[Series on Fake News and Democracy] IV. Perceptions and Current Status of Foreign Electoral Interference in South Korea

1. Introduction

The year 2024 can be described as a global election year. These elections, with more voters participating than ever before, will showcase the current state of democracy worldwide. For the first time, over 70 elections are scheduled to take place in countries inhabited by more than half of the world's population, totaling over 4.2 billion people (Standage 2023). In these elections, many foreign media outlets anticipate that democracy will be threatened by disinformation generated by artificial intelligence (AI) and foreign electoral intervention and interference. The use of AI-created information, images, and audio in politics is increasing, with so-called 'deepfakes'—fake videos mimicking the appearance and voice of real politicians—posing a significant threat to voters as they can deliver false information as if from the politicians themselves (Hong Seok-jae 2023). According to Taiwan's Ministry of Justice, in December, a YouTube channel named 'Eat Rice, No War' posted a deepfake video alleging that candidate Lai Ching-te had three mistresses; YouTube subsequently complied with the Taiwanese government's request to remove the video (Lau 2024).

Furthermore, authoritarian states, led by Russia and China, often seek to undermine democracy by sponsoring disinformation campaigns, capitalizing on political polarization and discontent within democratic societies (Hsu et al. 2024). A Taiwanese research institute revealed that networks on Facebook and TikTok have been spreading Chinese-manipulated disinformation in Taiwan as part of election manipulation strategies. The disinformation primarily casts doubt on the United States while disparaging Lai, a pro-China candidate, and other Democratic Progressive Party candidates (Kristof 2024). Taiwan's prosecutors arrested Lin, who published fake opinion polls allegedly 'interviewing or sampling over 300 citizens' through eight rounds of surveys, suspecting that these polls were manipulated and coordinated by Chinese Communist Party officials in Fujian Province. Prosecutors stated they would investigate under Taiwan's new Anti-Infiltration Act, enacted to counter Chinese interference (Lau 2024). The disinformation and foreign electoral intervention and interference observed in Taiwan's presidential election on January 13th offer significant implications for South Korea.

As attempts by foreign forces to undermine democracy by exploiting political polarization and eroding public trust increase and evolve, South Korea's democracy and elections are not immune to foreign electoral interference. Ahead of the 22nd general election in April this year, no clear acts of foreign electoral interference have been identified yet; however, given that the election outcomes are of interest to neighboring countries, various forms of foreign electoral interference are anticipated. In particular, Russia, China, and North Korea, often cited as key countries involved in electoral interference, can be easily predicted to be active in influencing South Korean elections. Foreign electoral interference can exacerbate political polarization, influence election results, and further undermine electoral integrity, leading to democratic regression. Therefore, it is crucial to pay attention to this issue and devise solutions.

However, within South Korea, there is a lack of even basic understanding of the phenomenon, let alone research, on foreign electoral interference. This study aims to provide foundational data and assess the current status of foreign electoral interference. It will focus on fake news and disinformation campaigns, which are common forms of foreign electoral interference. First, based on survey data on foreign electoral interference, this paper will present the results of a public perception survey regarding the existence, perpetrators, impact, and partisan nature of foreign electoral interference.[1]Furthermore, this study will analyze the relationship between foreign electoral interference and political polarization using this data. It is hoped that this research will be utilized for future studies and policy development concerning foreign electoral interference.[2]

2. Theoretical Review

This section will begin by defining foreign electoral interference and then introduce the content of key related literature. Based on a literature review, it will examine the relationship between foreign electoral interference and political polarization, and subsequently analyze this relationship using survey data.

2.1 Definition of Foreign Electoral Interference

The term used to describe cases where a country's elections are influenced by foreign actors has varied, including terms such as influence, meddling, and intervention or interference by foreign powers. While attempts to influence other countries' elections have occurred in the past, they were primarily during the Cold War when major powers sought to advance their interests, or after the Cold War, involving interventions in the elections of newly democratized nations with underdeveloped electoral systems, often in the form of monitoring. Corstange and Marinov (2012: 657) categorize intervention into partisan and procedural intervention, defining partisan intervention as attempts to promote or block specific candidates or parties, and procedural intervention as actions aimed at affecting the functioning of the democratic process itself.

In recent discussions on electoral interference, the focus has predominantly been on partisan intervention due to its increasing severity. Various types of electoral interference by different countries for diverse purposes are being identified. As this new phenomenon has not yet been academically systematized, a variety of terms are in use. To avoid terminological confusion in this paper, the term 'interference' will be used, rather than 'influence,' 'meddling,' or 'intervention,' to denote actions that negatively affect the electoral process and outcomes of other countries (excluding procedural intervention). The dictionary definition of 'interference' includes the meaning of obstruction, in addition to meddling and intervention; therefore, 'foreign electoral interference' will be used.

Levin (2016: 192) defines foreign electoral interference as 'the intentional actions taken by one or more sovereign states to influence an upcoming election in another sovereign state, in a public or covert manner, judged to be advantageous or disadvantageous to one of the competing sides in that election.' This definition by Levin is problematic as it focuses on state actions. This is because the primary actors in recent electoral interference are individuals or groups commissioned or controlled by states (Hollis and Ohlin 2021: 6). Considering this, a definition of foreign electoral interference can be formulated as follows:

Foreign electoral interference is the act of foreign state agencies or individuals or groups commissioned by state agencies to illegally intervene in a public or covert manner to influence the electoral process and outcomes of another country in order to promote the interests of the intervening country.

2.2 Political Polarization and Foreign Electoral Interference

Foreign electoral interference primarily utilizes disinformation because it is the cheapest and most rewarding method. Disinformation typically benefits candidates favorable to the interfering country or disparages unfavorable candidates. Additionally, it aims to stimulate internal polarization, foster internal distrust, or undermine the integrity of the electoral system (Fontaine 2023). The aforementioned interference activities are highly partisan in nature, often involving supporting or denigrating specific candidates and raising polarizing issues.

Recent research clearly illustrates this partisan nature of electoral interference. One study that conducted a perception survey on foreign electoral interference found that Americans generally condemn foreign intervention and lose trust in democracy due to electoral interference. It also revealed a partisan tendency where individuals seek retribution for foreign electoral interference when it supports the opposing party, but not when it supports their own party (Tomz and Weeks 2020). The partisan nature of foreign electoral interference is also evident in other case studies (Corstange and Marinov 2012).

The primary method of foreign electoral interference, disinformation, can also be observed through research on the partisanship of 'fake news.' The main theoretical discussion on disinformation revolves around motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning refers to the tendency to reason in a direction that aligns with one's beliefs. This directional motivation leads to confirmation bias and disconfirmation bias. Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek information that supports one's beliefs, while disconfirmation bias is the tendency to seek information that contradicts one's beliefs (Flynn et al. 2017). A study on South Korean cases based on motivated reasoning found that candidate favorability significantly influences the acceptance or rejection of disinformation in a direction favorable to that candidate (Roh Seong-jong et al. 2017). Individuals with stronger partisan leanings tend to positively accept reports that align with their political views and negatively accept reports that contradict them (Lee Jong-hyuk 2015; Oh Taek-seop & Park Sung-hee 2005). In a study on North Korea-related fake news, Yoo Ji-young and Yoon Kwang-il analyzed the influence of conservative ideology on the ability to identify such fake news, based on the theory that conservative ideology makes individuals more vulnerable to fake news (Yoo Ji-young & Yoon Kwang-il 2022). Ultimately, it is expected that the perception and identification of disinformation, a key component of foreign electoral interference, will be influenced by political polarization.

3. Perceptions of Foreign Electoral Interference Activities

To gauge basic perceptions of foreign electoral interference, a survey was conducted asking whether respondents had encountered fake news or disinformation suspected of being created and disseminated by foreign entities in relation to elections or domestic politics on social media or other online platforms. The results showed that 37.4% (466 respondents) had encountered such content, while 62.6% (781 respondents) had not.[3]The high proportion of respondents who had not encountered such content is understandable to some extent. In fact, foreign electoral interference activities have rarely been a subject of controversy in South Korean elections. While one case could be identified, it did not become a major societal issue.[4]For comparison with the past, a question was included: 'Do you believe there has been covert electoral intervention or interference from foreign countries in our elections in the past?' The results indicated that 61.0% (761 respondents) believed it had occurred, while 39.0% (486 respondents) believed it had not. The majority of respondents perceived that a significant level of interference exists, even if there have been no prominent recent cases.

Respondents who had encountered such content (466 individuals) were asked where they had encountered fake news or disinformation suspected of being disseminated by foreign entities. The options were: 1) Internet (portals, Facebook, KakaoTalk, etc.), 2) Mass media such as newspapers and television, 3) Social settings such as workplaces and schools, 4) Private gatherings with friends, seniors, or juniors, 5) Offline spaces such as rallies, and 6) Other. The results showed that the Internet (portals, Facebook, KakaoTalk, etc.) was overwhelmingly the most common source at 78.8% (367 respondents), followed by mass media such as newspapers and television at 9.9% (46 respondents), private gatherings with friends, seniors, or juniors at 5.2% (24 respondents), social settings such as workplaces and schools at 3.4% (16 respondents), offline spaces such as rallies at 1.5% (7 respondents), and other at 1.3% (6 respondents). Comparing these channels with those for general disinformation reveals a very similar pattern.[5]The Internet is overwhelmingly the primary channel, followed by mass media such as newspapers and television, and then private gatherings with friends, seniors, or juniors. The Internet (portals, Facebook, KakaoTalk, etc.), being the most cost-effective and impactful medium, can be considered the main stage for foreign electoral interference, not only from abroad but also within South Korea.

Regarding the question of whether covert electoral intervention or interference by foreign countries could influence South Korean elections, 20.2% (252 respondents) answered 'significantly influence,' and 57.7% (720 respondents) answered 'somewhat influence,' indicating that 77.9% perceived it as influential. Only 18.7% (233 respondents) believed it would have 'little influence,' and 3.4% (42 respondents) believed it would have 'no influence at all.' The majority recognized the risks of foreign electoral interference.

The most concerning aspects of foreign electoral intervention or interference were identified as fake news and disinformation campaigns (71.1%) and the creation of favorable or unfavorable public opinion for specific candidates (70.6%). Following these, financial support for candidates was cited by 54.6%, and hacking of voting machines, etc., by 42.9%. This indicates that fake news, disinformation campaigns, and the manipulation of public opinion for or against specific candidates, which are the most widespread forms of foreign electoral interference, are perceived as the most worrying activities.

Respondents were asked to name up to two countries they believed would intervene in or interfere with South Korean elections. China was ranked first for both the first and second choices. Combining the first and second choices, China accounted for 32.48% (1st), North Korea for 29.23% (2nd), the United States for 23.10% (3rd), and Japan for 10.30% (4th). Russia, often cited as a country that intervened in the US presidential election and has engaged in significant electoral interference in other countries like Sweden, was ranked very low at 3.41%. While Russia, China, and North Korea are recognized as potential interferers, a considerable number of respondents also indicated the United States and Japan, both democratic nations, as potential interferers. The responses regarding countries perceived to interfere in elections were highly partisan, a topic that will be discussed further in the section on political polarization and electoral interference.

In response to the question, 'How much do you trust the government's ability to prevent foreign electoral intervention or interference, should it occur?' 16.9% (211 respondents) answered 'very difficult to trust,' and 54.2% (676 respondents) answered 'somewhat difficult to trust,' totaling 71.1% who expressed distrust in the government's capabilities. Only 1.8% (23 respondents) answered 'very trust,' and 27.0% answered 'generally trust.' While foreign governments are making efforts such as establishing dedicated departments within government agencies or forming joint private-public committees to prevent electoral interference, and conducting campaigns to raise public awareness, the South Korean government has yet to engage in discussions or gather opinions on this matter. Swift government-level efforts to address electoral interference appear necessary.

4. Current Status of Foreign Electoral Interference and Political Polarization

4.1 Current Status of Foreign Electoral Interference

Two surveys were used to investigate foreign electoral interference. It should be noted that there are limitations due to the alternative selection of surveys, as suitable surveys for this study could not be found. Ideally, cases of foreign electoral interference that were controversial and recent, and thus widely recognized, would have been included, but no such cases were found. To assess partisanship in foreign-related issues, cases involving North Korea and the United States, and cases seemingly related to electoral interference, were selected as alternatives.

Two survey questions were used: 'There were traces of North Korea hacking into the election system of the National Election Commission' and 'Many of the documents related to the South Korean government's wiretapping allegations in the leaked US Department of Defense classified documents were fabricated.' Respondents were asked to choose from four options: 'Completely true,' 'Mostly true,' 'Mostly untrue,' or 'Completely untrue.' According to a press release from the National Election Commission's information security system consulting in October 2023, 'No traces of election system intrusion due to North Korean hacking were found during the security consultation,' indicating that the statement 'There were traces of North Korea hacking into the election system of the National Election Commission' is disinformation (National Election Commission 2023). For the second question regarding US wiretapping allegations in South Korea, Kim Tae-hyo, First Deputy Director of the National Security Office, stated in a phone call with the US Secretary of Defense that 'both countries agree that a significant portion of the publicly available information has been fabricated,' meaning it is not disinformation (Kim Dong-ha 2023).

Regarding the survey on North Korea's hacking of the election system, 46.0% of respondents answered 'Completely true' or 'Mostly true,' while 54.0% answered 'Mostly untrue' or 'Completely untrue.' The second survey on US wiretapping allegations showed a similar trend. 'Completely true' or 'Mostly true' received 44.5% of the responses, while 'Mostly untrue' or 'Completely untrue' received 55.5%. The proportion of responses that did not align with the facts was 46% for North Korean hacking and 55.5% for the fabrication of US classified documents, indicating a high vulnerability to disinformation related to electoral interference.

The number of respondents who answered both questions about foreign electoral interference disinformation correctly was 19.0% (224 respondents). Those who answered only one question correctly were 62.6% (780 respondents), and those who answered both incorrectly were 19.5% (243 respondents).

4.2 Relationship Between Foreign Electoral Interference and Political Polarization

Generally, the most common form of foreign electoral interference involves using disinformation to promote a country's own interests. The danger of such disinformation lies in the confirmation bias, where individuals tend to trust and accept information that aligns with their existing beliefs, while distrusting and rejecting information that contradicts them. In a context of political polarization, partisanship and political ideology are expected to significantly influence the acceptance of disinformation.

This tendency is readily apparent in the perception survey results. The majority of respondents perceive that foreign electoral interference activities disadvantage the political party they support or prefer, while benefiting other parties. In response to the question, 'Do you believe foreign electoral intervention or interference has a favorable impact on a specific political party in South Korea?', 73.8% (920 respondents) answered 'Yes,' and 26.2% (327 respondents) answered 'No.' Among the 920 respondents who answered 'Yes,' they were asked which party (Democratic Party, People Power Party, Justice Party, Other) it benefited, and a cross-analysis was conducted with their party affiliation or preference. This was to examine how foreign electoral interference activities are perceived to benefit specific parties based on party support or preference. As expected, a strong perception emerged that other parties, rather than the party they support or prefer, benefit from foreign electoral interference. 74.0% of respondents who support or prefer the Democratic Party responded that it benefits the People Power Party, while 74.3% of respondents who support or prefer the People Power Party responded that it benefits the Democratic Party. Among respondents who support or prefer the progressive Justice Party, more than half indicated that it benefits the People Power Party. An interesting finding was among those who responded 'no party affiliation'; 36.6% indicated it benefits 'Other parties,' followed by the People Power Party at 35.1%, and the Democratic Party at 27.8%.

Political polarization was also confirmed in the survey results regarding which countries were perceived to be interfering, broken down by party support/preference. Respondents supporting or preferring the Democratic Party and the Justice Party believed that the United States was the most likely interferer, followed by China or North Korea. Respondents supporting or preferring the People Power Party believed North Korea was the most likely interferer, followed by China. They also believed the United States might interfere, but at a much lower level than respondents supporting the Democratic Party or the Justice Party. For respondents supporting 'Other parties' or having no party affiliation, China was perceived as the primary interferer, followed by North Korea and then the United States.

To examine the relationship between political polarization and foreign electoral interference in more detail, the dependent variable was set as the identification of foreign electoral interference information. The dependent variable was categorized into four groups: correctly identifying both pieces of information, correctly identifying only the North Korean hacking-related information, correctly identifying only the US wiretapping allegations-related information, and incorrectly identifying both pieces of information. The category of incorrectly identifying both was set as the reference category for the analysis.

Independent variables were analyzed by dividing them into demographic variables (gender, age, region of residence, education), political variables (party support/preference, self-ideology, evaluation of Yoon Suk-yeol's and Moon Jae-in's presidencies, political knowledge), and political communication (political YouTube).[6]Since the dependent variable is categorical with four nominal levels, multinomial logistic regression analysis was performed.

In the multinomial logistic regression analysis, 'incorrectly identifying both' is the reference category. Compared to 'incorrectly identifying both,' the variables for President Yoon's and former President Moon's presidential approval ratings, self-ideology, and party support/preference were found to be significant in the 'correctly identifying both' category.[7]All of these are variables related to political polarization. The higher the evaluation of President Yoon's administration, and the stronger the support for the People Power Party, the lower the likelihood of correct identification. Conversely, the higher the evaluation of President Moon's administration and the more progressive one's ideology, the higher the likelihood of correct identification.

Compared to 'incorrectly identifying both,' in the case of 'correctly identifying North Korean hacking,' the variables for President Yoon's and former President Moon's presidential approval ratings, and party support/preference were significant.[8]Similar to the 'correctly identifying both' category (excluding self-ideology), variables indicating political polarization were found to be significant. A notable finding is that respondents from the 'Daejeon/Chungcheong/Sejong' region were more likely to correctly identify the information compared to other regions. The Honam region, where one might expect better identification due to a relatively more favorable view and more information about North Korea, was not significant.

Compared to 'incorrectly identifying both,' in the case of 'correctly identifying US wiretapping allegations,' party support/preference and political knowledge were significant among the political variables. Additionally, age, region of residence, and education level were also found to be significant.[9]The likelihood of identification decreased for those who support the People Power Party, showing a similar pattern to the 'correctly identifying both' and 'North Korean hacking' categories. Contrary to common sense, political knowledge and education level were found to decrease the likelihood of identification. It is unclear whether this is due to a more critical view of government announcements or if political knowledge reinforces confirmation bias; further research and analysis are needed in this area.

In all cases, compared to 'incorrectly identifying both,' political variables, particularly those indicating political orientation, were significant. Party support/preference was significant in all three categories, and President Yoon's and former President Moon's presidential approval ratings were significant variables in the 'correctly identifying both' and 'North Korean hacking' cases, suggesting that political polarization influences the perception and identification of foreign electoral interference. Notably, individuals with a more conservative orientation showed a tendency to incorrectly identify information, indicating a greater vulnerability to foreign electoral interference.

5. Conclusion

Foreign election interference can exacerbate political polarization in the target country by deepening existing divisions and creating new ones. It can also undermine trust in democratic institutions by raising doubts about the fairness and integrity of elections. Ultimately, if election results are perceived as illegitimate or unfair, it can lead to social unrest and violence. The analysis of the survey results above also clearly shows the partisan nature of foreign election interference, and given the high level of concern about it, election interference can be considered a significant threat to Korean democracy. Therefore, great attention must be paid to foreign election interference, and means to prevent it must be devised as soon as possible.

Last December, in preparation for the general elections to be held this year, the prosecution and police announced that they would hold an investigative agencies consultation meeting to prevent election crimes and decided to thoroughly investigate key targeted crimes such as the spread of false information, smear campaigns, the receipt of money or valuables related to elections, and interference in elections by public officials or organizations (Hwang Yoon-ki, 2023). However, as can be seen here, there is concern that preparations for foreign election interference are not included.

Preparations for foreign election interference can be made in four aspects: legislation, establishment of a public-private cooperation system, raising awareness of election interference, and institutionalizing international cooperation. First, the necessity of legislation against foreign election interference. Other countries are passing laws that criminalize foreign election interference in their own elections. Taiwan's legislature passed the Anti-infiltration Act in December 2019, which prohibits foreign forces from funding or directing lobbying activities, election campaigns, or false information related to elections in Taiwan (Lee and Hamacher, 2019). Ollin (2021) also argues for the need to pass a federal law criminalizing foreign election interference. The ruling and opposition parties must take this issue seriously and legislate it through discussion as soon as possible. Second, establishing a public-private cooperation system. Many governments are urging or legally mandating social media companies to work harder to identify the sources of duplicate content and expose them (Baines & Jones, 2018: 16-7). Rather than legal mandates, we should seek ways to control it through public-private cooperation. Third, raising awareness of election interference. It is necessary to repeatedly broadcast PSAs (Public Service Announcements) during election cycles to provide the public with general and non-partisan warnings (Posard, Reininger, and Helmus, 2021). Finally, preventing election interference through international cooperation among countries that are victims of election interference. As soon as possible, especially before the general elections in April, measures to prevent foreign election interference must be presented.

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[1] For this study, the East Asia Institute commissioned Korea Research to conduct a 'Survey on Perceptions of Fake News and Disinformation' in January 2024. This article is based on the results of this survey.

[2] Regarding foreign election interference, requests for information sharing were made to the National Election Commission, the National Intelligence Service, and the Korea Internet & Security Agency, but cooperation was not received.

[3] To the question, "In the past six months, have you directly received or seen news that you judged to be fake?", 44.7% (557 people) responded that they had received or seen it, and 55.3% (690 people) responded that they had not.

[4]On March 1, six weeks before the 20th general election, an anonymous whistleblower claimed in an online chatroom to be a Korean-Chinese residing in Korea, stating they were paid to spread misinformation and fake news on various internet websites to create a pro-China public opinion. Professor Lee Jiyong of Keimyung University claimed that there are approximately 30 million 'paid online commentators' in China who spread propaganda for the Chinese Communist Party, and about half of them rely on this profession for their livelihood (Kang 2023).

[5]Data on where respondents encountered news they judged to be fake in the last six months, among those who answered they had encountered or seen it.

[6]Age - Mean 49.12, Standard Deviation 16.214

Gender - Male 50.4% (628 people), Female 49.6% (619 people)

Region of Residence - Seoul 18.0% (225 people), Gyeonggi/Incheon 31.9% (398 people), Daejeon/Chungcheong/Sejong 11.1% (138 people), Gwangju/Jeolla 9.1% (114 people), Daegu/Gyeongbuk 10% (125 people), Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam 15.3% (191 people), Gangwon/Jeju 4.5% (56 people)

Education - High school graduate or below 40.6% (506 people), College graduate or above 59.4% (741 people)

Self-Ideology - Progressive 27.2% (339 people), Moderate 45.1% (563 people), Conservative 27.7% (345 people) (Respondents were asked to indicate their ideology on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means very progressive, 5 means moderate, and 10 means very conservative. Using an 11-point scale from 0 to 10, ideological tendencies were surveyed. In this study, progressive was coded as 0-4, moderate as 5, and conservative as 6-10.)

Yoon Suk-yeol's Presidential Performance Evaluation - Evaluated on a scale of 0 to 10, and this score was used (Mean 3.51, Standard Deviation 3.052).

Moon Jae-in's Presidential Performance Evaluation - Evaluated on a scale of 0 to 10, and this score was used (Mean 4.54, Standard Deviation 2.845).

Political Knowledge - A score of 1 was given for correctly answering questions related to the 2024 budget, the number of National Assembly members, the minimum voting age, and the name of the Prime Minister. The average of these scores was calculated as the level of political knowledge (Mean 2.31, Standard Deviation 1.08).

Party Preference - Democratic Party 32.7% (408 people), People Power Party 370 people, Justice Party 5.9% (74 people), Other Parties 3.5% (44 people), No Party Affiliation 23.0% (287 people), Don't Know 5.1% (64 people) indicated as parties they support or slightly prefer.

Political YouTube - Frequently watch 1, Occasionally watch 2, Rarely watch 3, Never watch 4 (Mean 2.67, Standard Deviation 1.001)

[7]For every one-point increase in President Yoon's approval rating, the likelihood of identifying all [fake news] decreases by 10.6%, and for every one-point increase in former President Moon's approval rating, the likelihood of identifying all [fake news] increases by a factor of 1.129. If one's ideology is progressive, the likelihood of identifying [fake news] increases by a factor of 1.990 compared to other ideologies, and if one's preferred party is the People Power Party, it decreases by 47.3%.

[8]For every one-point increase in President Yoon's evaluation, the likelihood of identifying North Korean hacking decreases by 10.4%, and for every one-point increase in former President Moon's evaluation, the likelihood of identification increases by a factor of 1.085. If the preferred party is the People Power Party, the likelihood of identification decreases by 50.3%, and if the region of residence is 'Daejeon/Chungcheong/Sejong,' the likelihood of identification increases by a factor of 2.722 compared to other regions.

[9]If the preferred party is the People Power Party, the likelihood of identification decreases by 51.7%, and for every one-point increase in political knowledge, the likelihood of identification decreases by 17.1%. For every one-year increase in age, the likelihood of identification decreases by 2%. If the region of residence is 'Gyeonggi/Incheon,' it increases by a factor of 2.373 compared to other regions, and if the education level is 'high school graduate or below,' it increases by a factor of 1.458.

■ Lim Seong-hak, Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Seoul.

■ Managed and Edited by:Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr