[Public Opinion on Korea-Japan Relations Series] ⑧ Korea-Japan Security Relations Through Public Opinion Polls: Is Security Important in Korea-Japan Relations?

I. Introduction

Under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, Korea-Japan relations have been improving. The reciprocal visits of President Yoon Suk-yeol to Japan in March 2023 and Prime Minister Kishida to South Korea in May 2023 restored shuttle diplomacy after a 12-year hiatus, emphasizing dialogue and cooperation between the two governments. Ahead of his visit to Japan, President Yoon stated in an address to the nation that "Korea and Japan are neighbors by destiny who have historically and culturally interacted most closely," and pointed out that "Korea-Japan relations can be, and must be, a win-win relationship where we achieve more by working together."[1] Following the summit meeting on May 7, Prime Minister Kishida emphasized, "We want to strengthen Korea-Japan relations and open a new era by working together." The resumption of shuttle diplomacy has marked a turning point in bilateral relations, which had been strained, and discussions are now underway for future cooperation between Korea and Japan.

Looking back, Korea-Japan relations may have been the most contentious among South Korea's foreign relations over the past decade. This is because South Korea's relations with Japan have been shaped by historical experiences, including the colonial period. Koreans' perceptions of past events have not only formed the basis for their image of Japan but have also significantly influenced foreign policy decisions. Realism in international relations theory posits that foreign policy is determined by the distribution of relative power among states, while liberalism emphasizes foreign policies that create absolute gains through economic interdependence. Constructivism, on the other hand, suggests that foreign policy can change based on the socio-cultural characteristics historically experienced by a state. In this regard, historical experiences and perceptions of past events can be important factors in shaping foreign policy. Son Yeol (2018) argued that the unique characteristics of Korea-Japan relations, where national identity is shaped by the collective memory of interpreting the past, have influenced relations with the other country. This implies that understanding South Korea's relations with Japan requires considering the socio-cultural context of past events.

As mentioned earlier, while perceptions of past events are a significant factor in shaping South Korea's relations with Japan, they are not the sole determinant in comprehensively explaining the dynamics of Korea-Japan relations. Since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965, the two countries have exhibited a dual characteristic of alternating between conflict and cooperation. If only negative perceptions of the other country based on past events existed, Korea-Japan relations would have been characterized solely by conflict. However, the reality is that relations have followed a complex evolutionary path, oscillating between conflict and cooperation, or vice versa (Nam Ki-jeong 2015). Notably, during the period of U.S.-China strategic competition from 2011 to 2021, conflict dominated Korea-Japan relations more than cooperation. Domestically, the comfort women issue resurfaced, reigniting social conflict. Furthermore, unlike Japan, South Korea pursued denuclearization of North Korea through dialogue and focused the Korea-U.S. alliance on defending the Korean Peninsula. While Japan proposed the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" strategy and strengthened its alliance cooperation with the United States, trilateral cooperation among Korea, the U.S., and Japan was delayed due to strained Korea-Japan relations (Cho Eun-il 2021).

What, then, is the current state of Korea-Japan relations? Amidst ongoing U.S.-China strategic competition, the Biden administration came into power. Unlike the previous Trump administration, the Biden administration places importance on the stable management of Korea-Japan relations and is reassessing the strategic value of security cooperation among Korea, the U.S., and Japan, not only for Korean Peninsula security but also for Indo-Pacific regional security. Subsequently, with the advent of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in South Korea, policy towards Japan also entered a period of change. In other words, Korea-Japan relations, which had exposed conflicts in various areas since 2018, including domestic political conflicts stemming from the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor, the low-altitude flight incident involving a Japanese patrol aircraft and the suspension of military cooperation, Japan's export control measures against South Korea and the ensuing trade disputes, and South Korea's notification to terminate the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the resulting security conflicts, are undergoing transformation. This improvement in bilateral relations is also positively impacting trilateral relations among Korea, the U.S., and Japan, with the trilateral summit held at Camp David in August 2023 serving as a policy turning point for the reactivation of security cooperation among the three nations.

These government-level changes demonstrate shifts in Korea-Japan relations at the policy-making level. What, then, are the perceptions of the public in both countries? If the government positively addresses Korea-Japan relations, will it be reflected in public opinion? Is there a consensus among the publics on important issues? If there is a certain level of likeability or goodwill between the publics, it suggests a higher likelihood of sustainability for government-led relationship improvements. However, if public perceptions of each other and their views on key issues differ from government-led changes, the sustainability of government-led relationship improvements may be uncertain.

Against this backdrop, it is meaningful to examine how mutual perceptions of the publics in both countries have evolved and to present prospects for future developments. The Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey, conducted annually by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in Korea and The Genron NPO in Japan since 2013, provides public opinion data tracking changes in mutual perceptions between the two nations. For a comprehensive analysis of public opinion in both countries, it is necessary to conduct a time-series analysis of survey results for specific questions. This allows for tracking changes in public perception.

However, this study aims to analyze the characteristics of Korea-Japan relations specifically within the context of security issues. The objective is to illustrate the trends in public opinion regarding security issues. For instance, both Korea and Japan have shared the security threat of North Korea's nuclear program, yet they have been hesitant to pursue security cooperation to resolve it. One argument suggests that this is due to the existence of mutually hostile national identities between the two countries, which have led to conflictual bilateral relations based on foreign policies derived from these identities (Glosserman & Snyder 2015). The Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey results can be usefully applied to empirically analyze this. If mutual perceptions regarding national identity, foreign policy views, and historical issues are similar or identical to security perceptions, it can be inferred that security issues have also influenced the direction of Korea-Japan relations. However, if there is a discrepancy between perceptions of security issues and those of other domains, further discussion will be needed to interpret and understand this.

II. Korea-Japan Security Relations as Reflected in Public Opinion Polls

1. Security Issues Influencing Korea-Japan Relations

Discussions on public opinion in foreign policy are diverse, and it is difficult to assert that public opinion has an absolute influence on the policy-making process.[2] Although the influence of public opinion on foreign policy may be limited, it can serve to restrict the scope of policy towards a particular country. For example, if public opinion solidifies a certain stereotype about a country, it becomes difficult for policy elites to create or change policies that do not reflect that public opinion. In democratic states, policy elites cannot easily ignore public dissatisfaction and opposition. In this regard, public opinion is an important variable to consider in shaping foreign policy, and research that understands public perceptions of other countries is necessary.

While various public opinion polls confirm South Koreans' perceptions of Japan, research on public opinion in Korea-Japan relations has not yet accumulated extensively. For instance, South Korean public opinion on Japan is periodically surveyed in the National Unification Survey by the Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, the Unification Survey by the Korea Institute for National Unification, public opinion surveys by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, and Gallup Korea surveys. Regarding Japanese public opinion on South Korea, there is an annual survey on diplomacy (外交に関する世論調査) conducted by the Cabinet Office of Japan. Furthermore, the joint Korea-Japan public opinion polls conducted by the Hankook Ilbo and Yomiuri Shimbun since 1995, similar to those by EAI-Genron NPO, are conducted jointly by both countries. The regular conduct of such opinion polls has enabled a general understanding of South Korean perceptions of Japan.[3]

Korea and Japan can be considered important security cooperation partners. However, historically, despite their importance, security cooperation between Korea and Japan has not been institutionalized. Neither Korea nor Japan is a military ally, nor do they participate in a multilateral security cooperation framework. Instead, Korea-Japan security relations have developed as part of a U.S.-led hub-and-spoke alliance system since the Cold War. This contrasts with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which the U.S. established as a multilateral security alliance to prevent the collapse of the European continental order (Campbell 2016). The U.S. has repeatedly engaged in and withdrawn from East Asia centered on its bilateral alliance system, and Korea-Japan security relations have been affected in this process. Cha (2000) defined Korea and Japan as a quasi-alliance, sharing the U.S. as a common ally, and explained their security relations during the Cold War, even though they did not have a mutual military alliance.[4] Furthermore, he explained that while Korea and Japan focus on their alliance with the U.S. during normal times, security cooperation between the two countries is pursued during crises when the U.S. reduces its regional engagement. Although Cha's research provides a useful framework for explaining the conditions under which cooperation is possible despite conflicts between Korea and Japan, it has limitations in that it explains the fluctuations in Korea-Japan security relations by making U.S. Asian policy an independent variable.

What, then, is the significance of security issues in bilateral relations? Son Yeol (2018) argues that security, economic, and identity variables do not exist independently but are interconnected and mutually influential. Instead of each variable independently affecting Korea-Japan relations, the three issues are complexly linked depending on the situation, exerting positive or negative influences. In other words, economic interdependence can foster a virtuous cycle where security competition is eased and similar identities are formed. Conversely, economic competition and persistent security tensions can create a vicious cycle that escalates into identity conflicts, worsening public sentiment. Korea-Japan relations are thus defined by this security-economy-identity nexus.

What security issues have been prominently raised in Korea-Japan relations? First, the influence of the U.S. variable on Korea-Japan security relations. This is linked to South Koreans' perceptions of Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation. It also includes South Koreans' perceptions of the Japan Self-Defense Forces' intervention in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula in support of the Korea-U.S. alliance. Second, security issues addressed in bilateral relations. While territorial disputes like Dokdo have been treated as persistent sources of conflict in Korea-Japan security relations, issues such as the patrol aircraft incident and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) have emerged as temporary sources of conflict. These issues have sometimes led to negative chain reactions, handled more conflictually due to historical issues between Korea and Japan, supporting the argument that various issues in Korea-Japan relations are complexly interconnected.

2. Empirical Analysis Through Public Opinion Polls

How, then, does public opinion view security issues in Korea-Japan relations? Various issues exist in Korea-Japan relations, and historical perceptions and territorial disputes have long been sources of heightened mutual negative perceptions. Public opinion in both countries has tended to view the other negatively;[5] this study aims to empirically analyze whether this is also true for security issues through public opinion polls. Specifically, it seeks to analyze survey results addressing questions such as whether the publics of Korea and Japan perceive each other as a threat, whether they believe a military conflict between Korea and Japan is possible, and to what extent they expect security cooperation between the two countries to occur, and to present their implications. For this purpose, the results of the Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey conducted by the East Asia Institute and The Genron NPO since 2013 will be utilized. However, there are items that have been surveyed continuously from 2013 to 2023 and items that have been surveyed discontinuously. Also, some items are surveyed individually for Korea and Japan, which may make horizontal comparative analysis of public opinion in both countries difficult.

1) Do the publics of Korea and Japan perceive each other as a military threat?

The persistent territorial disputes in Korea-Japan relations are also issues of military security for both countries. In situations where territorial disputes over Dokdo hinder Korea-Japan relations or become priority issues for discussion between the leaders of Korea and Japan, the question arises: do the publics of Korea and Japan perceive each other as a military threat? According to realism, states assess threats based on the military capabilities of other states, but in reality, military threats are sometimes determined by subjective perceptions based on the relationship with the other party. This is because threat perceptions can be produced or eliminated through interaction with the other party, not just through existing external threats. As such, threats have multifaceted aspects that include subjective dimensions, and threat perceptions can change with shifts in interstate relations.

<Table 1> shows the countries (or regions) that the publics of Korea and Japan perceive as military threats. The Korean survey results are from 2014 to 2023, and the Japanese survey results are from 2013 to 2023, excluding 2021. While the Korean public perceives North Korea, China, and Japan as military threats, the Japanese public perceives North Korea, China, and Russia as military threats. Both countries commonly perceive North Korea and China as threats, and the Korean public perceives Japan as a threat.

Specifically, from 2014 to 2016, the Korean public perceived Japan as a military threat after North Korea. From 2017 onwards, they perceived China as a military threat after North Korea. South Korea decided to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense System (THADD) to counter the North Korean threat, and its deployment to U.S. military bases in Korea was decided in 2016. China opposed the deployment, stating that THAAD deployment could harm China's security and national interests.[6] Following the decision to deploy THAAD, China implemented economic retaliatory measures against South Korea, including a ban on tourism to South Korea, starting in 2017. In other words, it can be understood that as the conflict between Korea and China over the THAAD deployment escalated and China's economic retaliation against South Korea became visible, the proportion of the Korean public perceiving China as a military threat increased relative to Japan.

<Table 1> Countries or Regions Considered Military Threats

Korean Survey Results(Unit: %)

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Japan Survey Results

(Unit: %)

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Meanwhile, Japanese public opinion has, depending on the period, viewed North Korea and China as similar levels of military threats, and since 2022, has perceived North Korea, China, and Russia as all posing significant military threats. Furthermore, the response rate considering South Korea a military threat has been around 10%. This shows a difference compared to the percentage of respondents who consider South Korea a military threat.

Indeed, the territorial dispute over Dokdo is a continuously raised issue between South Korea and Japan.[7] However, regarding the possibility of the territorial dispute escalating into an actual military conflict, public opinion in both countries has shown a common stance of reservation. <Figure 1> illustrates the perceptions of public opinion in both countries regarding the possibility of a South Korea-Japan military conflict. South Korean public opinion generally responded that a military conflict with Japan would not occur, followed by responses indicating that if a conflict were to occur, it would be in the distant future, not within a few years. Japanese public opinion also largely responded that a military conflict with South Korea would not occur. Concurrently, approximately 20-30% of respondents were either unaware or did not respond regarding the possibility of conflict. This indicates that public opinion in both South Korea and Japan does not foresee a military conflict between the two countries in the short term. However, this does not mean that the possibility of military conflict itself is entirely dismissed. This demonstrates that the territorial dispute over Dokdo remains a complex issue in the public opinion of both countries.

<Figure 1> Stance on the Possibility of South Korea-Japan Military Conflict

South Korean Survey Results(Unit: %)

Japanese Survey Results(Unit: %)

Both South Korea and Japan perceive North Korea as a significant military threat. North Korea conducted a nuclear test in February 2013 and adopted the line of parallel development of economy and nuclear weapons in March. Subsequently, it has pursued the advancement of nuclear technology by conducting successive nuclear tests in January and September 2016, and September 2017. Although efforts were made to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through the North Korea-U.S. summits in June 2018 and February 2019, no substantial progress has been made to date. North Korea legislated its nuclear weapons policy in September 2022 and seeks to gain the status of a nuclear-weapon state from the international community. Against this backdrop, public opinion in South Korea and Japan responded that North Korea is considered a significant military threat.

Given the ongoing military tensions due to such North Korean threats and the unresolved North Korean nuclear issue, what should be done? <Figure 2> shows the stance on possessing one's own nuclear weapons if the North Korean nuclear threat persists. From 2019 to 2023, South Korean public opinion largely supported the idea that South Korea should possess nuclear weapons if the North Korean nuclear threat continues. While the survey results in 2018 showed 50.3% opposing South Korea's possession of nuclear weapons due to some agreements reached on the North Korean nuclear issue during the inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summits, the proportion of respondents favoring South Korea's possession of nuclear weapons increased from 2019 onwards, in a situation where practical progress in North Korea's denuclearization could not be expected. Meanwhile, Japanese public opinion showed a majority opposing Japan's possession of nuclear weapons, with over 60% against it, even if the North Korean nuclear threat persists.

<Figure 2> Stance on Nuclear Weapons Possession Amidst Persistent North Korean Nuclear Threat

South Korean Survey Results(Unit: %)

Japanese Survey Results(Unit: %)

Furthermore, <Figure 3> illustrates the perception of the other country possessing nuclear weapons when the North Korean nuclear threat persists. South Korean public opinion opposes Japan's possession of nuclear weapons, and similarly, Japanese public opinion opposes South Korea's possession of nuclear weapons. While public opinion in South Korea and Japan shows differing stances on possessing their own nuclear weapons, they maintain an attitude of opposition to the other country possessing nuclear weapons.>

<Figure 3> Stance on the Other Country Possessing Nuclear Weapons Amidst Persistent North Korean Nuclear Threat

2) Is South Korean and Japanese Public Opinion Positive or Negative Towards Security Cooperation?

Over the past decade, South Korea-Japan relations have been strained without signs of improvement. Consequently, public opinion in both countries perceives each other negatively. Diplomatic friction between South Korea and Japan arose following the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor in 2018. In July 2019, the Japanese government imposed export control measures on materials for semiconductors to South Korea, and in response, the South Korean government considered terminating the extension of the South Korea-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Thus, diplomatic friction stemming from historical issues expanded into the economic sphere and created negative chain reactions, such as politicizing security issues.

The fluctuations in South Korea-Japan relations have also affected the military domain. Despite diplomatic tensions in the past, defense exchanges and military information sharing between the two countries have continued. In December 2018, a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force patrol aircraft flew at a low altitude near the South Korean Navy's destroyer ROKS Gwanggaeto the Great, posing a threat.[8] South Korea claimed that the Japanese patrol aircraft's close, low-altitude flight posed a threat to the South Korean destroyer, while Japan asserted that the South Korean destroyer's radar lock endangered the Japanese patrol aircraft's operations. These contrasting claims further strained South Korea-Japan relations. During the period of diplomatic friction between South Korea and Japan due to the Supreme Court ruling, a conflict also arose between the defense authorities of both countries over the low-altitude flight of the patrol aircraft.

What assessment did South Korean public opinion make regarding the occurrence of such an incident? <Table 5> shows the perception of South Korean public opinion regarding the low-altitude flight incident involving the Japanese patrol aircraft. 61.9% of respondents believed that the South Korean government's claim was correct. Across ideological distributions, progressives (63%), moderates (62.3%), and conservatives (60.5%) showed similar response rates. This indicates that there is not a significant ideological divergence on security issues.

<Table 2> Stance on the Patrol Aircraft Incident (2019 South Korean Survey Results, Unit %)

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<Figure 4> Stance on ROK-Japan Security Cooperation Amidst Conflict (2019 South Korean Survey Results)

Interestingly, even amidst these conflict situations, public opinion in South Korea evaluates ROK-Japan security cooperation positively. <Figure 5> shows the survey results asking about the stance on ROK-Japan security cooperation amidst conflict, and whether it should be pursued. 65% responded that ROK-Japan security cooperation should be pursued despite conflicts, while 16% responded that it should not. Among those who answered it should be pursued, 44.9% recognized the need for trust recovery between the two countries, and among those who answered it should not be pursued, 6.2% expressed the stance that pursuing ROK-Japan security cooperation is unnecessary for any reason. Security cooperation between countries sharing threats is easier to pursue, thus a common perception of the North Korean threat can be a condition for developing ROK-Japan relations.

The ROK and Japan have developed bilateral cooperation alongside trilateral cooperation involving the United States. As both countries have military alliance relationships with the U.S., they have engaged in security cooperation with it. Simultaneously, ROK-U.S.-Japan relations, where the ROK and Japan cooperate with the U.S. as the central axis, have also been treated with importance.

<Figure 5> Stance on Strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation

South Korean Survey Results(Unit: %)

Japanese Survey Results(Unit: %)

<Figure 5> shows the perceptions of public opinion in South Korea and Japan regarding the strengthening of ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. In surveys asking about the stance on whether ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation should be strengthened, public opinion in South Korea largely responded affirmatively. Except for 2020, over 60% agreed to strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Negative responses regarding ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation were around 10%. Public opinion in Japan was largely neutral, neither agreeing nor disagreeing with strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation; however, in 2023, the proportion of respondents who agreed to strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation (35.3%) became the majority for the first time. While public opinion in both South Korea and Japan did not hold negative perceptions towards strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation, it demonstrates that positive perceptions of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation are higher in South Korea than in Japan.

Although there are differences in the preferences of public opinion in South Korea and Japan regarding the strengthening of ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, the reasons for agreeing to strengthen cooperation were similar. <Table 6> shows the results of the South Korean survey, where from 2018 to 2023, excluding 2022, over 70% of respondents answered that strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation is essential for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, the Japanese survey results also showed the highest proportion of respondents stating that strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation is necessary for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. It is interesting that public opinion in both South Korea and Japan recognizes the role of ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In other words, it can be seen that public opinion in both countries recognizes the importance of U.S. engagement in easing military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and positively evaluates the role of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation in responding to North Korean issues.

<Table 3> Reasons for Agreeing to Strengthen ROK-U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation (Unit: %)

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<Figure 6> SDF Intervention in Case of Korean Peninsula Contingency (South Korean Survey Results, Unit: %)

Meanwhile, the most controversial aspect of ROK-Japan security cooperation is likely the intervention of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. Public opinion in South Korea was predominantly opposed rather than in favor of Japan's military support in the event of an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, as shown in <Figure 6>. 2016 was an exceptional year where opposition was less than support; this is likely due to the heightened threat from North Korea and the diplomatic friction with China over THAAD, which led to a relative perception of the need for ROK-Japan cooperation.

However, looking at the survey results from 2014 to 2021, excluding 2016, over 50% of respondents were negative about SDF intervention. Furthermore, from 2016 onwards, the proportion of respondents in favor of SDF intervention showed a declining trend. While ROK-Japan and ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation is important for addressing North Korean issues, the issue of SDF intervention in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula is a highly sensitive issue domestically in South Korea due to historical issues.

III. Conclusion

This study examined how public opinion in South Korea and Japan perceives security issues by utilizing the results of public opinion surveys conducted from 2013 to 2023. Both South Korea and Japan face the security threat of North Korea's nuclear program, and thus perceived North Korea as the primary military threat. While public opinion in South Korea viewed China and Japan as potential military threats, public opinion in Japan considered China and Russia as military threats. The perception of South Korean public opinion viewing Japan as a military threat stems from the territorial dispute over Dokdo. Although the territorial dispute over Dokdo is a long-standing unresolved security issue in ROK-Japan relations, public opinion in both countries viewed the possibility of military conflict between South Korea and Japan as low. Nevertheless, as the territorial issue remains a diplomatically confrontational issue, public attention to it is expected to continue.

Meanwhile, public opinion in South Korea recognized that security cooperation should be pursued even when conflicts arise between South Korea and Japan, such as in the P-1 reconnaissance aircraft incident. This is because, facing security threats that cannot be resolved in the short term, such as North Korea's nuclear program, security cooperation with Japan is important. However, cooperation in the form of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation, which includes the United States, appears to be more easily developed than bilateral cooperation. For example, public opinion in South Korea showed a negative attitude towards the intervention of the Japanese SDF even in the event of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This is consistent with the fact that while both South Korea and Japan share the security threat from North Korea, they have been passive in bilateral cooperation to resolve it. Instead, public opinion in South Korea viewed ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation as important for North Korean denuclearization and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and public opinion in Japan also held the stance that ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation can contribute to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Public opinion cannot determine policy. However, in a democratic society, if public opinion holds a clear preference on a particular issue, it can constrain policy decisions. This is because, generally, in democratic countries, political leaders are highly sensitive to public opinion, and policies that do not gain public support are difficult to sustain. In that sense, the views of public opinion in South Korea and Japan can be factors that both drive and constrain ROK-Japan relations. Public opinion in South Korea and Japan currently perceives each other with negative images. These negative images, stemming from historical or territorial issues, are like stereotypes that exist and may be difficult to change easily. Therefore, policy efforts to overcome these stereotypes and enable public opinion in both countries to perceive each other positively appear important. Above all, to foster future-oriented ROK-Japan relations, it is necessary to develop policies that present a new vision for cooperation on security issues. ■

[1]On March 21, 2023, President Yoon Suk-yeol's address to the nation on ROK-Japan relations was announced through a cabinet meeting.

[2]On one hand, public opinion tends to be rationally ignorant on international political issues (Guisinger 2009), while on the other hand, it is argued that public opinion constrains policy decisions during wars or crises (Fearon 1994; Gelpi 2017).

[3]Research evaluating Koreans' perceptions of Japan as based on anti-Japanese sentiment exists, as does research indicating that Koreans' perceptions of Japan vary depending on the issue. There is also research examining the interaction between Koreans' anti-Japanese sentiment and foreign policy (Choi Jong-ho et al. 2014; Choi Eun-mi 2021; Deacon 2022).

[4]According to Choi Hee-sik (2011), security cooperation during the Cold War was not determined at the bilateral ROK-Japan level but rather centered on ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation, which included discussions on contingencies on the Korean Peninsula within the scope of U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation.

[5]According to a survey by the East Asia Institute and Genron NPO, in terms of impressions of the other country, South Korea perceived Japan negatively and Japan perceived South Korea negatively from 2013 to 2022. In the 2023 survey, South Korea still perceived Japan negatively, but Japan perceived South Korea positively.

[6]At the South Korea-China summit held in Hangzhou, China, in September 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping directly expressed concerns to then-President Park Geun-hye that the deployment of THAAD would not contribute to regional stability.

[7]Since 2005, Japan has claimed in its Defense White Paper that Takeshima (Dokdo, the name Japan claims) is its inherent territory and remains an unresolved issue.

[8]On December 20, 2018, the ROKS Gwanggaeto the Great, a destroyer of the Republic of Korea Navy, was conducting a humanitarian rescue operation for a North Korean vessel adrift in the East Sea. During this operation, a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force P-1 patrol aircraft approached the Gwanggaeto the Great at a low altitude.

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■ Eun-il Chois a Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

■ Managed and Edited by: Juncheol Oh_EAI Research Assistant

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