[Public Opinion on Korea-Japan Relations Series] ⑤ How is Public Opinion on Historical Issues Between Korea and Japan Formed? Focusing on Historical Perception, Political Environment, and Framing

I. Introduction

In Korea-Japan relations, historical issues have been regarded not as positive factors but as issues with strong potential to worsen bilateral relations, requiring careful management. Therefore, how are public preferences formed regarding foreign policy related to historical issues?

Theoretical discussions on foreign policy and public opinion have a long history. There have been empirical and normative arguments that the general public lacks the knowledge to understand international issues and cannot form consistent opinions, and thus should not guide foreign policy. However, empirical studies have confirmed that the public directly or indirectly influences foreign policy decisions and implementation due to democratization, globalization, and the development of information and communication technology (Deacon 2015; Park 2017; Maeda 2021; Namgung Gon 1999; Kim Tae-hyun et al. 2003; Kim Sung-han & Jeong Han-wool 2005; Mitani 2010). Furthermore, as seen in cases such as the comfort women issue, diplomatic problems cannot be resolved even with intergovernmental agreements if the public does not support them. However, not all public opinions have an equal impact on foreign policy. While public opinion may influence the direction of foreign policy, in some cases, government policy directions can also influence public opinion. Separately, due to their historical experiences, Korea and Japan may have formed unique frameworks of perception that their respective publics hold towards the other country.

This paper examines the fixed perceptions of history held by the publics of Korea and Japan, based on the results of the 'Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey' conducted annually by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in Korea and The Genron NPO in Japan from 2013 to 2023. It also investigates the political environment in which diplomatic issues between Korea and Japan, such as the comfort women issue and the forced mobilization victims issue, are handled, and explores the relationship between the discourse released by both governments to their citizens and public opinion.

The reason for analyzing the unique frameworks of perception that the publics of both countries hold towards each other, along with the political environments and government messages of each nation, is ultimately to demonstrate that public opinion on individual issues needs to be interpreted within the political context of each country and can change depending on the efforts of both governments.

II. Fixed Perceptions of Historical Issues Between Korea and Japan

Existing research analyzing the influence of public opinion on foreign policy has focused on the highly stable formation of public opinion regarding foreign policy. These studies explain this phenomenon through 'schemas.' A schema is defined as 'a cognitive structure that contains knowledge about the attributes of a concept and the relationships between those attributes' (Kim Tae-hyun et al. 2003, 155). In other words, it refers to a state where individual pieces of knowledge are organized and interconnected. According to schema theory, even if the general public does not fully understand the details of foreign policy agendas, their individual schemas operate in specific situations, leading to consistent responses.

Regarding historical issues between Korea and Japan, we examined the survey questions from the Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in Korea and The Genron NPO in Japan from 2013 to 2023 to understand the fixed perceptions held by the publics of both countries. While showing some fluidity, what consistently differs between the Korean and Japanese publics is their answer to the question, 'What historical issues need to be resolved?' Although government officials and Korea-Japan relations experts warned that the forced mobilization victims issue was a significant event that undermined the foundation of the 1965 framework after the 2018 Supreme Court ruling, Korean public opinion identifies the comfort women issue as the historical issue that should be resolved first. Meanwhile, Japanese public opinion identifies the issue of Korean anti-Japanese textbooks as the historical issue that should be resolved first (see Table 1).

[Table 1] Historical Issues to be Resolved

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Separately, the responses to the question asking whether the people of both countries were aware of the 'Japan-Korea Annexation' in a 2014 survey explain the structural causes of the gap in historical perception between Korea and Japan.

[Figure 1] Knowledge of Japan-Korea Annexation by Country and Age (2014 Survey)

Regarding this question, 871 Korean respondents and 760 Japanese respondents answered that they were aware. While Korean respondents across all age groups were aware of the Japan-Korea Annexation, Japanese respondents showed low awareness among those in their 20s, with those aged 60 and above accounting for the majority (41%, 311 people) of all Japanese aware of the annexation ([See Figure 1]). Regarding this question, 871 Korean respondents and 760 Japanese respondents answered that they were aware. While Korean respondents across all age groups were aware of the Japan-Korea Annexation, Japanese respondents showed low awareness among those in their 20s, with those aged 60 and above accounting for the majority (41%, 311 people) of all Japanese aware of the annexation ([See Figure 1]). Regarding this question, 871 Korean respondents and 760 Japanese respondents answered that they were aware. While Korean respondents across all age groups were aware of the Japan-Korea Annexation, Japanese respondents showed low awareness among those in their 20s, with those aged 60 and above accounting for the majority (41%, 311 people) of all Japanese aware of the annexation ([See Figure 1]). Regarding this question, 871 Korean respondents and 760 Japanese respondents answered that they were aware. While Korean respondents across all age groups were aware of the Japan-Korea Annexation, Japanese respondents showed low awareness among those in their 20s, with those aged 60 and above accounting for the majority (41%, 311 people) of all Japanese aware of the annexation ([See Figure 1]).

Nine years have passed since the previous survey, and it is highly likely that the number of people in Japan aware of the Japan-Korea Annexation has decreased due to generational change. Recent surveys indicate significant fatigue within Japan regarding Korea's demands for an apology. The structural factor that could lead to greater resentment is Korea's demand for an apology directed at generations who do not share knowledge of past events.

Meanwhile, is the historical perception held by the people of both countries immutable? The results of opinion polls jointly conducted by Hankook Ilbo and Yomiuri Shimbun (読売新聞) in 2010 and 2015 show that this is not necessarily the case. In the 2010 joint opinion poll conducted by Hankook Ilbo and Yomiuri Shimbun (読売新聞), regarding the question 'Japanese Prime Ministers have repeatedly apologized for past actions, including colonial rule. Do you believe these apologies are sufficient?', the responses from the Japanese side were 43% 'sufficient apology' and 41% 'not sufficient' (<Yomiuri Shimbun>, "2010/4/17"). In the 2015 survey, 76% of Japanese respondents answered that Japan's apologies were sufficient, and 17% said they were not sufficient (<Yomiuri Shimbun> 2015/6/9). Compared to the 2010 survey, the proportion of those who believe Japan's apologies were insufficient has significantly decreased. This trend is similarly observed in other opinion polls. In a survey conducted by Dong-A Ilbo and Asahi Shimbun (朝日新聞) in 2015, 65% of Japanese respondents answered that apologies were sufficient, and 20% stated they were still insufficient (<Asahi Shimbun> 2015/6/22). The 2010 opinion poll results, while showing differences in historical perception between Korea and Japan, suggest that the gap in perception could be narrowed through the efforts of both countries. However, considering that 2010 was before the full-scale deterioration of Korea-Japan relations, subsequent opinion polls reveal that the gap in historical perception between the two countries has widened in conjunction with the worsening of Korea-Japan relations.

Such changes in perception are difficult to explain with schema theory. Therefore, 'frame,' which has a similar meaning to schema in terms of structured knowledge, is being used. Framing can be understood as selecting points to emphasize in a situation and adding a special interpretation. For example, Robert M. Entman has explained the process by which definitions, meanings, and emotions of events presented by political elites such as presidents are accepted by society through the media, using the Cascading Activation Model (Entman 2008). Chapters III and IV will examine how public opinion in both countries is being shaped by the political environment and government framing, using the issues of Japanese military comfort women and forced labor victims, which are historical issues between Korea and Japan, as case studies.

III. The Issue of Japanese Military Comfort Women and the Policy Decision-Making Environment of the Korean and Japanese Governments

The issue of victims of Japanese military comfort women has been a diplomatic issue between Korea and Japan since the testimony of the late Kim Hak-soon in 1991. In 2015, the 'Agreement on the Issue of Comfort Women Victims' (hereinafter referred to as the Comfort Women Agreement) was announced by the foreign ministers of Korea and Japan. However, it remains ingrained in the perception of the Korean public as a historical issue between Korea and Japan that must be resolved first. The public opinion formed between the people of Korea and Japan regarding the Comfort Women Agreement, and the political and policy environments of both countries that allowed such public opinion to form, are as follows.

1. The Issue of Japanese Military Comfort Women and Public Opinion in Korea and Japan

The 'Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey' conducted in 2016, 2017, and 2018 includes questions regarding the Comfort Women Agreement. [Table 2] shows the evaluation of the Comfort Women Agreement by the public in both countries.

In Japan, positive evaluations of the Comfort Women Agreement have been dominant in all surveys from 2016 to 2018, with no significant changes observed across the survey years. In contrast, negative evaluations are dominant in Korea. While in 2016, positive evaluations (28%) and negative evaluations (30%) were closely matched, the 2017 survey showed a sharp increase in negative evaluations (56%) compared to positive evaluations (21%).

[Table 2] Evaluation of the Comfort Women Agreement (2016, 2017, 2018)

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Meanwhile, in surveys conducted in 2017 and 2018, the question of whether the comfort women agreement had resolved the issue showed that in both South Korea and Japan, the opinion that it had not been resolved was dominant (see [Table 3]).

[Table 3] Has the comfort women agreement resolved the issue (2017, 2018)

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2. Policy Decision-Making Environments in South Korea and Japan

1) South Korea: Change of Administration and Lack of Persuasive Framing

It is necessary to examine the reasons for the intensified negative evaluation of the comfort women agreement in South Korea in 2017 compared to 2016 in connection with the political and policy environment at the time.

Since its inauguration in February 2013, the Park Geun-hye administration had set the resolution of the comfort women issue as its top foreign policy objective towards Japan. In November 2015, a summit between South Korea and Japan agreed to accelerate negotiations for an early resolution of the comfort women issue, and as an extension of this, the comfort women agreement was announced on December 28, 2015, through a meeting of the foreign ministers of South Korea and Japan and a joint press conference.

Through the joint press conference, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida stated that: (1) the comfort women issue is a problem in which the honor and dignity of many women were deeply wounded with the involvement of the Japanese military, and the Japanese government deeply regrets its responsibility; Prime Minister Abe, as Prime Minister of Japan, expresses his apologies and remorse to all those who suffered wounds. (2) The South Korean government will establish a foundation aimed at supporting the comfort women, and the Japanese government will provide funds totaling approximately 1 billion yen from its budget, and the governments of South Korea and Japan will cooperate to implement projects for the restoration of honor and dignity and the healing of wounds for all comfort women.

In response, South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se stated that, based on the premise that the Japanese government would faithfully implement the measures previously announced, this announcement confirmed that the issue was finally and irreversibly resolved, and on the same premise, it was announced that South Korea and Japan would refrain from mutual criticism and condemnation on this issue in international forums such as the United Nations. Furthermore, regarding the statue of a girl in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, it was acknowledged that the Japanese government was concerned about maintaining the peace and dignity of the diplomatic mission, and the South Korean government stated that it would strive to find an appropriate resolution through consultations with relevant organizations. In July 2016, the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation was established as an organization to implement projects in accordance with the comfort women agreement.

Regarding the comfort women agreement, opposition sentiment was formed within South Korea, primarily by civic groups such as the Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery (Jeongdaehyup). In the National Assembly, opposition party lawmakers submitted two resolutions in December 2015 and three in March 2016 calling for the invalidation of the 'Agreement on the Issue of Victims of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery,' but all were invalidated due to the expiration of the parliamentary term (National Assembly Bill Information System 2015-2016).

Following the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in March 2017 due to the state affairs corruption scandal, the Moon Jae-in administration took office in May 2017. During the presidential election campaign, President Moon Jae-in had pledged to nullify the 2015 comfort women agreement. After President Moon Jae-in took office, in July 2017, a consultative body directly under the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 'South Korea-Japan Agreement on the Issue of Victims of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery Review Task Force' (hereinafter referred to as the TF), was launched to factually confirm and evaluate the progress of consultations and the overall content of the comfort women agreement. On December 27, 2017, the review TF announced its findings that the South Korea-Japan comfort women agreement failed to adequately adopt a victim-centered approach, did not sufficiently prioritize democratic procedures and processes, and suffered from insufficient communication between the President, the chief negotiator, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Based on the findings of the review TF, the South Korean government announced its position that the 2015 agreement could not be a true resolution of the comfort women issue. It further stated that while the government would make every effort to restore the honor and dignity of the comfort women victims and heal their psychological wounds, it could not deny that the 2015 agreement was an official agreement between South Korea and Japan, and therefore, it would not demand renegotiations from the Japanese government. In November 2018, the government dissolved the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation.

2016 was the period when President Park Geun-hye, who promoted the comfort women agreement, was in power. Although there was public opposition to the agreement, it was difficult for discussions regarding the invalidation of the comfort women agreement to gain momentum in the National Assembly amidst the division between the ruling and opposition parties. Meanwhile, President Moon Jae-in, who took office in 2017, had pledged to nullify the comfort women agreement during his presidential campaign. After taking office, the government's position was finalized based on the review results of the TF: the 2015 agreement could not be a true resolution of the comfort women issue, but given that the 2015 agreement was an official agreement between South Korea and Japan, renegotiations would not be demanded from the Japanese government. The intensified public opinion against the comfort women agreement in South Korea in 2017 compared to 2016 is considered to be based on this political environment.

From 2016 to 2018, the media's interest in the comfort women issue was examined through the frequency of news articles. A search for articles using 'comfort women' as a keyword in 11 national daily newspapers[1] revealed 6,349 articles in 2016, 6,781 in 2017, and 3,557 in 2018. Media attention was concentrated in 2016 and 2017, with monthly peaks in January 2016, December 2017, and January 2018. This coincides with the announcement of the Japanese military comfort women agreement on December 28, 2015, the announcement of the TF review results on the comfort women agreement in December 2017, and the announcement of the government's future policy in January 2018. This indicates that media interest in comfort women is not constant but rather linked to government policy, and that media interest in the comfort women issue has significantly decreased since 2018 (BIG KINDS 2023).

[Figure 2] Word Cloud Analysis of Comfort Women Agreement News Coverage (December 2015 - December 2018)

A search for articles using 'comfort women agreement' as a keyword yielded 1,494 articles in 2015, 3,481 in 2016, 3,408 in 2017, and 1,628 in 2018. To visualize the similarities and differences between the government's position on the comfort women agreement and the media coverage, the content of these articles was used to create a word cloud ([Figure 2]). In a word cloud, words appear larger the more frequently they occur in the text; the top keyword was 'victim,' followed by 'President Moon Jae-in,' and then 'renegotiation.' While the South Korean government's official position on the comfort women agreement is to 'make every effort to restore the honor and dignity of the comfort women victims and heal their psychological wounds, but given that the 2015 agreement was an official agreement between South Korea and Japan, renegotiations will not be demanded from the Japanese government,' this persuasive framing is difficult to find among the core keywords of media coverage.

2) Japan: Continuity of Administration and the Frame of 'Final and Irreversible Resolution' of the Comfort Women Issue

According to the 'South Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey' conducted in 2017 and 2018, the public in both countries believed that the comfort women issue had not been resolved by the comfort women agreement. However, public opinion in Japan regarding the comfort women agreement itself showed a consistently dominant positive evaluation: 48% positive and 21% negative in 2016; 42% positive and 25% negative in 2017; and 39% positive and 33% negative in 2018.

In terms of the political environment, the periods when public opinion surveys related to the comfort women agreement were conducted all fall within the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Prime Minister Abe, who successfully returned to power in December 2012, served a long tenure of 7 years and 8 months until September 2020.

Since his return to power in 2012, the Abe cabinet maintained high approval ratings of around 50%. However, immediately after the passage of the security legislation in September 2015 (September 20), the cabinet's disapproval rating (45%) exceeded its approval rating (35%). Subsequently, approval ratings rose again following the comfort women agreement ([Figure 3]).

[Figure 3] Trend of Abe Cabinet Approval Ratings (January 2015 - December 2018)

A difference is found between the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in their explanations of the comfort women agreement results and their emphasis in persuading the public. While the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs website features the 'Content of the Joint Press Conference of the Foreign Ministers of South Korea and Japan' and 'Results of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting between South Korea and Japan,' the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website posts the 'Results of the Joint Press Conference of the Foreign Ministers of South Korea and Japan' and the 'Phone Call between Prime Minister Abe and President Park Geun-hye.' The results of the phone call between the foreign ministers state that Prime Minister Abe expressed apologies to those who suffered as comfort women, and simultaneously reiterated that the issue of property and claims between South Korea and Japan, including the comfort women issue, was finally and completely resolved by the 1965 Agreement on Claims between Japan and the Republic of Korea and the Economic Cooperation Agreement. However, it also welcomed the final and irreversible resolution of the comfort women issue through the recent agreement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023).

Subsequently, Prime Minister Abe attempted to persuade the public by explaining to the press that the agreement was executed with the intention of relieving future generations of the 'burden of continuous apologies.' It is assessed that the conservative base in Japan at the time, while opposing the comfort women agreement, generally had strong support for Abe. Abe's persuasion that the comfort women issue was finally and irreversibly resolved by this agreement and that future generations should not be burdened with apologies was effective in suppressing backlash (Park Myung-hee 2016).

Regarding the dissolution of the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation in November 2018, the Japanese government stated that it could not accept the dissolution as being in accordance with the South Korea-Japan comfort women agreement, asserting that the South Korean government had not 'broken the agreement' and was not 'demanding renegotiations.' It expressed the position that the South Korean government, as a member of the international community, must faithfully fulfill its promises.

[Figure 4] Number of Comfort Women-Related News Reports in Japanese Media (January 1, 2015 - December 31, 2019)

[Figure 4] shows articles from the 'Nihon Keizai Shimbun' and 'Yomiuri Shimbun' from 2015 to 2019, searched using the keyword 'comfort women.' While reporting was concentrated around the time of the 2015 Japanese military comfort women agreement, and there was a surge in comfort women reporting in 2017, both newspapers show a sharp decrease in comfort women-related reporting after 2018. Meanwhile, articles using 'Moon Jae-in' as a keyword after President Moon Jae-in took office numbered 741 in 2017 and 852 in 2018 for the 'Nihon Keizai Shimbun,' and 578 in 2017 and 704 in 2018 for the 'Yomiuri Shimbun.' This suggests that diplomatic issues focusing on Moon Jae-in as an individual, rather than the diplomatic issue of comfort women, are being reported, influencing inter-Korean relations.

IV. The Issue of Victims of Forced Mobilization and the Policy Decision-Making Environments of the South Korean and Japanese Governments

On October 30 and November 29, 2018, the Supreme Court of South Korea upheld the lower court's rulings in three lawsuits filed by victims of forced mobilization during the Japanese colonial period against Japanese companies such as Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal (formerly Nippon Steel) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The rulings ordered the defendants to pay compensation ranging from 80 million to 150 million Korean won per person. The core issue of the rulings was whether the victims' right to claim damages had been extinguished by the 'Agreement on Claims between Japan and the Republic of Korea.' The Supreme Court determined that the 'right to claim damages' against Japanese companies by victims of forced mobilization, based on the Japanese government's illegal colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula and its direct involvement in the conduct of aggressive warfare and the commission of inhumane illegal acts, was not included in the scope of application of the Agreement on Claims.

During the normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan in 1965, both countries reached an 'agreement on differing views' regarding the interpretation of the illegality of Japanese colonial rule. The fundamental conflict over historical issues, which was thus contained, resurfaced with the Supreme Court ruling. Furthermore, as the process of liquidating the assets of the Japanese companies, which had been seized by the plaintiffs who won lawsuits against them, progressed, the issue of victims of forced mobilization became the most significant diplomatic issue between South Korea and Japan from 2018 onwards.

1. The Issue of Victims of Forced Mobilization and Public Opinion in South Korea and Japan

The 'South Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey' conducted in 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022 includes questions regarding the issue of victims of forced mobilization. [Table 4] presents the evaluation of the Supreme Court ruling on the issue of victims of forced mobilization by the public in both countries.

The 2019 survey asked for an evaluation of the South Korean Supreme Court ruling on the issue of victims of forced mobilization. In South Korea, 75.5% evaluated it positively, while in Japan, 58.7% evaluated it negatively.

[Table 4] Evaluation of the Supreme Court Ruling on Victims of Forced Mobilization (2019)

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From 2019 to 2022, a survey was conducted on methods for resolving the issue of victims of forced mobilization, and the results show that various responses are supported in Korea ([Table 5]). In 2019, compulsory execution based on judicial rulings received the highest response rate at 58.1%, but this decreased in 2020 (36%), 2021 (32.6%), and 2022 (36.5%) ([Table 5]). In 2019, compensation through Korean companies and foundations (13.7%) was considered, and in 2020, compensation by the Korean government for legal responsibility of Japanese companies (18.2%), and joint lawsuits through arbitration committees and the ICJ (20.3%) were also included in the public's considerations. The opinion that Japanese companies are not obligated to comply with compulsory execution by the Korean government because Korean judicial rulings conflict with the 1965 "Agreement on the Status of Forces between the Republic of Korea and Japan" was supported by 14.2% in 2020 and 15.1% in 2022.

Meanwhile, in Japan, the opinions supported by respondents are limited compared to Korea. Throughout the entire period, the response "I don't know" was the most dominant, accounting for 28.4% in 2019, 34.5% in 2020, 40.2% in 2021, and 39.5% in 2022. The opinion that "Japanese companies are not obligated to comply with compulsory execution by the Korean government because Korean judicial rulings conflict with the 1965 Agreement on the Status of Forces between the Republic of Korea and Japan" was supported by 29.3% in 2020, 32.8% in 2021, and 30.6% in 2022. Regarding joint lawsuits through arbitration committees and the ICJ, 22.2% supported this in 2019, 14.5% in 2021, and 15.2% in 2022.

In 2022, regarding the opinion that "Japanese companies are not obligated to comply with compulsory execution by the Korean government because it conflicts with the Agreement on the Status of Forces between the Republic of Korea and Japan," 30.5% of respondents in Japan supported it, while 15.1% in Korea did. Concerning joint lawsuits through arbitration committees and the ICJ, 14.8% in Korea and 15.2% in Japan supported this.

[Table 5] Methods for Resolving the Issue of Victims of Forced Mobilization (2019, 2020, 2021, 2022)

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2. Policy Decision-Making Environment Regarding Forced Mobilization Victims in Korea and Japan

1) South Korea: Changes in administration, absence of a dominant frame

Following the Supreme Court rulings on October 30, 2018, and November 29, 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it would 'respect the judiciary's decision, strive to promptly heal the victims' wounds, and the Prime Minister, in consultation with relevant ministries and private experts, would consider all factors to formulate the government's response.' However, no specific response measures were presented thereafter (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). Furthermore, the government maintained its position that the matter was a civil lawsuit between private parties, and thus the details and scale of the lawsuit could not be disclosed.

In June 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the South Korean government's position on the forced mobilization lawsuit rulings. The proposal centered on Japanese companies involved in the lawsuits, along with Korean and Japanese companies, voluntarily contributing funds to create a pool to compensate the victims who received favorable rulings. The government stated that if Japan accepted this proposal, it would be willing to consider consultation procedures under Article 1 of the 1965 Agreement on the Settlement of Problems between the Republic of Korea and Japan and diplomatic solutions with the Japanese government. In response, the Japanese government reiterated its existing stance, effectively rejecting the proposal.

Since then, there has been no official statement from the South Korean government. However, former President Moon Jae-in, in his New Year's press conference in January 2021, expressed the view that 'monetizing the assets of Japanese companies or the government through compulsory execution is not desirable.' Nevertheless, no further specific solutions were discussed (<Hankook Ilbo> 2021/01/18).

President Yoon Suk-yeol, who took office in May 2022, set improving relations with Japan as a key task for South Korean diplomacy and pursued a comprehensive resolution encompassing historical issues, economy, and security. As the liquidation of assets of Japanese companies, seized by the plaintiffs in the Supreme Court rulings on forced mobilization victims, was reportedly imminent, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a 'Public-Private Consultative Body on the Forced Mobilization Issue' on July 4, announcing its intention to seek a reasonable solution by listening to opinions from all sectors of society (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022).

Meanwhile, since October 2018, the South Korean government has considered the Supreme Court rulings on forced mobilization victims as civil lawsuits between private parties and has not presented proactive solutions. Discussions on resolution measures have taken place in the National Assembly. For example, the 'Act on the Fund for Victims of Forced Mobilization during the Japanese Colonial Period' (proposed by Representative Hong Il-pyo and 10 others) and the 'Act on the Foundation for Memory, Reconciliation, and Future' (proposed by Representative Moon Hee-sang and 14 others) were introduced to the 20th National Assembly. These bills aimed to establish foundations for compensation and restitution for victims of forced mobilization following the Supreme Court rulings, but they expired due to the end of the legislative term (Park Myung-hee 2023).

[Table 6] Number of Media Reports in South Korea Regarding Forced Mobilization Victims (BIGCOUNTS 2023)

(Unit: cases)

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The number of media reports in South Korea concerning the issue of forced mobilization victims from 2018 to 2022, as shown in [Table 6], indicates the level of public attention. In 2018, the year of the Supreme Court ruling, there were 1,207 reports, primarily concentrated in October when the ruling was made. In 2019, the number of reports significantly increased to 4,152, with a concentration in July, coinciding with Japan's export control measures. After 2020, reports related to forced mobilization sharply declined. In comparison, reports on Japan's export control measures in 2019 numbered 9,469, and those concerning GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement) were 5,976. This suggests that the issue of forced mobilization victims was not perceived by the general public as a major bilateral issue compared to economic and security matters.

2) Japan: Cabinet changes, persistence of the 'Violation of the ROK-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement' frame

Following the Supreme Court rulings (October 30, 2018) concerning forced mobilization victims, Japan experienced two cabinet changes. On August 28, 2020, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe resigned for health reasons, and the Suga cabinet, which took office on September 16, 2020, lasted until October 4, 2021. Subsequently, the Kishida cabinet was inaugurated on October 4, 2021, and remains in power as of September 2023. Despite these two cabinet changes, the foreign policy direction established during the Abe administration did not undergo significant shifts. This is largely attributed to the high domestic evaluation of Abe's foreign and security policies, and the fact that Prime Ministers Suga and Kishida's respective factions within the Liberal Democratic Party did not hold stable positions to pursue changes. Moreover, with low approval ratings for both the Suga and Kishida cabinets, the foreign policy approach towards South Korea from the Abe era has been sustained.

Since the Supreme Court rulings of October 30 and November 29, 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued statements on the government's position, which are published on its website. The main points are as follows: First, the 'Agreement on the Settlement of Problems between the Republic of Korea and Japan' signed in 1965 stipulated that Japan would provide grants of $300 million and loans of $200 million in economic cooperation (Article 1), and that all claims between the parties and their nationals concerning property, rights, and interests, as well as claims between the parties and their nationals, were 'completely and finally settled' (Article 2), forming the basis of bilateral relations to date. Second, the two Supreme Court rulings by South Korea are unacceptable as they fundamentally overturn the legal foundation of friendly and cooperative relations between Japan and South Korea. Third, Japan urges South Korea to take appropriate measures to rectify its violation of international law, and if such measures are not taken, Japan plans to take firm action from the perspective of protecting the legitimate economic activities of Japanese companies, considering all options, including international courts. To facilitate these preparations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Division for ROK-Japan Claims Issues within the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau.

Key terms such as 'ROK-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement' and 'South Korea's Violation of International Law' are prominent. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' statements are translated and posted in English, Korean, French, Spanish, and Arabic, along with a document titled 'What is the Issue of Former Civilian Workers from the Korean Peninsula?'

Subsequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has posted on its website details of the Japanese government's actions based on the Claims Settlement Agreement and South Korea's non-compliance, including 'Request for Consultations Regarding the Issue of Former Civilian Workers from the Korean Peninsula under the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems between the Republic of Korea and Japan' (January 17, 2019), 'Demand for a Reply to the Request for Consultations Regarding the Issue of Former Civilian Workers from the Korean Peninsula under the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems between the Republic of Korea and Japan' (February 12, 2019), 'Referral to Arbitration under the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems between the Republic of Korea and Japan Regarding the Issue of Former Civilian Workers from the Korean Peninsula' (May 20, 2019), and 'Regarding the Republic of Korea's Failure to Fulfill its Obligation to Respond to Arbitration under the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems between the Republic of Korea and Japan' (July 19, 2019) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023).

The word cloud analysis of the content of these Ministry of Foreign Affairs actions, presented in [Figure 5], shows 'Japanese companies,' 'ROK-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement,' 'ruling,' and 'South Korea' as prominent keywords.

Since 2019, surveys on mutual perceptions between South Koreans and Japanese regarding the Supreme Court rulings on the forced mobilization issue have shown that the proposed solutions favored by Japanese respondents align with the Japanese government's stance: 'The South Korean judiciary's ruling contradicts the 1965 ROK-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement, therefore Japanese companies are not obligated to comply with the South Korean government's compulsory execution.'

[Figure 5] Word Cloud Analysis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Policy on the Forced Mobilization Victims Issue

[Table 7] presents the search results for the keyword 'forced laborers' in 'The Nikkei' (morning and evening editions) and 'Yomiuri Shimbun' (national edition) from 2018 to 2022. Although the Supreme Court ruling occurred in 2018, the highest number of articles was published in 2019. Thereafter, interest in the forced labor issue significantly decreased. The surge in articles in 2019 is likely attributable not only to the numerous related issues in ROK-Japan relations, such as the export control measures, but also to the fact that most of the Japanese government's announcements regarding measures against South Korea were concentrated in 2019.

[Table 7] Number of Media Reports in Japan Regarding the Forced Mobilization Victims Issue

(Unit: cases)

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V. Conclusion

How is public opinion on historical issues between Korea and Japan formed?

This study examined the fixed perceptions of the people of both Korea and Japan regarding history over the past 11 years, based on the results of the "Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey on Mutual Perceptions" conducted from 2013 to 2023. It also reviewed the relationship between public opinion on diplomatic issues such as the comfort women issue and the forced mobilization victims issue, and the discourse published by the governments of both countries targeting their own citizens.

First, historical issues between Korea and Japan exist not only in the perceptual differences between the two countries but also between their governments and citizens. Although attempts have been made to resolve these issues between the governments, and the Japanese government claims the issues are resolved, the comfort women issue is still perceived as a historical issue to be resolved by the Korean public. Furthermore, Korean textbooks, which the governments of both countries have not paid attention to over the past 11 years, have become a significant historical issue to be resolved for the Japanese public. While the history of the Japan-Korea Annexation is evenly recognized by all age groups in Korea, it is concentrated among those over 60 in Japan, a structural factor that could further widen the gap in historical perceptions between Korea and Japan in the future.

Second, while public opinion in Korea and Japan influences foreign policy, the cases of the comfort women issue and forced mobilization victims issue are examples where political environmental changes drove public opinion in both countries, rather than foreign policy being determined by reflecting public opinion. For instance, the Korean public's evaluation of the comfort women agreement differs between the 2016 and 2017 surveys. In 2016, positive and negative evaluations were in contention, but in the 2017 survey, negative evaluations significantly increased. This result is based on the political environmental change from the Park Geun-hye administration, which led the comfort women agreement, to the Moon Jae-in administration, which expressed a negative stance on the agreement. Meanwhile, in Japan, there is an environmental difference in that there was no change in government for 7 years and 8 months since the launch of the second Abe cabinet in December 2012, and support for the cabinet remained stable.

Third, the framing of diplomatic issues by policymakers shapes the framework of their citizens' perceptions. In Korea, there is no dominant frame for the government to persuade the public regarding the comfort women issue and the forced mobilization victims issue. In contrast, Japan has a solid government frame concerning the comfort women agreement and the forced mobilization victims issue. Following the comfort women agreement, the Japanese government's frame has emphasized the 'final and irreversible resolution' rather than the apology expressed in the agreement. In the case of the forced mobilization victims issue, the issue is interpreted within the frame of 'violation of the Korea-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement' and 'violation of international law,' thus substituting the issue of historical perception for the issue of international law and trust. Consequently, the solutions proposed by the Japanese public for the forced mobilization victims issue also remain within the framework of legal interpretation and government framing.

Is the gap in historical perceptions between the Korean and Japanese publics immutable? While fixed perceptual frameworks have been formed within both countries due to their historical experiences, the messages from the governments of both countries regarding diplomatic issues can either improve bilateral relations or exacerbate conflict, independent of these frameworks. From this perspective, the messages from the governments of both countries regarding diplomatic issues over the past 11 years have lacked active persuasive efforts directed at their own citizens, and furthermore, have been devoid of messages of reconciliation towards the citizens of the other country.

The comfort women issue and the textbook issue are fixed as tasks to be resolved in the perceptions of the publics of both countries. Nevertheless, if historical issues are pursued in a short-term, ad-hoc manner without considering these factors, the diplomatic issues between the governments of both countries may be resolved, but conflicts related to historical issues between the publics of both countries will inevitably continue.

[1]Kyunghyang Shinmun, Kookmin Ilbo, Naeil Shinmun, Dong-A Ilbo, Munhwa Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun, Segye Ilbo, Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, Hankyoreh, Hankook Ilbo

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■ Park Myung-hee is a legislative researcher at the National Assembly Research Service.

■ Managed and Edited by: Oh Jun-chul_EAI Research Assistant

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