[Korea-Japan Relations as Seen by Public Opinion Series] ⑥ Korea-Japan Diplomacy and Citizens' Political Efficacy: Focusing on Perceptions of the Other Country, Evaluation of Responses, and Political Trust

I. Introduction: Is Korea-Japan Diplomacy a Reflection of Public Opinion?

Does Korea-Japan diplomacy stem from political responses that consider public sentiment? This study seeks to find clues to this question by examining Korea-Japan diplomacy over the past decade, from 2013 to 2023. As is well known, this period encompasses the dynamism of Korea-Japan relations, from deepening and entrenchment of confrontation to a recent phase of easing. Furthermore, unlike the historical development of Korea-Japan relations promoted at the political level within the broader framework, this period is also evaluated as one in which both countries were conscious of and responded to their citizens' sentiments. Considering the temporal specificity and changes, public opinion in both countries should have observed a relatively high level of political efficacy in the political process of Korea-Japan diplomacy. However, public opinion trends remain fluid and uncertain, and the orientation of public perception regarding their own country's responses is not clearly explained. Therefore, this study aims to present the extent to which public trust in Korea-Japan diplomacy policy can be expanded from a political-structural perspective by examining the perceptions of Korean and Japanese citizens towards the other country and their evaluations of government responses, and deriving the political efficacy formed in this process.[1]

A point to note here is how to link public opinion and foreign policy. Unlike the general political process where public preferences and demands are inputted and policy is outputted, diplomacy is considered a closed policy process involving top government leaders or a small number of political elites. Therefore, even if public preferences are not directly projected here, public opinion can be positioned as an important domestic factor considered in government responses. That is, national policies originate from the perceptions and responses of political elites, but they are the result of a conversion process driven by factors such as electoral considerations or supporter preferences of the ruling party, and public opinion is indirectly reflected in this process. In particular, public opinion has been interpreted as an obstacle that makes negotiations between the two countries difficult during periods of strained relations, or as a factor that limits the scope of policy choices, thus serving as a basis for responses or a rationale for policy coordination difficulties.

Meanwhile, considering that the importance of approaching domestic political processes and analyzing domestic variables is also being emphasized in international relations research, the analysis of public opinion in Korea and Japan holds academic validity.[2]However, the analysis of public preferences and the analysis of foreign policy differ in their purpose and object. Public opinion analysis targeting citizens may lead to policy recommendations but has difficulty explaining the causal relationship of policy formulation, while policy analysis targeting the government and political elites can grasp the policy process and dynamics, but the actual trend of public opinion may not be visible.

In response, this study focuses on public opinion trends while also considering policy outcomes that reflect elite-centered endogenous processes. Figure 1 is an adaptation of the preceding problem awareness and discussion, linked to political system theory. First, we will examine the trends of public opinion itself (input), controlling for the endogenous processes occurring at the political elite level. This is to distinguish whether the confrontation pattern between Korea and Japan is mainstream public opinion in both countries or the government's orientation. Meanwhile, if the bilateral conflict arises from collective identity or norms encompassing politics and society, a dynamic analysis of how it has permeated and evolved is also necessary. To this end, we will examine the public's evaluation (output) of government responses and their changes.

[Figure 1] Analytical Framework

Meanwhile, through the feedback (policy gap and coordination between politics and society) of these input-output processes, the structuration of public opinion and policy surrounding Korea-Japan diplomacy can be understood (cause, process of public opinion-policy structuration). The reason this study focuses on political efficacy is precisely here. Citizens repeatedly re-perceive the other country (and relations with it) by comparing and evaluating the government's diplomatic responses and their own policy orientations. At this time, the result (effect) of accumulated citizen perceptions and evaluations is manifested as political efficacy.[3]In other words, political efficacy is not something that changes in the short term but is a perception accumulated over the long term, and can be understood as trust in the overall political process that is reduced to input and output (or political trust). This is distinct from short-term factors such as government policy performance or evaluation of political leaders, and is closer to perceptions of the system and satisfaction with democracy. Through this analysis, we aim to elucidate the reality (perceptions and evaluation of responses) of public opinion surrounding Korea-Japan diplomacy and to gauge the current state of public political trust regarding political responsiveness accumulated in the endogenous process of policy formulation.

II. Analysis Items

For the analysis of public opinion trends, this study utilizes data from the Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey conducted by the EAI-The Genron NPO.[4]Below, we present the items to be examined in consideration of the analytical framework presented in the previous study and introduce their validity.

As presented in Table 1, regarding perceptions of the other country in the input process of public opinion, we utilize four items: ① impression of the other country and the reasons for it, ② image of the other country's political and social operating methods, ③ perception of Korea-Japan relations, and ④ the position that one's own country should take to improve relations and avoid confrontation with the other country. ① is the most suitable for understanding mutual perceptions as it asks about favorability towards the other country and allows selection of reasons. ②, the item regarding political and social operating methods, implies public perceptions of the other country's system, such as pacifism, nationalism, statism, and liberalism, and thus holds academic and policy implications. In addition, ③, which asks about bilateral relations, corresponds to public perception of inter-governmental interactions and is thus useful for dynamic analysis, while ④ summarizes mutual public perceptions regarding the direction of relationship orientation.

[Table 1] Selected and Alternative Items

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Next, regarding the evaluation of government responses in the output process of public opinion, we selected two items: ⑤ what both countries should do to improve and develop Korea-Japan relations, and ⑥ evaluation of the Korean (Japanese) government's response and attitude. Although item ⑥, which asks for an evaluation of government responses, fulfills the analytical content, we include ⑤ in the examination considering that voters generally tend to make government evaluations based on policies they deem important to reduce time and resource costs.

Finally, as the political efficacy analysis has not been applied as a common question for both countries, for Korea, we will examine items asking whether there is a difference between the perceptions and policies of the South Korean government and the general public regarding Japan (⑧ in 2021) and the reasons for the evaluation. For Japan, although limited, we will infer public perception of the government's policy responsiveness based on the preceding results.[5]

III. South Korean Public Opinion on Perceptions of Japan and Evaluation of Government Responses

1. Perception of the Other Country: Distinguishing Politics (State) from Society (People)

South Korean public perception of Japan is reactive to the strained Korea-Japan diplomacy since the late 2000s. Since 2013, when it was surveyed at 76.7%, negative impressions have been predominant. However, it is noteworthy that the unfavorability has been easing year by year (Figure 2). Meanwhile, in 2015 (72.5%) and 2020 (71.6%), negative impressions increased compared to the previous year. These periods can be interpreted as being influenced by the worsening public opinion due to the expansion of bilateral confrontation encompassing history, economy, and security, such as the dispute over the comfort women resolution that continued after 2014, Japan's export control measures following the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling on forced mobilization in 2019, and South Korea's decision to terminate GSOMIA and the radar lock-on incident.

[Figure 2] Impression of Japan

Looking at the reasons for having a negative impression of Japan (Top of Figure 3), historical issues account for a large proportion. 'Lack of reflection on the history of Korean invasion (72.5%)', 'Dokdo issue (61.7%)', 'Statements and actions of political leaders (19.3%)', and 'Comfort women issue (18.1%)' are mostly entrenched conflict factors. Furthermore, these issues correspond to identity perceptions as they relate to the three elements of a state: sovereignty (history), people (victims of forced mobilization, comfort women victims), and territory (Dokdo). This indicates that distrust of Japan has not been resolved when issues related to past history and territory arise between the two countries.

Conversely, perceptions of the Japanese people's character and Japan as an advanced country contribute to positive feelings towards Japan (Bottom of Figure 3). Specifically, high perceptions include 'Kind and diligent national character (62.8%)' and 'Advanced country with a high standard of living (48.3%)'. In other words, a dual sentiment is observed, where criticism of past history coexists with favorability towards contemporary Japanese society, or where positive and negative feelings coexist among the public.

[Figure 3] Reasons for Negative (Top) and Positive (Bottom) Impressions of Japan (Average 2014-2023)

In this regard, it is interesting that South Korean citizens hold distinct images of Japanese politics-society, or the state-people as a whole. Figure 4 shows the image of Japan's political and social operating methods, where militarism (51.2%), nationalism (33.5%), and statism (33.6%) are high. Connecting this to the previous analysis, behind the coexistence of criticism of past history and favorability towards contemporary Japan, one can glimpse a combination of perceptions: wariness and criticism towards politics (the state), and at the same time, favorability towards society (the people).

<Figure 4> Image of Japan's Political-Social Operational Methods (Average 2013-2023)

<Figure 5> Perception of Korea-Japan Relations in Korean Public Opinion

This public perception suggests that while judgments about Korea-Japan relations may be fluid, influenced by diplomatic issues, the stance we should take can be positive. First, as presented in <Figure 5>, perceptions of Korea-Japan relations show inflection points in 2015 and 2020, after which the perception of poor relations eases, similar to the perception of the other country examined earlier (<Figure 2>). In other words, perceptions of relations and perceptions of the other country are interconnected, reflecting trends in diplomatic issues, and government responses act as a mediating variable, leading to fluid outcomes depending on the timing and issue (Son Yeol et al., 2023, pp. 11-13).[6]

<Table 2> Stance to be taken in relations with Japan (single response)

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However, separate from this perception of relations, the orientation of Korea-Japan relations in public opinion is generally positive, with a prevalence of normative and rational views. As seen in <Table 2>, even during the period of 2020-2021, when perceptions of relations were most pessimistic due to confrontation between Korea and Japan, Koreans viewed 'overcoming confrontation in a future-oriented manner' as the stance to be taken. Meanwhile, in 2023, when perceptions of relations were most positive during the survey period, the view that 'at least political confrontation should be avoided' was slightly more prevalent than future-oriented overcoming of confrontation, indicating a disconnect with the actual trends in Korea-Japan relations at the political level. Here, it can be interpreted that Korean public opinion, from a normative perspective, aims for friendly relations with Japan during times of heightened confrontation, while simultaneously making rational choices to adjust the level of orientation towards Japan based on the outcomes of Korea's diplomatic engagement with Japan, as influenced by mutual interactions between the governments of the two countries.

2. Evaluation of Government Response: Orientation along Historical and Economic Axes

How, then, does the public evaluate the Korean government's response? <Figure 7> summarizes the evaluations of the government's response since 2020. First, it is confirmed that the public is not favorable towards the hardline stance towards Japan maintained by the Moon Jae-in administration. However, there is no dominant public opinion either. Particularly in the evaluations of 2020-2021, during the phase of heightened confrontation, 'doing well (30.8%→30.2%)', 'average (30.5%→32.3%)', and 'doing poorly (32.9%→34.5%)' were in similar proportions, making it difficult to find a standout or dominant evaluation.

<Figure 6> Evaluation of the Korean Government's Response to Japan (2019-2023)

Meanwhile, public opinion is also not showing favorable evaluations of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which proposed the restoration of Korea-Japan relations. In 2022, immediately after its inauguration, the response that it was similar to or worse than the previous administration's evaluation (34.2% in 2021 → 43.2% in 2022) was somewhat high. In the 2023 survey, when the improvement of Korea-Japan relations became visible, the proportion of those who thought it was doing better compared to the previous year increased (14.1%→21.7%), and the proportion of those who thought it was doing poorly relatively decreased (43.2%→32.3%), but the most prevalent response was 'cannot say either way (=average)'. In other words, although the Moon Jae-in and Yoon Suk-yeol administrations show differences in their orientation towards Japan diplomacy, at the public level, there is a reserved situation where the responses of a specific government are not highly evaluated.

<Figure 7> What Both Countries Should Do for the Development of Korea-Japan Relations (Average 2020-2023)

Therefore, it is necessary to more concretely understand the criteria by which the public evaluates the government's response. Considering that voters tend to make government evaluations based on the policies they prioritize for decision-making efficiency, the responses regarding what both countries should do for the improvement of relations (<Figure 7>) can provide a clue. The results, similar to the perceptions of Japan discussed earlier, show high interest in resolving historical issues, Dokdo issues, and issues related to historical perception and education. Following these are communication and trust at the summit level, restraint in media reporting and politicians' statements that incite anti-Korean (anti-Japanese) sentiment, and strengthening economic cooperation such as trade and investment. In particular, given the high demand for communication and trust at the government summit level, it aligns with the perception of Korean citizens who are positive about improving relations between the two countries, such as economic cooperation and private exchanges, while valuing the resolution of issues by the political sphere.

<Table 3> What would be most helpful for establishing mutual trust between Korea and Japan in 2013 (1st + 2nd priority)

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Another point to discuss is whether the public's policy orientation has changed. In this regard, the 2013 survey data (Park Geun-hye administration) is particularly interesting. The question asking to select issues that would help establish a mutually trusting relationship between Korea and Japan (Table 3) reveals that public opinion at the time prioritized correct historical perception (72.5%) and economic and trade cooperation (43.9%). Furthermore, the public opinion survey on 'Conditions for the President's Success in 2022' conducted by EAI (Figure 8) shows high preference for addressing historical issues (49.7%) and pursuing future-oriented cooperation in areas such as economy, technology, security, and environment (35.3%).[7] While the proportions differ, it is clear that the Korean public generally leans towards prioritizing historical issues while maintaining economic cooperation, or towards a dual focus on history and economy.

Figure 8: Priority Issues for Japan Policy among Conditions for the President's Success in 2022 (Single Choice)

If, from a diachronic perspective, presenting solutions to historical issues and economic cooperation in tandem represents the public's orientation for diplomacy with Japan, then the government's response evaluation also warrants reinterpretation. First, examining the survey questions asking for specific reasons for evaluating the government's response (limited to 2021) allows us to infer public perception during a period of heightened conflict. Among those who evaluated the government positively, 48.7% cited 'the South Korean government's strong response to Japan's export restrictions,' followed by 'the South Korean government's firm stance on historical issues' (33%) (Table 4). Meanwhile, the highest proportion among those who evaluated the government negatively stated, 'I expected a stronger response towards Japan, but it did not meet expectations' (38.4%) (Table 5).

Table 4: Reasons for Positively Evaluating the South Korean Government's Response and Stance (2021)

(Unit: %)

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Table 5: Reasons for Negatively Evaluating the South Korean Government's Response and Stance (2021)

(Unit: %)

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The underlying basis for these positive/negative evaluations can be interpreted as the Korean public's expectation for Japan's response to historical and economic issues of importance, particularly the export regulation measures that escalated historical issues into economic security problems, being deemed unjust, and the evaluation and expectations for the Korean government's firm response to these measures. In other words, rather than directly supporting a strong stance against Japan, it appears that the evaluation of the Korean government's response was projected through criticism of the Japanese government's actions.

In fact, a 2021 survey on the Korean public's evaluation of the Japanese government's response revealed that negative evaluations (generally bad + bad: 43.2%) outweighed positive evaluations (very good + generally good: 14.1%), with a significant portion (37.4%) responding that they could not say either way. Furthermore, the fact that favorable/critical evaluations of the Korean government and the reasons for them were not significantly influenced by the respondents' ideological leanings suggests that the Korean public's perception of Japan shares common ground on historical and economic issues.[8]

IV. Japanese Public Opinion on Perceptions of South Korea and Evaluation of Government Response

1. Perception of the Other Country: Indifference, Convergence, and Nationalistic Discomfort

How, then, does Japanese public opinion perceive Korean politics and society? As presented in <Figure 9>, Japanese perceptions of Korea are somewhat reserved in judging favorability. While the proportion of those withholding judgment (neither/don't know) is high, the level of unfavorability is not higher than that in Korea, yet it constitutes the dominant perception for 40-50% of public opinion. Moreover, as of 2023, both favorability (37.4%) and unfavorability (32.8%) towards the other country show the most favorable figures since the survey began, and the overall pattern of favorability, unfavorability, and withheld judgment continues to coexist at around 30% each.

Observing the trend, while there is a general tendency for unfavorability to ease, fluctuations of around 10% are observed frequently. For instance, in the case of Korea, apart from the spikes in 2015 and 2021, it has steadily eased, whereas in Japan, unfavorable impressions increased compared to the previous year in four periods: 2014, 2017, 2019, and 2021.[9] Consequently, subtle and frequent increases in unfavorability linked to diplomatic issues, and convergence with Korean public opinion are detected.

<Figure 9> Impression of South Korea

The reason for the Japanese public's negative impression is overwhelmingly 'Japan's criticism related to historical issues and anti-Japanese sentiment (63%)', indicating a convergence effect with Korea's reactions. Following this are 'Dokdo Island issue (35.8%)' and 'Comfort Women/Forced Mobilization issue (28.5%)', showing that the same issues with Korea are acting as entrenched sources of conflict (<Figure 10>, Top). On the other hand, for positive impressions, factors such as 'Korean culture (51.8%)' and 'Korean food culture and shopping (46.6%)' have a significant effect through civilian exchanges and culture. Another striking point is the perception of 'being the same democratic country (21.5%)'. This reveals a dualistic sentiment of distrust and trust, where basic trust stemming from the shared perception of a democratic system coexists with distrust of Korea's anti-Japanese sentiment (<Figure 10>, Bottom).

<Figure 10> Reasons for Negative (Top) and Positive (Bottom) Impressions of South Korea (Average 2013-2023)

The uncomfortable perception of South Korea may be akin to discomfort with nationalistic sentiment. This is because they perceive nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment to be at play in Korean politics and society, which can lead to distrust in the Korean political process. Nationalism (51%) accounts for the majority in the image of how Korean politics and society operate (<Figure 11>). In essence, this is understood as a result of discomfort with the anti-Japanese nationalistic sentiment in Korean society, coupled with skepticism towards Korean politics, which promotes and amplifies it as needed. Unlike the Korean public, who distinguishes between the state (politics) and the people (society) with distrust towards the former and favorability towards the latter, Japanese sentiment reflects an uncomfortable view of the collective sentiment of the Korean people and the Korean politics that promotes it.

<Figure 11> Image of Korean Politics and Society Operation (Average 2013-2023)

However, Japanese public opinion is not negative towards improving Korea-Japan relations. Firstly, regarding perceptions of Korea-Japan relations (<Figure 12>), the perception that relations are bad has been gradually easing since peaking in 2014 (73.8%). Specifically, while the tendency to perceive worsening relations increased at two points in 2017 and 2019, it decreased in 2018 and 2022-2023. However, excluding 2023, when government-level measures for improving relations were taken, there was no substantial progress in relationship improvement. Notably, the easing of unfavorable perceptions in 2018 is a figure that is difficult to assume in a strained Korea-Japan relationship.

This could be due to ① the expectation of avoiding inherent confrontation, which conversely lowered the perception of 'bad', or ② the possibility that amidst the normalization of confrontation, relations were interpreted as not bad unless they were the worst possible situation. In that sense, 'relationship fatigue' and the tendency to avoid it can be seen as leading to a decrease in negative figures in the perception of Korea-Japan relations. Indeed, the orientation of Korea-Japan relations shown in <Table 6> well reflects the sentiment of the Japanese public desiring to avoid political confrontation. However, the high proportion of indifference towards Korea-Japan relations should not be overlooked as a point of difference with Korea.

<Figure 12> Japanese Public Opinion on Korea-Japan Relations

<Table 6> Stance to be Taken in Relations with South Korea (Single Response)

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2. Government Response Evaluation: A Security-Oriented Hesitation[10]

How, then, do Japanese citizens evaluate their government's response? Figure 13 summarizes evaluations from 2019 to the present. The proportion of respondents who answered 'neither' or 'don't know' is as high as the proportion of positive-negative evaluations, making it difficult to gauge whether the mainstream evaluation of the Japanese government is positive or negative. Thus, hesitant judgment and indifference are the dominant trends. The object of this hesitant indifference is both Korea and their own government. This offers a glimpse into the cynicism and indifference of Japanese public opinion towards politics and diplomacy in general (discussed later).

<Figure 13> Evaluation of the Japanese Government's Response to Korea (2019-2023)

Furthermore, issues related to Japan-Korea diplomacy are structured in a way that makes it difficult for the Japanese government to achieve results. Looking at the issues that public opinion considers important (Figure 14), Japanese citizens also identify the resolution of historical issues, the Dokdo issue, and issues of historical perception and education as important tasks, indicating that these are sensitive issues within Japan.

<Figure 14> What Japan and Korea Should Do for the Development of Bilateral Relations (Top 1-3 Priorities)

Meanwhile, differences in perception between Japan and Korea are also found in the subsequent items. Of particular note is the higher proportion of respondents who prioritize 'cooperation to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue' over 'strengthening economic cooperation such as trade and investment.' This indicates a difference in the priorities of the utility and cooperation content between the citizens of the two countries. Moreover, this difference in policy priorities between South Korea (economy) and Japan (security) is also an indicator that vividly shows the changed perception of Japan's politics and society towards the Korean Peninsula. Currently, Japan's perception of the Korean Peninsula cannot be discussed without considering the North Korean nuclear issue, and consequently, the difference in perceptions of the North Korean issue between the two governments has also significantly contributed to the sharpening of political conflicts between Japan and Korea.[11] In other words, the intensification of the North Korean nuclear threat has resonated with the sense of security crisis in Japan's politics and society, indicating that Japan's political and social circles perceive Korea's strategic value more highly in terms of security than economy. [12]

V. Political Efficacy: The Gap with Government Policy

In South Korea, a survey was conducted in 2021 on whether there was a difference between the government's and the general public's perceptions and policies regarding Japan. As shown in Figure 15, the view that there is 'some difference' constitutes the majority. Connecting this to the previous discussion, the characteristics of the political efficacy of South Korean citizens that can be inferred from this are as follows.

<Figure 15> South Korean Public's Political Efficacy Regarding Government's Japan Policy (2021)

First, regardless of ideological orientation, the view that 'there is some difference' is dominant. Generally, it is assumed that preferences for Japan diplomacy will differ according to ideological orientation, but the influence appears to be not significant. For conservative respondents, the view that 'there is a considerable difference' is 4% higher than for progressive respondents, and for progressive respondents, the view that 'there is almost no difference' is 4% higher than for conservative respondents. While there are slight differences in response, the view that 'there is some difference' converges across all segments of conservative, moderate, and progressive orientations, overwhelmingly surpassing the majority. A 4% margin is unlikely to be considered polarization of policy preferences based on ideological orientation.

Second, the public sentiment implied by 'some difference' suggests that there are boundaries for acceptable Japan diplomacy. The gap with government policy is based on the premise that Japan must properly recognize Korea's historical identity, and it is due to the convergence of policy orientations aimed at avoiding political conflict and strengthening economic cooperation. Here, a convergence space emerges with historical identity issues as the upper limit and conflict avoidance and economic (private) cooperation as the lower limit. In this context, it is necessary to consider whether the public sentiment, amidst the prolonged deterioration and conflict-confrontation phase of Japan-Korea relations, and as a counter-benefit, the active efforts of the political circles to restore relations (including the Japanese government's response), feels that there is some difference or is withholding judgment.

Furthermore, the academic and policy implications suggested by the convergence space of public opinion are significant. Currently, the differences in perceptions and strategies regarding Japan-Korea relations among domestic political factions are intensifying in a bipolar manner.[13] However, the fact that this has not extended to public opinion poses an interesting challenge for the political process.[14] If the public's orientation towards Japan, where convergence is confirmed, expands into ideological polarization in the future, the responsibility of political factions will be considerable. This is not unrelated to the logic of partisan politics that promotes and expands the confrontation of 'norms.' The current and subsequent governments will not be free from accountability, and above all, it may lead to self-restraining outcomes for both conservative and progressive camps in future Japan diplomacy. It is important to note that the politicization and expansion of orientation towards Japan can lead to complex dilemmas in domestic politics and diplomatic arenas.

Meanwhile, in Japan, there also appears to be a gap between policy and public perception. The characteristic of Japanese public opinion, as revealed through perceptions of Japan-Korea relations and evaluations of government responses, is that 'don't know' and 'neither' (hesitant judgment) constitute the majority. This is also evidence of a decline in political efficacy in Japan. It reflects a decrease in the expectation that one's own views and will can influence political decision-making (lowered internal efficacy) and an increased perception that policies produced by the political process are not responsive to society (lowered external efficacy). This cycle of perceptions, accumulating over time, can be interpreted as a form of abandonment, where individuals withdraw from politics.[15]

Currently, in Japan, the concentration of policy decision-making in the Prime Minister's Office has become normalized, and the lack of transparency in government policy output is pointed out as a problem in Japanese politics. In fact, surveys targeting Japanese politics as a whole have confirmed a decline in political efficacy since the 2010s.[16] This aspect of Japanese society reflects public cynicism towards political prominence and the opacity of policy decisions. In other words, rather than a limited distrust of the policies produced, there is an underlying dissatisfaction with the policymakers (politicians) and the process itself, and the diplomacy towards Korea is no exception.

VI. Conclusion and Implications: The One-Set of Japan-Korea Diplomacy and Public Opinion

The preceding sections have examined the perceptions of citizens in Japan and Korea towards each other, their evaluations of government responses, and the current state of political trust in both countries. The analytical results can be summarized into the following three points. First, regarding the perceptions of South Korean citizens towards Japan and their evaluations of the government's response. In terms of perceptions towards Japan, historical issues, i.e., identity factors, are the main source of conflict, and distrust of Japanese politics coexists with favorable views of Japanese society. The resulting orientation towards Japan-Korea relations is active in establishing friendly bilateral relations, and in that it is based on historical issue resolution and economic (private) cooperation, political outbursts by the governments of both countries are perceived as subjects to be controlled. Therefore, at present, policy performance is not attributed to either a conservative or progressive administration, and the situation can be described as one of reserved distance from government responses.

Second, the following characteristics have been confirmed regarding Japanese citizens' perceptions of Korea and their evaluations of the government's response. First, perceptions towards Korea share common ground with South Korea in that historical issues are considered important. However, there is a difference from the favorable Korean sentiments towards Japanese society, as Japanese citizens not only distrust Korean politics but also feel discomfort with the nationalistic sentiments of Korean citizens. Compared to South Korea, the sentiment of like/dislike is not as strong, but the tendency to withhold judgment is also pronounced. In that sense, a mixture of moderate assimilation effects and indifference towards the reactions of Korean politics and society can be confirmed. Meanwhile, in terms of orientation towards Japan-Korea relations, there is positivity towards restoring relations. However, the will for active relationship improvement is relatively weak, and while preferring to avoid political confrontation, historical issue resolution and security cooperation related to North Korea are considered important tasks. Here, resonance within Japan's politics and society regarding the North Korean threat and the necessity of Japan-Korea security is confirmed. Furthermore, a difference emerges between South Korean citizens, who prioritize economic aspects in the strategic value of the other country, and Japanese citizens, who prioritize security aspects. In the evaluation of government responses, there is little expectation (evaluation) of changes in diplomatic direction due to changes in prime ministers, indicating a tendency to avoid confrontation and indifference in Japanese public opinion across the board in setting relations with South Korea and evaluating government responses.

Third, regarding the diplomatic policies of the Japanese and Korean governments and the political trust of their citizens. Has the implementation of Japan-Korea diplomacy aligned with public opinion trends? The tentative conclusion drawn from the analysis is that there is a gap between the policy orientations of the citizens of both countries and the government's responses, which manifests as dissatisfaction with the political process and low political trust. While Japan-Korea diplomacy has been characterized by conflict and instability depending on the government's line and methods, it has not received the support of the majority public opinion in any phase. Furthermore, this pattern is not resolved by changes in government, and the political trust of citizens in both countries is not high, as neither Japanese nor Korean citizens are evaluating the policy performance of any particular government. The difficulties in Japan-Korea diplomacy are particularly evident in that it is accompanied by distrust of the other country's politics (Figure 16).

<Figure 16> Mechanism of Japan-Korea Relations Stalemate Viewed Through the Political Process

As such, both factors that promote and hinder the restoration of relations between the two countries are simultaneously present in the consciousness of the citizens of both nations. First, the common policy orientation of avoiding political confrontation and emphasizing the importance of cooperation can act as a positive factor for improving diplomatic relations and promoting cooperation. However, as dissatisfaction with the political process and low trust accumulate, neither Japan nor South Korea is in a structure that can easily absorb policy support domestically. While the current situation involves reserved evaluations of their own government's responses, if distrust of domestic and foreign politics continues in the future, the possibility of entrenching exclusive collective identities cannot be ruled out. In particular, historical issues, which are also linked to clashes of identity, require a delicate approach not only in Japan-Korea diplomacy but also in domestic political processes. The shared historical memory among the members of a nation, and the structure in which this combines with the political process, lie at the root of the historical issues between Japan and Korea, and it is necessary to face the complex political structure of domestic and international politics at play here.[17]

Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that the essence of the stalemate in Japan-Korea relations stems not from fragmented and fluid factors such as the policy stance of a particular government, but from a structural problem arising from the mutually reinforcing effect of distrust in the political process (Figure 21). The significant improvement in Japan's perception of Korea currently observed in 2023 is also a fluid view that responds to changes in the South Korean government's attitude. On the one hand, there are doubts as to whether the current government's efforts and policies can guarantee policy continuity in subsequent administrations, and concerns about regime change between conservatives and progressives. This is accompanied by a lack of purposeful understanding of the South Korean political operation based on the presidential system, or distrust in the systemic stability derived from political dynamism and balance. On the other hand, public opinion in South Korea's perception of Japan is still not free from the collective memory of its invasion history. Concerns about Japan's militarization demonstrate a lack of trust and a leap in judgment regarding the current operation of Japanese democracy.

This remains a significant challenge for the governments of both countries, who have embarked on a rapid restoration of relations with the trilateral cooperation of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan as a focal point. At the political level, the purpose and methods of diplomacy are not linear and may differ from the expectations of the majority of the public. However, finding practically effective solutions and precedents is not easy. Over the years, Japan and South Korea have pursued various approaches to relationship development by adjusting priorities on historical, economic, and security issues. Representative approaches include: ① a two-track strategy separating history and economy (private sector), ② gradual easing of historical conflicts by activating private cooperation and cultural exchange, and ③ increasing the autonomy of future generations by quickly resolving historical issues at the government level. However, none of these solutions can be definitively declared effective. Even if a phase of relationship restoration is created based on the diplomatic judgment and decisiveness of the governments of Japan and South Korea, building stable and long-term mutual trust remains a challenge.[18]

Therefore, the following remain important tasks for the future: ① delicate approach to historical issues at the Japan-Korea political level, ② ensuring transparency in the process of identifying comprehensive cooperation agenda items, ③ enhancing domestic political trust through strengthening accountability, and ④ acquiring (restoring) trust in the other country's politics by securing the normativity of Japan-Korea diplomacy. In this regard, Son Yeol (2022)'s policy recommendations are noteworthy. He points out that Japan policy led by the Blue House may lead to a weakening of accountability and an increase in inaction due to power concentration.[19] The direction of an alternative to Japan policy led by the Blue House is also a recommendation applicable to the Prime Minister's Office-led diplomacy in Japan. The balance between political leadership and institutional stability can serve as a measure of the virtuous cycle of domestic politics and diplomatic continuity, and at this point, it is necessary to reconsider the comprehensive meaning of the above recommendations.

Amidst the prolonged phase of stagnation, if there is a common perception and a minimal premise that has emerged between the Korean and Japanese publics, it is that political confrontation should be avoided, and avenues for dialogue, communication, and private exchange should remain open. Furthermore, it is time for hopeful interpretations and expanded efforts regarding the fact that the proportion of people who perceive the political and social systems of the other country as 'democratic' has steadily increased. For the Korean-Japanese relationship, which normatively shares freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, to not become mere political rhetoric, a long-term perspective and response are required. Expanding mutual public trust will not be achieved in a short period. To drive a mechanism for alleviating the deadlock, a long-term approach is necessary, considering a chain process of politics and society that expands from 'mutual respect at the political level between Korea and Japan → public-level trust in one's own politics (diplomacy) → trust in the other country'.

[1] Political efficacy is generally an evaluation of how well the public's (my) demands are responded to at the government level, and specifically includes two evaluative orientations: self-evaluation of whether one can influence political decision-making (internal efficacy) and evaluation of the government (external efficacy). Therefore, it has been discussed in conjunction with voter political participation or democratic consciousness in domestic political processes. In this regard, this study aims to make external efficacy the primary object of analysis in that it seeks to understand the long-term structuralized state of the gap between voter perceptions of national policies and government policies through political efficacy.

[2] For example, from a realist perspective, theoretical attempts have been made to explain state responses to international system stimuli through domestic variables such as leader image, state-society relations, and domestic institutions. From a liberal perspective, the two-level game theory, which analyzes domestic processes in which state strategies are formed to identify the win-set between states, is well-known. The constructivist perspective, which emphasizes intersubjective factors and identity, tends to focus more on domestic factors in that it seeks to explain domestic and international politics within a single analytical framework as a process of constructing collective identity.

[3] Political efficacy is sometimes identified as an independent variable related to political participation. In contrast, this study sets political efficacy as a dependent variable, in that it seeks to understand the long-term structuralized state of voter policy preferences (input), government policies (output), and the political process that results from this.

[4] This survey has been ongoing since 2013, targeting approximately 1,000 individuals from both the Korean and Japanese publics (Korea uses face-to-face interviews, Japan uses in-person and mail-out surveys, conducted annually from June to August). The survey content consists of unique questions for each country and common questions for both countries. In particular, the common questions include identical longitudinal questions each year, as well as timely issues reflecting the political characteristics of each year, allowing for an understanding of the orientation and dynamics of public opinion in both countries.

[5] The figures and tables presented in Chapters III-V are based on the analysis and processing of data from the EAI-Genron NPO Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey (2013-2022). To avoid duplication, the source is omitted here, but if data other than that from this survey is presented, the source will be indicated.

[6] From this, we can infer a feedback loop in the political process where 'public perception of the other country → government response → public perception (re) of Korea-Japan relations' circulates. Furthermore, through statistical analysis, the significant variables influencing Koreans' favorability towards Japan are identified as ① the Korean government's efforts to improve relations, ② the Japanese government's efforts to improve relations, and ③ the perception of the importance of Korea-Japan relations (Son Yeol, Kim Yang-gyu, Park Han-soo 2023, 11-13).

[7]<Figure 8> and <Figure 9> present results from surveys conducted by the same institution in the same year. However, the latter includes multifaceted cooperation encompassing economy as an option, and contains the intention to gauge the priority between past and future issues. Therefore, it is interpreted that the proportion differs from the previous analysis results, which presented economic cooperation as a single response option.

[8] The relationship with ideological orientation will be discussed in Chapter V.

[9] This can be understood as the aftermath of conflicts such as the dispute over comfort women in 2014, the Moon Jae-in new administration's re-examination of the comfort women agreement in 2017, and South Korea's declaration to terminate GSOMIA in response to Japan's export control measures in 2019.

[10] Although the same analysis is applied using common questions for Korea and Japan, it is noted that there are limitations to specific analysis due to the absence of items in the Japanese survey that allow for inferring the reasons for evaluating their own government's diplomatic responses. This is stated here.

[11] Meanwhile, differences in diplomatic and security views between conservative and progressive political forces in South Korea are also evident in issues concerning North Korea and Korea-Japan relations. The dramatic changes in the diplomatic policies of the Moon Jae-in and Yoon Suk-yeol administrations are also seen in their North Korea and Japan policies. For a discussion on the polarization of diplomatic and security perceptions between conservative and progressive forces and the complexity of North Korea-Japan issues, refer to Choi Hee-sik (2022).

[12] While there are differences between the two countries in terms of policy priorities, public opinion in both countries indicates a majority positive response to the necessity of security cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan (Korea: very positive 8.9%, somewhat positive 51.7%), similar to Japanese public opinion (very positive 14.6%, somewhat positive 35.3%) (as of 2023).

[13] In conjunction with this, research that clarifies the relationship between Korea-Japan diplomatic policy processes and domestic variables is drawing attention in academia (Shin Wook-hee 2019; Jeong Ki-woong 2020; Choi Hee-sik 2022).

[14] Meanwhile, according to a public opinion survey by EAI (2022), ideological differences were confirmed between respondents who prioritize finding solutions to historical issues (conservative 28.8%, progressive 53.1%, moderate 39.6%) and those who prioritize promoting future-oriented cooperation (conservative 46.5%, progressive 25.1%, moderate 36.9%) regarding priorities in policy toward Japan (single response). While the analysis results vary, readers are left to interpret them, and it is added that further review is necessary. In the future, in addition to examining whether the deviation by ideological tendency is at a significant level and when that occurs, it is also necessary to identify variables that define public preference for diplomacy toward Japan, such as the influence of government foreign policy (leader approval, evaluation of diplomacy toward Japan) and its linkage with party identification.

[15] The expression of 'I don't know' can be interpreted not only as ignorance or indifference but also as an active expression of not wanting to be linked to political situations such as Korea-Japan relations, or as a neutral response that neither sympathizes with nor criticizes anti-Korean sentiment and media reports. For an interpretation of 'I don't know' from a socio-cultural perspective, refer to Park Seung-hyun (2022).

[16] For the decline in political efficacy of Japanese voters due to the strengthening of policy leadership by the Prime Minister's Office, refer to Lee Ju-kyung (2019, 5-6).

[17] In this regard, the research by Asano (2022), which develops this discussion from a constructivist perspective, is noteworthy.

[18] In recent Korea-Japan diplomacy, the 1998 'Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration (Joint Declaration on a New Partnership between Japan and the Republic of Korea for the 21st Century)' is presented as a model case symbolizing comprehensive cooperation and reconciliation across various fields. However, this declaration was also the result of a combination of the South Korean government's Sunshine Policy toward North Korea at a time when the North Korean nuclear threat emerged, and the inclusive perspective within the Japanese political sphere that sought to open channels with North Korea and partially alleviate the North Korean threat. In other words, while the Korea-Japan cooperation at the time had the effect of expanding the diplomatic room for maneuver of the other country by considering the balance between South Korea's North Korea policy and Japan's perception of the Korean Peninsula, the diplomacy currently pursued by the governments of Korea and Japan requires securing domestic trust and trust from the other country as even more indispensable elements, given that it must be premised on shared perceptions of the international system, shared direction, and furthermore, the continuity of domestic and foreign policies encompassing economy and security.

[19] Therefore, it is proposed that institutional improvements are necessary to enhance policy expertise by granting autonomy and negotiation authority to the ministry in charge of foreign affairs, and to strengthen communication and coordination with relevant ministries (Son Yeol 2022, 13-14).

References

East Asia Institute. 2022. “Conditions for Presidential Success: Survey on Proposals for the New Administration's Foreign Policy.” EAI.

Park Seung-hyun. 2022. “The Active Response of 'I Don't Know'.” 『EAI Issue Briefing』

Son Yeol. 2022. “Policy Toward Japan: Rebuilding Korea-Japan Relations with the Long-Term Vision of a Century.” 『EAI Working Paper: 2022 EAI New Administration Foreign Policy Proposals Series 5.c』

______·Kim Yang-gyu·Park Han-soo. 2023. “The Distance Between Korean and Japanese Publics Regarding Relationship Improvement: Analysis of the 2023 Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey Results.” 『EAI Issue Briefing』.

Shin Wook-hee. 2019. “The Agreement on the Comfort Women Victims Issue and the Two-Level Security Dilemma in Korea-Japan Relations.” 『Asian Review』 9,1.

Asano Toyomi. 2022. “The Co-evolution of Domestic and Foreign Politics and Historical Reconciliation Across the Fault Lines of Nation-State Formation.” 『EAI Working Paper: Future Vision of Korea-Japan Cooperation Series 12』.

Lee Ju-kyung. 2019. “Challenges in Japanese Politics and the Direction of the 2030 Next Generation of Politics.” 『EAI Working Paper: Future Japan 2030 - Where is Japan Headed After Abe? 2』.

Jeong Ki-woong. 2020. “A Study on the Conflict Factors in South Korea's Diplomacy Toward Japan: The Case of GSOMIA and the Two-Face Game.” 『Journal of Political Information』 23, 1.

Choi Hee-sik. 2022. “Korea-Japan Relations in the Era of US-China Strategic Competition: Polarized Politics and Policy Toward Japan.” 『Journal of Japanese Studies』 56.

Easton, David. 1965. A System Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley and Sons.

Kolln, Ann-Kristin and Kees Aarts. 2021. “What Explains the Dynamics of Citizens’ Satisfaction with Democracy? An Integrated Framework for Panel Data.” Electoral Studies 69.

■ Lee Ju-kyung is a professor at the Institute for Social Sciences, Pusan National University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Oh Jun-chul_EAI Research Assistant

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