[Japan-Korea Relations as Seen by Public Opinion Series] IV. Perceptions of the Korean and Japanese Publics on Future-Oriented Cooperation and Historical Issues

I. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the Korean and Japanese publics perceive future-oriented cooperation and historical issues by analyzing the results of the survey question, 'What do you think about Korea-Japan relations and the historical issues between the two countries?' from the <Mutual Perceptions Survey of Korea and Japan> (2013-2023) conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO in Japan. To this end, we will review the perspectives and outlooks on Korea-Japan relations and policy preferences inherent in the four survey responses: 'It will be difficult to have a future-oriented cooperative relationship without resolving historical issues,' 'If we build a future-oriented cooperative relationship between the two countries, historical issues will also be gradually resolved,' 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries,' and 'I don't know.' Based on the survey results, we will discuss the mutual perceptions of the Korean and Japanese publics regarding the correlation between future-oriented cooperation and historical issues.

Looking at the breakdown of the survey period, Korea-Japan relations experienced a so-called 'lost decade' from 2012 to 2022, and then showed signs of improvement in 2023.[1]During the 'lost decade,' Korea-Japan relations exhibited aspects of nationalistic conflict over historical issues, leading to a complex crisis where historical conflicts spilled over into economic and security sectors. In 2023, South Korea's Yoon Suk-yeol administration proposed a third-party payment solution for the forced conscription issue, and subsequently, shuttle diplomacy and communication channels have been restored. Amidst this, did the publics of South Korea and Japan consider 'resolving historical issues as a prerequisite for a future-oriented cooperative relationship,' believing that 'it will be difficult to have a future-oriented cooperative relationship without resolving historical issues'? Or did they envision a future of reconciliation where historical issues would be gradually resolved through sustained cooperation, thinking that 'if we build a future-oriented cooperative relationship between the two countries, historical issues will also be gradually resolved'? Alternatively, did they foresee the persistence of historical issues, stating that 'historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries'? Or were they leaving the situation unattended or observing it under the response 'I don't know'?

As each response suggests, there are two tracks in the relationship between Korea and Japan: historical issues and future-oriented cooperation. The bilateral relationship unfolds through the prioritization and combination of these two tracks. The 'lost decade' in recent Korea-Japan relations was the result of an overemphasis on historical issues, which overshadowed the track of cooperation. The complex crisis involving historical issues, the economy, and security was its peak. Had the two countries focused on cooperation issues, a different scenario might have unfolded. Nevertheless, historical issues, being closely tied to national identity, can re-emerge and cause conflict in Korea-Japan relations.

According to numerous public opinion polls on Korea-Japan relations, a dynamic of anti-Japan sentiment and anti-Korea sentiment has taken root in Korean and Japanese societies due to historical conflicts over the past decade. This dynamic is a consequential aspect of the historical conflicts that have occurred at the governmental level. This paper will examine public perceptions, encompassing not only the consequential aspects of historical conflicts but also their outlook and solutions, by investigating the survey results of the '[Korea-Japan Relations and Historical Issues Between the Two Countries]' survey. Furthermore, we will gauge the extent to which public opinion aligns with the government's policy stance of prioritizing historical issues through an analysis of the survey results.

With this problem awareness, this paper is structured as follows. First, it will provide an overview of Korea-Japan relations during the survey period and examine the meaning of the 'Korea-Japan Relations and Historical Issues Between the Two Countries' survey and its three responses. Subsequently, based on the analysis of the actual survey results, it will reveal the thoughts and outlooks of the Korean and Japanese publics regarding the possibility of developing bilateral relations and historical reconciliation during the 'lost decade' of bilateral relations. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the main points of the body and discuss the implications for the South Korean government's diplomacy towards Japan.

II. Korea-Japan Relations from 2013-2023 and the 'Korea-Japan Relations and Historical Issues' Survey

1. Overview of Korea-Japan Relations from 2013-2023

1) The Park Geun-hye - Abe Administration Period (2013-2016)

The Park Geun-hye - Abe administration period was a time when the nationalisms of the two conservative leaders clashed. Inheriting the severely deteriorated Korea-Japan relations following President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo, the two leaders clashed over historical perceptions from the outset of their administrations. Japan's Abe administration exhibited revisionist stances on history, such as visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. Simultaneously, President Park Geun-hye created a confrontational dynamic between Korea and Japan over historical issues, stating in her March 1st Independence Movement Day address that 'the historical positions of the perpetrator and the victim cannot change even after a thousand years.'

The issue of comfort women mobilized by the Japanese military was the most representative historical conflict during the Park Geun-hye - Abe administration. South Korea's Park Geun-hye administration made the resolution of the comfort women issue a prerequisite for the development of Korea-Japan relations. During the Lee Myung-bak administration, the Constitutional Court of Korea ruled that the South Korean government's response to the comfort women issue was an omission, and thereafter, the comfort women issue became the top priority in the South Korean government's diplomacy with Japan. In response, the subsequent Park Geun-hye administration demanded an apology and compensation from Japan, making Japan's proactive measures a condition for Korea-Japan summit talks. By placing the comfort women issue at the entrance to the development of Korea-Japan relations, the South Korean government created a rigid situation where bilateral relations could not move forward without resolving historical issues.

In addition to the Park Geun-hye administration's principled diplomacy towards Japan, the Abe administration's historical policies at the time also contributed to the deterioration of relations. The Abe administration believed that South Korea continued to raise historical issues that had already been resolved, demanding apologies and repentance from Japan. It was perceived that South Korea was using historical issues as a diplomatic card, 'burdening post-war generations with the obligation of apology,' despite these issues having been settled through previous bilateral agreements, such as the Claims Settlement Agreement. Therefore, Prime Minister Abe believed it was necessary to adopt a stance of not compromising with South Korea on historical issues, rather than expressing repentance and apology, and was prepared to accept the resulting deterioration of relations with South Korea (21st Century Committee for the Future of Japan 2015, 227-228).[2]

As the costs of ongoing historical conflicts continued to mount, the two governments sought a political resolution to the issue by reaching the comfort women agreement on December 28, 2015. In the agreement, Prime Minister Abe expressed his apologies and repentance, acknowledging his deep remorse, and the Japanese government agreed to contribute 1 billion yen to fund projects aimed at restoring the honor and dignity of the victims and healing their wounds. However, the agreement was not smoothly implemented due to growing criticism within South Korea that the victims' wishes had not been respected.

2) The Moon Jae-in - Abe and Post-Abe Administration Period (2017-2021)

The Moon Jae-in administration, which came to power in May 2017 with a platform of eradicating deep-rooted evils, questioned the legitimacy of the comfort women agreement, stating that it did not adhere to a victim-centered approach. On December 27, 2017, the task force established by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs to review the comfort women agreement concluded that 'a victim-centered approach was not sufficiently reflected in the negotiation process.' Subsequently, the Moon Jae-in administration dissolved the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation established under the comfort women agreement. The Japanese government considered the dissolution of the foundation by the Moon Jae-in administration a violation of the agreement and strongly protested.

The conflict between the Moon Jae-in and Abe administrations further worsened with the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling on the forced conscription issue. In October 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court ruled that Japan's colonial rule was an illegal occupation and that the claims for damages by the victims of forced conscription remained valid. The court determined that the right to compensation for inhumane illegal acts resulting from colonial rule was not included in the 1965 Claims Settlement Agreement. As the defendant Japanese companies refused to pay compensation, procedures were initiated to forcibly sell their assets and convert them into cash. The Japanese government argued that compensation for forced conscription had been fully settled under the Claims Settlement Agreement and that the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling fundamentally overturned the legal basis of Korea-Japan relations.

In 2019, the conflict surrounding the forced conscription issue expanded into the economic and security sectors, plunging Korea-Japan relations into a complex conflict. As the South Korean courts proceeded with the process of liquidating the assets of the defendant Japanese companies, the Japanese government implemented export control measures on key semiconductor components. Although the Japanese government officially denied it, the export control measures were intended as an 'alarm to move' South Korea on the forced conscription issue and as retaliatory action (<Mainichi Shimbun>. 2019/9/4). In response, the South Korean government retaliated by terminating the Korea-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). As the Japanese government undermined economic cooperation based on historical issues, the South Korean government sought to impose a cost by undermining security cooperation with Japan. The United States intervened, leading to a conditional suspension of GSOMIA, but it remained in a legally precarious state.

The Korea-Japan conflict continued even after the post-Abe era. A characteristic of the Japanese government's policy towards South Korea during the post-Abe period was to make the resolution of the asset liquidation issue a prerequisite for improving relations. In September 2020, the Suga administration, succeeding the Abe administration, refused to hold Korea-Japan summit talks, citing South Korea's failure to present a solution for the asset liquidation issue. The Suga administration's policy solidified the stalemate where export controls and the GSOMIA issue remained unresolved unless the asset liquidation issue was resolved. The same policy stance continued under the Kishida administration, which succeeded the Suga administration. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stated, 'It is necessary to develop Korea-Japan relations based on the foundation of friendly cooperation built since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965, and to this end, it is necessary to resolve pending issues between Korea and Japan, including the conscription issue.'

3) The Launch of the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration in South Korea and Korea-Japan Relations (2022-2023)

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration in South Korea, launched in May 2022, proposed a comprehensive approach and resolution encompassing historical issues, economy, and security. President Yoon Suk-yeol argued, 'We can discuss past issues and future cooperation together,' and 'We must put historical issues and the future of both countries on the same table and resolve them together.' This indicated a policy stance of seeking momentum for resolving historical issues through security and economic cooperation with Japan, aiming to resolve the complex bilateral conflict. In his Liberation Day address on August 15, 2022, President Yoon Suk-yeol stated, 'When Korea-Japan relations move towards the future and the mission of the times based on universal values, past issues can also be resolved properly.'

In March 2023, the South Korean government proposed a third-party payment as a solution to the asset liquidation issue concerning forced conscription. With the breakthrough in the forced conscription issue through third-party payment by the South Korean government, the Japanese government lifted its export restrictions on South Korea, and the Korea-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement was normalized. Concurrently, with the restoration of shuttle diplomacy between the leaders of South Korea and Japan, as well as dialogue channels across various government and economic sectors, bilateral relations moved away from a complex crisis and entered a phase of improvement. Currently, efforts are being made between the governments of South Korea and Japan to consolidate bilateral cooperation in various fields, including security, economy, and civilian exchanges.

2. 'Korea-Japan Relations and Historical Issues Between the Two Countries' and Mutual Perceptions

The survey question 'Korea-Japan Relations and Historical Issues Between the Two Countries: What do you think about Korea-Japan relations and the historical issues between the two countries?' from the 'Mutual Perceptions Survey of Korea and Japan,' conducted by the East Asia Institute and Genron NPO since 2013, is structured as follows:

<Table 1: Survey on Korea-Japan Relations and Historical Issues Between the Two Countries>

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Each response implies different perspectives, outlooks, and policy preferences regarding the relationship between Korea-Japan relations and historical issues.

● It will be difficult to have a future-oriented cooperative relationship between the two countries without resolving historical issues

The first response reflects the perception that historical issues are the biggest obstacle to Korea-Japan cooperation. While Korea-Japan relations consist of two tracks, history and cooperation, past conflicts have often overshadowed the cooperation track. Another aspect of the first response is that it views the resolution of historical issues as a prerequisite for the development of Korea-Japan relations. 'It will be difficult to have a future-oriented cooperative relationship between the two countries without resolving historical issues' is equivalent to 'future-oriented cooperation between the two countries is possible only after historical issues are resolved.' Therefore, the first response aligns with a principled approach by the government to historical issues or a one-track policy focused on past issues.

However, the first response does not assume that historical conflicts constitute the entirety of Korea-Japan relations. What the first response intends is that historical issues must be resolved first in order to build a future-oriented cooperative relationship with the other country, in a literal sense. In the first response, historical conflicts are seen as a period of adjustment leading to a future-oriented relationship. In other words, the conflict situation arising from historical issues can be viewed as a transitional phase towards a future-oriented relationship.

● If we build a future-oriented cooperative relationship between the two countries, historical issues will also be gradually resolved.

The second response suggests that historical issues can be resolved in the process of accumulating practical cooperative relations between South Korea and Japan. It is diametrically opposed to the first response in that it is not the other way around. The Korea-Japan relationship inherent in the second response is similar to the Franco-German relationship after World War II. France and Germany institutionalized cooperation in diplomacy, defense, and youth education through the Élysée Treaty in 1963, and through long-term cooperative relations, they ended the long-standing historical confrontation between the two countries (Feldman 2013).[3]In other words, the response 'If we build a future-oriented cooperative relationship between the two countries, historical issues will also be gradually resolved' contains the prospect that historical reconciliation can be achieved by prioritizing long-term and continuous cooperation.

If South Korea and Japan cooperate, it will be because such cooperation serves their national interests. In other words, according to the second response, the resolution of historical issues depends on whether South Korea and Japan can discover national interests in their cooperation with each other. Therefore, it can be predicted that the proportion of the second response will increase as perceptions of North Korea and China converge, necessitating Korea-Japan cooperation, and a perception of the other country's importance is formed. Accordingly, a policy stance that emphasizes future-oriented cooperation issues over historical issues and pursues separate responses between the two countries will be pursued.

● Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries.

The third response predicts that historical issues will remain a persistent source of conflict in Korea-Japan relations. In other words, the third response envisions a Korea-Japan relationship where historical issues become a 'Sisyphean punishment.'[4]Unlike the first response, it does not hold the view that Korea-Japan relations will develop only after historical issues are resolved. However, it also differs from the second response in that it distances itself from the rosy prospect that the development of Korea-Japan relations will lead to historical reconciliation. In other words, the third response posits a Korea-Japan relationship where the hard-won edifice of cooperation collapses again due to the re-emergence of historical issues.

The first response views conflicts arising from historical issues as a painful adjustment period for entering a better stage of future-oriented Korea-Japan relations. In contrast, the third response aligns with skepticism about the possibility of resolving historical issues. It harbors a pessimistic outlook that South Korea and Japan will confront each other again due to unresolved historical issues. In other words, in the Korea-Japan relationship envisioned by the third response, there is no exit from historical conflicts. Historical conflicts are seen as conflicts in themselves.

● I don't know.

The fourth response, 'I don't know,' is a question that can be interpreted in several ways. Literally, 'I don't know' means being unable to choose any of the three options. In this regard, two scenarios can be considered.[5]First, it could be that the survey question is too difficult. If ordinary citizens, not experts, find the question difficult, they may not be able to choose an answer and select 'I don't know.' In such cases, the reason for not knowing would be a lack of knowledge. Second, 'I don't know' can also signify indifference to the issue itself. The development of Korea-Japan relations and historical issues are political topics. In this context, 'I don't know' can be seen as the public's political apathy, as discussed in political science. As a result, the response 'I don't know' is on the same level as tacit acceptance or neglect of the conflict situation. Another aspect of 'I don't know' is 'It doesn't matter to me if the current situation continues where conflicts persist and Korea-Japan relations do not improve' (Park Seung-hyun 2022).

Therefore, to understand which type of 'I don't know' it represents, an analysis of other survey questions would be necessary.

III. South Korean Public Opinion Survey Results

1) Trends over the Past Decade

The survey results for South Korea regarding 'Korea-Japan Relations and Historical Issues Between the Two Countries: What do you think about Korea-Japan relations and the historical issues between the two countries?' from 2013 to 2022 are as follows.

[Table 2: Korean Survey Results]

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Over the course of a decade of surveys, the statement 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' has been the most frequently selected. After recording the highest figure of 41.5% in 2013, the year the survey began, it remained the most chosen option in most years, except for 2018, 2022, and 2023. This indicates that the Korean public prioritizes the resolution of historical issues as the most crucial task for advancing bilateral relations.

Concurrently, it has been observed that the statement 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' has gained increasing traction as the survey progressed. This response was lowest at 29.1% in 2013, the year the survey commenced. Subsequently, it showed a declining trend, falling to 23.3% in 2014 and 20.9% in 2015. However, it began to rise in 2016, narrowing the gap with the previously dominant statement, 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues.' In 2018, the latter was surpassed by the former, and it was the most selected option for two consecutive years, in 2022 and 2023. Despite experiencing a 'lost decade' in relations with Japan, the Korean public's opinion has increasingly emphasized the importance of sustained cooperation with Japan and the perception that historical issues should be resolved based on long-term cooperation.

2) Detailed Analysis: Park Geun-hye-Abe Administration Period (2013-2016)

<Graph 1: Survey Results 2013-2016>

From 2013 to 2015, South Korea and Japan experienced a period of strained relations due to historical conflicts, to the extent that summit meetings could not be held. During this time, the statement 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' was the most frequently chosen by the Korean public. It garnered 41.5% in 2013 and 41.2% in 2014, before significantly rising to 52.8% in 2015, the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations. The survey results from this period suggest that as historical conflicts intensified, the Korean public considered the resolution of historical issues to be the most pressing concern. This public sentiment aligned with the principled diplomacy of the then Park Geun-hye administration, which stipulated forward-looking measures from Japan as a prerequisite for summit talks.

The second most frequent response was 'Even if bilateral relations improve, resolving historical issues will be difficult.' This option accounted for 29.4% in 2013, followed by 30.7% in 2014 and 24.3% in 2015, ranking second. The sharp deterioration of South Korea-Japan relations following then-President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo in 2012 led a considerable portion of the Korean public to become skeptical about the possibility of resolving historical issues. Furthermore, amidst Japan's conservative shift and the Abe administration's historical revisionism, the image of Japan as unwilling to apologize or reflect was reinforced among Koreans.

2016 marked a turning point as the agreement on the 'comfort women' issue was reached, initiating movement in the previously stagnant bilateral relations (Yonhap News 2016). Survey results also reflected this shift. The statement 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' was selected by 33.1%, marking its first time ranking second. This represented a significant increase of 12.3% from 20.9% in 2015. This response, which had ranked third from 2013-2015, showed a declining trend until 2015 (2013: 29.1%, 2014: 23.3%, 2015: 20.9%) before reversing to an upward trend in 2016, reaching second place. This indicates a growing sentiment among the Korean public to resolve historical issues by establishing long-term cooperative relations with Japan.

In 2016, the top response remained 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues,' with 42.8%. Nevertheless, the notable aspect is that the sharp rise in the 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' response coincided with a sharp decline in the 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' response. The latter decreased by 10% from 52.8% in 2015 to 42.8% in 2016. This suggests that the Korean public's emphasis on cooperation with Japan was accompanied by a decline in support for a principled approach towards Japan.[6]

The ranking of responses in 2016 continued until 2020. Therefore, the discontinuity between 2013-2015 and 2016 warrants attention. Although the majority of the Korean public evaluated the comfort women agreement negatively, only a minority believed the issue was resolved by the agreement.[7] However, the improvement in bilateral relations brought about by the agreement served to remind the Korean public of the importance of cooperation with Japan.

In summary, while the Korean public in 2015 showed a strong preoccupation with historical issues, stating that 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues,' they also began to re-evaluate the importance of South Korea-Japan relations. The sharp increase in the response 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' in 2016 coincided with this renewed recognition of the importance of bilateral relations.

3) Detailed Analysis: Moon Jae-in-Abe and Post-Abe Administration Period (2017-2021)

<Graph 2: Survey Results 2017-2018>

The South Korea-Japan relationship during the Moon Jae-in-Abe period began amidst conflict surrounding the comfort women agreement. The Moon Jae-in administration, which took office in May 2017, was critical of the comfort women agreement. Public opinion polls on this matter indicated that the majority of the Korean public sympathized with the Moon administration's concerns. In a 2017 survey on 'Stance on the Comfort Women Agreement,' only 21.2% of Koreans evaluated it positively, while 55.5% opposed it. In 2018, positive evaluations rose to 23.9%, and negative evaluations decreased to 45.9%. Although the gap between positive and negative evaluations narrowed in 2018, the latter remained higher. The Korean public's dissatisfaction with the comfort women agreement was starkly evident in the question asking whether the issue of Japanese military 'comfort women' had been resolved by the agreement. In the first survey in 2016, 73.7% stated it was 'not resolved,' while only 21% said it was 'resolved.' In the 2017 survey, only 19.5% believed it was 'resolved,' with 75% stating it was 'not resolved.' In 2018, 'not resolved' again accounted for an overwhelming majority at 70.4% compared to 22.5% for 'resolved.' This stance was diametrically opposed to that of the Japanese government, which claimed the issue was fully settled by the agreement.

<Graph 3: Stance on the Comfort Women Agreement (2016-2018)>

<Graph 4: Stance on Whether the Issue of Japanese Military 'Comfort Women' Was Resolved by the South Korea-Japan Agreement>

Crucially, dissatisfaction with the comfort women agreement did not represent the entirety of the Korean public's perception of Japan. The Korean public recognized the importance of future-oriented cooperation. <Graph 2> shows that the proportion of respondents selecting 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' increased from 2017 to 2018. In 2016, 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' and 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' accounted for 42.8% and 33.1%, respectively, a difference of 9.7%. The following year, 2017, the gap narrowed to 7.6%. In 2018, the former stood at 33.5%, while the latter reached 35.8%, marking the first time 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' ranked first since the survey began.

Admittedly, in 2017-2018, the responses 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' and 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' occupied the first and second positions, indicating that public opinion prioritizing the resolution of historical issues remained significant. The negative views on the comfort women agreement are consistent with this sentiment. Nevertheless, the increasing trend of 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' from 2017 to 2018 suggests a perception that distinguished between negative views on the comfort women agreement and the necessity of improving bilateral relations and fostering future-oriented cooperation.

This perception among the Korean public differed somewhat from the relationship between the two governments at the time, which was experiencing conflict. The background and dynamics behind the rise in responses recognizing the importance of cooperation with Japan, despite poor government relations, remain unclear. It could be influenced by factors such as private exchanges like tourism to Japan or reflect fatigue from prolonged conflict. However, it is clear that while government relations were deteriorating, opportunities for improving relations were emerging within South Korean public opinion. These opportunities manifested as a tendency to acknowledge the necessity of future-oriented cooperation between South Korea and Japan, even while maintaining a critical stance on specific issues like government-level agreements.

From 2019 to 2021, South Korea-Japan relations entered a complex crisis as the conflict stemming from the forced labor lawsuit rulings extended into economic and security domains. The trends in 2019 reflect the conflict that arose after the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor in October 2018. 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' regained the top position with 39.1%. The response that ranked first the previous year, 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved,' fell to second place with 30.8%.

From 2019 to 2021, South Korea-Japan relations were mired in a complex crisis as the conflict stemming from the forced labor lawsuit rulings spilled over into economic and security sectors. In 2019, reflecting the aftermath of the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor in October 2018, 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' constituted the largest proportion at 39.1%. The response that ranked first the previous year, 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved,' dropped to second place with 30.8%.

<Graph 5: Survey Results 2019-2021>

The survey results for 2020 reflect the complex conflict involving historical issues, economy, and security. The response 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the state of bilateral cooperation' was the most selected at 43.6%. 2020 is the only year in South Korean public opinion surveys where 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the state of bilateral cooperation' was the most frequently chosen option. Japan had imposed export control measures against South Korea, and the resulting backlash and distrust among the Korean public were directed towards this sentiment.

This reaction from the Korean public differs from the characteristics observed during the Park Geun-hye administration. As previously mentioned, during the Park Geun-hye administration, the Korean public exhibited a strong orientation towards resolving historical issues, believing that 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues.' In contrast, the 2020 survey results indicate a strengthening of skepticism among the Korean public, with a growing belief that 'Historical issues will not be resolved.'

Furthermore, the increase in 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the state of bilateral cooperation' occurred alongside a simultaneous decline in the other two responses. 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' dropped from 39.1% in 2019 to 28.4%, and 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved,' which garnered 30.8% in 2019, fell to 24.5%.

These survey results are considered a natural reaction to the comprehensive deterioration of relations with Japan. As historical conflicts between South Korea and Japan extended to cooperative areas such as the economy and security, the space for future-oriented cooperation with Japan, which could serve as an exit from historical conflicts, was closing. Consequently, 'building future-oriented cooperative relations to gradually resolve historical issues' also became an unrealistic option. As a result, the response 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the state of bilateral cooperation' accounted for the largest proportion.

The survey results for 2020 were thus directly influenced by the complex conflict between South Korea and Japan. However, a change occurred within a year. In the 2021 survey, 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' and 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' both received 38.1%, resulting in a tie. The response 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the state of bilateral cooperation' decreased by more than 20% from 2019 to 21.7%. Numerically, public opinion in South Korea showed an equal emphasis on 'resolving historical issues as a prerequisite for future-oriented relations' and 'resolving historical issues through sustained and long-term cooperation.'

The fact that 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' tied for first place in 2021, a period of strained South Korea-Japan relations, warrants attention. At that time, the relationship between the two countries was mired in complex conflict, with the Suga administration in Japan making the issue of asset liquidation a prerequisite for improving relations, and the Moon Jae-in administration showing little initiative in finding a resolution to the liquidation issue. Amidst this stalemate in government relations, the Korean public simultaneously held a principled stance on historical issues and a flexible approach of addressing historical issues and future-oriented cooperation separately.

The background to this was the changes in the international landscape surrounding South Korea-Japan relations, such as the North Korean nuclear issue and US-China competition. The intensification of US-China competition and growing concerns about China, particularly the increasing perception of threat from China, were altering the Korean public's perception of relations with Japan. In an international context of heightened US-China competition and assertive Chinese foreign policy, the Korean public showed a tendency to prioritize cooperation with Japan (Son Yeol 2021).

In 2021, despite deteriorating government relations, the Korean public responded sensitively to changes in the international situation of US-China competition and recognized the necessity of cooperation with Japan. Looking back, even in 2018, government relations were poor, yet the Korean public recognized the importance of cooperation with Japan. When historical conflicts arise between the South Korean and Japanese governments, the Korean public prioritizes the resolution of historical issues, even if it entails enduring conflict. However, a pattern emerged where they subsequently also acknowledged the importance of cooperation with Japan and future-oriented South Korea-Japan relations.

4) Detailed Analysis: Launch of the New South Korean Government under Yoon Suk-yeol (2022) and Diplomacy towards Japan

<Graph 6: Survey Results 2022-2023>

2022 marked the launch of a new South Korean government that adopted an active stance towards cooperation with Japan. President Yoon Suk-yeol's approach to Japan aligns with the survey response 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved.' The day after his election, on March 10, President Yoon stated, 'It is important to find what benefits both South Korea and Japan in the future, rather than the past,' expressing his intention to resolve contentious issues such as historical problems while building future-oriented cooperative relations.

The survey results for 2022 show that 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' was the most selected option with 42.5%. This marks the first time since 2018 that this response ranked first independently.

2023 was a year in which bilateral relations showed signs of restoration as the South Korean Yoon Suk-yeol administration formulated a solution to the forced labor asset liquidation issue through third-party compensation. In 2023, 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' remained the most selected option with 36.3%. This is the first time in the history of the survey that this response has ranked first for two consecutive years. Although the figure decreased compared to 2022, it is a significant characteristic of 2023. The perspective that prioritizes future-oriented cooperation with Japan while also addressing historical issues, and the policy orientation that historical issues can be resolved through a continuous and long-term cooperative process, are becoming established within South Korean public opinion.

Another notable feature of the 2023 results is the significant increase in the response 'Even if bilateral relations improve, resolving historical issues will be difficult.' In 2022, this figure was only 15.2%, but in 2023, it rose by 11.8% to 27%. This sharp increase occurred alongside a decline in the other two responses: 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' and 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues.' Although it ranked third, it was only 2.6% behind the second-ranked response, 'Future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues,' at 29.6%. Considering the 24.4% gap between these two responses in 2022, the sharp rise in 'Even if bilateral relations improve, resolving historical issues will be difficult' is a striking change. Previous surveys indicated a sharp increase in this response in 2020, influenced by the complex crisis in South Korea-Japan relations. However, the current increase during a period of improved relations is particularly noteworthy.

Other survey results from 2023, such as increased favorability towards Japan and the importance of South Korea-Japan relations, did not show upward trends, indicating a general lack of high expectations among the Korean public for improved bilateral relations. Specifically, the third-party compensation plan received 28.4% in favor and 34.1% against (Son Yeol et al. 2023). In this context, the sharp rise in 'Even if bilateral relations improve, resolving historical issues will be difficult' can be understood. In 2023, while the Korean public believes that historical issues should be overcome through future-oriented cooperation, they also maintain a cautious stance on whether the current improvement in relations can resolve historical issues.

The aforementioned characteristics suggest two implications for South Korean public opinion in 2023. First, although public opposition to the third-party compensation plan is dominant, this cannot be interpreted as opposition to the South Korean government's policy direction, which emphasizes future-oriented cooperative relations. Despite the prevailing opposition to the third-party compensation plan, 'If future-oriented cooperative relations are built between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' ranked first in the 2023 survey. This indicates that the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's policy direction towards Japan is aligning with South Korean public opinion to a certain extent.

Second, the increase in the response 'Even if bilateral relations improve, resolving historical issues will be difficult' serves as evidence that historical issues have not been resolved, despite the third-party compensation plan. While the third-party compensation plan was a breakthrough for improving South Korea-Japan relations, it was a solution for the asset liquidation issue, not for historical issues as a whole. The issue of the illegality of colonial rule, raised by the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling, remains unresolved despite the resolution of the liquidation issue. The increase in the response 'Even if bilateral relations improve, resolving historical issues will be difficult' in 2023, despite improved South Korea-Japan relations, may imply that a significant portion of the Korean public perceives that 'even if bilateral relations improve,' 'resolving historical issues,' including the issue of the illegality of colonial rule, will be difficult, using the third-party compensation plan as a catalyst.

IV. Japanese Public Opinion Survey Results

1) Trends Over the Past Decade

The responses of the Japanese public to the question 'South Korea-Japan Relations and Historical Issues: What are your thoughts on South Korea-Japan relations and the historical issues between the two countries?' from 2013 to 2022 are presented below.

<Table 3: Japanese Survey Results>

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Over the ten years of the survey, the response 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries' was the most frequent. Starting at 32.1% in 2013, it reached a high of 35.2% in 2018, accounting for the largest proportion of responses. This indicates that the Japanese public perceives and anticipates that historical issues will continue to constrain Korea-Japan relations.

A noteworthy trend during the survey period is the emergence of the response 'Future-oriented cooperation between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' as the top answer. In 2021 and 2022, this response accounted for 29.8% and 27.8% respectively, surpassing the 28.3% and 24.5% for 'Resolving historical issues will be difficult even if bilateral relations improve.' The top two responses are 'Resolving historical issues is a prerequisite for improving bilateral relations' and 'There is no prospect of resolving historical issues.' This shift is a key focus for analysis regarding Japan.

Amidst this, there were years when 'If we build future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' ranked first. These were 2016 and 2023. In 2016, this response accounted for 30.2%. This represented an increase of over 10% from 19.3% in 2015, surpassing the 28.1% for 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries' to take the top spot. Subsequently, this response has shown an upward trend since 2022, reaching its highest point in 2023. In 2022, it rose by 5.6% from 20.4% in 2021 to 26%, and then ranked first in 2023 with 32.1%. The second-highest response was 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries' at 21.7%.

A peculiar aspect is the consistent near-20% response of 'I don't know' from the Japanese side. This 'I don't know' response, ranging from the 20% level to nearly 40% in some surveys beyond the scope of this analysis ([Attitudes toward Korea-Japan Relations and Historical Issues]), warrants analysis to determine if it reflects a genuine lack of knowledge and information preventing a judgment, or if it carries other political implications.

2) Detailed Analysis: The Park Geun-hye-Abe Administration Period (2013-2016)

<Graph 7: Survey Results 2013-2016>

During the Korea-Japan historical conflict from 2013-2015, a significant portion of the Japanese public believed that 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries.' In the first survey in 2013, this response accounted for 32.1%, increasing slightly to 34.7% in 2014 and 35.1% in 2015, making it the most frequent answer. The second most selected response was 'Bilateral relations will not improve if historical issues are not resolved.' This accounted for 25.9% in 2013, 24.7% in 2014, and 27.1% in 2015.

The Japanese public does not perceive future-oriented Korea-Japan relations within the context of historical conflict. They tend to view historical conflict as a recurring conflict in itself. This perception among the Japanese public was fundamentally aligned with the Abe administration's historical policies. This is not to say that the Japanese public agreed with historical revisionism that glorified aggression. Rather, it can be said that the Japanese public shared the Abe administration's distrust of South Korea, namely the perception that historical issues would remain unresolved because South Korea would continuously raise them.

2016 marked a period when the governments of South Korea and Japan sought to improve relations, prompted by the comfort women agreement. In response to these changes in government relations, perceptions among the Japanese public also shifted. In 2016, 'If we build future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' became the most frequent response at 30.2%. The response that had ranked first until 2015, 'Resolving historical issues will be difficult even if bilateral relations improve,' accounted for 28.1%. Although the difference was only about 2%, the result for 'If we build future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' in 2015 represented an increase of over 10% from 19.3% in 2014. This increase occurred concurrently with a decline in the other two responses: 'Bilateral relations will not improve if historical issues are not resolved' and 'Resolving historical issues will be difficult even if bilateral relations improve.' The former decreased from 27.1% in 2015 to 21.9%, and the latter dropped from 35.1% in 2015 to 28.1%. Optimism that historical issues could be overcome through continuous cooperation with South Korea expanded among the Japanese public.

The sudden increase in the response 'If we build future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' in 2016 was also observed in surveys targeting the South Korean public. However, a key difference is that while it ranked second in the South Korean survey, it ranked first in the Japanese survey. This suggests that the Japanese public had greater expectations for the improvement of Korea-Japan relations following the comfort women agreement in December 2015 compared to the South Korean public. This difference in expectations was also linked to differing evaluations of the comfort women agreement. While a majority of the South Korean public held negative views of the agreement, the Japanese public largely held positive evaluations. According to the 2016 survey, 47.9% of the Japanese public viewed the agreement favorably, approximately 20% higher than the positive evaluation rate among the South Korean public.

In essence, for the Japanese public in 2016, the response 'If we build future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' was directly linked to their evaluation of the comfort women agreement. Consequently, if the comfort women agreement were not implemented smoothly, the response 'If we build future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' would likely decline.

3) Detailed Analysis: The Moon Jae-in, Abe, and Post-Abe Administration Periods (2017-2021)

<Graph 8: Survey Results 2017-2018>

The period of 2017-2018, corresponding to the early Moon Jae-in administration in South Korea, was a time when conflicts over the implementation of the comfort women agreement carried over into the early years of the Moon administration. The Moon Jae-in administration questioned the legitimacy of the comfort women agreement, leading to conflict with the Abe administration. The response from the Japanese public to this was 'Historical issues will not be resolved.' The survey results from 2017 show that 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries' was the most frequent response at 35.2%. During this period, pessimism regarding the unresolved nature of historical issues was prominent. In 2017 and 2018, the response 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries' showed an upward trend at 29.3% and 35.2% respectively. This occurred amidst a downward trend in the other two responses: 'Bilateral relations will not improve if historical issues are not resolved' and 'Historical issues will gradually be resolved as bilateral relations improve.' The former decreased from 25.5% in 2017 to 22.6% in 2018, and the latter dropped from 26.2% in 2017 to 21.9% in 2018. It can be concluded that pessimistic outlooks regarding the continuation of historical issues between Korea and Japan expanded among the Japanese public following the renewed conflict after the comfort women agreement.

<Graph 9: Survey Results 2019-2021>

From 2019 to 2021, Korea-Japan relations entered a complex crisis surrounding the issue of forced laborers. Two main trends emerged during this period. First, 'I don't know' ranked second or third in some years. The 'I don't know' response, which was 20% in 2018, reached 23.1% in 2019, surpassing the 20.4% for 'Historical issues will gradually be resolved as bilateral relations improve' to become the third most frequent response. In 2020, it rose to second place with 23.3%. This situation occurred amidst a gradual decline in 'Historical issues will gradually be resolved as bilateral relations improve,' which had peaked in 2016. Therefore, the emergence of 'I don't know' in second and third place carries significance beyond its numerical value. It implies that as the conflict persisted, the public opinion advocating for resolving historical conflicts through future-oriented cooperation became narrower than those indifferent to bilateral political issues. Furthermore, 'I don't know' was tantamount to tacit acceptance and neglect of historical conflicts.

Second, in 2021, 'Resolving historical issues is a prerequisite for improving bilateral relations' ranked first for the first time. This response accounted for 29.9%, narrowly surpassing the 28.3% for 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries,' which had previously held the top position. During the post-Abe era in 2021, the Japanese government considered the issue of forced laborers' compensation as a prerequisite for improving Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, the response trends among the Japanese public mirrored government policy. The post-Abe administration set the compensation issue as a prerequisite for improving Korea-Japan relations, and the government's policy stance influenced public opinion in Japan.

The survey results from 2021 show a different pattern compared to previous Japanese responses. Historically, when Korea-Japan governments faced historical conflicts, a significant portion of the Japanese public perceived that 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries.' In contrast, the 2021 survey results indicate that the Japanese public began to view historical conflicts not as recurring conflicts in themselves, but as a prerequisite for future-oriented Korea-Japan relations. If the South Korean government were to take proactive measures to resolve historical issues, it would create an opportunity for a positive response from the Japanese public. v

4) Detailed Analysis: The Launch of the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration in South Korea and Korea-Japan Relations (2022-2023)

<Graph 10: Survey Results 2022-2023>

In 2022, a tendency emerged among the Japanese public for historical issues to overshadow other matters in their perception of South Korea, alongside a trend towards resolving historical issues through long-term and sustained cooperation. In the 2022 survey results, 'Future-oriented cooperation between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' was the most frequent response at 27.8%, while 'If we build future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' ranked second at 26%. This represents an increase of 5.4% compared to 20.4% in 2021. This rise occurred to the same extent as the decrease in 'Future-oriented cooperation between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' and 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries.'

In 2023, 'If we build future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' recorded the highest percentage at 32.1%. This marks the second time since 2016 that this response has ranked first. This can be attributed to the improvement in Korea-Japan relations following the South Korean government's third-party payment initiative. The 2023 survey by the East Asia Institute and Genron NPO generally indicated that the Japanese public held greater expectations for improved relations. 35.2% of the Japanese public evaluated the third-party payment positively, while 24.6% held negative views, a near opposite of the perception among the South Korean public.

This trend is similar to that observed after the comfort women agreement in 2016. The response 'If we build future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' is associated with positive evaluations of the third-party payment. In other words, the more favorably the Japanese public evaluates government-level agreements and efforts to improve relations, the more strongly they tend to recognize the importance of future-oriented cooperation and the possibility of resolving historical issues.

Meanwhile, a new trend emerged in 2023: 'I don't know' recorded 26.5%, ranking second for the first time since the survey began. 'Future-oriented cooperation between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' accounted for 19.3%, and 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries' was 21.7%. The 26.5% recorded for 'I don't know' in 2023 is the highest figure since the survey's inception. Amidst the improving phase of Korea-Japan relations, an increasing number of Japanese citizens are unable to form a judgment on the correlation between historical issues and future-oriented cooperation.

The rise of 'I don't know' in 2023 occurred alongside a decline in 'Future-oriented cooperation between the two countries will be difficult without resolving historical issues' and 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries.' This represents a different situation from the rise of 'I don't know' in 2019-2020. How this should be interpreted requires careful consideration, as it is a trend that first appeared in 2023. In summary, while the Japanese public expresses expectations for moving beyond the 'lost decade' in Korea-Japan relations, they also exhibit a 'political' stance of indifference. The increase in 'I don't know' among the Japanese public during a period of improving relations with South Korea warrants close observation of future trends. ㅍ

V. Korea-Japan Comparison

1. Different Primary Responses to the Same Historical Conflict

A difference was observed in the primary responses of South Korean and Japanese citizens when historical conflicts arise. South Koreans tend to believe that 'Bilateral relations will not improve if historical issues are not resolved,' while Japanese citizens perceive that 'Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of the cooperative situation between the two countries.' In essence, amidst historical conflict, South Koreans exhibit a strong orientation towards resolving historical issues as a prerequisite for future-oriented relations. Conversely, Japanese citizens do not contextualize historical conflicts within future-oriented Korea-Japan relations, tending to view them as recurring conflicts in themselves.

This implies a difference in the meaning and status that historical issues hold within South Korean and Japanese societies. South Korea believes that while future-oriented Korea-Japan relations are important, resolving historical issues as a victim of colonial rule is a necessary step. In contrast, for Japan, South Korea's raising of historical issues is merely the prelude to another conflict. This primary response aligns with the sense of fatigue regarding historical issues that existed in Japanese society during the 2010s.

2. Differences Between Korea and Japan Regarding 'If we build future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved'

Even regarding the approach of resolving historical issues through long-term cooperation, Korean and Japanese citizens show different paths of perception. South Koreans are influenced by the government's cooperative stance towards Japan and periods of improved relations, but to a lesser extent than Japanese citizens. In some cases, as seen in the 2017-2018 and 2021 survey results, the response 'If we build future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' increased even when the government prioritized historical issues in its relations with Japan and relations had deteriorated.

Notably, for South Koreans, the response 'If we build future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' was not closely linked to support for government agreements and measures to resolve historical issues, or the smooth implementation of these agreements and measures. This is a critical difference from Japan, where citizens' responses appear to be influenced by government policies and their outcomes. In summary, South Koreans maintain a flexible stance, taking a negative position on intergovernmental agreements while emphasizing the issue of future-oriented cooperation with Japan. Meanwhile, Japan tends to have its perception of future-oriented cooperation overshadowed by the difficulties encountered during the implementation process of intergovernmental agreements.

3. The Relative Passivity of the Japanese Public Regarding Korea-Japan Relations, Indicated by 'I Don't Know'

While the 'I don't know' response among South Koreans remained at a maximum of 7%, it ranged from a minimum of 18% to a maximum of 26% in opinion polls of the Japanese public. This means that approximately 20% of the Japanese public does not express a clear opinion on the relationship between Korea-Japan relations and historical issues.

The fact that about 20% of the Japanese public answers 'I don't know' leads to a general tendency for the figures of other responses to be lower compared to South Korea. Whether positive or negative about the possibility of resolving historical issues, all figures are lower than in South Korea, implying that fewer Japanese citizens are actively interested in and vocal about Korea-Japan relations than their South Korean counterparts.

VI. Conclusion

The East Asia Institute and Genron NPO surveys indicate that over the past decade, Korea-Japan relations have experienced a 'lost decade,' but a phase of improvement began in 2023. As the surveys progressed, the response 'If we build future-oriented cooperative relations between the two countries, historical issues will gradually be resolved' ranked highest in both South Korea and Japan. This suggests that over the ten-year period of conflict, the publics of both countries have come to recognize the approach of resolving historical issues through sustained and long-term cooperative relations.

The decade-long historical conflict has led to increased anti-Japan and anti-Korea sentiments in mutual perceptions. The surveys in this study also show that South Koreans prioritized the resolution of historical issues during periods of conflict, while Japanese citizens exhibited fatigue with recurring historical conflicts. However, the ten-year survey revealed that despite the distrust inherent in anti-Japan and anti-Korea sentiments, the publics of both nations simultaneously recognized the necessity of future-oriented cooperation and held a disposition towards it. As the perception among the publics of both countries solidifies towards viewing long-term cooperation as a condition for resolving historical issues, this will positively influence the improving trend in Korea-Japan relations observed since 2023.

Nevertheless, concerning trends are emerging. In South Korea, skepticism about the impossibility of resolution persists even amidst improving relations, while in Japan, indifference, as indicated by 'I don't know,' is increasing. The current perceptions of both publics regarding Korea-Japan relations reveal a coexistence of the desire to build future-oriented relations with skepticism and indifference regarding the resolution of historical issues.

The primary challenge for South Korea's diplomacy towards Japan moving forward will be securing public support for the policy of third-party payment and cooperative relations with Japan. As the survey indicates, the South Korean public does not actively support the improvement of Korea-Japan relations. The South Korean government must gain public understanding for the third-party payment and wisely address the sensitive and complex historical issue of the illegality of colonial rule. In particular, since the Japanese public's attitude towards future-oriented cooperation depends on the successful implementation of intergovernmental agreements and measures concerning historical issues, South Korea's domestic efforts to persuade the public are essential to sustain Japan's cooperative stance and continue the relationship improvement phase observed in 2023.

Finally, although a gap has been pointed out between the South Korean government and its public, for the improvement phase of Korea-Japan relations to continue, both the South Korean government and its public must be the main actors. This is because over 20% of the Japanese public still responds 'I don't know' regarding Korea-Japan relations and historical issues. This suggests that the South Korean government, as well as the South Korean public, will be dealing with a relatively indifferent and passive Japanese public concerning Korea-Japan relations and historical issues. As long as a significant portion of the Japanese public remains indifferent to the political issues of Korea-Japan relations and historical issues, the impetus for improvement will inevitably come more from the South Korean government and public. From a long-term perspective, efforts to reduce the proportion of 'I don't know' among the Japanese public must also be undertaken. To this end, public diplomacy and private exchanges targeting the Japanese public are necessary to inform them about South Korea as a political entity and the importance of Korea-Japan relations. ■

[1]The 'lost decade' in Korea-Japan relations is a phrase used by former Ambassador to Japan Shin Kak-soo. It refers to the ten years of valuable cooperative time that was missed due to the continuous deterioration of Korea-Japan relations starting from then-President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo in 2012.

[2]In the process of preparing the Abe administration's 70th anniversary statement of the post-war era in 2015, Professor Masayuki Yamauchi, who participated in the learned persons committee, argued that 'the historical positions of perpetrator and victim do not change even after a thousand years,' citing President Park Geun-hye's remarks. He claimed that South Korea was not ready to forgive Japan and would continue to demand apologies from the victim's perspective. 21st Century Vision Council, Nikkei BP, 2015. 'Points of Discussion for the Post-War 70th Anniversary Statement.' pp. 227-228.

[3]There are arguments that a comprehensive cooperation framework, such as the Élysée Treaty, could serve as a model for resolving historical conflicts between Korea and Japan. Lily Gardner, Feldman. 2013. 'The Franco-German Élysée Treaty at Fifty: A Model for Others?,' American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.

[4]In Greek mythology, Sisyphus was condemned by the gods to repeatedly roll a heavy boulder up a mountain, only for it to roll back down each time, forcing him to begin anew. This is a metaphor for a situation where an absurd and futile endeavor continues without any improvement.

[5]The response 'I don't know' accounted for a significant proportion of Japanese respondents, ranging from 18% to 23%. This contrasts sharply with South Korea, where the highest proportion was 4.9%. Therefore, the 'I don't know' responses from Japanese citizens are considered meaningful and require further analysis.

[6]A 2016 survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in Korea and Genron NPO in Japan indicated an overall improvement in perceptions of Japan. For instance, the percentage of Korean respondents who felt a negative impression of Japan decreased by 11.5 percentage points from the previous year to 61%. Similarly, the percentage of Japanese respondents who had a negative impression of Korea fell to 44.6%, down from 52.4% in the previous year.

[7]According to the results of the [Comfort Women Agreement Stance] survey conducted by the East Asia Institute and Genron NPO in 2016, negative evaluations stood at 37.4%, while positive evaluations were only 28.2%. Notably, 73.7% responded that the agreement had 'not resolved' the issue.

References

Park, Seung-hyun. 2022. "'I Don't Know' as an Active Response," *EAI Issue Briefing*.

Son, Yeol. 2021. "Escalating US-China Conflict Demands Improvement in Korea-Japan Relations," *EAI Issue Briefing*,

____, Kim, Yang-gyu, and Park, Han-soo. 2023. "The Distance in Koreans' and Japanese People's Views on Improving Relations: An Analysis of the 2023 Survey on Mutual Perceptions between Korea and Japan," *EAI Issue Briefing*.

Yonhap News Agency. 2016. "One Year Since Comfort Women Agreement: Will the Trend of Improved Korea-Japan Relations Continue? 'Presidential Election Variable'", https://m.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20161223106300014 (Accessed: October 30, 2023).

Lily Gardner, Feldman. 2013. "The Franco-German Elysee Treaty at Fifty: A Model for Others?," American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.

21st Century Vision Council, Nikkei Publishing. 2015. *Issues of the Post-War 70th Anniversary Statement*. 227-228.

<Mainichi Shimbun>. September 4, 2019.

■ Yoon, Seok-jeong is a professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy.

■ Managed and Edited by: Oh, Jun-cheol_EAI Research Assistant

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | jcoh@eai.or.kr