and actively engage in foreign affairs. On the other end are the conservative non-interventionist factions, who seek to reduce costs and avoid entanglement in international conflicts (Dueck 2019).[12]And in between are the conservative hard-liners who advocate for U.S. unilateralism, excluding international norms, and who, while generally non-interventionist, retaliate with overwhelming force when U.S. interests are threatened. Trump belongs to this group, and because he possesses elements of both interventionism and non-interventionism, it is ultimately difficult to predict which conservative grand strategy and foreign policy he will pursue.

4. Conclusion

Examining the U.S. foreign policy decision-making elite at the individual, state, and organizational levels reveals the coexistence of actors with disparate motivations. While the direction of foreign policy under the U.S. grand strategy may be determined, the content and intensity of its implementation can be adjusted by the agency of actors within the organization. As Trump believes he has received strong authority from the people by winning a majority of both the popular vote and the Electoral College in the 2024 election, he is expected to project America First foreign policy more overtly. Trump is likely to pursue foreign policy initiatives unilaterally, bypassing Congress, and will show a high reliance on executive orders rather than legislation. If MAGA loyalists surround a president with immense foreign policy decision-making authority, the trend of American exceptionalism could weaken, leading to decisive changes in U.S. power and influence. However, considering the practical response capabilities of cabinet members, the procedures of Congress and the bureaucracy, and the influence of the national security expert community, an approach that views the final U.S. foreign policy product as emerging from the interactions among various actors within the foreign policy decision-making elite is necessary.

Moving forward, the persistence of MAGA forces within the organization will be crucial. Trump, who operates on pragmatism rather than ideology, does not align perfectly with the identity of the MAGA forces. For instance, a significant portion of Trump's supporters are reported to not fundamentally trust his words (McCreesh 2024). Among those who supported Trump in this year's election, particularly the youth (18-29 years old) who constitute more than half of his support compared to 2020, about half did not agree with the MAGA agenda on issues such as immigration, climate change, and small government (Thomson-Deveaux 2024). Moreover, the core of the current MAGA movement is Trump himself, with no clear successor. (Siders 2024). This suggests that the cohesion of supporters gathered under the MAGA banner to win the election may weaken during the second Trump administration. The given four-year presidential term is an uncertain amount of time to actually implement and evaluate policies. The expectations and patience of voters who chose him following the zeitgeist of change, rather than the substance or effectiveness of Trump's policies, are also important variables, as is Trump himself, who prioritizes personal gain over national or organizational interests. The evolution and fusion of populism and dynamism, represented by J.D. Vance and Elon Musk respectively, will have a significant impact on the future of the U.S. Republican Party (Douthat 2024).

III. Application to the Russia-Ukraine War Case

From the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 through the 2024 election period, Trump's statements regarding the conflict have consistently centered on the criticism that the Biden administration is excessively involved in a European war unrelated to U.S. national interests. Given the convergence of motivations among individuals and organizations within the U.S. foreign policy decision-making elite seeking to reduce costs and avoid entanglement, and the state's motivation to secure primacy over China, a peace settlement appears inevitable. Both the Ukrainian people and the American public are weary of the war. According to Gallup polls conducted in August-October, 52% of Ukrainian respondents desired a swift end to the war, and among those supporting a peace settlement, 52% indicated a willingness to cede some territory (Vigers 2024). A November Pew Research Center survey asking Americans about their views on aid to Ukraine revealed partisan divides. While 42% of Republican supporters believed the U.S. was providing excessive aid to Ukraine, only 13% of Democratic supporters agreed. Among Republican supporters, only 36% felt it was America's responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself, significantly lower than the 65% of Democratic supporters. Furthermore, 42% of Democratic supporters viewed Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a major threat to U.S. national interests, compared to only 19% of Republican supporters (Copeland 2024).

The peace proposal for the Russia-Ukraine war, to be offered by the U.S. to the parties involved, will be designed by Ukraine Special Envoy Keith Kellogg and approved by the president. President-elect Trump has contacted the leaders of both countries immediately after the election and has already met with President Zelenskyy in person. Given the diverse views within the Republican Party regarding the Russia-Ukraine war, the actual solution will likely be subject to coordination. Special Envoy Kellogg plans to pursue negotiations by using the threat of expanded lethal aid to Ukraine and delaying Ukraine's NATO membership as leverage against Russia, and the possibility of reduced or suspended weapons aid as leverage against Ukraine. He believes that Ukraine does not need to abandon its territorial claims but must commit to using only diplomatic means, even if it takes time. He argues for partial easing of sanctions against Russia and Russian financial support for Ukraine's reconstruction, advocating for a "comprehensive, verifiable, and security-guaranteeing agreement" (Kellogg and Fleitz 2024). Trump believes he can play a decisive role in ending the Russia-Ukraine war, driven by his strong desire to achieve accomplishments as a peacemaker. However, Trump's personal will to end the war does not automatically guarantee cooperation from the parties to the conflict, stakeholders, and the battlefield situation. While the potential for improving U.S.-Russia relations exists as a result of ending the Russia-Ukraine war amidst intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition, if Putin makes excessive demands during preliminary negotiations, Trump may not accept them, and the war could last longer than anticipated.

Meanwhile, various perspectives exist within the Republican Party regarding support for the Russia-Ukraine war and the method of ending it. Those with conservative interventionist leanings criticize the negative impact of Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine on the liberal international order and sovereignty, and argue for continued support to Ukraine in line with U.S. strategic interests. For example, Kori Schake, who served in the National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department during the George W. Bush administration, criticizes that while diplomacy backed by military force can deter war, the Biden administration not only inadequately responded to warnings from U.S. intelligence agencies to Ukraine and NATO allies about an imminent Russian attack prior to the invasion but also failed to adequately explain why defending Ukraine was strategically important. Schake 2022). She argues that through the Russia-Ukraine war, the U.S. secured strategic interests by investing less than 5% of its defense spending in 2023 and without sacrificing a single U.S. soldier. The war has depleted Russian forces, weakened China's international standing for condoning Russia's illegal actions, thereby creating a more favorable environment for the U.S., and has strengthened the U.S. position by inducing voluntary participation from European and Asian allies in supporting Ukraine (Schake and Tavares 2023). While reducing federal spending is an important goal for Republicans, she also argues for increased aid to Ukraine, given that 60% of U.S. aid funds are returned to U.S. defense industry companies (Schake 2023).

Mike Pompeo, former Secretary of State, urged a transition from limited arms support to active arms support by the current administration and advocated for strong economic sanctions against Russia. He emphasized the need to focus on China rather than Europe and to increase NATO's defense spending burden-sharing to 3% to enhance Europe's own defense capabilities (Urban and Pomepo 2024). Congressional members who voted in favor of the Ukraine aid bill in April 2024, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, and others (22 in the Senate, 101 in the House), can also be considered to have conservative interventionist leanings.

There are also individuals within the Republican Party who advocate for selective interventionism focused on Asia. Elbridge Colby, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri emphasize that containing China is the top priority, thus advocating for limiting aid to Ukraine and stockpiling U.S. military power and resources in the Indo-Pacific region to prepare for a Taiwan contingency. Meanwhile, Jakub Grygiel, a former NSC advisor, argues that to effectively contain China and achieve true Asian primacy, it is necessary to expand lethal arms support to Europe and strengthen active deterrence (Grygiel 2024).

Finally, individuals with conservative hard-liner leanings advocate for limiting support to Ukraine based on the principle of homeland defense and prioritizing domestic issues. They argue that U.S. disengagement from Europe and focus on the Indo-Pacific region are impossible without ending the Russia-Ukraine war, and therefore urge a swift peace settlement through negotiation and strengthening the defense capabilities and expanding the role of NATO allies for Ukraine's security. Vance, for example, argues against prioritizing the Ukraine issue for the U.S., advocating for a reduction in U.S. security commitments to Europe and a focus on Asia. He draws a line, suggesting that support should be limited to helping Ukraine resolve its own issues, rather than outright refusal. Vance has proposed a peace plan based on establishing a demilitarized zone along the current Russia-Ukraine territorial lines, guaranteeing Ukraine's independence and neutrality, and maintaining some form of long-term U.S. support (Ferguson 2024). This plan involves not allowing Ukraine to regain lost territory or join NATO, but maintaining a certain level of long-term U.S. support for the demilitarized zone.

With Trump's re-election, foreign policy aligned with the MAGA-based conservative hard-liner faction is expected to become dominant. If Trump does not request aid for Ukraine from Congress in 2025, support will naturally cease. In such a scenario, traditional Republican factions remaining in the House and Senate, namely conservative interventionists, may still participate in bipartisan efforts to prevent the cessation of aid to Ukraine through institutional and procedural means, based on their convictions and the characteristics of their constituencies. It is important to understand the process by which final policy decisions are made through the operation of foreign policy decision-making elites at the individual, state, and organizational levels, and to strive to narrow the scope of uncertainty.

IV. Conclusion

The uncertainty and predictable direction of the second Trump administration's foreign policy pose a significant burden not only to adversaries but also to allies. While Trump himself holds negative views on alliances, conservative nationalists within the Republican Party are fundamentally skeptical of alliances and recognize the need to prevent security freeloading and avoid entanglement for the sake of national interest (Priebe et al. 2024, 154-155). It is unclear which foreign policy issues the Trump administration will prioritize, but it is highly likely that it will begin by attempting to resolve the Russia-Ukraine war, where the motivations at the individual, state, and organizational levels converge. Although this war is geographically distant from Korea, it is linked to the stability of the Korean Peninsula in geopolitical and geo-economic terms. Given that Russia and North Korea have formed a military alliance and North Korean troops have been deployed to the Kursk region of Russia, the priority of negotiations with North Korea is likely to increase. As Trump has recently begun to mention the necessity of China's contribution to ending the Russia-Ukraine war, this issue, linking Europe and Asia, may become multilateralized, making management and response more complex and difficult. Furthermore, the U.S.'s grand plan to concentrate military, diplomatic, and economic assets in the Indo-Pacific region to counter China may again face setbacks. Trump's decision-making approach, based on pragmatism and negotiation rather than ideology, offers allies an opportunity to persuade the U.S., thus requiring careful yet creative preparation. ■

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[1] “I want the war to stop. I want to save lives. I think it’s the U.S. best interest to get this war finished and just get it done.”

[2] “When Putin saw [the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan], he said, ‘You know what? I think we’re gonna go in [to Ukraine] and maybe take my …’ This was his dream. I talked to him about it. His dream.”

[3] “I said, ‘How smart is that?’ He’s going to go in and be a peacekeeper. That’s the strongest peace force. We could use that on our southern border. That’s the strongest peace force I’ve ever seen. There were more army tanks than I’ve ever seen. They’re going to keep peace, all right.”; “If properly handled, there was absolutely no reason that the situation currently happening in Ukraine should have happened at all. I know Vladimir Putin very well, and he would never have done during the Trump Administration what he is doing now, no way!”

[4] “This is a different world than it was three and a half years ago,” “The worst thing that happened is we’ve allowed, because Biden is a stupid person, he’s forced Russia and China to get married. They’re married. Then they took in their little cousin, Iran, and then they took in North Korea. They don’t need anybody else.”

[5] “Russia has today threatened to use Nuclear Weapons, and we have Low IQ individuals, the same that messed up Afghanistan (who don’t have a clue!), in charge of this deadly situation. NO GOOD — NOT ACCEPTABLE.”

[6] “Why isn’t Europe giving more money to help Ukraine? Why is it that the United States is over $100 Billion Dollars into the Ukraine War more than Europe, and we have an Ocean between us as separation! Why can’t Europe equalize or match the money put in by the United States of America in order to help a Country in desperate need? As everyone agrees, Ukrainian Survival and Strength should be much more important to Europe than to us, but it is also important to us! GET MOVING EUROPE!”

[7] “What we’re doing with sanctions is we’re forcing everyone away from us. So I don’t love sanctions… I found them very useful with Iran, but I didn’t even need sanctions with Iran so much. I told China that, and Russia is in a similar position.”

[8] Russia has gotten in deeper than they ever thought possible [in Ukraine, because of] the weapons that I gave and that the Ukrainians used so well.”

[9] “If I’m president, I’ll have that war settled in one day, 24 hours. I’ll meet with Putin, meet with Zelenskyy… and within 24 hours, that war will be settled.”

[10] “I know Zelenskyy very well and I know Putin very well. I have a good relationship. And they respect your president. OK? They respect me. They don’t respect Biden. How would you respect him? Why? For what reason? He hasn’t even made a phone call in two years to Putin.” “I will get it settled before I even become president. If I win, when I’m president-elect, and what I’ll do is I’ll speak to one, I’ll speak to the other, I’ll get them together.”

[11] “Conventional forces: Strengthen denial deterrence against China. Prepare U.S. conventional force plans with China’s invasion of Taiwan as the top priority, and allocate resources accordingly for potential simultaneous wars. Allies must expand their responsibilities and roles in conventional defense, and prepare for threats from Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Specifically, empower South Korea to lead conventional defense against North Korea.” Project 2025, Chapter 4, Department of Defense (Christopher Miller)

[12] “the basic hardline instinct is to maintain very strong defenses, punish severely any direct threat to U.S. citizens, refuse international accommodations, and otherwise remain detached from multilateral commitments.” Dueck 2019, 33.

■ Kwon BoramSenior Researcher, Security Strategy Research Center, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

■ Contact and Editing:Lee Soyoung, EAI Research Assistant

    Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | sylee@eai.or.kr