[Fake News and Democracy Series] ② The Nature of Fake News and Countermeasures Based on Perception Surveys: Focusing on Structure and Actors

1. Introduction

Fake news emerged as a serious social problem around the time of the 2016 US presidential election and the UK's 'Brexit.' Concerns among the public are growing as fake news is routinely disseminated through social media, including Twitter. According to Google Trends (trend.google.com) analysis, interest in fake news increased from October 2016, peaking in early January 2017 (Yeom Jeong-yoon & Jeong Se-hoon, 2019, p. 10). In Korea, fake news became a significant issue starting from the period of President Park Geun-hye's impeachment and the early presidential election. Various information surrounding the political situation was rapidly spread through various media outlets without proper fact-checking (Jeong Sang-yoon & Jeong Se-hoon, 2019, p. 11). In the 2020 general election, fake news related to electronic vote counting and election fraud allegations also spread. A more serious problem is that even after being identified as fake news, people still want to believe it as truth if it does not align with their beliefs.

The issue of fake news is becoming more serious as it is linked to the structural societal change of the 'post-truth' era. Oxford Dictionaries defines post-truth as "relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief" (Harsin, 2015). In other words, the situation where falsehoods overwhelm truth, as people rely more on emotions and beliefs than objective facts when judging truthfulness, has become our reality. In the post-truth era, relativism according to the axiom of "definition of situation" prevails, leading to a surge in anxiety and crisis (Kim Kwang-ki, 2020, p. 232). In such an era, facts are not accepted as facts, and what constitutes a fact becomes irrelevant. Farkas and Schou (2018) explain the problem of fake news through Laclau's (2005) concept of "floating signifier." A floating signifier is the worldview and correct perspective put forth by the group that wins in the struggle between hostile camps (Kim Kwang-ki, 2020). The floating signifier is the logic and truth of the group that wins in the hegemonic struggle. Facts in the post-truth era are not absolute truths but 'alternative facts' that we believe and want to believe. In this context, hostile camps actively utilize fake news to gain hegemony and construct alternative facts familiar to them.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution brings about powerful and vast changes in all aspects of our lives, completely different from the past. The breadth and depth of change are extensive and profound, affecting not only the mode of production and social operating systems but also human thought and behavior. Worldviews for understanding the world and values guiding individual lives are being shaken entirely. We are living in a transitional era where the world is changing so rapidly that we do not know which direction it is heading. Fake news is generated and disseminated within the cracks of uncertainty and unpredicticality that appear in this transitional era. In such situations, it is often difficult to determine what is true and what is false, or it takes a long time to ascertain the truth. In a world where everything is uncertain, fake news is used as a tool for winning hegemonic struggles.

As such, fake news is a problem that arises in the context of a transitional era characterized by changes in social structures, systems, and operating principles due to the Fourth Industrial Revolution, as well as changes in individual perceptions and value systems. This study analyzes the causes of fake news dissemination in Korean society and proposes countermeasures from the perspectives of structure and actors. All phenomena arise through the interaction between structure and actors. Structure constrains action, but without action, there is no structure. Structuralist theorists argue that deep social structures, rather than individuals and their actions, determine society. That is, individual actions are strongly determined by specific social relationship frameworks or operating principles that cannot be controlled solely by individual will and capacity. Individuals' judgments and choices regarding fake news are also not entirely autonomous and are inevitably influenced by political and social structures and the media environment. Therefore, this study focuses on the deepening polarization due to partisan politics and social conflicts in terms of political and social structures, and the changes in political communication structures due to the spread of digital technology. From the perspective of actors, it analyzes the process and causes of fake news production and dissemination by focusing on changes in the attributes and characteristics of citizens.

2. Previous Research on Fake News

While there are various explanations for the definition of fake news, previous research generally suggests using the terms 'disinformation' or 'misinformation' instead of 'fake news' (Min Hee, 2022, p. 156). Generally, fake news is created with a specific intent and disseminated in the form of news (Hwang Yong-seok & Kwon Oh-seong, 2017; Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Fake news mostly takes the form of news to gain individuals' trust while hiding the intent to deceive. When the claims and values people want to believe differ from universal facts, people seek 'alternative facts' and accept fake news (Strong, 2017). The acceptance of fake news is related to confirmation bias. Confirmation bias refers to a biased information processing process where individuals selectively acquire only the information they want to believe, reinforcing their existing beliefs and convictions, rather than judging the veracity of information based on logic and reason (Hart et al., 2009). When the reporting of existing media differs from one's own thoughts, people have an instinctive desire to find information that aligns with their beliefs. At this point, if fake news supporting their views emerges, people readily accept it without questioning its veracity (Yeom Jeong-yoon & Jeong Se-hoon, 2019, p. 12). The usefulness of information becomes a more important criterion than its accuracy in determining whether to accept it (Guess et al., 2019, p. 3).

Most previous research on fake news has focused on individual-level cognitive processes, such as the impact of fake news dissemination on voters' political perceptions and judgments, or their behavior in consuming fake news (Howard, Bradshaw, Kollanyi & Bolsolver, 2017; Silverman, 2016; Weeks & Garrett, 2014).

Theories explaining the motivation for sharing fake news can be broadly categorized into ignorance theory and polarization theory. While ignorance theory focuses on accuracy, polarization theory is goal-oriented. Ignorance theory analyzes the extent of individuals' fake news sharing by focusing on variables such as age, cognitive reflection, political knowledge, and digital literacy. Brandt et al. explain the dissemination of fake news from the perspective of news supply. According to their research, people seek fake news when they cannot sufficiently access real news that can support their claims (Brandt et al., 2014).

Meanwhile, polarization theory focuses on partisanship, a significant driver of fake news sharing. According to Guess et al.'s research, conservatives and Republicans were more likely to share fake news on Facebook during the 2016 US presidential election than Democratic supporters. Both the supply and consumption of fake news during the election period were more supportive of Trump, which was due to a goal-oriented information consumption attitude that prioritizes the political utility of information (Guess et al., 2019).

Osmundsen et al. explain through a case study of the United States that fake news sharing is deeply related to an increasingly polarized political situation. Therefore, they argue that it is difficult to solve the problem of fake news without addressing the issue of political polarization in real politics (Osmundsen et al., 2021). Amira et al.'s research also explains that political polarization is the most important variable in fake news sharing, arguing that negative emotions towards the opposing party are the biggest motivation for sharing fake news. According to their research, individuals share fake news with the aim of counterattacking when they perceive a threat to their own group and to undermine the credibility of the opposing group (Amira et al., 2019). Brady et al.'s research also explains that when individuals decide which news articles to share, they prioritize articles that harm the opposing party over supporting their own group (Brady et al., 2017). Meanwhile, Lelkes & Westwood (2017) published research indicating that strongly partisan individuals prioritize helping their own party over harming an external party.

3. Current Status of Perceptions on Fake News

A majority of respondents perceived the problems caused by fake news as serious. An overwhelming majority of 81.3% of respondents answered that the fake news problem in Korean society is serious, while only 4.5% answered otherwise. Regarding the statement 'I am also likely to be fooled by fake news,' 60.8% agreed, and only 13.4% stated they would not be fooled. Given that the fake news problem is serious and that they themselves are likely to be fooled, 58.7% of respondents also supported the need to regulate fake news. Only 18.2% of respondents argued that fake news should not be punished because it could stifle freedom of the press.

44.7% of respondents answered that they had directly received or seen news they judged to be fake within the last six months. Regarding the channels through which they encountered news they deemed fake, an overwhelming majority of respondents, 68.4%, cited the internet (portals, Facebook, KakaoTalk), while traditional media such as newspapers and television accounted for only 13.5%. Meanwhile, YouTube was most frequently blamed for the production and dissemination of fake news, but politicians and existing media were also held highly responsible.

Consistent with previous domestic and international case studies, a majority of respondents (63.8%) agreed with the statement 'Platforms such as social media like KakaoTalk and Facebook, or portals like Naver and Google, have exacerbated the problem of false information,' with only 7.7% disagreeing. Furthermore, 74.3% of respondents perceived that 'falsehoods spread faster than truth on social media.' This confirms that social media is a major factor exacerbating the fake news phenomenon.

4. Factors Influencing the Acceptance of Fake News

Human behavior is simultaneously influenced by behavioral factors such as individual values or goals, and structural factors such as social systems, norms, and frameworks of social relations. While actor theories emphasize individuals' autonomous and subjective judgments in explaining social phenomena, structuralists focus on the frameworks of social relations or operating rules that compel individual behavior (Bang In-hyuk, 2008). This study aims to analyze the causes of fake news acceptance by distinguishing the variables influencing fake news acceptance into actor factors and structural factors.

As actor factors, variables emphasized in ignorance theory, such as gender, age, education level, socioeconomic status, ideology, and political knowledge, were adopted. For structural factors, variables that could measure the degree of influence from partisanship and social conflict structures, which are emphasized in polarization theory, were used.

4.1 Actor Factors

48.4% of men reported having received or seen fake news, while 40.9% of women reported the same. However, no significant age-based difference was found in the experience of fake news. This result differs somewhat from US cases. A study by Osmundsen et al. analyzing Twitter content during the 2016 US presidential election found that older adults were more likely to share fake news than younger adults. Guess et al.'s research also explains that older adults over 65 shared more than six times as much fake news as those in their 20s, possibly due to lower digital literacy compared to younger generations.

A significant correlation was found between political interest and the experience of fake news. The average for the group with no political interest was 0.18 (0 for no experience, 1 for experience), while the group with very high political interest showed an average of 0.62.

Political knowledge level also showed a positive correlation with the experience of fake news. The average for the group that answered none of the four political knowledge questions correctly was 0.33, while the group that answered all four correctly had an average of 0.63, indicating a significantly higher likelihood of experiencing fake news. On the other hand, no correlation was found between variables such as socioeconomic status, education level, and efficacy and the experience of fake news.

Next, an analysis was conducted on the variables influencing the acceptance of fake news. First, there are a total of 8 pieces of fake news analyzed, of which 4 are news that conservatives would want to believe, and the remaining 4 are news that progressives would want to believe.

※ Conservative Fake News

1-a. The substantial deficit incurred by Korea Electric Power Corporation is due to the nuclear phase-out policy.

1-b. There was election fraud, such as vote manipulation, in the 2020 general election.

1-c. Traces of North Korea hacking into the National Election Commission's election system have been discovered.

1-d. Due to 'Gemsuwanbak' (adjustment of investigative powers between prosecution and police), the police's investigative burden has increased, leading to a shortage of personnel at police substations.

※ Progressive Fake News

2-a. Traffic congestion has become severe around the presidential office since its relocation to Yongsan.

2-b. The current government is concealing facts about the contaminated water (treated water) from the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan.

2-c. Justice Minister Han Dong-hoon allegedly drank with President Yoon Suk-yeol and about 30 lawyers from Kim & Chang at a Cheongdam-dong bar until dawn.

2-d. The Daejang-dong incident occurred because President Yoon Suk-yeol, during his time as a prosecutor, conducted a 'soft investigation' into the Daejang-dong loan aspect of the Busan Savings Bank illegal loan case.

The acceptance rate of fake news was found to be quite high. The acceptance rate for progressive fake news was higher than for conservative fake news. Regarding the occurrence of traffic congestion due to the relocation of the presidential office, 68.1% perceived it as fact, and 59.6% believed the concealment of Fukushima wastewater. On the other hand, only 33.9% perceived the 2020 general election fraud as fact, and a majority considered the North Korean election system hacking to be false.

A linear regression analysis was used to examine the influence of nine actor factors, including gender, age, education level, and political knowledge, on the acceptance of fake news. For the acceptance of conservative fake news, socioeconomic status, education level, ideology, political knowledge, and efficacy 2 were found to be significant. Lower socioeconomic status and education level were associated with a higher likelihood of believing conservative fake news. In terms of ideology, it was natural that conservatives were more likely to believe conservative fake news. Political interest did not show statistical significance, but political knowledge showed a negative relationship, indicating that lower political knowledge was associated with a higher likelihood of believing conservative fake news. Among the efficacy variables, the more respondents thought public officials did not listen to the public's voices, the higher the probability of accepting conservative fake news.

The finding that higher political knowledge is associated with a lower probability of accepting fake news is also supported by overseas cases. According to ignorance theory, people want to share accurate information, but they lack the cognitive reflection or motivation to distinguish truth from falsehood, leading them to share falsehoods. Pennycook & Rand's (2019) US case study shows that individuals who perform better on a cognitive reflection test are better able to discern whether news headlines are true or false. Furthermore, Guess et al.'s (2019) research also explains that older adults are more likely to share fake news on Facebook, possibly due to lower digital literacy compared to younger generations.

Regarding the probability of accepting progressive fake news, only age, ideology, and efficacy 2 were found to be significant variables. Younger age and progressive ideology were associated with a higher probability of accepting progressive fake news. Among the efficacy variables, similar to conservative fake news, the more respondents perceived that public officials did not listen to the public's thoughts, the higher the probability of accepting progressive fake news. On the other hand, unlike the acceptance of conservative fake news, education level and political knowledge did not have a significant impact on the acceptance of progressive fake news.

4.2 Structural Factors

Next, a linear regression analysis was conducted to determine how variables related to our society's polarization structure, such as like/dislike of Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung, Yeongnam-Honam conflict, ruling-opposition party conflict, ideological conflict, and the 'birds of a feather flock together' phenomenon in online networks, influence the acceptance of fake news.

Among the total 1,247 respondents, 209 perceived all four pieces of conservative fake news as true, while 448 accepted all pieces of progressive fake news as true. Regarding the like/dislike evaluation of Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung (0-10 points), the average like/dislike score for Yoon Suk-yeol among those who accepted conservative fake news was 4.48, while for Lee Jae-myung it was 2.80. For those who accepted progressive fake news, the like/dislike score for Yoon Suk-yeol was 1.67, and for Lee Jae-myung it was 5.27. The evaluation of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's national performance also showed a stark difference between those who accepted conservative fake news and those who accepted progressive fake news, confirming that the political polarization structure significantly influences the acceptance of fake news.

Next, a linear regression analysis was performed to examine the influence of six variables related to the polarization structure on the acceptance of conservative fake news. The analysis results showed that the like/dislike of Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung, and perceptions of the Yeongnam-Honam conflict and ruling-opposition party conflict, had a significant impact on the acceptance of conservative fake news. The more favorable the perception of Yoon Suk-yeol and the more unfavorable the perception of Lee Jae-myung, the higher the likelihood of believing conservative fake news. Meanwhile, the more severe the perception of the Yeongnam-Honam conflict, the higher the likelihood of accepting conservative fake news; however, for the ruling-opposition party conflict, the opposite was true, with weaker perceptions of conflict leading to a higher probability of accepting fake news. On the other hand, the 'birds of a feather flock together' network in the online space did not have a significant impact on the acceptance of conservative fake news. Many studies express concern about emotional polarization and echo chamber phenomena in online spaces, suggesting that strong connections with like-minded individuals online lead to echo chamber formation and confirmation bias. However, this study found that the degree to which the political views of friends and acquaintances communicated via KakaoTalk or Facebook align with one's own did not affect the acceptance of conservative fake news.

Next, the structural factors influencing the acceptance of progressive fake news were examined. Similar to conservative fake news, the like/dislike of Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung had a clear impact on the acceptance of progressive fake news. Meanwhile, regarding perceptions of conflict, the Yeongnam-Honam conflict had no significant impact, while perceptions of the ruling-opposition party conflict and ideological conflict influenced the acceptance of progressive fake news. The less severe the perception of the ruling-opposition party conflict, and the more severe the perception of ideological conflict, the higher the probability of accepting progressive fake news. Similar to conservative fake news, the polarization structure of the online space did not significantly influence the acceptance of progressive fake news.

4.3 Comparison of Actor Factors and Structural Factors

Finally, comparing the goodness-of-fit of the actor factor model and the structural factor model, the adjusted R² value for the actor factor model was .115 for the acceptance of conservative fake news, which is lower than the adjusted R² value of .231 for the structural factor model. For the acceptance of progressive fake news, the adjusted R² value for the actor factor model was .305, which is lower than the adjusted R² value of .554 for the structural factor model. This indicates that structural factors, which represent the degree of polarization, have a greater influence on the acceptance of fake news in Korean society than actor factors.

A linear regression analysis was conducted on all variables to compare the influence of actor and structural variables on fake news acceptance. Variables that had a significant (95% level) influence on the acceptance of conservative fake news included age, socioeconomic status, political interest, political knowledge, like/dislike of Yoon Suk-yeol, like/dislike of Lee Jae-myung, Yeongnam-Honam conflict, and ruling-opposition party conflict. Among these, the variable with the greatest influence was the like/dislike of Yoon Suk-yeol (β=.303), followed by the like/dislike of Lee Jae-myung (β=-2.29), Yeongnam-Honam conflict (β=.108), and ruling-opposition party conflict (β=-.107). The more one liked Yoon Suk-yeol and disliked Lee Jae-myung, the higher the probability of perceiving conservative fake news as true. The more severe the perceived conflict in the relationship between Yeongnam and Honam, and between ruling and opposition parties, the higher the probability of accepting conservative fake news. Meanwhile, among actor variables, those with high influence on fake news acceptance were age (β=-.084) and socioeconomic status (β=-.083). That is, the younger the age and the lower the perceived socioeconomic status, the higher the probability of accepting conservative fake news as true.

Table 14 below compares the structural and actor variables influencing the acceptance of progressive fake news. Similar to conservative fake news, the like/dislike of Yoon Suk-yeol (β=-.445) and Lee Jae-myung (β=.324) had the greatest influence on the acceptance of progressive fake news. That is, the more one disliked Yoon Suk-yeol and liked Lee Jae-myung, the higher the probability of accepting progressive fake news as true. Next, the variables with high influence were age (β=-.158) and perceptions of conflict between progressives and conservatives (β=.116). The younger the age and the more severe the perceived conflict between progressive and conservative groups in our society, the higher the probability of accepting progressive fake news as true.

Among all variables, four variables—age, like/dislike of Yoon Suk-yeol, like/dislike of Lee Jae-myung, and perception of ruling-opposition party conflict—significantly influenced both conservative and progressive fake news acceptance. Among these, the variable with the highest influence was the emotional sentiment towards President Yoon Suk-yeol.

A characteristic of Korean politics that has been consistent from liberation to the present is personality politics. Regional, ideological, and generational conflicts, as well as ruling-opposition party conflicts, which form the axes of Korea's political cleavage structure, all manifest as conflicts centered around the president or leaders of factions. As revealed in previous studies, while there are significant emotional differences between progressive and conservative groups, there are no substantial differences in specific policies and attitudes that could be considered conflict. Generational and gender conflicts also show similar patterns. Although polarization between groups is severe, there are no significant differences in actual policies or gender perceptions. Ultimately, the phenomenon of polarization and political conflict in Korean society is strongly a result of the 'mobilization of bias' by the political sphere, rather than actual differences between groups. The issue of fake news also exhibits the same pattern as existing conflict factors. The variable that most significantly influences the act of perceiving and disseminating fake news as true, causing social problems, was found to be the like/dislike of political leaders.

5. Conclusion

The perception survey confirmed that the fake news problem in our society is serious. An overwhelming majority of respondents (81.3%) perceived the fake news problem in Korean society as serious. Anxiety about fake news was also quite high. A majority of respondents (60.8%) stated they were likely to be fooled by fake news, with only a minority (13.4%) believing they would not be fooled. Due to high anxiety about fake news, 58.7% of respondents favored regulating fake news over freedom of the press. Responsibility for fake news was rated highly for YouTube, politicians, and the media. Similar to international cases, a majority of respondents (63.8%) believed that social media exacerbates the fake news problem, and an overwhelming majority (74.3%) believed that falsehoods spread faster than truth.

The proportion of people believing fake news even after it has been proven false was also quite high. In particular, the acceptance rate for progressive fake news was higher than for conservative fake news. Among conservative fake news, the news that 'police substations are understaffed due to Gemsuwanbak' was believed as true by the largest number of people (61.9%). Among progressive fake news, the belief that 'traffic congestion occurred due to the relocation of the presidential office' was the most widely believed (68.1%). On the other hand, only 33.9% perceived the 2020 general election fraud as fact, and a majority considered the North Korean election system hacking to be false.

The variables influencing the acceptance of fake news were examined by dividing them into actor and structural models. Among the 9 actor variables, ideology, socioeconomic status, education level, political knowledge, and efficacy were significant for the acceptance of conservative fake news, with ideology having the highest influence (β = .293). For progressive fake news, ideology (β = -.374), age (β = -.261), and efficacy 2 were significant. In the structural model, variables such as like/dislike of Yoon Suk-yeol (β= .298), like/dislike of Lee Jae-myung (β= -.244), Yeongnam-Honam conflict, and ruling-opposition party conflict were significant for the probability of believing conservative fake news. The like/dislike of Yoon Suk-yeol (β= -.526) and Lee Jae-myung (β= .337) showed high explanatory power for the probability of believing progressive fake news, and the ruling-opposition party conflict and ideological conflict variables were also significant.

Similar to international cases such as the United States, it has been confirmed that the political polarization structure is the most influential variable in the acceptance of fake news in Korea. As this perception survey showed, changes in the political communication environment, such as the spread of social media, also have a negative impact by accelerating the dissemination of fake news. Furthermore, falsehoods spread faster than truth. A majority of people desire regulation of fake news. However, it is questionable how much the problem of fake news can be resolved through regulation. Osmundsen et al., who studied fake news cases in the US, concluded that it is difficult to solve the fake news problem without addressing the larger issue of political polarization. However, they also expressed regret that resolving polarization is much more difficult than adding fact-checking functions to social media platforms (Osmundsen et al., 2021, p. 1013).

The spread of fake news is in line with the social changes of the post-truth era. In an era of uncertainty and unpredictability, it is not easy to distinguish between falsehood and truth. Fake news is not the only information that causes social conflict and chaos. Even if true, biased news can divide society and put it at risk just as much as fake news. With the spread of digital media, individual information consumption behavior has also changed. Above all, selective exposure, where people choose information that suits their tastes, has become generalized, further strengthening echo chamber phenomena and confirmation bias. Even if people seek and share real news rather than fake news, if the content is full of criticism and contempt for the opposing camp, it will lead to negative consequences just as much as fake news. In this process, people easily establish 'alternative facts' that reinforce their in-group's values and interests and are useful for attacking out-groups. The result naturally leads to political polarization and social division.

Efforts to implement various measures, such as regulation and civic education, are necessary to resolve the fake news problem. Above all, thorough monitoring and strict punishment must be applied to YouTube, politicians, and the media, which are perceived as the main culprits of fake news. Measures for social media platforms that spread fake news are also needed. However, the fact that can be confirmed from international cases and this study is that the ultimate solution to the fake news problem lies in resolving political polarization.

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■ Yoon, Sung-yi_Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University.

■ Editor:Park, Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

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