[22nd General Election Research Series] Gender Differences in the Choices of Voters in their 20s in the 22nd General Election: Consistent Support for the Democratic Party of Korea by Women in their 20s and Departure of Support for the People Power Party by Men in their 20s

1. Introduction

Youth voters are a representative group of political apathy. Compared to middle-aged and older adults, they lack political resources and cognitive effort, and have lower political efficacy. As they go through important life events such as employment and marriage, their political resources expand, their scope of political activity increases, and their political efficacy grows. Among these young voters, men and women may show differences in voting participation. Inglehart and Norris (2000, 2003), focusing on gender differences in voting participation from a comparative politics perspective, found that as modernization progresses, women not only vote more than men but also tend to support progressive parties. They called this phenomenon the modern gender gap in political participation. In contrast, the traditional gender gap refers to men voting more than women and married women tending to follow their spouses' political choices.

Synthesizing previous research in Korea, a modern gender gap where women's voter turnout surpasses men's has been detected since the 2012 presidential election, which featured the first female presidential candidate. According to voter turnout data by gender and age group, systematized since the 2000s by the National Election Commission, turnout is lowest in the late 20s regardless of the type of election, and the difference in voter turnout between women and men is most pronounced in this age group. This modern gender gap characteristic among young voters is also politically significant. In Korea's general election environment, where the two major parties fiercely compete under a single-member district system, the concentration of political support from women in their 20s for a particular party can lead to significant differences in outcomes.

The youth who sympathized with the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye began to diverge by gender after the launch of the Moon Jae-in administration. The conservative candidate support from young men, mobilized in the Seoul mayoral by-election in 2021, fully ignited the so-called 'Lee-dae-nam' (men in their 20s) debate. In the 20th presidential election held about a year later, with the abolition of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family becoming a contentious issue, young men quickly rallied behind candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, while women in the same age group rallied behind candidate Lee Jae-myung towards the end of the election, leading to the 'Lee-dae-nam vs. Lee-dae-nyeo' (women in their 20s) debate (Lee Yoon-jung, 2022). The debate on whether the gender gap in voting behavior observed in the youth demographic, particularly those under 20, stems from fundamental social cleavages or from the 'mobilization of bias' by political actors is still ongoing (Gu Bon-sang, 2023; Kim Han-na, 2022).

The Democratic Party of Korea, which benefited from the mobilization of young women's votes as a backlash against young men's support for the conservative candidate in the 20th presidential election, revealed limitations in making young women a fully supportive constituency. During the 2017 presidential election campaign, the main supporters of the Democratic Party of Korea exhibited characteristics of benevolent sexism rather than aiming for gender equality (Glick and Fiske 1996; Gu Bon-sang 2021). That is, while supporters of the Democratic Party candidate held traditional stereotypes about women, unlike hostile sexism which desires punishment for non-traditional women, they showed a tendency to be favorable towards women by viewing them as complementary to men's shortcomings, revealing an association with benevolent sexism. Due to these characteristics of the supporter base, the Moon Jae-in administration and the Democratic Party of Korea faced limitations in implementing active gender equality policies, and consequently, their lukewarm gender equality policies failed to garner active support from young women who aspire to gender equality.

Viewed in this light, the persistence of the gender gap in the voting behavior of voters under 20 holds significant meaning. If the trend of a majority of male voters under 20 supporting conservative parties and a majority of female voters supporting the Democratic Party of Korea continues in the 22nd general election, this would have worked in favor of the Democratic Party of Korea, considering the modern gender gap where women's voter turnout surpasses men's. Furthermore, it is significant in that if young voters continuously support a particular party through a series of elections, forming a psychological attachment to that party, they are more likely to continue supporting it in future elections.

From this perspective, this study analyzes the gender-based voting intentions of voters under 20 revealed in the 22nd general election held in April 2024. The paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 examines whether a modern gender gap exists in the voter turnout of men and women in their 20s since the 20th presidential election and confirms voting trends using the National Election Commission's sample survey results and the exit poll results from the three major broadcasting networks. Chapter 3 analyzes the voting intentions of voters under 20, as revealed in the survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) immediately after the general election, distinguishing between constituency candidates and parties, and focusing on gender, ideology and policy attitudes, perceptions of gender-related issues, and sentiments towards parties and politicians. Chapter 4 conducts a regression analysis while controlling for various variables. Chapter 5 summarizes the statistical analysis results and concludes by offering policy implications.

2. Modern Gender Gap in Voting Participation and Exit Poll Results

1) Modern Gender Gap

As discussed earlier, the main finding in comparative politics regarding gender differences in voter turnout is that as modernization progresses, women's voter turnout surpasses men's, or the gender gap disappears altogether (Inglehart and Norris 2000; 2003; Norris 2002; 2003). Recent surveys of European countries, considered to have the highest level of modernization, consistently show a traditional gender gap where male turnout exceeds female turnout in elections to the European Parliament. However, at least for national-level elections, a modern gender gap where female turnout exceeds male turnout is clearly evident (Kostelka et al. 2018). These gender differences in voting participation have been explained by gender differences in interest in politics or by gender roles culturally expected of men and women (Dassonneville and Kostelka 2020).

In academia in Korea, multiple studies reported that male voter turnout generally exceeded female voter turnout until the 2010s after democratization (Kim Won-hong 2003; Kim Min-jung et al. 2003; Kim Hyung-jun 2008). In contrast, since the 2010s, a modern gender gap in voting participation has begun to be reported (Ga Sang-jun et al. 2020; Lee So-young 2013). Furthermore, an analysis of survey data from the 20th general election in 2016 confirmed a trend of a modern gender gap where female voters support progressive parties more than male voters, which appears to reflect improvements in women's status and changes in gender stereotypes (Kang Ju-hyun 2020).

Research focusing on young female voters indicates that women in their 20s and 30s are emerging as active political actors compared to middle-aged and older adults, and their voter turnout is higher than that of men in the same age group (Park Sun-kyung 2019; Yoon Ji-so et al. 2020). This is also supported by the analysis of aggregated voter turnout data from the National Election Commission. Even in elections where male voter turnout has consistently been higher than female voter turnout since the early 2000s, the phenomenon of female voter turnout exceeding male voter turnout in the late 20s to early 30s is consistently observed (Gu Bon-sang et al. 2015).[1]

Table 1 shows the voter turnout by gender and age group for the 21st general election held in 2020 and the 20th presidential election held in 2022. According to this, despite the dynamism in voter turnout by gender and age group, at the aggregate level, female voter turnout consistently exceeds male voter turnout, and women's voter turnout surpasses men's from ages 18 to 50s. Only after the 60s does male voter turnout overtake female voter turnout, rapidly reducing the gender gap in voter turnout.

In particular, the significant difference in voter turnout between men and women in their late 20s warrants attention. This is not because women's turnout has risen faster, but because men's turnout has rapidly declined. Notably, women's voter turnout in their 20s and under is currently higher than in their 30s, which could be a generational (or peer group) characteristic. If men and women in this age group support different party candidates, but the proportions are equal, for example, if 50% of women under 20 support the Democratic Party candidate and 50% of men in the same age group support the People Power Party candidate, the election outcome could favor the Democratic Party because women's voter turnout exceeds men's.

Table 1. Voter Turnout by Gender and Age Group, 20th Presidential Election, 21st General Election

2) Exit Polls

Then, did the gender gap in party support among voters under 20 persist in the 22nd general election? While the gender gap in voter turnout can be confirmed through the National Election Commission's voter turnout data, information on supported candidates or parties by gender and age group cannot be obtained. Although there are methodological limitations, exit polls based on large samples provide insights into the sentiments of voters by gender and age group.[2]As revealed in Table 2, which summarizes the exit poll results for the 20th presidential election, the 8th nationwide local elections, and the 22nd general election, the gender gap in party choice among voters under 20 has persisted since the 20th presidential election (women's support for the Democratic Party and men's support for conservative parties). However, while the tendency of women under 20 to support the Democratic Party was maintained in the 22nd general election, a significant proportion of men under 20 who had previously supported the People Power Party appear to have defected from it.

Table 2. Exit Polls: Gender Support Among Voters Under 20

Despite their usefulness, exit poll results also only show the proportion of parties chosen by gender and age group at an aggregate level and have limitations in clearly understanding the voting intentions of young people under 20. Therefore, this study utilizes survey results conducted immediately after the 22nd general election to examine whether the gender gap in candidate and party choice among voters under 20 is still distinct, and if so, whether this gender gap is based on differences in ideology or sentiment, or driven by preferences for gender-related policies or differences in perceptions of gender conflict, through regression analysis.

3. Aggregate Analysis

This study analyzes the voting intentions of male and female voters under 20 using the results of an online survey commissioned by the East Asia Institute (EAI) to Korea Research immediately after the 22nd general election. The survey was conducted from April 12 to 16, 2024, targeting 1,528 men and women aged 18 and over nationwide, using stratified sampling by gender, age, and region.

According to Table 2, which presents the party vote proportions by gender and age group, the party vote proportions for men under 20 were as follows: People Future Party (36.5%) > Democratic Party of Korea United (18.8%) > Reform Party (16.7%) > Cho Kuk Innovation Party (9.4%). In contrast, for women in the same age group, the party vote proportions were: Democratic Party of Korea United (68.0%) > People Future Party (12.0%) > Green Justice Party (7.0%) > Cho Kuk Innovation Party (6.0%). Although the degree differs, the fact that a majority of female respondents under 20 voted for the Democratic Party of Korea United, while a majority of male respondents in the same age group chose the People Future Party, is similar to the exit poll results presented earlier. Furthermore, the significant difference in support for the two major parties between male and female respondents under 20, as well as the significant difference in voting for the Reform Party (men 16.7% vs. women 2.0%), aligns with the trend of the exit poll results.[3]

Table 3. Party Vote Proportions by Gender and Age Group

We will examine the gender differences in party support, which are distinctly different from other age groups, one by one, focusing on ideology and policy attitudes, perceptions of gender-related issues, and favorability towards the Democratic Party of Korea.

1) Are there ideological differences between men and women in their 20s?

Discussions have arisen regarding the conservatism of men in their 20s or the progressivism of women in their 20s, as men and women in their 20s who sympathized with the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in 2017 began to show divergence after the launch of the Moon Jae-in administration (Park Sun-kyung 2020; Cheon Gwan-yul 2018). Efforts have been made to explain the voting intentions of voters under 20 by focusing on political ideology. According to a survey conducted by the JoongAng Ilbo in December 2022, the 40s age group showed the most progressive policy attitudes, and progressivism weakened as age decreased to under 20s and increased to over 60s (Gu Bon-sang 2023). Most importantly, gender differences in policy attitudes were clearly evident among the under-20 demographic. Specifically, women in the same age group showed decidedly progressive attitudes in social policy areas compared to men under 20.

From January 19 to 25, 2022, the Korean Political Science Association and the JoongAng Ilbo commissioned Sti, a survey company, to conduct an online survey targeting men and women aged 18 to 59 nationwide. Table 4 presents the policy attitude scores (1=progressive ~ 5=conservative) in the political-economic and social-postmaterial domains by gender and age group.

Table 4. Policy Attitudes by Gender and Age Group (1=Progressive ~ 5=Conservative)

The results above show that men tend to be more conservative than women up to their 30s, but as age increases, women tend to be more conservative than men. The gender gap in policy attitudes is most pronounced between men and women under 20.[4]In terms of policy attitudes, a strong conservative group (30%) was formed among men under 20s, and a majority of them responded that they supported candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the presidential election. Among these, men under 20 who identified as conservative showed characteristics of self-identifying as conservative at a high rate, having high political efficacy, and being highly interested in elections.

In contrast, in terms of policy attitudes, the conservative group among women under 20 was relatively small (around 10%). Most importantly, their conservative policy attitudes did not translate into support for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol. The conservative group of women under 20 differs significantly from the conservative group of men in the same age group in that they tend to identify as moderate rather than conservative.

The results of this East Asia Institute survey also clearly reveal ideological differences between male and female respondents under 20. Table 5 compares the average values of self-rated ideology measured on an 11-point scale and policy attitudes (1=progressive ~ 4=conservative) measured on a 4-point scale for 10 issues (ROK-US alliance, ROK-Japan cooperation, inter-Korean cooperation, ROK-US-Japan response to North Korea's nuclear program, tax increase for high-income earners, restrictions on protests, corporal punishment of students, privatization of public enterprises, labor union participation in corporate management) by gender.[5]

Table 5. Comparison of Ideology and Policy Attitudes Between Genders: Under 20s (N=239)

tAccording to the t-test results, men among voters under 20 rate themselves as more conservative than women and exhibit more conservative policy attitudes. However, whether these ideological gender differences translate into gender differences in voting choices needs to be confirmed while controlling for valid variables.

2) Do men and women in their 20s show differences in their perceptions of gender-related issues?

In addition to ideological or policy attitude differences among voters in their 20s, differences in perceptions of gender-related issues may have influenced their support for the two major parties (women's support for the Democratic Party, men's support for the People Power Party). To date, conservative parties have shown a tendency to easily reverse their policy direction on gender-related issues depending on the election landscape. For example, during the 20th presidential election campaign, Yoon Suk-yeol, the candidate for the People Power Party, appointed Shin Ji-ye, former leader of the Green Party and known as a feminist politician, as the head of the New Era Preparation Committee on December 20, 2021. When young male supporters strongly protested this online, candidate Yoon Suk-yeol presented the pledge to 'abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family' on his Facebook page on January 7, 2022. Regardless of whether this was the candidate's own strategy, such a rapid shift in gender-related policy direction made conservative parties' policies on gender unreliable. Young women are sensitive to physical threats such as stalking and sexual violence, but conservative parties tend to be passive about these issues or consistently offer legalistic solutions (Gu Bon-sang 2021). For these reasons, women, particularly young women, appear hesitant to support conservative parties as an alternative to the Democratic Party of Korea, despite the repeated sexual harassment scandals involving politicians from the Democratic Party of Korea.

To determine if men and women under 20 show differences in their perceptions of gender-related issues, this study uses questions about the level of perceived gender conflict and perceived discrimination based on gender. Specifically, the level of perceived gender conflict was measured on a 5-point scale (1=not very severe conflict ~ 5=very severe conflict) in response to the question, "How conflictual do you think the relationship between the following two groups is?" Perceived discrimination based on gender was re-scaled from the response to the question, "How fair do you think Korean society is regarding the following items?" on a 5-point scale (1=not at all fair ~ 5=very fair).

Voters under 20 may have different perceptions of gender-related issues based on gender, which could lead to gender differences in party support. As shown in Table 6, the results of measuring how fairly men and women perceive treatment based on gender indicate that women perceive treatment based on gender as more discriminatory than men.

Table 6. Comparison of Perceptions of Gender-Related Issues: Under 20s (N=239)

However, the gender gap in perceived gender conflict, which significantly increased during the 2022 presidential election, was no longer statistically significant in the 2024 general election. This implies that issues that could create a gender gap in perceived gender conflict, such as the 'abolition of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family,' were absent in the 2024 general election.

3) Do men and women in their 20s show differences in their favorability towards parties and politicians?

Compared to middle-aged and older adults, young people, who tend to have less solidified belief systems, are more likely to make political choices based on emotional judgments about parties or politicians. In this context, it is meaningful to examine how much favorability voters under 20 have towards parties and politicians, and whether gender differences are revealed. Table 7 compares the average favorability ratings of parties and politicians by gender, measured using the feeling thermometer method (0=dislike very much ~ 50=neutral ~ 100=like very much).[6]To understand the characteristics of voters under 20, we also compared them with those in their 30s, who belong to the same youth demographic.

Table 7. Comparison of Favorability Towards Parties and Politicians Between Men and Women in their 20s

First, among respondents under 20, the gender differences in favorability towards the Democratic Party of Korea, the People Power Party, and the Cho Kuk Innovation Party were statistically significant. Women under 20 showed higher favorability towards the Democratic Party of Korea and the Cho Kuk Innovation Party compared to men in the same age group, and lower favorability towards the People Power Party.

In terms of favorability towards politicians, except for Cho Kuk, leader of the Cho Kuk Innovation Party, all showed distinct gender differences. For women under 20, except for Lee Jae-myung (44.6%) and Cho Kuk (23.4%), favorability towards all conservative politicians was below 20%. In contrast, for male respondents in the same age group, favorability towards conservative politicians such as Lee Jun-seok (40.6%), Han Dong-hoon (36.7%), and Yoon Suk-yeol (27.2%) was higher than favorability towards progressive politicians such as Lee Jae-myung (26.0%) and Cho Kuk (25.2%).

It is noteworthy that although there are gender differences in favorability, considering the nature of the measurements and that the neutral point on the feeling thermometer is 50, the average favorability of women under 20 towards all parties and politicians, except for the Democratic Party of Korea, falls below neutral. In particular, the average favorability towards conservative politicians being below 20%, indicating strong aversion towards conservative politicians and emotional polarization at the individual level, is a cause for concern.

These distinct gender differences in favorability towards parties and politicians are not observed in the 30s age group. Among parties, only favorability towards the People Power Party is statistically significant (p < 0.05), the gender difference in favorability toward politicians is only pronounced for Lee Jun-seok, leader of the New Reform Party (p < 0.001). Ultimately, voters under 20 exhibit distinct favorability levels toward political parties and politicians compared to voters in their 30s, who are also categorized as part of the youth demographic. These gender differences in favorability may translate into gender differences in the selection of district candidates and proportional representation parties in the 22nd National Assembly elections.

4. Regression Analysis

This study set the selection of district candidates and proportional representation parties among respondents under 20 as dependent variables. The key explanatory variables were set as ideology, policy attitudes, perceptions of gender-related issues, and favorability toward the Democratic Party of Korea and the People Power Party, as confirmed previously. A multinomial logistic regression model was employed, with the Democratic Party (Democratic Alliance) set as the reference category, given that the dependent variable is categorical. Tables 8 and 9 summarize the results of the multinomial logistic regression analysis with district and proportional party votes of voters under 20 as dependent variables.[7]

1) District Candidates

The importance of favorability toward political parties in selecting district candidates can be confirmed in Table 8. Specifically, a higher favorability toward the Democratic Party significantly increased the likelihood of voting for a People Power Party candidate over a Democratic Party candidate. Conversely, higher favorability toward the People Power Party increased the likelihood of voting for a People Power Party district candidate.

It is noteworthy that even after controlling for other variables, including favorability toward political parties, the gender variable significantly decreased the likelihood of choosing a People Power Party candidate compared to a Democratic Party candidate for district elections. Given the numerous close races in this election, it can be inferred that voters under 20, particularly women, had a significant impact on the election outcomes for district candidates.

<Table 8> Multinomial Logistic Regression: District Votes of Voters Under 20

The likelihood of choosing district candidates from other parties, relative to Democratic Party candidates, showed a significant association only with favorability toward the Democratic Party. That is, favorability toward the Democratic Party significantly decreased the likelihood of choosing district candidates from other parties. This result clearly indicates that the affective evaluation of the Democratic Party played a decisive role in the selection of district candidates for voters under 20.

When favorability toward political parties was considered, political variables such as ideology, policy attitudes, and evaluation of the president's state administration no longer showed a significant relationship with the selection of district candidates. Furthermore, perceptions of gender conflict and evaluations of fairness in gender treatment were also difficult to consider as significantly associated with the selection of district candidates. Of course, these results do not imply that these political variables are unimportant. Rather, these factors should be seen as reflected in the relative favorability toward the Democratic Party.

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2) Party Votes

District elections, decided by a plurality voting system, increase the possibility of strategic voting by voters concerned about wasted votes. In contrast, party votes, which follow a proportional representation system, are more likely to involve sincere voting rather than strategic voting. A notable aspect of the party vote in the 22nd National Assembly elections was the strong support for the Cho Kuk Innovation Party. In terms of vote share, it garnered 24.25%, a significant portion following the People's Future (36.67%) and the Democratic Alliance (26.69%). Therefore, this study considered votes for the Cho Kuk Innovation Party as an additional category in the analysis of party votes.

Table 9 confirms that favorability toward political parties was the most important factor for voters under 20 when selecting proportional representation parties. Specifically, higher favorability toward the Democratic Party significantly decreased the likelihood of casting a party vote for the People's Future over the Democratic Alliance. Conversely, higher favorability toward the People Power Party increased the likelihood of voting for the People's Future, a satellite party. Furthermore, individuals who identified as conservative were significantly more likely to cast a party vote for the People's Future than for the Democratic Alliance. However, perceptions of gender conflict and fairness in gender treatment were not found to be statistically significantly associated with the choice of party vote.

<Table 9> Multinomial Logistic Regression: Proportional Party Votes of Voters Under 20

Favorability toward the Democratic Party did not increase the likelihood of voting for the Cho Kuk Innovation Party. However, it significantly decreased the likelihood of voting for other parties, excluding the Cho Kuk Innovation Party. More interestingly, no explanatory variable created a statistically significant difference in party votes between the Cho Kuk Innovation Party and the Democratic Alliance. This was not the case for district candidate votes, where the Cho Kuk Innovation Party did not field candidates. This suggests that the support base for the Cho Kuk Innovation Party and the Democratic Alliance among voters under 20 is not significantly different or substantially overlaps. In other words, there exists a group that can be called pro-progressive, and a majority of them likely voted for the Democratic Alliance in party votes and for Democratic Party candidates in district elections.

The multinomial logistic regression analysis above shows that regression coefficients vary depending on the setting of the reference category, and it is difficult to intuitively interpret the likelihood of selecting each category based solely on the regression coefficients. For ease of interpretation, marginal effects were calculated based on the regression model in Table 8 and then visualized. Figure 1 illustrates the likelihood of voting for district candidates according to gender and favorability toward the Democratic Party.

Figure 1: Likelihood of Voting for a District Candidate from the Democratic Party by Favorability and Gender: Under 20s

Overall, even amidst general dislike for parties and politicians, for women under 20, the likelihood of choosing a Democratic Party district candidate exceeded 50% if their favorability rating for the Democratic Party surpassed 25 points. In contrast, for men under 20, their favorability rating for the Democratic Party had to exceed 50 points for the likelihood of choosing a Democratic Party district candidate to surpass 50%. For women under 20, a 'moderate' favorability rating (50 points) for the Democratic Party resulted in a nearly 90% likelihood of choosing a Democratic Party district candidate. Furthermore, even with a favorability rating close to 0 for the Democratic Party, the likelihood of women under 20 voting for a People Power Party district candidate did not reach 50%.

Figure 2 visualizes the likelihood of party voting based on gender and favorability towards the Democratic Party, derived from the regression analysis results in Table 9. For party voting, where concerns about wasted votes are significantly lower, women under 20 exceeded a 70% likelihood of voting for the Democratic Party when their favorability rating was at a 'moderate' level (50 points). This contrasts with men in the same age group, for whom favorability towards the Democratic Party had to exceed 70 points to surpass a 50% likelihood of party voting, highlighting a clear gender difference in party voting.

Figure 2: Likelihood of Party Voting by Favorability towards the Democratic Party and Gender: Under 20s

Conversely, as shown in the upper right panel of Figure 2, there was no substantial difference between men and women under 20 in the likelihood of voting for the People Power Party based on their favorability towards the Democratic Party. Such a difference was reflected in the likelihood of voting for other parties, as confirmed in the lower right panel. This can be inferred as the likelihood of voting for the Reform Party, which has secured a voter base among men under 20.

5. Conclusion

This study focused on the gender aspect of the voting intentions of voters under 20 in the 22nd National Assembly election. Following the 20th Presidential Election, a modern gender gap was observed, with women in their 20s exhibiting a tendency to participate more actively in voting than men. The analysis utilized survey data collected by the East Asia Institute (EAI) immediately after the general election, examining the voting behavior of individuals under 20, categorized by their choices of district candidates and parties. The analysis focused on gender, ideological and policy stances, perceptions of gender-related issues, and sentiments towards parties and politicians.

The analysis revealed the following points. First, voters under 20 generally hold negative sentiments towards current parties and politicians. Second, there are parties and politicians that evoke strong dislike, particularly among women. As mentioned earlier, strong aversion towards male politicians, including the president, and negative sentiments towards conservative parties appear to be widespread among women in their 20s, seemingly translating into strong support for the Democratic Party, unlike in other age groups. Consequently, their support for the Democratic Party has remained consistent since the 20th Presidential Election. However, it appears they view the Democratic Party more as an alternative to disliked politicians and parties rather than actively embracing it emotionally. Third, unlike other age groups, voters under 20 do not appear to view the Cho Kuk Innovation Party as a clear alternative. However, in party voting, favorability towards the Democratic Party did not create a significant difference in the likelihood of choosing the Democratic Party Federation compared to the Cho Kuk Innovation Party, suggesting that the supporter bases for the Democratic Party and the Cho Kuk Innovation Party are not substantially different. It can be inferred that since the Cho Kuk Innovation Party did not field district candidates, these voters likely chose Democratic Party candidates in their districts. Fourth, although differences in ideology and policy stances were observed between men and women among voters under 20, a direct correlation with their political choices was not confirmed. Fifth, differences in perceptions of gender-related issues were partially detected, but these also did not show a direct relationship with their choices of district candidates or party voting.

Most importantly, the sustained support for the Democratic Party among women voters under 20 since the 20th Presidential Election holds significant meaning. Attention should be paid to the persistence of the modern gender gap, particularly the difference in voter turnout between men and women in their late 20s. Specifically, if the political support of women in their 20s becomes concentrated in a particular party, it can create a significant difference in outcomes within South Korea's political landscape, characterized by intense competition between the two major parties. This could lead to results favorable to the Democratic Party, especially in district candidate selections where choices are narrowed to the two major parties. It is worth recalling that although a large proportion of women in their 20s do not view the Cho Kuk Innovation Party as a policy alternative, they did not fundamentally differ from voters who chose the Democratic Party Federation in proportional representation voting. Thus, it can be inferred that women voters under 20 who cast their vote for the Cho Kuk Innovation Party invariably chose a Democratic Party candidate, not a People Power Party candidate, in their district. From this perspective, favorable outcomes for the Democratic Party can be anticipated in urban districts where many young women under 20 reside. Above all, the consistent support of young women under 20 for the Democratic Party in the 22nd National Assembly election is crucial, as consistently choosing a particular party in their 20s and forming a psychological attachment increases the likelihood of continued support for that party as they age.■

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■ Author: Koo Bon-sang, Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Chungbuk National University.

■ Management and Editing: Kim Sun-hee, Senior Researcher, EAI.

Inquiries: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 209), shkim@eai.or.kr

[1]However, according to Koo (2019), who analyzed the voter turnout by district in Seoul from 2012 to 2017, a paradoxical phenomenon was observed in Gangnam-gu, the most modernized (developed) district in Seoul, where the modern gender gap between age groups was weakest or even absent, with male voter turnout exceeding female voter turnout, revealing a traditional gender gap. This also reveals the limitations of the developmentalist approach that predicts a linear relationship between economic development and voter turnout.

[2] In particular, for National Assembly elections, exit polls face sampling difficulties compared to presidential or local elections. Furthermore, as 47% of the total voters in the 22nd National Assembly election were early voters, if there is a difference between early voters and same-day voters, it is difficult to be certain about the exit poll results.

[3] Compared to the exit poll, the response rate for the Democratic United Party's party vote was higher, suggesting that the proportion of voters under 20 who support the Democratic Party may have been overrepresented.

[4] Policy attitudes were measured as the average of 8 items.

[5] Measured on an 11-point scale with the question: “People usually divide politics into progressive and conservative. Where do you think the following parties, politicians, and you yourself belong? 0 represents very progressive, and 10 represents very conservative.”

[6] The specific questions for the feeling thermometer are as follows: “Please choose a number between 0 and 100 to indicate how much you like or dislike the following parties and politicians. 0 means you strongly dislike them, and 100 means you strongly like them. A score of 50 means you neither like nor dislike them.”

[7] In addition to demographic and socioeconomic status variables, political variables such as interest in politics, self-rated ideology, policy attitudes, and evaluation of the president's job performance were included as control variables in the regression model. Interest in politics was measured on a 5-point scale (1=very interested ~ 5=not at all interested) to the question “How interested are you personally in politics?” and then reverse-coded. Evaluation of President Yoon Suk-yeol's job performance: Measured on an 11-point scale (0=very poorly ~ 5=average ~ 10=very well) to the question “How well do you think President Yoon Suk-yeol is doing his job?”