[Trump's Return and the American Series] ⑤ Prospects for the Trump Second Administration's Foreign Policy: Focusing on the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Elite

I. The Meaning of Trump's Re-election in 2024 and U.S. Foreign Policy

Throughout 2024, foreign policy experts focused on projecting the outcomes and ripple effects of the U.S. presidential election, treating domestic U.S. politics as the primary variable and the international security environment as a constant. Contrary to the predictions of polling agencies, the election concluded with a clear victory for candidate Donald J. Trump, and experts are striving to understand this phenomenon. While the actions of various heads of state congratulating President-elect Trump and seeking to align with him are notable, the dynamics of international politics are being highlighted, such as the rebel forces resisting the Assad regime in Syria suddenly gaining the upper hand.

The victory of a Republican president, rallying around the "Make America Great Again" (MAGA) movement, in the 2024 presidential election was a victory for anti-establishment promises and a victory for a closed agenda that rejects the opening of the U.S. market and the overseas projection of unnecessary national power. While the candidate's attributes, the parties' election campaigns, and demographic shifts in the support base were important, structural factors unfavorable to incumbents played a significant role, which was part of a global trend of incumbents being replaced due to the inflation that spread after the pandemic. The author has argued that if Trump wins the election, there will be a need to re-examine the tradition of conservative nationalism within the Republican Party (Kwon Bo-ram 2024). Specifically, the combination of nationalism, which prioritizes U.S. national interests, and internationalism, which emphasizes foreign intervention from the perspective of providing global public goods, will influence the direction and concrete outcomes of U.S. foreign policy. The Trump second administration will have institutional backing for presidential-led policy implementation because the Republican Party controls the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The Republican leadership mobilizes its base through anti-elitism and economic populism, and by appointing loyalists from the federal government down to state and local governments, there are few forces that can check the president. Furthermore, Trump's re-election has solidified the MAGA supporters as a mainstream force within the Republican Party, leading to a situation where movement politics dominate party politics by external forces (Son Byung-kwon 2024). The foreign policy of the Trump first administration aimed to dismantle the existing liberal international order, showing a strong tendency to reject international norms and institutions and to reshape free trade and alliance systems. With the MAGA agenda poised to secure policy momentum, the possibility of an interest-based "America First" policy, rather than one based on shared values, being projected in the Trump second administration's foreign policy has increased.

Based on this assessment, this paper projects the foreign policy of the Trump second administration by examining the foreign policy decision-making elite not only at the individual level of President Trump but also at the level of organizations, including the Republican Party, and national leadership. Focusing on the Russia-Ukraine war, a high-priority international security issue facing the United States, we will examine how the foreign policy decision-making elite may operate and derive implications for allied nations.

II. Composition of the U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making Elite

1. Individual

Donald Trump, nominated for president three consecutive times by the Republican Party, is now a familiar figure to the public. If there is one difference in his 2024 campaign compared to 2016, it is his expressed willingness to respond to newly arising international crises. Trump has repeatedly criticized the unnecessary loss of life caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, which began in February 2022, and has expressed his determination to achieve a peace settlement that aligns with U.S. national interests (Knickmeyer 2024).[1] He argued that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2021 exposed the vulnerability of the Biden (Joe Biden) administration, leading to a failure to deter Russia and causing instability in international security (Rashid 2024).[2] Furthermore, Trump evaluated Putin's (Vladimir Putin) use of force as ingenious and effective, while emphasizing that deterrence against Russia was effective during his term because the U.S. was respected (Dress 2022; Griffiths and Haltiwanger 2022),[3] and raised concerns about the strengthening of alliances between great powers and the nuclear arms race, which were exacerbated by the Biden administration's failure to deter (Bloomberg July/16/2024).[4] He warned that the alliance between Russia and China had strengthened over the past three and a half years, and with the addition of Iran and North Korea, they had reached a stage where they no longer needed the help of other powers. He also criticized the Biden administration's deterrence failure, pointing out that the use of nuclear weapons had become normalized, with discussions of nuclear use becoming commonplace, and that the U.S.'s nuclear strike capability had not been adequately demonstrated (Trump 2024b).[5] Against this backdrop, Trump has consistently shown a negative attitude towards foreign intervention, particularly direct military involvement by U.S. forces. This is consistent with his history of publicly criticizing the Bush administration's Iraq War in 2003 and opposing the construction of democratic states abroad.

He also expressed his views on how to support Ukraine and punish Russia. He criticized NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) for its response and lack of support, arguing that the U.S. was wasting national resources by excessively intervening in international conflicts of low priority (Trump 2024a).[6] He was also skeptical about the effectiveness of economic sanctions in punishing Russia and emphasized that proactive deterrence is more important than reactive measures.[7] He also claimed that the arms support provided to Ukraine during his first term enabled Ukraine to mount an effective defense.[8] Trump emphasized a peaceful resolution through negotiations and pledged to achieve a peace agreement within 24 hours by directly communicating with President Putin and President Zelenskyy (Volodymyr Zelenskyy) (Forest 2023).[9] When asked by the moderator during a presidential debate how he would resolve the Russia-Ukraine war within a day, Trump responded that he would successfully conclude negotiations before his presidential term even began, based on his good relationship and respect for both leaders (Schatz 2024).[10] While it is difficult to take politicians' election rhetoric at face value, Trump's refusal to bear unnecessary costs or become involved in wars, coupled with the reduced burden of re-election, may lead to a strong desire to achieve accomplishments as a peacemaker rather than pursue foreign policy adventures. In other words, he may delegate the management of domestic MAGA agendas, such as immigration and the economy, to loyal bureaucrats and focus on creating foreign policy achievements through summit diplomacy.

2. State

The goals of U.S. national strategy, such as national security strategy and defense strategy, which have been maintained with continuity by the U.S. leadership, have converged on containing China as the power gap between the U.S. and China narrowed faster than expected after the Cold War. In particular, since the Trump administration's first term, China has been perceived as the primary military and economic threat to the U.S., and after a long period of discourse competition, the trajectory of U.S. grand strategy has been set towards contraction rather than expansion. During his term, Trump advocated for "America First," showing a willingness and behavior to reshape the U.S.-led liberal international order and weaken internationalism, multilateralism, and free trade. Nevertheless, the core elements of the grand strategy of seeking primacy—military hegemony, security guarantees for allies, integration into international institutions and markets, and nuclear non-proliferation—were maintained. This can be attributed to the inertia of the U.S. leadership and the effective checks placed on the president by the establishment that leads U.S. foreign policy decision-making (Porter 2018).

The international security environment facing the U.S. after 2025 may lead to changes in the existing primacy-seeking strategy, in addition to domestic political conditions and the president's leadership capabilities. Although the U.S. war on terror, which has lasted for over 20 years, has officially ended, regional conflicts, including those in the Middle East, are still ongoing. The Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas war continue, significantly weakening the rules-based international order. With the return of geopolitics after the COVID-19 pandemic, China and Russia have grown closer, and competition between great powers to form an alternative order has intensified, leading the non-aligned Global South to gain political leverage. Furthermore, as China's nuclear capabilities accelerate, the U.S. faces the burden of deterring multiple nuclear-armed great powers simultaneously. Meanwhile, in the Indo-Pacific region, as China's economic growth slows, the trend of power balance shifts between the U.S. and China is moderating, while the U.S.-China strategic competition is intensifying. The U.S.-led grid-like alliance network confronts China-led economic and security structures (Global Security Initiative: GSI, Global Development Initiative: GDI), forming a confrontation structure around the Korean Peninsula involving South Korea-U.S.-Japan versus Russia-China-North Korea. Amidst these growing challenges to U.S. global leadership, there is a heightened sense of crisis domestically due to increasing fiscal deficits, and democratic governance is difficult due to deepening political polarization.

The foreign policy direction of the Trump second administration, stemming from this background, can be summarized as "America First 2.0," securing primacy over China, and "Peace through Strength," which is linked to the U.S. global alliance strategy. First, the 2024 Republican Party platform defines U.S. national interests as beginning with "the defense of the homeland, the people and borders, the great American flag, and the protection of God-given rights," and declares that U.S. foreign policy is conducted to protect the most essential U.S. national interests. The characteristic of "America First 2.0" is the explicit statement that "the U.S. acts independently at times according to its national interests" (Fleitz 2024).

China is the only competitor that can challenge U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific region and globally, and must be deterred. The U.S. is emphasizing the military threat from China, particularly strengthening its anti-access/area denial capabilities towards Taiwan, thereby sacrificing short-term gains for long-term competitive victory by prioritizing resilience over economic efficiency under the guise of national security logic. Furthermore, the U.S. is emphasizing the role and responsibilities of its allies to achieve these goals, and consequently, pressure such as de-coupling from China, which forces allies to bear current costs for uncertain future gains, is expected to intensify. In terms of military security, the U.S. is pursuing the integration of military and defense resources within the Indo-Pacific alliances to win strategic competition, pursuing military buildup, nuclear force expansion and modernization, and even attempting to integrate industrial resources, thereby dedicating all efforts to enhancing the defense industry base based on alliance cooperation (CSIS 2024). These changes indicate that the strategy of utilizing alliances is evolving in ways such as expanding the role of U.S. alliances, maximizing the utilization of alliance resources, and dividing nuclear and conventional security support between allies to reduce costs. In particular, while U.S. security support based on nuclear deterrence for allies will continue, demands for allies to contribute more to conventional military security are expected to intensify (The Heritage Foundation 2023).[11]

The 2024 Republican Party platform also declares the development of the U.S. military into the world's most powerful and modernized, lethal force and emphasizes investment in advanced science and technology. The U.S. is particularly increasing its vigilance and developing various countermeasures regarding the possibility of simultaneous and strategic conflicts in more than two theaters (RAND Corporation, 2024). For instance, the report "21st Century Peace Through Strength: A Generational Investment in the U.S. Military," led by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Roger Wicker, makes unprecedented recommendations, including a 5% increase in the U.S. defense budget and an expansion of nuclear capabilities.

3. Organization

In the foreign policy decision-making elite, organizations, particularly political parties, play a role in coordinating and mobilizing their support bases by adjusting party platforms while pursuing the acquisition of power and the establishment of a majority party status. Since Trump's nomination as an outsider and election as president in 2016, the Republican Party has transformed from a traditional conservative party into "Trump's party," a transformation partly built on his strategy of inciting and mobilizing the traditional conservative base through intra-party control and personalization (Kim Yoo-jin, Kang In-sun 2024). Although there were critical moments when Trump's position within the party weakened after failing to win re-election in 2020 and the Democratic Party's strong performance in the 2022 midterm elections, Trump passed the primaries this year without significant difficulty and secured re-election. His election has further consolidated the Republican Party around its ideological supporters who embrace MAGA, and individuals with MAGA leanings are being appointed to key positions within the party, Congress, and the federal government.

Although the MAGA forces appear to have become the mainstream of the Republican Party, various factions still coexist within the party, presenting distinct visions or policy preferences and prescriptions for key foreign policy issues. Conservative nationalists are generally cautious about deep engagement to preserve the American way of life and society, but a spectrum of foreign policy motivations can be observed, ranging from active interventionism to passive non-interventionism (Dueck 2019). On one end are the traditional Republican factions with a conservative interventionist inclination, who seek to bear the burden of providing global public goods and actively intervene in foreign affairs. On the other end are the conservative non-interventionist factions, who aim to reduce costs and avoid entanglement in international conflicts (Dueck 2019).[12] And in between are the conservative hard-liners who advocate for American unilateralism, excluding international norms, and who maintain a stance of non-intervention under normal circumstances but retaliate with overwhelming force when American interests are threatened. Trump belongs to this group, and because he possesses elements of both interventionism and non-interventionism, it is ultimately difficult to predict which conservative grand strategy and foreign policy he will pursue.

4. Conclusion

Examining the U.S. foreign policy decision-making elite at the individual, state, and organizational levels reveals the coexistence of actors with divergent motivations. Therefore, even if the direction of foreign policy is determined under the U.S. grand strategy, the content and intensity of its implementation can be adjusted by the agency of the actors within the organization. As Trump believes he has received strong authority from the people by winning a majority of the popular vote and electoral votes in the 2024 election, he is expected to express "America First" more overtly through foreign policy. Trump is likely to pursue foreign policy unilaterally, bypassing Congress, and will show a high reliance on executive orders rather than legislation. If MAGA loyalists surround a president with immense foreign policy decision-making power, the trend of American exceptionalism may weaken, leading to decisive changes in U.S. national power and influence. However, considering the practical response capabilities of cabinet members, the procedures of Congress and the bureaucracy, and the influence of the national security expert community, an approach that views the final U.S. foreign policy product as emerging from the interaction among various actors within the foreign policy decision-making elite is necessary.

Moving forward, the cohesion of MAGA forces within the organization will be crucial. Trump, who operates based on pragmatism rather than ideology, does not align with the identity of the MAGA forces. For instance, a significant portion of Trump's supporters do not fundamentally trust his words (McCreesh 2024). Among those who supported Trump in this year's election, especially the youth (18-29 years old) who constitute more than half of those who supported him compared to 2020, about half did not agree with the MAGA agenda on immigration, climate change, and small government (Thomson-Deveaux 2024). Furthermore, the core of the current MAGA movement is Trump himself, with no clear successor (Siders 2024). This suggests that the degree of cohesion among supporters gathered under the MAGA banner to win the election may weaken during the Trump second administration. It is unclear whether the given four-year presidential term is sufficient time to implement and evaluate actual policies. The expectations and patience of voters who chose him following the zeitgeist of change, rather than the actual content or effectiveness of Trump's policies, are also important variables, as is Trump himself, who prioritizes personal interests over national or organizational interests. The evolution and fusion of populism and dynamism, represented by J.D. Vance and Elon Musk respectively, will have a significant impact on the future of the U.S. Republican Party (Douthat 2024).

III. Application to the Russia-Ukraine War Case

Trump's statements regarding the Russia-Ukraine war from its outbreak in 2022 until the 2024 election period consistently point out that the Biden administration has made the mistake of excessively intervening in a European war unrelated to U.S. national interests. Given the convergence of motivations within the U.S. foreign policy decision-making elite—individuals and organizations seeking to reduce costs and avoid entanglement—and the state's motivation to secure primacy over China, a peace settlement appears inevitable. Not only the Ukrainian people but also the American people are weary of the war. According to a Gallup poll conducted in October, 52% of Ukrainian respondents desired a swift end to the war, and among those supporting a peace settlement, 52% expressed willingness to cede some lost territory (Vigers 2024). A November Pew Research Center survey asking Americans about their views on supporting Ukraine revealed partisan divides. While 42% of Republican supporters believed the U.S. was providing excessive aid to Ukraine, only 13% of Democratic supporters agreed. Among Republican supporters, only 36% perceived it as the U.S.'s responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself, significantly lower than the 65% of Democratic supporters. Furthermore, 42% of Democratic supporters viewed Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a major threat to U.S. national interests, compared to only 19% of Republican supporters (Copeland 2024).

The negotiation proposal that the U.S. will present to the parties in the Russia-Ukraine war will be designed by Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg and approved by the President. President-elect Trump has contacted the leaders of both countries since the election and has already met directly with President Zelenskyy. Due to the diverse views within the Republican Party regarding the Russia-Ukraine war, the actual solution may be subject to adjustment. Special Envoy Kellogg plans to use the threat of expanded lethal aid to Ukraine and delayed NATO membership for Ukraine as carrots and sticks for Russia, and the possibility of reduced or suspended arms support as leverage for Ukraine. He believes that Ukraine does not need to abandon territorial recovery but must promise to use only diplomatic means, even if it takes time. He argues that partial easing of sanctions against Russia and financial support from Russia for Ukraine's reconstruction are necessary, and that a "comprehensive, verifiable, and security-guaranteeing agreement" should be pursued (Kellogg and Fleitz 2024). Trump believes he can play a decisive role in ending the Russia-Ukraine war, driven by his strong desire to achieve accomplishments as a peacemaker. However, Trump's personal desire for peace does not automatically guarantee cooperation from the parties to the Russia-Ukraine war, stakeholders, and the battlefield situation. While the possibility of restoring U.S.-Russia relations exists as a result of ending the Russia-Ukraine war amidst intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition, if Putin makes excessive demands during the preliminary negotiation phase, Trump may not accept them, and the war could last longer than expected.

Meanwhile, various perspectives exist within the Republican Party regarding support for the Russia-Ukraine war and the method of ending it. Those with a conservative interventionist inclination criticize the negative impact of Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine on the liberal international order and sovereignty, and argue for continued support for Ukraine in line with U.S. strategic interests. For example, Kori Schake, who served in the National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department during the George W. Bush administration, argued that diplomacy backed by military force can deter war, but the Biden administration not only acted inadequately in the face of warnings from U.S. intelligence agencies to Ukraine and NATO allies about an imminent Russian attack but also failed to adequately explain why defending Ukraine was strategically important (Schake 2022). She argued that through the Russia-Ukraine war, the U.S. secured strategic interests by investing less than 5% of its 2023 defense spending and without sacrificing a single U.S. soldier. The logic was that the war depleted Russian forces, weakened China's international standing for condoning Russia's illegal actions, thereby creating a more favorable environment for the U.S., and strengthened the U.S. position by inducing voluntary participation from European and Asian allies to support Ukraine (Schake and Tavares 2023). Although the Republican goal of reducing federal spending is important, she also argued that support for Ukraine should be increased because approximately 60% of U.S. aid to Ukraine is reinvested in U.S. defense industry companies (Schake 2023).

Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urged a shift from the current administration's limited arms support to active arms support and advocated for strong economic sanctions against Russia. He emphasized the need to focus on China rather than Europe and to increase NATO's defense spending burden-sharing to 3% to enhance Europe's own defense capabilities (Urban and Pomepo 2024). Members of Congress who voted in favor of the Ukraine aid bill in April 2024, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, also can be considered conservative interventionists (22 in the Senate, 101 in the House).

There are also individuals within the Republican Party who advocate for selective interventionism focused on Asia, with prescriptions largely divided into two categories. Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby and Missouri Senator Josh Hawley emphasize that deterring China is the top priority, and therefore, support for Ukraine should be limited, and U.S. military power and resources should be stockpiled in the Indo-Pacific region to prepare for contingencies in Taiwan. Meanwhile, Jacob Grygiel, a former NSC advisor, argues that to truly achieve an "Asia First" policy in order to deter China, it is necessary to expand lethal arms support to Europe and strengthen proactive deterrence (Grygiel 2024).

Finally, individuals with conservative hard-liner leanings advocate for limiting support to Ukraine based on homeland defense and prioritizing domestic issues. They argue that U.S. disengagement from Europe and focus on the Indo-Pacific region are impossible without ending the Russia-Ukraine war, and therefore, they urge for a swift end to the war through peace negotiations and for NATO allies to strengthen their defense capabilities and expand their roles to ensure Ukraine's security. Vance, for example, advocates for reducing U.S. security commitments to Europe and focusing on Asia, opposing the prioritization of the Ukraine issue for the U.S. He draws a line, suggesting that support should be limited to helping Ukraine resolve its own issues rather than outright refusal. Vance has proposed a negotiation plan based on establishing a demilitarized zone along the current Russia-Ukraine territorial lines, guaranteeing Ukraine's independence and neutrality, and maintaining some form of long-term U.S. support (Ferguson 2024). This plan involves not allowing Ukraine to regain lost territory or join NATO, but maintaining a certain level of long-term U.S. support for the defense of the demilitarized zone.

With Trump's re-election, foreign policy aligned with MAGA-based conservative hard-liners is expected to prevail. If Trump does not request aid for Ukraine from Congress in 2025, support will naturally cease. In that case, traditional Republican factions remaining in the House and Senate, the conservative interventionists, may still participate in bipartisan efforts to prevent the cessation of aid to Ukraine through institutional and procedural means, based on their convictions and the characteristics of their constituencies. It is important to understand the process by which final policy decisions are made through the operation of foreign policy decision-making elites at the individual, state, and organizational levels, and to strive to narrow the scope of uncertainty.

IV. Conclusion

The uncertainty and predictable direction of the Trump second administration's foreign policy pose a significant burden not only on adversaries but also on allies. Despite Trump's personal negative views on alliances, conservative nationalists within the Republican Party are fundamentally skeptical of alliances and recognize that preventing security freeloading and avoiding entanglement is necessary for national interests (Priebe et al. 2024, 154-155). It is unclear which foreign policy issues the Trump administration will prioritize, but it is highly likely that it will begin with resolving the Russia-Ukraine war, where the motivations at the individual, state, and organizational levels converge. Although this war is geographically distant from Korea, it is linked to the stability of the Korean Peninsula in geopolitical and geo-economic terms. Given that Russia and North Korea have formed a military alliance and North Korean soldiers have been deployed to the Kursk region of Russia, the priority of negotiations with North Korea is likely to increase. As Trump has recently begun to mention the need for China's contribution to ending the Russia-Ukraine war, this issue, which links Europe and Asia, may become multilateralized, making management and response more complex and difficult. Furthermore, the U.S.'s grand plan to concentrate military, diplomatic, and economic assets in the Indo-Pacific region to counter China may once again face setbacks. Trump's decision-making approach, based on pragmatism and negotiation rather than ideology, offers allies an opening to persuade the U.S., thus requiring cautious yet creative preparations. ■

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[1] “Quiero que la guerra termine. Quiero salvar vidas. Creo que es el mejor interés de EE. UU. que esta guerra termine y se acabe.”

[2] “Cuando Putin vio [la retirada de EE. UU. de Afganistán], dijo: ‘¿Sabe qué? Creo que entraremos [en Ucrania] y tal vez tomaremos mi…’. Este era su sueño. Hablé con él al respecto. Su sueño.”

[3] “Dije: ‘¿Qué tan inteligente es eso?’ Él va a entrar y ser un pacificador. Esa es la fuerza de paz más fuerte. Podríamos usar eso en nuestra frontera sur. Esa es la fuerza de paz más fuerte que he visto. Había más tanques del ejército de los que jamás había visto. Van a mantener la paz, de acuerdo”. “Si se manejara adecuadamente, no había absolutamente ninguna razón para que la situación que ocurre actualmente en Ucrania hubiera sucedido en absoluto. Conozco muy bien a Vladimir Putin, y él nunca habría hecho durante la Administración Trump lo que está haciendo ahora, ¡de ninguna manera!”

[4] “Este es un mundo diferente al de hace tres años y medio”. “Lo peor que ha sucedido es que hemos permitido, porque Biden es una persona estúpida, que hemos obligado a Rusia y China a casarse. Están casados. Luego se llevaron a su pequeño primo, Irán, y luego se llevaron a Corea del Norte. No necesitan a nadie más.”

[5] “Rusia ha amenazado hoy con usar armas nucleares, y tenemos individuos de bajo coeficiente intelectual, los mismos que arruinaron Afganistán (¡que no tienen ni idea!), a cargo de esta situación mortal. NADA BUENO — NO ACEPtable.”

[6] “¿Por qué Europa no está dando más dinero para ayudar a Ucrania? ¿Por qué Estados Unidos ha invertido más de 100 mil millones de dólares en la guerra de Ucrania más que Europa, y tenemos un océano entre nosotros como separación? ¿Por qué Europa no puede igualar o equiparar el dinero invertido por los Estados Unidos de América para ayudar a un país en necesidad desesperada? Como todos coinciden, la supervivencia y la fortaleza de Ucrania deberían ser mucho más importantes para Europa que para nosotros, ¡pero también es importante para nosotros! ¡MUÉVANSE EUROPA!”

[7] “Lo que estamos haciendo con las sanciones es que estamos alejando a todos de nosotros. Así que no me gustan las sanciones… Las encontré muy útiles con Irán, pero ni siquiera necesité tantas sanciones con Irán. Le dije eso a China, y Rusia está en una posición similar.”

[8] Rusia se ha metido más de lo que jamás pensó [en Ucrania, debido a] las armas que di y que los ucranianos usaron tan bien.”

[9] “Si soy presidente, habré resuelto esa guerra en un día, 24 horas. Me reuniré con Putin, me reuniré con Zelenskyy… y dentro de 24 horas, esa guerra estará resuelta.”

[10] “Conozco muy bien a Zelenskyy y conozco muy bien a Putin. Tengo una buena relación. Y ellos respetan a su presidente. ¿De acuerdo? Me respetan a mí. No respetan a Biden. ¿Cómo lo respetaría usted? ¿Por qué? ¿Por qué motivo? Ni siquiera ha hecho una llamada telefónica en dos años a Putin”. “Lo resolveré antes de convertirme incluso en presidente. Si gano, cuando sea presidente electo, y lo que haré es hablaré con uno, hablaré con el otro, los reuniré.”

[11] “Fuerza convencional: Fortalecer la disuasión de negación para China. El plan de fuerza convencional de EE. UU. debe priorizar la preparación para la invasión de Taiwán por parte de China y, al mismo tiempo, asignar recursos prioritarios a las guerras que puedan ocurrir simultáneamente. Los aliados deben ampliar sus responsabilidades y roles en la defensa convencional, y prepararse no solo para las amenazas de China, sino también de Rusia, Irán y Corea del Norte. En particular, se debe empoderar a Corea del Sur para que lidere la defensa convencional contra Corea del Norte.” Project 2025, Capítulo 4, Departamento de Defensa (Christopher Miller)

[12] “el instinto básico de línea dura es mantener defensas muy fuertes, castigar severamente cualquier amenaza directa a los ciudadanos estadounidenses, rechazar acomodaciones internacionales y, de lo contrario, permanecer distanciado de los compromisos multilaterales.” Dueck 2019, 33.

■ Kwon BoramInvestigadora Principal, Centro de Estudios de Estrategia de Seguridad, Instituto Coreano de Investigación de Defensa.

■ Responsable y Editora:Lee So Young, Asistente de Investigación, EAI

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