[Trump's Return and the American Series] I. The 2024 US Presidential Election and Polarized Politics

I. Analysis of the 2024 US Presidential Election and Outlook for Domestic Politics

The election held on November 5, 2024, exceeded expectations on multiple levels. In short, it was a decisive victory for Trump (Donald J. Trump), with the results finalized early. This outcome, where he swept all seven swing states, is comparable to the period in 2016 when the outsider Trump first emerged and decisively defeated Hillary Clinton, contrary to poll predictions. Furthermore, in US presidential elections, where early voting has become more prevalent since the pandemic, several states expected to take a considerable amount of time to complete vote counting were among the seven swing states. In the 2020 election, the final results were not announced until Saturday of election week. However, this year's election results were remarkably swift, defying predictions. One reason for this speed appears to be the legislative changes made in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania prior to the election, allowing for overnight vote counting. This election and its vote count defied the predictions of many election experts who anticipated it would take several days to determine the winner, given the consistently close poll results throughout the campaign.

The election, which concluded with a decisive victory for Trump, not only saw the Republican candidate sweep all seven swing states but also marked the first time since the 2004 election that the Republican candidate led in the popular vote (see Figure 1). This is the first such occurrence since the presidential election held after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, when incumbent President George W. Bush defeated Democratic candidate Senator John Kerry in both the Electoral College and the popular vote. Some analyses suggest that the Republican Party has formed a "Trump Coalition," going beyond a mere electoral victory. A notable finding from The New York Times' vote analysis is the increase in Trump's support across various demographics, including residential area, education level, racial composition, and age (see Figure 2). Support increased by 7 percentage points in 290 counties where the white population constituted less than half, and Trump also performed remarkably well in areas with a significant Black population. The Black male vote, in particular, appears to have made a difference. Furthermore, 71 percent of the voters in this election were white, the highest proportion since the 1992 US presidential election. The most significant shift in support, however, occurred in areas where the Hispanic population constitutes more than a quarter. While President Trump secured Latino support in the 2020 election, this election saw an increase of over 9 percentage points. This presents a significant implication for the Democratic Party, which has relied on identity politics strategies focused on minority groups, youth, and women. Even the group of highly educated voters (college graduates and above), who were previously thought to lean Democratic following Trump's emergence, showed increased support for Trump in this election.

However, there are also arguments and indicators suggesting that Trump's victory in the 2024 US presidential election should not be overestimated. Firstly, while Trump did lead in the popular vote, the margin over Kamala Harris was only 1.6 percentage points as of November 21, and projections indicated this gap could narrow further upon complete vote tabulation. Moreover, as is often the case, US presidential elections are decided by a few swing states among the 50 states. Analysis suggests that the outcome was determined by a margin of 235,000 votes across three states: Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. Typically, a decisive presidential victory is also reflected in a "coattail effect" on congressional elections, but this election presents a different picture (Edwards III 1979; Seo Jeong-geon 2021). Specifically, in the Senate races in the swing states of Arizona, Nevada, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, the Democratic Party retained its seats in four of them, losing only one in Pennsylvania. Even in Pennsylvania, the incumbent senator conceded defeat nearly 20 days after the election, indicating an extremely close contest. In fact, the Republican Party's gain of a Senate majority was largely due to winning Senate races in strongly Republican states such as Montana, Ohio, and West Virginia. The House of Representatives election shows a similar trend. The Democratic Party gained one seat in this election, and the distribution of seats in the 119th Congress, which convenes on January 3 next year, is projected to be 220 Republicans and 215 Democrats, a historically narrow margin.

Meanwhile, the most significant implication of the Republican Party securing 53 seats in the new federal Senate, which convenes on January 3 next year, is the increased possibility of passing legislation that can be included in the budget reconciliation process for Trump's legislative agenda. It is important to recall that both the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 from the Trump era and the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 from the Biden era were passed in the Senate with a simple majority, without the application of filibuster rules (Seo Jeong-geon 2023). On November 13, the Republican Senate held a vote with all 53 senators, including those newly elected, to select their new leader. Prior to the election, prominent Trump allies such as Sean Hannity, Tucker Carlson, and Elon Musk actively supported Senator Rick Scott (R-FL) and attempted to block Senator John Thune (R-SD). However, Trump refrained from publicly endorsing anyone until the last moment, and ultimately, Senator Thune defeated Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) in the second round of voting to become the new Senate Republican leader. Both Senator Thune and Senator Cornyn are classified as traditionalist senators. Their combined votes (40) significantly outnumbered the 13 votes received by Senator Scott. However, Senator Thune is characterized not by opposition to Trump, but by a tendency to manage the Senate quietly and seek a balance between Trump and the moderate wing of the Republican Party on specific issues. For instance, he has shown a somewhat accommodating attitude towards unconventional changes in the executive-legislative relationship, such as recess appointments requested by Trump. Nevertheless, it is clear that he will not pursue radical changes to Senate rules, such as replacing the parliamentarian or abolishing the filibuster, as Senator Scott might have. For example, a strict immigration bill, as promised by Trump, which would tighten asylum application procedures, would likely be subject to the filibuster by the Senate parliamentarian, making its passage difficult (Son Byung-kwon 2021).

<Figure 3> Internal Election for Senate Republican Leader in the 119th Congress

Source: The Hill and author's calculations.

In the House of Representatives, current Speaker Mike Johnson was elected as the Republican nominee for Speaker without opposition in the party's internal election on the 13th. Trump, as a President-elect, met with House Republicans and expressed his full support for Speaker Johnson, who in turn referred to Trump as the "comeback king." While Johnson secured the Republican nomination for Speaker through a voice vote in a closed-door meeting of House Republicans, the real challenge will come during the election for Speaker on January 3 next year, as not all members of the Republican caucus, including the Freedom Caucus, fully support him. However, the possibility of a repeat of the chaos seen at the beginning of the 118th Congress, where the House could not elect a Speaker, appears low for now. Nevertheless, dissenting votes against Speaker Johnson could emerge depending on the issue. In such a scenario, President Trump might find it more difficult than expected to exert influence over the hardline Republicans in the House during his second term.

II. US Presidential Elections and Party Politics in an Era of Polarization

From a theoretical perspective, a comparison can be drawn between the 1980 Reagan victory and the current election. Most notably, the inflationary situation, a key factor contributing to Trump's victory in this US presidential election, is similar. Facing economic decline and unprecedented inflation and energy crises following the second oil shock, the then-Democratic President Jimmy Carter failed to offer effective policies or rhetoric. The President's plea for Americans to turn down their thermostats and wear thicker clothing angered the public, and no politician had a policy prescription to control prices. While interest rate hikes are typically used to stabilize prices, they politically backfire by increasing the burden of credit card and loan payments for ordinary citizens. Interestingly, no US presidential election since Carter's defeat by Ronald Reagan in 1980 has had inflation as the primary electoral issue. This means that for the past 44 years, data-driven analysis and forecasting of inflation's political impact have been virtually impossible. As is well known, another crucial aspect of the 1980 Reagan Revolution was the end of the New Deal Coalition era, which had been established since Roosevelt's election in 1932. For over a century after Jefferson's election in 1800 (Revolution of 1800), the United States did not recognize or acknowledge the concept of an active government. During the Great Depression and World War II, Roosevelt introduced policies and messages that demonstrated the federal government's ability to directly assist its citizens. This fundamentally changed the public's perception of the executive branch and the presidency, and the New Deal Coalition reshaped American politics through Roosevelt's four terms and Truman's Fair Deal policies. Furthermore, the solidity of the New Deal Coalition was evident not only in policy but also in the construction of identity politics that guaranteed future electoral victories. The New Deal electoral coalition, mobilized by urban residents, Black voters, Jewish Americans, women, and youth, became a critical factor for the Democratic Party in maintaining presidential election strategies and congressional power. Over time, efficient bureaucracy became criticized for inefficient operations, and it was perceived as excessive government intervention, ultimately being framed as a problem rather than a solution through the Reagan Revolution of 1980. Two issues related to this election can be considered.

<Figure 4> Comparison of the 1980 US Presidential Election and the 2024 US Presidential Election

Source: 270 To Win 2024.

First, Trump is proposing a reform of the federal bureaucracy through an agency named the "Department of Government Efficiency." This connects to the long-standing debate about the nature of the American state, following the "Weak State" versus "Strong State" debate, and the emergence of the concept of the "Deep State." While this is a recurring theme in Republican administrations, as pointed out by Skowronek, Dearborn, and King (2021), all presidents aspire to create their own administration. Trump, based on his experience in his first term, is bringing his administration's top reform agenda to his second term, making his future actions significant. Trump, who firmly believes his governance was obstructed by existing institutional personnel and half-filled appointments during his first term, has identified the "Deep State, warmongers, and globalists" as targets for elimination if he takes office. The reform of the federal bureaucracy is a critical issue encompassing the entire scope of American politics, including the delegation of congressional powers, the discretionary authority of the executive branch, the neutrality and protection obligations of public officials, democratic accountability, and judicial rulings and arguments concerning inter-agency disputes (Crouch, Rozell, and Sollenberger 2020). The "Deep State" debate, along with the unitary executive theory, is expected to remain a major focus of American political science. Notably, individuals as unpredictable as Musk and Ramaswamy are leading the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). The two co-chairs, who have already expressed their stance on deregulation, workforce reduction, and cost savings through an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal, are expected to pursue their agenda relentlessly.

<Figure 5> 2024 US Presidential Election and Trump's Shifting Support

Source: The New York Times 2024.

Second, while Reagan's 1980 victory challenged the concept of an active government, a cornerstone of the New Deal Coalition, Trump's victory in this year's US presidential election is interesting because it has shaken the other cornerstone of the New Deal Coalition: identity politics (Seo Jeong-geon 2019). In fact, even after the Republican victories in 1980 and 1984, the strategy of identity politics remained firmly established until Obama's election in 2008. Minority groups, women, and young voters have consistently leaned Democratic by a ratio of 70% or more, forming the Democratic Party's base. However, factors such as the alliance between the Democratic Party, symbolized by Chuck Schumer, and Wall Street, weakened ties with labor unions, and the potential for elitism surrounding the climate crisis prompted the absorption of white working-class voters by the Republican Party following the election of the first Black president in 2008 and the emergence of the outsider Trump in 2016. While it is premature to draw definitive conclusions from Trump's victory, which included support from a majority of Latino men and increased support from Black male voters, it is difficult to definitively assess the permanence of the shift in Latino male voters' preferences, especially given that the Democratic candidate was a Black woman and the issue of illegal immigration was highly contentious. Nevertheless, the combination of gender and race that has emerged through Trump's victory in this election is likely to offer significant insights into future American politics. Figure 5 illustrates the increased support for Trump across all areas, including residential area, race, education level, industry, and generation (clockwise from top left).

It is, of course, too early to determine whether the 2024 US presidential election will be classified as a critical election in the future. Historically, critical elections, agreed upon by scholars, generally occur approximately every 40 years. These include the election of Thomas Jefferson in 1800, which affirmed the return to and continuation of state-centric politics over federal government power; the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828, which established a new political and electoral system centered on the populace rather than elites; the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860, which led to the formation of the Republican Party and the subsequent unprecedented Civil War, abolition of slavery, and the Republican Party's dominance; the election of William McKinley in 1896, which curbed populism and established a national development direction centered on industry and the gold standard; the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, which introduced the concept of an active government for the first time, fundamentally altering the relationship between the US government, market, power, and citizens; and the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, which ushered in an era of small government through tax cuts and strong defense, dismantling the New Deal Coalition. The 2024 US presidential election, occurring 40 years after Reagan's decisive re-election in 1984, is chronologically significant. While Reagan's election was a critical election in terms of the ideological shift towards small government, further research and discussion are needed to determine if Trump's election this time represents a critical election in terms of the weakening of identity politics. This can be compared to how the 1860 Lincoln election marked a transition from the Jacksonian Democratic era to the Republican ascendancy, while the 1896 McKinley election challenged the populist Democratic movement led by William Jennings Bryan.

Looking ahead to the Trump era, in the 119th Senate next year, the confirmation of Trump's cabinet nominees and the passage or repeal (reduction) of key legislation such as the extension of the Trump tax cuts or the Inflation Reduction Act will require a simple majority, meaning 50 votes. Conversely, four Republican senators would be needed to block Trump's cabinet appointments or defeat simple majority bills. These four senators could potentially be from the "C2M2" group: Susan Collins (R-ME), Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK). Among them, Senators Collins, Cassidy, and Murkowski voted to convict Trump in his second impeachment trial in February 2021. Senator McConnell, a traditionalist senator retiring in 2026, has often clashed with Trump. Senators Collins and Cassidy face re-election in 2026. Senator Collins represents Maine, a state won by Harris, while Senator Cassidy represents Louisiana, which operates under a jungle primary system, making his re-election less vulnerable to Trump's pressure. In essence, if these four Republican senators unite and vote against Trump's agenda, they could influence it. However, in the 2026 midterm elections, the Republican Party must defend 20 incumbent seats, while the Democratic Party must defend 13. Among the Republicans, only Collins and Thom Tillis (R-NC) face uncertain re-elections. In contrast, Democrats like Jon Ossoff (D-GA) and Gary Peters (D-MI) are among those up for re-election. Therefore, it is likely that the Republican majority in the Senate will be maintained for Trump's four-year term.

III. Political Science Perspective on the Outlook for the Second Trump Administration

Understanding the significance of the 2024 US presidential election and forecasting the second Trump administration requires time, and further empirical data related to this election must be analyzed. Even the total popular vote count for the 2024 election differs between projections by AP News and data from the Cook Report. The second Trump administration, even before its inauguration, is already generating numerous controversies regarding appointments, and it is difficult to gauge the full impact. It is clear that a unified government led by Trump will commence in January next year, but the first two years of his first term, 2017 and 2018, also constituted a period of unified government. During that time, Trump's leadership, detached from the traditional American political system, was evident through executive orders, chaotic messaging via Twitter, and top-down diplomacy, such as the summit with Chairman Kim Jong Un in Singapore. It is difficult to predict the actions of Trump, who will navigate his four-year term with a cabinet composed solely of loyalists. Nevertheless, a systematic approach is necessary to forecast Trump's second term.

First, analyzing and forecasting Trump's policy priorities is crucial. This is directly linked to Trump's four-year presidential term, as he is ineligible to run in the 2028 election due to the 22nd Amendment. Generally, immigration is expected to be the top priority. A czar has already been appointed within the White House to handle immigration issues, and his close confidant, Steve Miller, is expected to wield significant influence. The war in Ukraine is also a priority, but it requires time as it depends on the choices made by other key actors, namely Putin of Russia and Zelensky of Ukraine. Trade issues with China are also among the policy priorities. Trump, who believes tariffs are the best policy tool, will wield them against China, a target that allows him to easily demonstrate strong political leadership. These points suggest that North Korea may not be a priority. Furthermore, for the North Korea issue to be linked to Trump's policies, an "Americanization" process is necessary. It remains to be seen how much this process will be bypassed for Trump to suddenly bring the issue to the forefront, as he did after the previous US-North Korea summit.

Meanwhile, another consideration is that, contrary to some analyses, Trump's authority over foreign policy is not significantly affected by the lame-duck phenomenon. Traditionally, the period of power granted to a re-elected president is generally considered to be the first year of the second term. The second year is marked by midterm elections where the president's party often struggles, and from the third year onwards, all media and internal party dynamics focus on the next presidential candidates. It is important to note that these analyses are primarily confined to the president's domestic political interactions with Congress. For example, President George W. Bush attempted a partial privatization of Social Security in 2005, his first year after re-election, but failed. Thus, the lame-duck effect often manifests relatively quickly in a re-elected president's domestic policy agenda. However, in the realm of foreign policy, presidents generally pursue active engagement to build their legacy. For instance, President Clinton's conciliatory policy toward North Korea and his free trade policy with China were both implemented in the final year of his re-elected term. Therefore, while less critical US domestic issues such as immigration policy, tax policy, and federal government reform are likely to be pushed by Trump during the unified government period before the midterm elections, foreign policy, encompassing security and trade, is more accurately expected to be dominated by Trump throughout his four-year term.

Second, once Trump's policy priorities are set, it is necessary to analyze whether they can be implemented through executive orders or if they require congressional approval or repeal. For instance, imposing tariffs, such as the widely discussed over 60% tariff on Chinese goods, can be done through executive order. However, a universal 10% tariff on all imported goods could face legal challenges from progressive federal judges citing procedural flaws. In immigration policy, aggressive measures like deporting undocumented immigrants could be pursued through executive orders under the executive branch's authority, but the judiciary could also intervene. For example, a bill to tighten asylum application procedures might be subject to the Senate filibuster, making its legislative passage difficult. Similarly, the CHIPS and Science Act, which holds significant importance for us, would be difficult to repeal due to the Senate filibuster. The Inflation Reduction Act could be repealed with a simple majority, but its repeal faces political complexities due to the benefits concentrated in Republican districts. Thus, the success of Trump's policies may depend on whether they are pursued through executive orders or involve Congress and the judiciary. In conclusion, whether Trump's second term will result in a complete transformation of American politics or conclude as another aberration, separated by four years, will require time and further analysis of all cases in American politics. ■

References

Seo Jeong-geon. 2019. *When American Politics Meets International Issues: Does Political Strife Disappear Before Diplomacy or Begin?* Seoul: Sogang University Press.

______. 2021. “The 117th US Congressional Elections and Changes in American Politics.” *Journal of Parliamentary Research* 27, 1: 197-204.

______. 2023. “US Domestic Politics and Economic Security: How Does the US Contain China?” *National Strategy* 29, 3: 5-31.

Son Byung-kwon. 2021. “An Empirical Review of the Partisan Nature and Utilization of the US Congressional Budget Reconciliation Process.” *Korean Association of Party Studies Review* 20, 4: 5-42.

Bloch, Matthew, Keith Collins, Robert Gebeloff, Marco Hernandez, Malika Khurana and Zach Levitt. 2024. “Election Results Show a Red Shift Across the U.S. in 2024.” The New York Times, November 6. https://www.nytimes.com/...shift.html.

Conley, Patricia H. 2001. Presidential Mandates: How Elections Shape the National Agenda. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Edwards III, George C. 1979. “The Impact of Presidential Coattails on Outcomes of Congressional Elections,” American Politics Quarterly 7, 1: 94-108.

Levitt, Zach, Keith Collins, Robert Gebeloff, Malika Khurana and Marco Hernandez. 2024. “See the Voting Groups That Swung to the Right in the 2024 Vote.” The New York Times, November 8. https://www.nytimes.com/...victory.html.

Skowronek, Stephen, John A. Dearborn, and Desmond King. 2021. Phantoms of a Beleaguered Republic: The Deep State and the Unitary Executive. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Jeffrey P. Crouch, Mark J. Rozell, and Mitchel A. Sollenberger. 2020. The Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government. University Press of Kansas.

270 To Win. 2024. “2024 Presidential Election Interactive Map.” https://www.270towin.com/.

■ Seo Jeong-geon_Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University.

■ In Charge and Edited by:Lee So-young, EAI Research Assistant

    Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | sylee@eai.or.kr