[Series on Fake News and Democracy] ① Populism, Fake News, and Korean Democracy

1. Introduction

Although optimistic prospects for liberal democracy emerged after the 'Third Wave' of democratization that began in the mid-1970s, concerns about democratic backsliding have recently increased. This phenomenon is occurring not only in new democracies but also in established Western democracies such as the United States and the United Kingdom. A notable aspect related to democratic backsliding is the rise of populism. The election of Trump in the 2016 US presidential election and the UK's Brexit referendum clearly demonstrated that even countries with strong democratic traditions are not immune to the influence of populism.

Compared to Western democracies like the US and Europe, the phenomenon of populism has received relatively less attention in South Korea. This is likely because there have been no instances of populist parties causing a sensation in parliamentary elections, as seen in Europe, or candidates overtly espousing populism, like Trump in the US, emerging victorious in presidential elections. In fact, populism in Korean politics has historically been used more as a term for mutual slander in political circles or as a word to criticize irresponsible campaign promises, rather than as a subject for academic analysis.

However, populist phenomena are indeed present in South Korea, and the current political climate is creating a favorable environment for the rise of populism (Kang Won-taek 2021). Above all, trust in politics in general is low, and the proportion of respondents with no party affiliation is relatively high. Politics is polarized, leading to significant dissatisfaction with the inability of politics to effectively address important societal issues. Trust in political institutions as a whole, including the National Assembly, the judiciary, and the executive branch, is considerably low, and anti-elitist sentiment is strong. Consequently, during presidential elections, there are movements seeking 'outsiders' with no political experience to resolve current grievances.

While it may not be possible to definitively label current Korean politics as 'populist politics' compared to other Western democracies, it is clear that the situation has become 'vulnerable' to populist politics due to high distrust in politics overall, distrust in the National Assembly and political parties, anti-elitism, and political polarization. And this politics of polarization and populism provides a favorable environment for the production, distribution, and consumption of fake news (or disinformation).[1]The problem awareness in this paper is that populism and polarization are not solely issues for political suppliers, i.e., politicians or parties, but also require attention to the attitudes of political consumers, i.e., ordinary citizens, who are willing to accept them. In other words, the danger of populism is not just about politicians or parties espousing populist rhetoric and claims, but also related to the attitude of citizens who willingly embrace them. This paper argues that populism thrives in the soil of political polarization, and the acceptance and consumption of fake news are also related to populist attitudes. The generation, distribution, and consumption of fake news are related to political polarization and a receptive attitude towards populism. With this problem awareness, we aim to analyze the relationship between political polarization, populism, and attitudes toward fake news.

2. Populism

Although commonly used, defining populism is actually not easy (Kang Won-taek 2021). Populism cannot be seen as a single, well-defined ideology. Therefore, populism is sometimes referred to as a 'thin' ideology (Mudde 2004; Stanley 2008). The general characteristics observed in real-world politics can be summarized as follows:

First, as the term suggests, populism is fundamentally a political phenomenon related to the masses, the people. Like the expression 'populism is a shadow cast by democracy itself' (Canova 1999: 2-3), democracy and populism are fundamentally difficult to separate. In populism, the entity contrasted with the people is the elite. Populism frames politics as the struggle of the noble and pure ordinary masses, the people, against a corrupt, immoral, and incompetent elite, with the inevitable outcome being the victory of the general will of the people (Mudde 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). Thus, populism inherently possesses an anti-elitist characteristic. When public dissatisfaction with political elites failing to properly address the difficulties of the masses, such as rising unemployment and deepening economic polarization, is combined with corruption, it creates a very favorable environment for the rise of populism.

The second characteristic of populism is distrust in representative democracy. Existing political parties or elites are seen as merely representing vested interests, thus favoring direct popular participation and the direct expression of will over mediation by existing parties or interest groups. Instead of relying on complex political structures, they advocate for the people to directly decide important policies through methods like referendums, which do not require elite mediation (Seo Byung-hoon 2008: 117). In essence, populism embodies distrust in the system of representation and party politics, which are fundamental to the operation of liberal democratic systems.

The third characteristic is the politics of division and exclusion. There is a clear distinction between 'us' and 'them,' and there exists an object of hatred and exclusion. In recent forms of populism, 'we' is narrowly defined by cultural factors such as religion, race, class, or customs (Galston 2019: 11), leading to hostility and exclusion towards 'them.' This is evident in the sentiments of nationalism, racism, patriotism, and regionalism seen in Europe, and the resulting arguments for anti-immigration, anti-refugee policies, protectionism, separatism, and anti-EU stances. Trump's promise to build 'a big beautiful wall' on the border with Mexico during the 2016 US presidential election can also be included here. This involves finding external 'them' or 'enemies' to blame for economic and social problems that are difficult to solve realistically, thereby shifting responsibility and criticism onto them (Mounk 2018: 15). Indeed, phenomena that attribute socioeconomic difficulties or social conflicts in the US and Europe to immigrants or minority ethnic groups are emerging, forming a major basis for populism.

The fourth characteristic is its anti-liberal and collectivist nature. Of particular concern is its negation of pluralism, a core value of liberal democracy. Pluralism, which posits that diverse citizens who are free, equal, and irreducible coexist (Galston 2019: 12-13), is difficult to accept in populism, which emphasizes the will of the people and presupposes the superiority and purity of one group over others. Populism, by emphasizing the general will of the entire populace, is incompatible with pluralism, which is predicated on difference and diversity.

The fifth characteristic is the emphasis on an idealized past (heartland) accepted as a related concept within the community (Taggart 2017: 163-169). In reality, the heartland is an imaginary space, and it is during times of hardship that such an ideal is explicitly invoked. However, this ideal society is not a utopia; it is an idealized vision drawn from memories of the past to reclaim what has been lost. Trump's slogan 'Make America Great Again' in the 2016 US presidential election serves as an example of this.

The sixth characteristic is the preference for a strong leader with charismatic leadership. Charismatic leaders are not only seen as embodying the values that the people desire in political leaders, such as integrity, honesty, and simplicity, but are also considered to possess special powers to rescue and protect the people in times of crisis (Joo Jeong-rip 2006: 59-61). This tendency sometimes leads to illiberal democracy or delegative democracy, as mentioned earlier.

Considering these characteristics, populism can be described as 'a reactionary politics that criticizes the ideas, institutions, and practices of representative politics and seeks, potentially or explicitly, an idealized past as a response to social crises' (Taggart 2017: 23).

Populist political phenomena are also emerging in South Korea recently. While it is difficult to definitively label them as populist or populist parties, such tendencies are observable. Discussions on populism began during the Roh Moo-hyun administration (Kim Il-young 2004), but its characteristics became clearly evident during the Moon Jae-in administration, which advocated for 'clearing out deep-rooted evils' after the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye (Cha Tae-seo 2021: 152-153). The 'pro-Japan collaborator' theory, framed as an 'enemy image' by pro-Moon factions at the time, can be cited as an example.

The conceptualization of 'pro-Japan collaborators' as a fusion of populism and anti-Japanese nationalism, or a combination of racism and anti-elitist sentiment, represents a chauvinistic exclusionary language that labels opponents as 'non-citizens' and expresses a populist mentality opposed to pluralism. This concept was primarily mobilized in the context of the diplomatic conflict between South Korea and Japan, triggered by the Supreme Court ruling acknowledging the responsibility of Japanese companies for wartime forced labor, and against the backdrop of the so-called 'Jeongui Association/Yoon Mi-hyang incident.'... On the other hand, the other pole of identity politics or tribalism is constructed through the process of presupposing the moral superiority of one's own group against a great evil. (Cha Tae-seo 2021: 153)

Furthermore, the Moon Jae-in administration favored direct democratic methods over representative democracy by praising and utilizing the Blue House National Petition and public 'candlelight vigils' rather than discussions in political parties or the National Assembly.

It favors amorphous popular movements like mass rallies and national petitions over the function of interest adjustment by parliamentary politics, party politics, and voluntary associations such as labor unions and professional groups. It incites political impatience, urging immediate solutions, and is accustomed to exerting pressure through prejudice, hatred, and animosity. Representative democracy, which respects opposing views and works through compromise and adjustment amidst differences, is perceived by them merely as a means to maintain vested interests. Virtues necessary for a modern pluralistic society, such as respect for imperfection and wise tolerance of differences and diversity, are dismissed as the cowardice of unenlightened citizens. Contrary to humanity's historical experience of organizing and institutionalizing mutual trust to save conflict and promote community development, they are accustomed to mobilizing distrust rather than trust. They indulge in conspiracy theories and do not restrain their desire to dominate the thoughts of others (Park Sang-hoon 2020: 18).

This type of politics, along with the populist characteristic of 'we are good, the other side is evil,' has further accelerated political polarization. Moreover, with the advancement of information technology, the gatekeeping function of traditional media has weakened, while the rise of new media such as YouTube and SNS has created an environment conducive to the consumption of fake news, exacerbating political polarization. Communication among 'like-minded people' within polarization has intensified, functioning as an echo chamber that reinforces existing views (Diaz Ruiz and Nilsson 2023).

This environment has led to a bias in information consumption, where individuals selectively accept only what 'pleases us' or is 'favorable to our side.' The generation, distribution, and consumption of fake news gain strength in this environment. While there are various factors that allow fake news to be accepted, the politics of populism, which divides camps through the distinction between 'us' and 'them' in political polarization and the accompanying confrontation between good and evil, also influences the acceptance of fake news.

The following section will analyze the impact of partisan polarization and receptivity to populism, as well as attitudes toward populism, on the acceptance of fake news using empirical data.

3. Populism, Partisanship, and Fake News

3.1 Partisan Polarization

As examined above, populism in South Korea is closely related to partisan polarization. The problem awareness here is that populism and polarization are not solely issues for political suppliers, i.e., politicians or parties, but also related to the attitudes of political consumers, i.e., ordinary citizens, who are willing to accept them. Populism is closely related to partisan polarization. As discussed earlier, populism has the characteristic of dividing people into 'us' and 'them.'

Therefore, it is necessary to first examine the extent of current partisan polarization in Korean politics. To do so, we analyzed the differences in partisan preferences. Table 1 analyzes the preferences for the two major parties and key political leaders, as well as national performance evaluations, by party affiliation.

As shown in Table 1, party preferences varied dramatically depending on partisan affiliation. Specifically, the preferences of Democratic Party supporters and People Power Party supporters showed completely opposite results. Both Democratic Party supporters and People Power Party supporters gave positive evaluations of 6 or higher for their preferred party or party-affiliated figures, but gave low evaluations below 2 for the opposing party. Those who responded that they had no party affiliation showed values generally between 3 and 4, consistently in the middle of the two partisan groups. Table 1 clearly illustrates the stark differences in evaluations of opposing parties or politicians based on partisan support. The differences in means were statistically significant across all items. This indicates a very large difference in affective preferences based on partisanship.

This time, we examined the perceived ideological distance rather than affective preferences. Specifically, we investigated how respondents perceive the ideological distance between the two rival parties based on their partisan stance. Figure 1 illustrates the ideological positions of each party as perceived by supporters of each party on an ideological spectrum.

First, ideological proximity based on party support is confirmed. The utility of the proximity model, as argued by Downs (1957), is confirmed here. For Democratic Party supporters, the ideological distance to the Democratic Party was 0.28, while the distance to the People Power Party was a considerable 3.85. The ideological distance between Democratic Party supporters and Lee Jae-myung was 0.58, while the distance to President Yoon Suk-yeol was 3.96. This pattern was also observed among People Power Party supporters: the ideological distance between the People Power Party and its supporters was 0.74, and the ideological distance between People Power Party supporters and President Yoon Suk-yeol was 0.99. In contrast, the ideological distance between People Power Party supporters and the Democratic Party was 3.84, and the distance to Lee Jae-myung was 4.07.

Furthermore, the perceived ideological distance between the two rival parties and between the two main political leaders was found to be very large by supporters of each party. The ideological distance between the Democratic Party and the People Power Party, as perceived by Democratic Party supporters, was 4.13, and the ideological distance between Lee Jae-myung and President Yoon Suk-yeol was 4.54. For People Power Party supporters, the perceived distance between the two parties was 4.58, and the ideological distance between President Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung was perceived to be even greater at 5.06.

As can be seen here, Korean voters perceive a very large ideological difference between the parties. This perception of significant ideological distance may be one factor making compromise and adjustment between the two partisan groups difficult.

Moreover, supporters of both parties perceived their own party as taking a relatively moderate stance ideologically, while perceiving the opposing party as taking an extreme stance. Democratic Party supporters consider themselves, the Democratic Party, and Lee Jae-myung to be in the 3-4 range, i.e., relatively moderate progressive, while viewing the People Power Party and Yoon Suk-yeol as taking a very strong conservative stance, close to 8. Similarly, People Power Party supporters perceive themselves as taking a relatively moderate conservative stance between 6-7, while viewing the opposing party and Lee Jae-myung as taking a very strong progressive stance at 2-3. This indicates that they perceive the partisan polarization situation as arising because their own side is moderate while the opposing side is extreme. This result suggests that responsibility for political deadlock or stalemate can be shifted away from 'our side' to 'the other side.'

The analysis in Figure 1 is based on the respondents' self-placement on the ideological spectrum. A common criticism of using subjective ideological evaluations is that their validity may be reduced because respondents may use different criteria for their evaluations (Park Kyung-mi, Han Jeong-taek, Lee Ji-ho 2021: 131-133). Considering this, we examined the differences in policy stances between party supporters on specific policy issues.

Table 2 includes questions on a total of nine policy issues. These nine questions reflect three distinct ideological attributes each (Kang Won-taek 2005). The first category concerns inter-Korean relations and security policies. Since 2002, foreign policy and security issues, such as North Korea and relations with the US, have caused intense ideological conflict between conservatives and progressives in Korean politics. Table 3 includes questions on attitudes towards three policy areas: strengthening relations with the US, strengthening relations with Japan, and inter-Korean cooperation. The second category is the economy. This can be considered the most classic area of ideological division. In Western class politics, the typical ideological distinction is between the right, which emphasizes market competition and efficiency, and the left, which emphasizes state intervention and equity. This section includes three question items: taxation, labor union participation in management, and privatization of public enterprises. The third category is social issues, which reflects the difference in attitudes between libertarianism and authoritarianism. Emphasis on individual freedom, autonomy, and choice is considered progressive, while emphasis on order, tradition, and authority is considered conservative. This section includes three policy items: regulation of protests and assemblies, alternative military service, and corporal punishment in schools.

The analysis results are quite interesting: consistent and clear differences in stances were confirmed between Democratic Party supporters and People Power Party supporters across all nine items. Differences in stances were evident not only in the areas of inter-Korean relations and security, which have been major factors in 'North-South conflict' between conservative and progressive parties, but also in the economic and social domains. This indicates that the differences in perspective based on partisan affiliation have clearly extended across all policy areas. The results in Table 2 strongly demonstrate the severe level of partisan polarization in contemporary Korean society.

Based on these results, one might argue that partisan polarization stems from these differences in policy stances. However, it is not entirely clear whether these differences in perspective accurately reflect the policy stances shared by supporters of each party. It is possible that partisan affiliation takes precedence, leading to persuasion where supporters adopt their party's policy stances, or it could be the result of projection, where respondents infer their party's policy direction (Brody and Page 1972). In other words, it could be the result of rationalization of one's policy stances to align with partisan affiliation.

Examining this in relation to ideological attitudes further clarifies the characteristics. As shown in Table 3, clear differences are observed across the three policy areas based on ideological stances of conservative, progressive, and moderate. The pattern of average values also clearly shows the order of 'progressive < moderate < conservative.' In this regard, the differences in partisan stances seen in Table 2 could be interpreted as reflecting ideological attitudes.

However, Table 4 reveals a somewhat different picture. It is not necessarily the case that party affiliation and ideological attitudes align perfectly. Among Democratic Party supporters, the proportion who self-identified as progressive was slightly over half at 54.3%. Among Democratic Party supporters, the response of 'moderate' was quite high at 34.2%, and even 11.5% identified as conservative. Among People Power Party supporters, 62.4% identified themselves as conservative, but 'moderate' was also high at around 30%, and 8.3% identified as progressive. This indicates that while partisan affiliation and ideological attitudes have a certain degree of correlation, they do not perfectly align.

Therefore, the highly consistent and clear partisan differentiation across all nine policy issues shown in Table 2 appears to be the result of persuasion or projection, i.e., partisan rationalization, influenced by partisanship, rather than a reflection of ideological stances. In reality, the factor of partisanship amplifies the differences in policy stances, rather than simply reflecting the actual differences held by the general public. The consistent and clear differences in policy stances can be seen as the result of partisan mobilization, persuasion, or projection, rather than the outcome of each voter's judgment on policy direction.

3.2 Partisan Polarization and Populism

Next, we will examine the impact of partisan polarization on populism. This survey utilized populist items proposed by Akkerman et al. (2014). The specific items are as follows:

1. Politicians in the National Assembly should follow the will of the entire nation.

2. The most important policy decisions should be made by the people, not by politicians.

3. I prefer to be represented by an ordinary citizen rather than a professional politician.

4. The difference in political stances between elites and the people is greater than the difference among ordinary people.

5. Politicians conclude compromises to protect their privileges.

6. Elected officials talk a lot but do little in action.

7. Politics is ultimately a confrontation between good and evil.

8. What people call compromise in politics is merely abandoning principles.

The eight items can be categorized into three dimensions representing the characteristics of populism. Items 1, 2, and 3 indicate skepticism towards representative democracy and a preference for direct democracy or mass direct participation. Items 4, 5, and 6 can be categorized as representing anti-elitist attitudes. Items 7 and 8 signify anti-pluralism, or the politics of drawing boundaries and confrontation between 'us' and 'them.'

First, we examined the average responses to these eight items.

The highest average score among the eight items was for 'Elected officials talk a lot but do little in action' (4.21), followed by 'Politicians conclude compromises to protect their privileges' (4.14). This indicates a considerable distrust in politicians and an anti-elitist attitude. Next were 'Politicians in the National Assembly should follow the will of the entire nation' (4.11) and 'The most important policy decisions should be made by the people, not by politicians' (3.96), suggesting a stronger tendency for direct mass leadership over representative democracy. When the three categories were combined, the order was anti-elite > mass direct leadership > good vs. evil, confrontational politics.

Next, we examined populist attitudes in relation to party affiliation. As shown in Table 6, differences were observed based on party affiliation. Those with a party affiliation showed a more receptive attitude towards populism. This suggests that populist attitudes are related to existing political parties, which differs from the rise of populism centered around new or non-mainstream parties in Europe. However, no statistically significant difference was found in the anti-elite category, suggesting that this sentiment is widely shared regardless of partisan affiliation. Among the three categories, the anti-elite dimension had the highest average.

Given the connection between existing party politics and populist attitudes, we now examine the relationship between support for the Democratic Party and the People Power Party, and populist attitudes. As shown in Table 7, differences based on partisan affiliation were confirmed. Generally, stronger populist attitudes were observed among Democratic Party supporters. Democratic Party supporters showed stronger tendencies in mass direct leadership and anti-elite sentiments. However, no significant difference in means was found between supporters of the two parties regarding attitudes related to the politics of good versus evil and confrontational politics. Supporters of both parties exhibited similar levels of these attitudes.

Based on this discussion, we analyzed the factors influencing populist attitudes. The independent variables included partisan affiliation, favorability towards political leaders, ideology, political satisfaction, trust in major state institutions, as well as political knowledge, political interest, gender, age, and education level. The results of the linear regression analysis are summarized in Table 8.

3.3 Partisan Polarization and Fake News Acceptance

In the category of direct popular leadership, those who answered 'no party affiliation' showed a strengthening of attitudes when they had progressive subjective ideology and high political interest. In terms of socioeconomic background, it was higher among men and older individuals. Meanwhile, the anti-elite category was higher when presidential trust was low and the preference difference between Yoon Suk-yeol and Moon Jae-in was large. Considering that these two categories showed stronger tendencies among Democratic Party supporters in <Table 6>, these results can be understood.

In the good-vs-evil and confrontational politics categories, it was higher when there was a party affiliation and high trust in the president, and also higher in the conservative orientation of subjective ideology. As seen in <Table 7>, although not statistically significant, these results can be understood considering that this attitude was stronger among People Power Party supporters. As the preference difference between the two parties widened, the acceptance of good-vs-evil and confrontational politics increased. Acceptance was higher among those with lower education or political knowledge, and higher age.

In the popular-led category, which implies a rejection of representative democracy, there was a tendency for higher scores when there was no party affiliation, but in terms of good-vs-evil and confrontational politics, there was a tendency for higher scores when there was a party affiliation. Ultimately, it can be seen that good-vs-evil politics and confrontational politics are premised on partisanship, and such factors influence populism. Ultimately, <Table 8> confirms again that populist attitudes are also related to party affiliation.

However, the most noteworthy point in the analysis of <Table 8> is related to trust in political institutions. The item 'Public officials do not try to listen to the opinions of the general public' and negative trust in the National Assembly were statistically significant in all four areas: the three populist categories and the sum of eight items. Additionally, the item 'It is useless for people like me to say anything about what the government does' was significant in two areas. Among socioeconomic background variables, acceptance of populism increased with age. These results suggest that disappointment and dissatisfaction with political responsiveness, the perception that existing political institutions do not adequately reflect public demands or voices, lead to an accepting attitude towards populism. Ultimately, populist appeals appear to be deeply related to strong distrust in representative institutions like the National Assembly, and a sense of political alienation stemming from the perception that the government or public officials do not properly listen to public demands or appeals.

3.3 Populism and Fake News

Based on this analysis, we proceeded to analyze the factors influencing attitudes toward fake news. For fake news, eight items were presented, and respondents answered on a 4-point Likert scale from '1-Not true at all; 2-Probably not true; 3-Probably true; 4-Completely true'. The eight question items were constructed to include four items of interest to Democratic Party supporters and four items of interest to People Power Party supporters.

○ Fake news that Democratic Party supporters might be interested in

- Traffic congestion has become severe around the presidential office since its relocation to Yongsan.

- The current administration is concealing facts about the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant's contaminated water (treated water).

- Justice Minister Han Dong-hoon allegedly drank with President Yoon Suk-yeol and about 30 lawyers from Kim & Chang at a Cheongdam-dong bar until dawn.

- The Daejang-dong scandal occurred because President Yoon Suk-yeol, during his time as a prosecutor investigating the Busan Savings Bank illegal loan case, allegedly offered preferential treatment only for the Daejang-dong loan.

○ Fake news that People Power Party supporters might be interested in

- Korea Electric Power Corporation's significant deficit is due to the nuclear phase-out policy.

- There was election fraud, such as vote manipulation, in the 2020 general election.

- Traces of North Korea hacking into the National Election Commission's election system have been discovered.

- Due to the 'discontinuation of 검수완박 (transfer of investigative authority from prosecution to police)', the police's investigative burden has increased, leading to a shortage of personnel at police substations.

To verify whether these distinctions are indeed perceived differently by party supporters, we examined the average responses to issues of interest to each party's supporters, categorized by party. As shown in <Table 9>, the degree of reaction to different fake news items varied by party affiliation. Notably, the responses to issues of interest to Democratic Party supporters showed a clear contrast between party affiliations: Democratic Party supporters tended to accept them as true, while People Power Party supporters tended to view the same issues as largely untrue. <Table 9> confirms that the consumption of fake news differs along partisan lines.

Based on this, we conducted a comprehensive analysis of the factors influencing the acceptance of fake news. <Table 10> uses responses to fake news items of interest to Democratic Party supporters, fake news items of interest to People Power Party supporters, and the sum of all eight fake news items as dependent variables, respectively.

- Populist tendencies: popular-led, anti-elite, good-vs-evil, confrontational

- Political preference difference: absolute difference in preference between the Democratic Party and the People Power Party, absolute difference in preference between Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung, absolute difference in preference between Yoon Suk-yeol and Moon Jae-in

- Ideology: subjective ideology, degree of ideological polarization

- Perception of social conflict: ruling party vs. opposition party, rich vs. poor, conservative vs. progressive, Yeongnam vs. Honam

- Trust in political institutions: President, National Assembly, Executive Branch, Judiciary, Constitutional Court

- Personal political attributes: political interest, political knowledge

- Socioeconomic background variables: age, gender, education level

- Class: household income, household assets, subjective class identification

- Region of origin: Chungcheong, Jeolla, Daegu-Gyeongbuk, Busan-Ulsan-Gyeongnam

Linear regression analysis was performed using variables from these nine categories as independent variables.

The analysis revealed interesting characteristics. Among the populist items, the 'good-vs-evil, confrontational politics' category influenced the acceptance of fake news. That is, politics of division and exclusion. Politics of division and exclusion, where there is a clear distinction between 'us and them' and an object of exclusion and hatred, influences the consumption of fake news. Politics of division and exclusion increased the acceptance of fake news. Politics of division and exclusion can further deepen polarization and strengthen in-group politics and discourse. Fake news is also more easily accepted in such an environment.

This characteristic is reconfirmed in the severity of conflict variables. The greater the perceived conflict between conservative and progressive ideological groups, the higher the acceptance of fake news. In terms of ideology variables, acceptance of fake news increased as ideological positions moved to extremes. That is, acceptance of fake news increased with stronger ideological positions and a greater sense of ideological conflict. However, no statistically significant differences were found regarding political preferences and differences in like/dislike between parties and political leaders.

In addition, trust in major political institutions is noteworthy. Trust in the National Assembly and the President showed different results depending on partisan stance. For the National Assembly, where the Democratic Party holds a majority, trust in the National Assembly was associated with higher acceptance of fake news items of interest to Democratic Party supporters, while lower trust in the National Assembly was associated with higher acceptance of fake news items of interest to People Power Party supporters. Regarding trust in the President, who belongs to the People Power Party, the opposite pattern was observed compared to the National Assembly: lower presidential trust was associated with higher fake news acceptance for items of interest to Democratic Party supporters, and higher presidential trust was associated with higher acceptance for items of interest to People Power Party supporters. This indicates that fake news consumption is closely related to partisan stance, and as observed earlier, the intensified partisan polarization affects fake news consumption.

However, regarding political institutions, the judiciary is noteworthy. For both the courts and the Constitutional Court, lower trust was associated with higher acceptance of fake news. For items of interest to Democratic Party supporters, lower trust in the courts was associated with higher fake news acceptance, and for items of interest to People Power Party supporters, lower trust in the Constitutional Court was associated with higher acceptance. Both the courts and the Constitutional Court showed statistically significant results when all eight items were aggregated. This demonstrates that a decline in trust in the judiciary is related to the acceptance of fake news. The partisan evaluation of political institutions and the decline in trust in the judiciary both increase the acceptance of fake news, suggesting that low trust in major political institutions in South Korea is a cause for increased acceptance of fake news.

By age, younger individuals showed higher acceptance of fake news. By region of origin, statistically significant results were found only for the Jeolla region, where acceptance of issues of interest to the Democratic Party was high, while belief in issues of interest to the People Power Party was low. This appears to reflect the characteristic of the Honam region being a stronghold for the Democratic Party.

Ultimately, the acceptance of fake news reflects the various problems in our politics. The populist attitude of 'good-vs-evil, confrontational politics,' related to partisan polarization, influences the acceptance of fake news, and low trust in 'institutional arbiters' such as the judiciary increases the acceptance of fake news.

4. Public Opinion on Fake News Regulation as Revealed by the EAI Public Opinion Survey

This paper analyzed the impact of partisan polarization and populist attitudes on the acceptance of fake news. The findings of this paper can be summarized as follows.

First, partisan polarization was found to be severe. The ideological distance between parties perceived by supporters of each party was so large as to make compromise difficult. The perception that one's own party is generally moderate while the opposing party is ideologically extreme was similarly observed among supporters of both parties. This appears to be an attribution of responsibility for the ideological gap to the opposing side. Consistent and clear partisan attitudes were also confirmed in terms of policy, suggesting that this is a result of political rationalization, such as persuasion and projection by the party, rather than a difference in self-judged positions. In other words, parties are mobilizing partisan polarization.

In terms of populist attitudes, they were found to be related to partisanship, specifically party affiliation. However, the most noteworthy point is that the problem of political responsiveness, the perception that political institutions do not adequately reflect public demands or voices, leads to an accepting attitude towards populism. Regarding political institutions, lower trust in the National Assembly was associated with a higher acceptance of populist attitudes, and lower external political efficacy, meaning the belief that public officials or the government are indifferent or unresponsive to one's demands or thoughts, led to higher populist attitudes. The failure of existing political institutions in terms of responsiveness is fostering populist politics.

Regarding fake news, the 'good-vs-evil, confrontational politics' attribute influenced the acceptance of fake news. Politics of division and exclusion, which define an 'enemy' as an object of exclusion and hatred, affected fake news consumption. Politics of division created an environment conducive to fake news.

Regarding political institutions, a significant point is that low trust in the judiciary increases the acceptance of fake news. For both the courts and the Constitutional Court, lower trust was associated with higher acceptance of fake news.

Trust in political institutions such as the President and the National Assembly influences fake news acceptance in a partisan manner, and above all, a decline in trust in the judiciary increases the acceptance of fake news. The seriousness of the fake news problem is highlighted by its connection not only to political parties but also to low trust in South Korea's major political institutions. These results clearly demonstrate the urgent need for political reform to achieve more competitive and transparent politics.

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[1]Here, fake news is used in the sense of disinformation, a more universal term than fake news.

■ Kang Won-taekDirector, EAI Center for Democracy and Peace; Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Responsible Editor: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries and Editorial: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr