[East Asia Institute Policy Series] ⑦ Asymmetry in South Korean and Japanese Citizens' Perceptions of Relative National Status

I. Introduction

Since liberation and the establishment of the state, South Korea has continuously pursued catch-up, using Japan as a model, to overcome its 'backwardness.' For Koreans, Japan was simultaneously an object of pursuit and imitation in economic terms, and a nation to surpass; diplomatically, it was an object of cooperation and a source of conflict, with intertwined perceptions (Kim Ji-yoon et al. 2014). As Japan's high economic growth continued, South Korea sought growth by being incorporated as a subordinate partner to Japan within the global division of labor under US global strategy, while simultaneously exploring its own path of development (Cumings 1984; Nishino Junya 2010). However, from the 1990s onwards, South Korea began full-scale independent technological development, gradually rising to a competitive position with Japan in advanced industries (Kim Yong-yeol 2011). While the Japanese economy experienced stagnation for about 30 years after the collapse of its bubble economy, leading to entrenched low growth, South Korea maintained relatively smooth growth, excluding the period of the financial crisis.

Most significantly, the economic gap between South Korea and Japan has considerably narrowed. According to the World Bank's 2021 data on GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity, South Korea recorded $47,068 and Japan $42,895, with South Korea surpassing Japan (OECD 2023). Furthermore, South Korea's international standing has significantly increased in cultural terms. While in the past, Japanese films, animation, dramas, and music were highly popular in South Korea, now Korean cultural industries, such as 'BTS' and 'Squid Game,' are achieving considerable success by expanding into Asia and beyond (Cho Young-han 2022). In political terms, South Korea has established periodic changes of government, whereas Japan has maintained a dominant one-party system under the Liberal Democratic Party, with the exception of one brief period of Democratic Party rule. Amidst these circumstances, discourse on the so-called 'South Korea-Japan reversal,' suggesting South Korea has surpassed Japan, has proliferated in South Korea, and media outlets frequently feature articles discussing Japan's stagnation due to failed innovation (Lee Myung-chan 2020; Lee Ji-won 2021). Within Japan, voices of concern about the narrowing gap between South Korea and Japan are emerging, with economists like Yukio Noguchi, a former Ministry of Finance official and Professor Emeritus at Hitotsubashi University, issuing warnings that South Korea has surpassed Japan or that Japan might fall out of the ranks of developed countries (Yukio Noguchi 2022). Of course, criticisms exist that the logic of the 'South Korea-Japan reversal' is a simplistic argument based on only a few statistics. In terms of overall national strength, Japan's nominal GDP in 2021 was $4.9374 trillion, while South Korea's was $1.8102 trillion; considering the population difference, the GDP gap remains substantial. In comprehensive national strength, including basic science capabilities, technological prowess of small and medium-sized enterprises, and national diplomatic capacity, there are many aspects where it is difficult to assert that South Korea has surpassed Japan.

Consequently, while the Japanese economy experienced stagnation for 30 years after the 1990s, the South Korean economy achieved remarkable growth, leading to two opposing views: one that the economic gap between South Korea and Japan has narrowed and their relationship has shifted to a horizontal one, and another that the claim of South Korea reaching an equal standing with Japan is a simplistic argument based on a few statistics. In a public opinion poll conducted in 2022 by the East Asia Institute and Genron NPO, 48% of South Koreans and 28% of Japanese respondents believed that South Korea had reached an equal relationship with Japan. This shift in perception regarding relative status holds significant implications for bilateral relations. South Korea views the colonial period as a time of national humiliation and has established a sense of victimhood towards Japan based on this 'collective memory' (Jeong and Vollhardt 2021). This memory and sentiment have led to an emphasis on power and status in international politics and an attitude of viewing Japan as a model to learn from but ultimately to surpass. In contrast, Japan was the first non-Western country to successfully industrialize and join the ranks of imperial powers (Kim Nam-eun 2016). The historical memory of occupying a position of overwhelming superiority to surrounding Asian nations, symbolized by 'Datsu-A Nyu-O' (leaving Asia, entering Europe), is a crucial part of Japan's national identity and has long served as a basic reference point in its relationship with South Korea. Considering these points, this study aims to analyze the factors influencing perceptions of relative national status in both South Korea and Japan. Through this, we will explore the similarities and differences between perceptions of relative status and perceptions of cooperation between the two countries. Furthermore, ultimately, this study seeks to elucidate the academic and practical implications for South Korea-Japan relations.

II. Literature Review and Theoretical Discussion

1. Literature Review

Studies on South Korean perceptions of Japan are less numerous compared to those on perceptions of the United States or China. However, synthesizing various studies reveals that complex emotions are at play, and the national image of Japan is also changing with the growth of national power. When viewing Japan, it is sometimes perceived as an object of emotional envy and security concerns, but also as a subject for learning and cooperation (Lee Sang-rok 2018; Jeon Jae-ho 2019). Existing research recognizes anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea as a deeply ingrained emotion at the popular level. While anti-American and anti-Chinese sentiments are closely linked to political ideology, anti-Japanese sentiment is reported to be shared by the majority of the population, transcending specific ideological leanings (Lee Sang-shin et al. 2020).

Ji Byung-keun (2008) argued that perceptions of Japan's soft power, in addition to perceptions of military threat, significantly influence South Korean citizens' attitudes toward Japan. Factors such as fairness in trade, the roles and responsibilities of both countries in Asia and the international community, and cultural openness were identified as important. Choi Jong-ho et al. (2014) analyzed the factors influencing South Koreans' sentiments towards Japan using public opinion survey data. They identified security threat factors such as Japan's militarization, as well as economic factors supporting free trade, as significant influences on sentiments towards Japan. Choi Eun-mi (2018) explored the relationship between national and personal identity through an online survey. South Koreans felt a high degree of familiarity with Japan but low trust. Furthermore, South Koreans exhibited higher national pride than Japanese people and a stronger tendency to identify with their own nation, making them more sensitive to national conflicts than Japanese people.

Lee Sang-shin et al. (2020) sought to explain South Korea-Japan relations by incorporating previously undiscussed political and sociological variables. Their study found that individuals with strong right-wing authoritarian tendencies and strong social dominance orientations showed negative attitudes towards demands for compensation for forced labor and comfort women. Song Saem and Lee Jae-mook (2019) argued that unlike perceptions of the United States and China, there are no generational differences in perceptions of Japan. Jung Sang-mi (2023) utilized public opinion survey data from the 'South Korea-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey' conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO to analyze South Koreans' support for improving relations and military cooperation with Japan. The study found that perceptions of threats from China and North Korea significantly influenced support for improving relations and military cooperation with Japan.

These previous studies have greatly contributed to establishing key variables for explaining South Korea-Japan relations. However, existing research on the perception of relative status, one of the themes this study addresses, is relatively scarce. The National Unification Advisory Council's Public Opinion Survey on Unification investigates citizens' perceptions of national capabilities by comparing them with neighboring countries. Using the United States, China, Japan, and Russia as target countries, the survey compared South Korea's relative capabilities in three dimensions: military power, economic power, and cultural aspects. Japan was found to have a slight edge over South Korea in military and economic power, but was rated lower in cultural aspects (Koo Bon-sang 2022). Furthermore, over time, relative status scores for economic and cultural capabilities decreased compared to the 2020 survey, while military power slightly increased. However, these surveys are intended to describe the 'image' of the respective countries and do not systematically investigate the factors determining perceptions of relative status or capabilities. In this regard, it is necessary to construct new hypotheses using international relations theory and political psychology theory of international relations to analyze the attitudes of citizens in both South Korea and Japan regarding their relative status.

2. Theoretical Discussion and Research Hypotheses

International relations theorists have shown great interest in the perception of relative status or hierarchy among states to identify their relative positions within the international system (Holsti 1970; Organski 1958; Gilpin 1981; Murray 2010; Wolf 2011; Paul et al. 2014; Larson and Shevchenko 2014; De Carvalho and Neumann 2015; Renshon 2017; Zarakol 2017; Solomon 2020). Generally, status refers to 'an actor's relative position within a hierarchy in a given community' (Renshon 2017, 4). Within international society, status is closely linked to a state's self-identity and fundamental perception of its existence. Therefore, states pursue status enhancement through material means such as nuclear weapons, economic means such as economic development, or social means such as national reputation or honor (Solomon 2020).

However, accurately assessing a state's relative position is difficult. Firstly, while some components of state capabilities can be measured with objective indicators, others cannot. For example, while the performance of weapons can be objectively assessed in evaluating military capabilities, abstract elements like troop morale, motivation, loyalty, and leadership are more difficult to evaluate (Herrmann 2013). Furthermore, more fundamentally, status is a relative and perceptual concept, meaning it can be measured differently depending on the actor (Solomon 2020, 135). It is unclear whether 'status' refers to state capabilities centered on military power in international politics, hierarchy in international society, the economic living standards of the average citizen within a nation, or the level of R&D in science and technology. Since status among nations is not solely about capabilities in international politics, it is unclear what criteria should be used for measurement, and even if the same criteria are chosen, the objectivity of measurement is questionable. It is highly likely that it will be measured differently depending on one's intentions, motivations, or available information. In this regard, as Renshon (2017, 21) points out, status in the international system is a relative and cognitive concept.

In other words, regarding the relative position between South Korea and Japan, which this study aims to explore, it is unclear what criteria will be used for measurement. It is necessary to point out that the perspective of evaluating national standing is itself a matter of 'cognitive' dimension through which individuals view international relations. Therefore, different citizens can evaluate the positions of South Korea and Japan based on their own criteria and information. Considering these points, it is possible to analytically examine the perceptions of South Korean and Japanese citizens regarding whether South Korea has reached an equal level with Japan.

Meanwhile, 'national image theory' has extensively discussed the issue of overall national status at the level of the general public, not just policy elites. Many scholars have recognized national status or capabilities as important elements of national image. Cottam (1977) identified perceptions of threat or opportunity, relative power, and judgments about the relative cultural status of other nations as important criteria for judging a nation. Herrmann et al. (1997) also viewed judgments about national capabilities or relative power as key factors shaping national image. Research in this vein has primarily led to studies on national images of 'enemies, empires, and colonies,' where perceptions of relative national capabilities or cultural levels, and their equivalence or differences, are recognized as very important factors. Alexander et al. (2005) distinguished between evaluations of military power and cultural levels. They identified the relative evaluation of military power and cultural levels as important factors in the formation of national image, alongside goal compatibility. However, these national image studies have primarily treated the evaluation of status or level between nations as independent variables, with little research conducted on what variables influence them. To analyze this, it is necessary to utilize political psychology theories of international relations in addition to international relations theories.

This study aims to analyze the relative status between South Korea and Japan using international relations theories, as well as cognitive psychology theories of information judgment and social psychology theories of group evaluation. Based on the preceding discussion, the following hypotheses can be proposed. 'Social identity theory,' developed in social psychology, posits that the identity individuals hold towards a particular group serves as a crucial basis for judging ingroups and outgroups and establishing relationships between them. Social identity theory suggests that people acquire their identity by identifying with the groups to which they belong (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Individuals with a strong sense of belonging to their ingroup, if that group is superior, will strengthen their sense of community and feel superior through comparison with outgroups. In this process, ingroup favoritism and negative prejudice towards outgroups are reinforced (Allen and Wilder 1975). Furthermore, individuals with negative views of outgroups tend to underestimate their capabilities. Therefore, individuals are likely to exhibit biased choices, overestimating information favorable to their own nation and rejecting information favorable to the other nation.

This tendency is particularly significant considering the historical relationship between South Korea and Japan and may manifest asymmetrically in both countries. Specifically, when analyzing perceptions of relative status between the two nations, it is necessary to consider that South Korean and Japanese citizens have formed different reference points for viewing the status difference or relationship between the two countries. While South Korean citizens have framed the Japanese colonial period as a time of national humiliation, Japanese people, as evident in the 'leaving Asia' discourse, have long used their superior position relative to other Asian countries, including South Korea, as a source of national pride. Japan is one of the most modernized countries in the non-Western world and has a history of differentiating itself from its neighbors by taking pride in having reached a level of 'leaving Asia' (Kim Nam-eun 2016). From the perspective of Japanese people, the historically superior status relative to South Korea will function as a kind of 'reference point'.

Social identity theory suggests that the extent to which one feels like a member of a nation significantly influences perceptions related to that nation. Social identity theory points out that people belonging to a superior group react sensitively to threats to their group's status. The fact that South Korea has reached a similar level to their own is information that hinders the process of positively differentiating their group from the other group. In this regard, Japanese citizens may exhibit cognitive biases such as underestimating positive information about South Korea or overestimating negative information to maintain their group's superiority, or exhibiting a status quo bias during the process of updating information about intergroup relations. The degree of this information processing bias is influenced by other factors. Japanese individuals who have a high degree of favorability towards South Korea will not feel any particular aversion or discomfort towards information about South Korea's relative development. Furthermore, individuals with higher education levels may engage in critical exploration of various pieces of information about neighboring countries rather than selectively choosing only ingroup-biased information.

Furthermore, research on the limitations and constraints of human cognitive abilities is a major topic in social psychology and political communication. Humans are 'cognitive misers' and have developed various heuristics (heuristics) to make approximate judgments with appropriate criteria for matters that are not important to them (Tversky & Kahneman 1974; Ross & Sicoly 1979). Additionally, schema theory argues that when making judgments, people utilize background knowledge acquired through their experiences. We draw information from our limited experiences and view various phenomena in the world based on this. We tend to reject information that does not conform to our existing beliefs. In this context, indirect experiences through media and popular culture will be important tools. Recently, South Korean media have been reporting more frequently that the bilateral relationship has become more horizontal than before. Considering this situation, the more South Koreans trust media reports on South Korea-Japan relations, the more they will perceive the bilateral relationship as more equal.

<Hypothesis 1> In Japan, the higher the favorability towards South Korea, the more likely respondents will perceive the bilateral relationship as equal; however, in South Korea, the effect of favorability will not be significant.

<Hypothesis 2> In Japan, the higher the level of education, the more likely respondents will perceive the bilateral relationship as equal; however, in South Korea, the effect of education level will not be significant.

<Hypothesis 3> In both countries, the more respondents trust their domestic media, the more likely they are to perceive the bilateral relationship as equal.

Conversely, South Koreans update their information regarding the relative status or capabilities between the two countries based on the premise of 'catching up' to Japan. Considering this, favorability or education level is unlikely to be a major factor in determining the relative status between the two countries in South Korea. Instead, attention will be paid to indicators or events that can demonstrate the 'performance' or 'competence' of national governance. Satisfaction with democracy or evaluations of the COVID-19 response can serve as indirect indicators of the competence of national governance. Indeed, several studies using various surveys have confirmed a tendency for national pride to increase with higher satisfaction with democracy and more positive evaluations of the country's COVID-19 response (Gil Jeong-ah 2011). Furthermore, from the perspective of a catching-up nation, perceptions of security instability also influence perceptions of national status in a similar context. Especially considering South Korea's colonial experience and its geopolitical situation surrounded by four major powers, the nation's ability to provide security will be perceived as important by citizens when evaluating their country's status.

From an international relations perspective, realism emphasizes comprehensive national capabilities centered on military power when evaluating state relations (Waltz 1979). While South Korea may be considered close to Japan in various fields such as popular culture, governance, and advanced technology, there remains a gap in comprehensive national power, particularly concerning population and GDP, from an international relations perspective. In this regard, those who adopt a realist perspective, viewing state relations and international politics as a stark confrontation between nations, will likely believe that a gap still exists between South Korea and Japan. Conversely, those who view state status or relations centered on attractiveness, soft power, or economic strength will likely judge South Korea to be in an almost equal position with Japan.

Considering this, if South Koreans perceive their country's security situation as unstable due to being surrounded by major powers, they will view Northeast Asian international politics through a harsh realist lens. In this case, comprehensive national power, including population, becomes important for safeguarding national security, and South Koreans are less likely to perceive South Korea as being on equal footing with Japan. Conversely, if they perceive their country's security situation as very stable, they will view international society as cooperative or friendly, rather than a zero-sum game between nations. In this scenario, state relations will be framed around soft power such as culture or economic strength, and South Koreans are more likely to perceive South Korea as being on equal footing with Japan.

<Hypothesis 4> In South Korea, the more positively respondents perceive the country's COVID-19 response, the more likely they are to perceive the bilateral relationship as equal.

<Hypothesis 5> In South Korea, the more respondents perceive the country's security situation as unstable, the more likely they are to perceive the bilateral relationship as unequal.

III. Analysis Methods and Results

1. Analysis Methods

This study empirically investigated South Korean and Japanese citizens' perceptions of the relative status between South Korea and Japan using data from the 'South Korea-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey' conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO, research institutions in both countries. Since 2013, these organizations have conducted public opinion surveys with approximately 1,000 respondents each in South Korea and Japan, covering over 50 common questions. This survey has developed various questions focused on South Korea-Japan relations and is the most suitable data for this study as it is virtually the only survey data available on perceptions of relative status between the two countries. Notably, to reflect changes in South Korea-Japan relations, a question asking whether South Korea and Japan have generally reached an equal level was added to the survey starting in 2021. Meanwhile, questions relevant to this study, such as perceptions of COVID-19, are only available from the 2022 survey. Therefore, the data actually used in this study is limited to the '2022 Survey on East Asian Perceptions of South Koreans.' Furthermore, the East Asia Institute's 'South Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey' conducted in South Korea includes additional questions unique to South Korea, beyond the common questions shared with Genron NPO. For the analysis of South Korea, these additional questions will also be used.

To examine the perceptions of relative status between South Korea and Japan, which is the focus of this study, the question used was: 'According to certain standards, South Korea's per capita GDP has already surpassed Japan's, and defense expenditures are also at a similar level, suggesting that South Korea and Japan are in an equal relationship.' 'What are your thoughts on this statement?' Respondents were asked to choose one of the following options. Responses indicating agreement with the statement were coded as 1, and others as 0. In the 2022 survey, 48.1% of South Koreans and 28.0% of Japanese respondents believed that South Korea had reached an equal relationship with Japan. To elaborate, in the South Korean survey, 48.1% responded, 'Yes. I believe South Korea and Japan are already in an equal relationship,' while 40.1% said, 'South Korea and Japan are not yet in an equal relationship, but they are moving in that direction,' 5.2% stated, 'Japan is still superior, and it will be a long time before South Korea and Japan reach an equal relationship,' and 6.7% responded, 'I don't know.' In Japan, 28.0% answered, 'I think so,' 29.1% responded, 'I do not think so,' 10.2% stated, 'It is not an issue to judge whether they are equal or not,' and 32.8% responded, 'I don't know.'

The main independent variables in this study are perceptions of security instability, national favorability, education level, evaluation of COVID-19 response, and media trust. First, regarding security instability, data is available only for the supplementary survey in South Korea. The question used was, 'What are your thoughts on South Korea's overall security situation?' and the responses were measured on a 5-point scale. This variable was reverse-coded so that 5 points represent strong agreement. Among respondents, 1.7% perceived the situation as very unstable, 24.9% as generally unstable, 41.7% as normal, 30.9% as generally stable, and 0.8% as very stable.

Next, to measure favorability, the question 'What impression do you have of the other country?' was used. Respondents could choose one option from: 'I have a good impression,' 'I tend to have a good impression,' 'I tend to have a bad impression,' 'I have a bad impression,' or 'I cannot say either way.' These were coded on a 1-5 scale, with higher scores indicating greater favorability. In South Korea, the average favorability towards Japan was 2.60 (standard deviation 1.19), and in Japan, the average favorability towards South Korea was 2.83 (standard deviation 1.08). Although favorability towards South Korea in Japan was slightly higher than favorability towards Japan in South Korea, in both countries, favorability towards the other country was below the midpoint of the scale.

To measure the evaluation of the COVID-19 response, the question 'How do you evaluate your country's response to the novel coronavirus pandemic?' was used. In South Korea, 18.2% answered, 'I think the response was quite appropriate,' 55.8% 'relatively appropriate,' 20.0% 'not very appropriate,' 2.4% 'quite inappropriate,' and 3.4% 'I don't know.' In Japan, 13.9% responded 'very well,' 35.8% 'relatively appropriate,' 12.6% 'not very appropriate,' 33.0% 'quite inappropriate,' and 4.7% 'I don't know.'

To measure the credibility of domestic media regarding South Korea-Japan relations, the question 'Do you believe your country's newspapers, magazines, and broadcasts provide objective and fair reporting on South Korea-Japan relations?' was used. This question was asked in both South Korea and Japan, and respondents were categorized as answering 'yes' or otherwise. In South Korea, 35.6% of respondents answered yes, while in Japan, 20.6% did.

Socioeconomic variables such as age and education level were measured. Finally, according to socialization theory, political perceptions and value judgments about specific subjects are formed during adolescence and do not easily change in adulthood (Mishler and Ross 1999). Middle-aged and older individuals who experienced Japan's high growth period formed an image of a highly developed Japan, while generations born after Japan's recession period developed entirely different images of Japan. Older generations in both countries likely formed perceptions during their socialization that Japan was superior to South Korea, while younger generations are more likely to have formed perceptions during their socialization that the status of the two countries is similar. According to socialization theory, these judgments do not change easily, so age was set as a control variable. Education level was measured through the question 'What is the highest level of education you have completed?' Responses were categorized as elementary school or below, middle school, high school, some college/dropout (including vocational college), college graduate, graduate school or above, and other. These were simplified into 'college graduate or above' and 'below college graduate.' In South Korea, 35.4% of respondents had a college education or above, and in Japan, 29.4% did.

In addition, other major variables that are likely to influence perceptions of relative status between South Korea and Japan were used as control variables. First, demographic factors such as gender and income level were controlled for. Income was measured using the question 'What is your total monthly income? Please state the monthly average, including bonuses, interest, rent, etc., for the entire family.' In South Korea, income was measured on an 11-point scale, and in Japan on a 6-point scale; both were simplified into a 3-point scale. Furthermore, while conservatism-progressivism in the West is based on socioeconomic characteristics, the importance of security issues is very high in the conservative-progressive dichotomy in East Asia. In both South Korea and Japan, individuals who identify as conservative are likely to hold a worldview similar to the realist perspective in international relations theory, while those who identify as progressive often adopt a perspective similar to the liberal viewpoint. Therefore, political ideology was set as a control variable. Political ideology data was only available in the supplementary survey for South Korea, measured by the question 'What is your ideological orientation? Most progressive is 0, most conservative is 10, with 5 being neutral.' The average was 5.22, with a standard deviation of 1.89. For analytical convenience, it was simplified into progressive (0-3), moderate (4-6), and conservative (7-10).

Additionally, the degree of contact between the two countries can influence judgments about the other nation. In particular, contact with popular culture serves as a major mechanism for shaping perceptions of the other country. With the global success of 'BTS' and 'Squid Game,' there are opinions emerging in Japan that Korean culture is transcending the 'Hallyu' phenomenon (Cho Kyu-heon 2021; Cho Young-han 2022). Considering this, those who particularly enjoy Korean culture in Japan may perceive the bilateral relationship as more equal. To examine the extent of consumption of the other country's popular culture, the question 'Do you enjoy the popular culture of the other country?' was used. In South Korea, 17.2% of respondents answered that they enjoy Japanese popular culture, while in Japan, 34.7% answered that they enjoy Korean popular culture.

2. Analysis Results: Perceptions of Relative Status between South Korea and Japan

This study investigated the factors influencing South Korean and Japanese citizens' perceptions of the equality of status between the two countries. Since the perception of equality was categorized as a binary outcome (yes/no), 'Binomial logistic regression analysis' was performed. The statistical significance of these results is briefly examined. The analysis results for South Korea are summarized in <Table 1>, and the results for Japan are presented in <Table 2>.

1) South Korean Survey Results

First, let's examine the results of the South Korean survey. Regarding the effect of the perception of security instability, a key variable in this study, as expected, the more South Koreans perceived the security situation as unstable, the more they judged that South Korea and Japan were not equal. When instability was perceived as high, the probability of perceiving both countries as being of equal status decreased by 15%, and this difference was statistically significant (ρ<.05). Conversely, contrary to expectations, the difference between those who identified as progressive and those who identified as conservative was not statistically significant. These results indicate the unique nature of South Korea-Japan relations, suggesting that perceptions of South Korea's status do not simply overlap with a progressive-conservative dichotomy.

Next, let's examine the effect of media, a key variable in this study. In South Korea, individuals who trust their domestic media's reporting on South Korea-Japan relations were 50% more likely to perceive both countries as being of equal status compared to those who do not, and this difference was highly statistically significant (ρ<.01). South Korean mass media frequently report that the status of South Korea and Japan is becoming equal, particularly in economic and cultural aspects. In this context, it is believed that the credibility of these reports influences judgments about the relative status between South Korea and Japan.

In South Korea, for every one-step increase in the perceived success of the country's COVID-19 response, the probability of perceiving South Korea and Japan as being of equal status increased by 24%, and this difference was statistically significant (ρ<.05). Overall, South Korea is evaluated as having established a successful quarantine system, known as 'K-Quarantine,' and the perception and evaluation of this quarantine system have led to increased national pride (Gil Jeong-ah 2021). Conversely, South Korean media have frequently reported on Japan's failed response in the early stages of COVID-19, making the COVID-19 response a subject of relative comparison regarding the efficiency of national governance (Kim Sung-jo 2020). In this context, the more positive the perception of the COVID-19 response, the more the relative status between South Korea and Japan is perceived as similar. On the other hand, demographic factors such as age, gender, income, and education level showed no significant correlation with perceptions of relative status between South Korea and Japan. This indicates that the perception of equal status between South Korea and Japan has spread broadly, not being confined to specific demographic groups.

<Table 1> Analysis of South Korean Citizens' Perceptions of Relative Status between South Korea and Japan

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* ρ < 0.05, **ρ< 0.01, *** ρ < 0.001 / ( ): Reference

2) Analysis of Japanese Public Opinion

Let us examine the analysis results of Japanese public opinion surveys. Security-related variables were not statistically significant. As expected, affinity toward South Korea emerged as a highly significant variable. Subsequently, a one-unit increase in affinity toward South Korea among the Japanese population was associated with a 59% higher probability of perceiving the two countries as being in an equal position, a difference that was highly statistically significant (ρ<.001). In contrast to the significant difference observed with South Korea, affinity toward Japan among the South Korean population was not statistically significant. This finding can be understood in the context of Japan's initial condition as a country that preceded South Korea in modernization, leading to a perception of superiority. Japanese individuals face situations where the superior position of their in-group (nation) within East Asia is threatened; such information can lead to a decline in self-esteem, thus generating resistance. However, individuals with high affinity toward South Korea would be able to accept such information without resistance.

Meanwhile, individuals who enjoy South Korean popular culture were 37% more likely to perceive the two countries as being in an equal position compared to those who do not, when affinity was not controlled for, and this difference was statistically significant (ρ<.01). However, after controlling for affinity, the magnitude of this effect decreased, and the difference became statistically insignificant. This is understood to be because those who feel affinity toward South Korea also frequently engage with and enjoy its popular culture.

Next, in terms of cognitive aspects, media trust and education level had significant impacts. Japanese individuals who trusted their domestic media's reporting on South Korea were 55% more likely to perceive the two countries as being in an equal position compared to those who did not, and this difference was statistically significant (ρ<.05). Considering that Japanese media have generally reported on South Korea's rising status and the economic achievements of South Korean companies, individuals who accept such media reports are more likely to judge that the two countries have reached an equal standing. Furthermore, individuals with a college education or higher were 48% more likely to perceive the two countries as being in an equal position compared to those without, and this difference was statistically significant (ρ<.05).

As mentioned earlier, information or judgments suggesting that South Korea has reached a position equivalent to Japan's is uncomfortable information for the general Japanese public, except for those who are particularly favorable towards South Korea. This is because humans tend to preserve their self-esteem through the relative superiority or dominance of their in-group (Tajfel and Turner 1986). In the process where information about South Korea reaching an equivalent position to Japan is mixed with other information, the cognitive ability to critically accept the former, even if it is uncomfortable, becomes important. In this regard, higher education levels increase the likelihood of objectively judging and accepting information, even if it is disadvantageous or uncomfortable.

Meanwhile, the age effect was not statistically significant. The younger generation in Japan today encountered South Korea after it had moved beyond the stage of a developing country. They are also part of the generation that experienced the first wave of the Korean Wave, such as 'Winter Sonata,' during their adolescence, and thus have had more frequent exposure to advanced information or images of South Korea compared to the elderly. However, this implies that the way given information is judged is a more crucial factor than the mere quantity of information or exposure in terms of perceptions of relative status between Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, the relative status between Japan and South Korea is not a phenomenon that changes instantaneously but rather occurs gradually; therefore, even the elderly group is continuously updating new information that differs from their past. Additionally, judgments regarding South Korea's response to COVID-19 in Japan were not statistically significant in influencing perceptions of relative status between the two countries. This may be related to the fact that South Korea's COVID-19 response was also excellent, making it difficult to create differentiation through this aspect.

<Table 2> Analysis of Japanese Public Opinion on Relative Status between Japan and South Korea

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* ρ < 0.05, **ρ< 0.01, *** ρ < 0.001 / ( ): Reference

IV. Comparative Analysis of South Korea and Japan and Its Implications

This study analyzed South Korean and Japanese citizens' perceptions of relative status and subsequently examined the factors supporting their support for improved bilateral relations. Perceptions and misperceptions of national status significantly influence international relations, yet research in this area has been neglected (Renshon 1997; Soloman 2020). Furthermore, most previous studies have focused solely on public opinion analysis in South Korea, making comparisons with public opinion trends in Japan impossible. To overcome this limitation, this study simultaneously examined data from Japan. In this regard, the present study differentiates itself from existing research in terms of its research subjects and methodology.

According to the research findings, the analysis of South Korean and Japanese citizens' perceptions of relative status revealed significant differences between the two countries. Fundamentally, it is necessary to consider that the reference points and emotions through which South Koreans and Japanese view bilateral relations have been formed differently. As evident in the discourse of 'leaving Asia' (탈아시아), Japanese people have long considered their superior status compared to other Asian countries, including South Korea, as a source of national pride. In this context, citizens have been exposed to a mixture of information suggesting that South Korea has reached a level comparable to Japan and information to the contrary. In such a situation, if Japanese citizens feel threatened by information that lowers the status of their own group, they are likely to selectively exclude information that challenges their group's superior status. Therefore, 'emotional' factors such as favorability towards South Korea, along with factors related to 'cognitive information processing ability' concerning education level and media trust, emerged as important factors.

In contrast, South Korean citizens have aimed to overcome their relatively lower status, much like they pursued development by remembering the Japanese colonial period as a time of national humiliation. From the perspective of a catch-up nation, South Koreans are updating their perceptions of their nation's relative status based on information related to national governance 'performance' or 'competence,' such as COVID-19 containment success and security stability. The more they perceived instability in the Korean Peninsula's security, the more likely they were to feel inferior to Japan in terms of overall national power as discussed in international politics. Conversely, those who experienced heightened national pride due to global recognition for their response to COVID-19 evaluated South Korea's status more highly. Moreover, in South Korea, judgments about the fairness of domestic media reporting on South Korea-Japan relations also played a crucial role. This clearly illustrates the difference where, in Japan, factors related to information about relations with South Korea and cognitive information processing ability are emphasized, while in South Korea, cognitive judgments about the nation's competence are more important.

This survey is limited to the data from 2022. In the future, perspectives on the relative status of South Korea and Japan will inevitably be influenced by the degree of economic growth and sociopolitical development between the two countries. Furthermore, as information regarding the status between the two nations accumulates over time, perceptions may change once a certain threshold is crossed. Considering these points, it is highly probable that the degree of perceived equality between the two countries will increase overall.

Overall, this analysis offers significant academic and practical implications for South Korea-Japan relations. Firstly, discrepancies in status perceptions between the two countries can be a major driver of deteriorating bilateral relations. As social identity theory suggests, the desire to preserve or gain status can lead to status-seeking competition. At a time when the reference points for bilateral relations are shifting, 'status seeking' or 'status conflict' between South Korea and Japan could become a new driver of worsening relations. To prevent 'status seeking' from devolving into excessive nationalistic competition, building cooperative relationships on common challenges is crucial.

Secondly, given that emotional and cognitive factors such as national pride, education level, and attitudes toward the media are highlighted as very important in citizens' status perception processes, policy pursuits that consider the sentiments of citizens in the other country are required. This study observed asymmetries in the perception of relative status between the two countries. In South Korea, bilateral relations were perceived as equal regardless of favorability towards Japan or political ideology. In Japan, individuals who felt affinity towards South Korea or had higher education levels agreed on the equality between the two countries. In particular, efforts are needed to build a national image of South Korea as a 'partner' for Japanese citizens who feel threatened by potential relative status loss.

Finally, from a cognitive perspective, media reporting was identified as a very important factor in both countries. In both nations, individuals who trusted their domestic media's reporting on South Korea-Japan relations showed a more receptive attitude towards status changes. In this regard, the role of traditional media remains important, and the fairness and objectivity of media reporting on bilateral relations need to be ensured. ■

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■ Kim Sung-jo is a professor at Sunchon National University.

■ In charge and edited by: Oh Joon-chul_EAI Research Assistant

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | jcoh@eai.or.kr