[East Asia Institute Policy Series] ③ Japan-Korea Relations Viewed Through Mutual Perception Surveys: Phenomena of Hate and the Bilateral Relationship

I. Introduction

According to the Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO, public opinion in both South Korea and Japan has been moving towards improving relations, beyond anti-Japan and anti-Korea sentiments, over the past 11 years from 2013 to 2023. Conversely, negative perceptions such as nationalism are becoming a source of conflict in Korea-Japan relations. Nationalism is latent in normal times but immediately manifests as protests, backlash, and hatred when issues surrounding history or territory between Korea and Japan arise. For example, the anti-Korean protests and anti-Japan demonstrations that occurred after the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor and export regulations in 2019, and the declaration to resolve GSOMIA, fall into this category. According to the Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey, in Japan, the proportion of respondents who described the political and social situation in South Korea in 2022 as 'nationalistic' was 50.9%, higher than those who described it as 'democratic' (43.3%). This is a 7.6% increase compared to 2013 and higher than 48.6% in 2017. Regarding national character, the proportion of respondents who described it as belligerent was higher than those who described it as peaceful. These survey results indicate that conflicts surrounding history and territory between Korea and Japan have become internalized and entrenched. However, these results alone have limitations in approaching the causes or realities of the latent negative perceptions such as nationalism, statism, and militarism between Korea and Japan.

This paper aims to explain the background of negative perceptions between South Korea and Japan from a socio-political perspective, using the Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey as data. The analytical data utilizes the portion of the Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO from 2013 to 2023 that pertains to Japanese public perception.

The main research contents are as follows. First, it examines the background of the emergence of 'hate' as everyday discourse and its impact on Korea-Japan relations. In Japan, nationalism is primarily expressed through exclusionism. Exclusionism, which manifests as hatred and discrimination towards foreign countries, is a hindering factor in Korea-Japan relations, along with historical revisionism. Exclusionism is not only a social phenomenon that arises from widespread discontent or economic instability but also significantly impacts Korea-Japan relations concerning nationalism, historical revisionism, and the issue of North Korean abductions. Japanese-style exclusionism, which combines social movements with far-right nationalism, negatively influences Japanese public opinion by disseminating anti-Korean news through right-wing civic groups. Second, it examines how negative perceptions of the other country manifest through the Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey. The questions analyzed are those that present 'negative keywords,' allowing for an examination of trends and changes from 2013 to 2023.

Third, based on the above analysis, it explains the changes and trends in public opinion between South Korea and Japan over the past 11 years. It examines how major Korea-Japan issues are reflected in bilateral relations through major media articles and outlets from 2013 to 2023. It presents the changes and trends in how nationalism spreads and converges between the two countries. Through this, it will present the impact and trends of the nationalism variable on Korea-Japan relations and can be used as a basis for predicting future Korea-Japan relations. It will be possible to explain whether cooperation is possible in Korea-Japan relations despite the recognition of nationalism. In conclusion, it is proposed that to improve Korea-Japan relations, it is necessary to move beyond the discourse of 'hate' and expand public diplomacy and private exchanges.

II. 'Hate' as Everyday Discourse and Korea-Japan Relations

1. The Structure of 'Hate' Discourse and Korea-Japan Relations

Hate has become a problem in Korea-Japan relations relatively recently. According to the EAI Mutual Perception Survey, in 2022, favorability ratings in both South Korea and Japan reached record highs (Son Yeol, 2022). Unfavorability ratings approached their lowest points, indicating a trend of friendly cooperation between the two countries. The spread of Korean culture online during the COVID-19 pandemic appears to have been relatively successful in fostering positive sentiment towards South Korea among Japanese people.

However, negative discourse such as anti-Korean sentiment and anti-Japan sentiment continues to circulate on the internet and online platforms, as well as in publications. The terms 'hate Korea' (hankan) and 'special privileges for Zainichi Koreans' (Zainichi tokken), which express anti-Korean sentiment, originated not from traditional media but from the internet (Higuchi Naoto, 2015, p. 287). Higuchi Naoto views the manga "Hate Korea" (Manga Hankanryu) as having widely spread terms like 'hate Korea' and 'special privileges for Zainichi Koreans' (Higuchi Naoto, 2015, p. 287). Following the popular success of "Hate Korea" manga, right-wing figures sequentially spread hate discourse online through their homepages, message boards, and social media. As books related to anti-Korean sentiment appeared in the publishing market, hate speech targeting specific countries and ethnicities became normalized as everyday language even in the traditional media market. Hate expressions that have emerged as everyday discourse, in this manner, influence not only social phenomena but also inter-state relations. Although favorability ratings have recently increased, looking at the trend over the past decade, instances of anti-Korean sentiment and anti-Japan demonstrations were frequently observed in both countries during periods of government confrontation over history, territory, and the comfort women issue.

The structure and spread of hate discourse can be summarized as follows (Table 1). From the perspective of actors, hate spreads to the public through the statements or discourse of politicians or officials with political influence, and through continuous repetition. Negative perceptions can be spread continuously and repeatedly through the actor's discourse, regardless of the truthfulness of the statement. From a structural perspective, we can consider Korea-Japan relations in terms of domestic institutional aspects and external aspects. In the analytical framework, 'institutions' refer to the presence or absence of regulations that limit anti-Korean sentiment or discourse. 'Political space' is a tangible or intangible space where discourse spreads or is limited, and it can be classified as open or closed depending on its nature. Under this structure, hate influences inter-state relations beyond being a social phenomenon.

Table 1: Structure and Political Dissemination of Hate Discourse

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Prior to the discussion of anti-Korean sentiment in Korea-Japan relations, it is important to note the influence of 'net-uyoku' (internet right-wing) and political influence. In Japan, anti-Korean sentiment has been expressed online since the late 1990s, and the term 'net-uyoku' was coined in the media in 2005. Unlike traditional right-wing groups, net-uyoku advocate exclusionism and have grown into organizations that incite anti-Korean protests not only online but also through offline gatherings (Tsuji, 2008, p. 16). The cyber spaces where net-uyoku are active include 2ch, Niconico, Open Japanese message boards, and social media. Net-uyoku constantly post information criticizing South Korea or disseminate content related to discrimination against foreigners. However, unlike exclusionist discourse, it is difficult to ascertain the actual scale of net-uyoku. It is difficult to know their exact numbers because a small number of right-wing individuals operate through multiple individual accounts or primarily use email. What is clear is that they have contributed to the active spread of hatred and discrimination against foreigners in Japanese society regarding South Korea. This spread is linked to the rightward shift in Japanese conservatism. Koichi Nagano (2016) points out that 'Japan's rightward shift is related to issues of historical perception, history, and moral education. The rightward shift is based on historical revisionism centered on the Yasukuni historical view, which justifies all wars as wars for self-defense and peace.'

In the 2000s, net-uyoku began to show signs of political mobilization. In 2007, Zaitokukai was formed, centered around Makoto Sakurai. Zaitokukai disseminates distorted information about South Korea and is the largest right-wing organization in Japan, with approximately 17,000 registered members as of 2020. Net-uyoku, who were confined to small, limited spaces online, began producing content accessible to the general public through the media and engaging in full-fledged political activities. This series of developments is characterized by the leadership of right-wing figures like Makoto Sakurai and the popularization through media. Japanese media also presented forecasts that the Korean Wave could decline due to anti-Korean sentiment. The argument was that as the anti-Korean atmosphere intensifies, not only would the base of Korean Wave fans shrink, but people would also distance themselves from South Korea (<Yomiuri Shimbun>, 2015/5/14). Anti-Korean sentiment led to a boom in the publication of anti-Korean books, and the number of Japanese visiting South Korea significantly declined by over 30% from 3.51 million in 2012 to 2015 (<Yomiuri Shimbun>, 2015/06/22; <Asahi Shimbun>, 2015/11/22).

Even after 2019, articles expressing antipathy towards anti-Korean sentiment occasionally appear. Toyo Keizai reported, 'In Japan, emotional rhetoric and reporting fueled by anti-Korean sentiment continue to persist, particularly in mass media. Katsuhiro Kuroda, a visiting columnist for Sankei Shimbun in Seoul and author of "A Study of Koreans" (Koreanjin no Kenkyu) published in 2014, expressed surprise at the anti-Korean sentiment. Japan has experienced anti-Korean phenomena in the past. For instance, the Kim Dae-jung abduction incident in 1973 marked the first wave of anti-Korean sentiment. The background was the anger of the Japanese people over the abduction of Kim Dae-jung, who later became President of South Korea, from Japan. The current anti-Korean sentiment is deeply rooted among the general public. It is presented as a backlash against the Korean Wave, criticizing South Korea. Bookstores are flooded with anti-Korean books, but most of the authors are not experts on Korea or related individuals. Seeing Korea criticized so harshly in Japan makes one want to sympathize with South Korea.'

Voices calling for apologies or self-restraint regarding statements that incite anti-Korean sentiment have emerged. On August 30, 2019, the variety show "GOGO! SMILE!" apologized for hate speech made in a previous broadcast: 'The hate speech made in the segment related to Korea-Japan issues on the August 27 broadcast should not have happened. Furthermore, statements that incite crime are unforgivable for any human being... (omitted)... Hate speech or incitement to crime is unacceptable. We apologize to those who were offended by watching the broadcast.' Journalist Hideki Nishimura, in an article titled "Why Does Television Incite 'Hate Korea'?" (Naze Terebi wa 'Hankan' o Aoru ka), cited the case of GOGO! SMILE! and discussed the media's responsibility as a political tool. The article criticized the Abe administration for instilling anti-Korean consciousness and promoting exclusionism among the Japanese public. (Gendai no Riron, Issue 21, 2019)

There have also been moves to institutionally regulate anti-Korean sentiment. In May 2016, the 'Act on the Eradication of Discriminatory Speech and Conduct Against Persons of Foreign Origin (Hate Speech Countermeasure Act)' was enacted. Local governments have also implemented institutional measures. In Kawasaki City, the 'Ordinance for the Creation of a Community Free from Discrimination and Respectful of Human Rights (Hate Speech Prohibition Ordinance)' was enacted in December 2019, the first of its kind at the local government level. These institutional measures are expected to place some restrictions on the indiscriminate spread of hate speech and anti-Korean sentiment.

2. Review of Existing Research

Recent research in Japan concerning anti-Korean sentiment has proceeded as follows. Motoaki Takahara (2006) identified factors contributing to hatred towards foreigners in Japanese society, including employment insecurity, social anxiety, and discontent arising from a rapidly changing society. Koichi Yasuda (2015) also pointed out that exclusionism originates from socially and economically marginalized groups in Japan. Naoto Higuchi (2014) conducted research on hate speech against Zainichi Koreans and Zaitokukai. However, unlike previous research, Higuchi Higuchi argued that anti-Korean sentiment arises from a perception that denies South Korea from a traditional colonial imperialist perspective. Based on this research, it is difficult to argue that anti-Korean sentiment or such perceptions have directly influenced Korea-Japan relations. However, it is necessary to be vigilant about the spread of anti-Korean sentiment or perceptions to the general public through media such as newspapers, television, and publications. Furthermore, since the possibility of influencing inter-state relations cannot be ruled out, continuous observation is necessary.

Research has also been conducted in South Korea on the background of anti-Korean sentiment in Japan. Most research on anti-Korean sentiment has focused on the cultural sphere. Han Young-gyun (2013) viewed anti-Korean sentiment as a phenomenon that emerged as a counter-reaction to the Korean Wave. He argued that the Korean Wave emerged in the 2000s, and 'Hate Korea Wave' appeared as a counter-reaction in 2005. Jeong Su-young (2009) also suggested that as everyday cultural exchange became established due to the Korean Wave, mass media could play a role in amplifying and reproducing the Korean Wave and the Hate Korea Wave. Kang Ki-cheol (2020) identified the commercial interests of publishers, the recession in the magazine market, and the emergence and influence of internet media as background factors for anti-Korean sentiment. He viewed the boom in anti-Korean book publications as a phenomenon arising from the publishing industry's profit-generating structure. On the internet, he argued that existing contempt for Korea and racial discrimination were expressed under the guise of freedom of speech. Park Soo-ok (2009) and Song Min-soo (2016) elucidated the structure of anti-Korean sentiment and media nationalism through 2ch. Meanwhile, anti-Korean sentiment inherently involves nationalism, ethnic nationalism, and discriminatory perceptions towards Zainichi Koreans. From this perspective, Kim Woong-ki (2016) focused on hate speech as a phenomenon of anti-Korean sentiment and Zainichi Koreans as its target. Through qualitative research, he investigated the patterns of anti-Korean protests by Zaitokukai and ethnic Koreans with Korean nationality (Chōsen-seki) and the perceptions of the victims.

Research on the relationship between anti-Korean sentiment and Korea-Japan relations includes studies by Lee Myung-hee (2021) and Noh Yoon-sun (2016). Lee Myung-hee emphasized the importance of balanced criticism and self-reflection for building future-oriented Korea-Japan relations, citing editorials from the Asahi Shimbun. Noh Yoon-sun sought alternatives for the development of bilateral relations through a comprehensive approach to anti-Korean sentiment, suggesting a focus on the roles of publishing, media, and NPOs.

III. Analysis of Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Surveys and 'Negative Perceptions'

1. Anti-Korean Sentiment and Favorability

How can we understand the phenomenon of anti-Korean sentiment in Korea-Japan relations? It is difficult to directly ascertain the impact of anti-Korean sentiment on Korea-Japan relations. In essence, anti-Korean sentiment can be understood as a phenomenon where individuals' extreme emotions towards a specific country or ethnicity are socially expressed. Anti-Korean sentiment inherently involves discriminatory and structural issues, and it is difficult to argue that it has directly impacted Korea-Japan relations. However, the issue is that anti-Korean sentiment is expressed through various media such as social media, the internet, and online message boards, which warrants caution. The problem of anti-Korean sentiment can be viewed as an exceptional and minor phenomenon when considering society as a whole or Korea-Japan relations. However, when it spreads to public opinion through mass media or new media, its ripple effect can be significant. In reality, there have been numerous cases where conflicts that occurred in everyday spaces, even if not wars or riots, were transmitted to the public through the internet, shaped public opinion, and escalated into social problems. In this regard, we need to pay attention to the impact of anti-Korean sentiment on Korea-Japan relations.

This chapter presents the trends and changes over the past decade by selecting questions related to negative perceptions from the Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey. Shunsuke Tanabe, who has researched anti-Korean sentiment, attributes the causes of anti-Korean sentiment to favorability towards South Korea and individual and social perceptions. According to his findings, favorability towards South Korea in Japan declined from 2009 to 2013, with different causes appearing at different times. For example, in 2012, he attributed the expression of Japanese exclusionism towards South Korea to President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo. In contrast, in 2013, he viewed it as the expression of latent patriotism within individuals directed towards foreigners. Tanabe explains 'anti-Korean sentiment' as a sub-concept of patriotism and emphasizes the importance of individual and social perceptions (Tanabe Shunsuke, 2011). Thus, to understand the causes of anti-Korean sentiment and hate, which are expressions of extreme emotions towards a particular ethnicity or nation, it is necessary to examine individual perceptions and public opinion trends. In particular, negative perceptions of countries and their people revealed in the Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey are also related to the causes of anti-Korean sentiment, making the questions in this area particularly significant.

Based on the above discussion, this chapter aims to investigate the negative perceptions of South Korea latent within Japanese individuals or Japanese society through the Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey. The Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey holds significant implications in two aspects. First, it allows for long-term, continuous observation of Japanese perceptions of South Korea. This ensures reliability and stability of the data. Second, it enables the empirical presentation of the 'emotional' aspect through objective and balanced questions. While the hypothesis that citizens' 'negative perceptions' can influence inter-state relations exists, there are few cases where this has been observed empirically through data over a long period. In this regard, the Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey is a highly valuable and useful data source.

2. Analysis of the Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (2013-2023)

This chapter analyzes items revealing hate and negative influences based on the results of the Japan Mutual Perception Survey. The period analyzed is from 2013 to 2022, covering 10 years. The subjects of analysis are questions that reveal the 'negative' perceptions of the Japanese public towards South Korea, as follows:

■ Where do you obtain information about South Korea or Korea-Japan relations?

■ What is the impression of the Japanese people towards South Korea?

■ What are the reasons for having a negative impression of South Korea (in Japan)?

■ What do you think best describes the current political and social situation in South Korea?

■ Korean National Character: Peaceful or Belligerent

■ Which countries and regions do you perceive as military threats to Japan?

【Question】 Where do you obtain information about South Korea or Korea-Japan relations?

As shown in the table above, Japan has primarily obtained information about South Korea through traditional media such as newspapers and television. Surveys from 2014 to 2022 show that over 90% of respondents answered that they primarily obtain information about South Korea from media outlets. In contrast, direct conversations with Koreans or visits to South Korea accounted for less than 10%, a very small proportion. Of course, information can be obtained without direct experience or observation, and it is not necessarily unreliable. However, traditional media, while guaranteeing objectivity, may be limited in the information they provide, such as specific images or frames, depending on the circumstances. Therefore, if opportunities to encounter the other country through various direct and indirect means increase, beyond information obtained through the media, there will be room for improvement in mutual perception.

【Question】 What is the impression of the Japanese people towards South Korea?

Over the past 11 years, favorability ratings towards South Korea in Japan showed a downward trend peaking in 2016, and have been steadily rising since 2019. In 2023, positive impressions surpassed negative impressions, reaching the highest level of favorability towards South Korea. The periods when negative impressions were high largely coincided with conflicts over history or territory between South Korea and Japan. In 2012, then-President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo led to a sharp deterioration of public opinion in Japan towards South Korea. In 2015, the Korea-Japan agreement on comfort women was reached, and in 2019, the Supreme Court ruling on forced labor and export regulations led to lower favorability ratings towards South Korea. However, between 2020 and 2021, while direct exchanges between South Korea and Japan decreased due to the COVID-19 pandemic, interest in Korean culture such as Korean dramas and K-pop increased within Japan, leading to a rise in favorability ratings towards South Korea. With the Yoon Suk-yeol administration taking office in 2022, a friendly and cooperative atmosphere between the governments has continued, showing an upward trend in positive impressions of South Korea.

【Question】 What are the reasons for having a negative impression of South Korea (in Japan)?

Over the past decade, conflicts surrounding historical issues and territorial disputes over Dokdo between South Korea and Japan have become entrenched. From 2014 to 2022, historical issues have consistently accounted for the largest proportion of reasons why Japan has a negative impression of South Korea. Disputes over Dokdo territory have shown little change in response rates but remain the second-highest reason after historical issues. Negative perceptions of political leaders or government attitudes have fluctuated significantly depending on the period. Since 2021, the proportion of respondents who cited a sense of discomfort with the actions of the South Korean government has gradually decreased. It is noteworthy that in 2023 alone, the proportion of respondents who cited 'anti-Korean sentiment among Koreans' as the reason was 64.9%. Taken together, conflicts over historical issues or Dokdo territory between South Korea and Japan have become more entrenched. In contrast, perceptions related to political leaders and governments varied by period. This suggests the need for caution, as the attitudes of political leaders and governments have an immediate impact on public opinion. As shown by the 2023 results, it is evident that anti-Korean sentiment among Koreans is also a major factor lowering favorability towards South Korea among Japanese people.

【Question】 What do you think best describes the current political and social situation in South Korea?

The results of the survey from 2013 to 2022 regarding the political and social situation in South Korea show that 'nationalism' received the highest response, followed by 'statism.' In contrast, positive perceptions such as 'pacifism' and 'democracy' were relatively low. In Japan, nationalism, statism, and militarism are all perceived negatively and are related to viewing South Korea as being in a state of war or taking a hardline stance on historical and territorial issues. The response 'nationalism' has consistently been the highest proportion over the past decade. 'Democracy' and 'pacifism' received response rates below 20%, but 'democracy' has steadily increased since 2015, surpassing 'statism' in proportion in 2022. Despite South Korea being a democratic country like Japan, the low perception of South Korea's democracy in Japan requires an examination of its background. Since 2021, the proportion of respondents describing the political and social situation in South Korea as 'democracy' has increased, and in 2022, 'democracy' accounted for a much higher proportion than 'statism.'

Pacifism consistently showed the lowest proportion in all cases. However, militarism has somewhat decreased since 2020, while pacifism has steadily increased since 2019. In 2022, both pacifism and democracy increased, while statism and militarism decreased, indicating a trend of somewhat easing negative perceptions of South Korea. This change also reflects an increase in favorable perceptions of South Korea during the COVID-19 period.

The background for the increase in favorable perceptions of South Korea in Japan includes indirect experiences with South Korea and Korean culture during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition to the Korean Wave boom that has continued since the early 2000s, interest in Korean popular culture such as K-pop and K-dramas in Japan increased during the COVID-19 period. Furthermore, the friendly atmosphere between the South Korean and Japanese governments under the Yoon Suk-yeol and Kishida administrations appears to have contributed to a positive shift in perceptions of South Korea.

【Question】 Korean National Character: Peaceful or Belligerent

Surveys in 2013 and 2014 indicated a strong tendency among Japanese respondents to view the Korean national character as belligerent rather than peaceful. In 2014, the perception of belligerence (41.5%) was nearly four times higher than the perception of peacefulness (10.7%).

【Question】 Which countries and regions do you perceive as military threats to Japan?

From 2013 to 2022, South Korea was perceived as a country with almost no military threat compared to North Korea, China, and Russia. While the United States showed its lowest figure in 2015, it was perceived as a greater military threat than South Korea in 2017 and 2018. The perception of China as a military threat relatively decreased. In 2022, when Japan increased its defense spending, the perception of threat from North Korea slightly decreased, while the military threat from China increased compared to the previous year. Due to the Russia-Ukraine war, the perception of Russia as a military threat has been over 60% since 2022.

Regarding threat perception, increases and decreases in the United States and China, and South Korea and North Korea, are symmetrically linked. Furthermore, military threats from communist countries such as North Korea, China, and Russia are perceived as high, while threats from South Korea and the United States are perceived as low. However, the contrasting figures in threat perception towards South Korea and the United States between 2017 and 2019, in relation to ROK-Japan relations, can be considered a rare case.

In summary, Japan consistently perceives North Korea as the highest military threat, while the perception of China as a military threat has fluctuated with changing circumstances, showing both decreases and increases. Russia was perceived as a lower military threat than North Korea or China, but higher than the United States or South Korea. This appears to reflect ideological characteristics. Meanwhile, South Korea and the United States are ranked lowest, but their threat perception has also shown changes, increasing or decreasing depending on the East Asian geopolitical situation.

Additionally, surveys by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cabinet Office between 2019-2020 and 2021 indicated a higher level of friendliness towards South Korea compared to previous periods. Friendliness towards South Korea was also higher in 2017 and 2022 compared to earlier times. This can be interpreted as reflecting the Japanese public's expectations for a new government following a change in leadership.

In summary, over the approximately 11 years from 2013 to 2023, while mutual perceptions improved, negative perceptions of South Korea have consistently been entrenched within Japan. According to the aforementioned survey, these negative perceptions can be categorized into fixed and variable factors. Firstly, historical issues and territorial disputes between South Korea and Japan can be considered fixed factors. Regarding historical issues in Korea-Japan relations, the prevailing view is that "it is difficult to expect the narrowing of differences in views between Korea and Japan on issues such as Japan's 'post-war settlement' and colonial problems" (Nam Sang-gu 2010). Therefore, there is a possibility that negative perceptions between Korea and Japan will persist, necessitating responses not only from governments but also from civil society.

IV. Beyond the Discourse of 'Hatred'

Recently, amidst efforts to foster friendly cooperative relations, public diplomacy and private exchanges have been emphasized in ROK-Japan relations. To build stable and sustainable ROK-Japan relations, it is necessary to persuade the general public and foster favorable public opinion. Son Yeol (2019) proposed public diplomacy as a means to alleviate anti-Korean sentiment and distrust in Japan, stating that "public diplomacy must transition into systematic efforts to foster favorable public opinion among the Japanese public."

Public diplomacy is generally defined as "the intentional efforts by government or non-government actors to change the perceptions of the other country's public in a way that is favorable to one's own country." The scope of public diplomacy includes government efforts to influence foreign public opinion, interactions between non-governmental organizations and interest groups within each country, the impact of media reporting and policies on diplomatic issues, communication between diplomats and overseas staff, and inter-cultural communication processes (Hwang Byung-deok et al. 2012). In South Korea, public diplomacy is also described as "a general term for governmental and non-governmental diplomatic activities that, unlike traditional diplomacy, target the general public of foreign countries" (Kim Tae-hwan 2012). The need for public diplomacy in South Korea is explained as follows: "Public diplomacy is an important means to solidify South Korea's strategic position as a middle power in the international community and realize national interests; it is a method to reduce dependence on major powers economically and in terms of security; and it possesses significant potential as a new 'minefield'" (Kim Tae-hwan 2012).

In Japan, public diplomacy, or 'Public Diplomacy',[1]first appeared in the Diplomatic Bluebook published in May 2004. The Diplomatic Bluebook described Public Diplomacy as follows: "In the West as well, with the development of communication means including the mass media, attention is being paid to and promotion is being undertaken of Public Diplomacy (or public opinion diplomacy or citizen diplomacy) which directly utilizes one's own country's appeal to all foreign public opinion." The 2005 Diplomatic Bluebook stated that Public Diplomacy is "a diplomatic activity of the government that, unlike traditional government diplomacy, directly engages with the citizens and public opinion of other countries in cooperation with the private sector. It is often translated as 'citizen diplomacy' or 'public relations diplomacy,' but there is no definitive translation yet." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Public Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange Department in 2004, initiating full-scale activities.

Public diplomacy, which emerged after 2014, emphasized activities to strengthen the promotion of the Japanese government's positions. The Diplomatic Bluebook stated: "To enhance Japan's presence in the international community and foster trust and understanding of Japan's image, it is essential to actively communicate Japan's fundamental positions and thinking both domestically and internationally. Simultaneously, by promoting Japan's diverse attractions, we must increase interest and familiarity with Japan and create a positive image of Japan."

The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also outlined as follows: "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must accurately and effectively disseminate relevant information based on objective facts and respond strategically. When overseas media report on Japan's history, territory, or foreign policy based on factual errors or inaccurate perceptions, we must promptly refute them based on facts. Simultaneously, we must calmly and appropriately convey Japan's position. In particular, in the area of territorial defense, various materials explaining Japan's position and claims in an easily understandable manner are prepared in 11 major languages and disseminated on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website." It also stated, "We introduce diverse Japanese culture, including traditional culture and subcultures, and promote people-to-people exchanges, starting with young people, and the dissemination of the Japanese language overseas through the Japan Foundation." For public diplomacy, it was stated that "we seek cooperation with relevant organizations and actively promote Japan utilizing overseas diplomatic missions, etc." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). Kang Tae-woong (2015) explained Japan's cultural policy by stating, "Japan sought to alleviate diplomatic conflicts among South Korea, China, and Japan through cultural exchange. Japan's cultural exchange policy in 2004 aimed to foster understanding and goodwill towards Japan."

As such, public diplomacy can be seen to have both a universal definition and specific definitions based on country and case. What is commonly pointed out about public diplomacy is that, based on soft power, the actors and agents have shifted from government to the private sector, and from one-way to two-way communication. In Japan's case, public diplomacy actively promotes public relations and cultural exchange. In particular, regarding historical issues and maritime territories, emphasis is placed on actively advocating the Japanese government's position and disseminating it abroad. Finally, a question can be raised as to whether public diplomacy can reduce exclusive perceptions such as anti-Korean sentiment or anti-Japanese sentiment. Anti-Korean sentiment is primarily expressed by right-wing or patriotic groups or individuals who claim to be so, through content creation, broadcasting, publishing, and protests. Therefore, in response to anti-Japanese or anti-Korean sentiment, it is necessary for the government to correct their misconceptions through official information targeted at the public and to spread positive perceptions.

V. Conclusion

Amidst the escalating conflict surrounding history between South Korea and Japan, discussions on the role of civil society have been active. Currently, South Korea is seeking phased and strategic responses with neighboring countries for peace in East Asia. To build lasting and stable peace on the Korean Peninsula, it is necessary to establish a long-term and stable cooperative relationship between South Korea and Japan. However, on the other hand, conflicts surrounding historical issues and nationalism persist between South Korea and Japan. In 2004, Japan proposed its role as a leader in the East Asian regional order by announcing the 'East Asian Community' at the UN, and in 2006, it presented itself as a 'Built-in Stabilizer' for regional stability through its military alliance with the United States. In 2016, the Japanese government announced the Indo-Pacific strategy and strengthened relations with Asian countries in cooperation with the United States. To realize a 'free and open Indo-Pacific,' Japan has prioritized strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance while also considering cooperation with India, Australia, and ASEAN countries.

Conversely, the popular spread of historical revisionism and the rightward shift of conservative politics have caused conflict in ROK-Japan relations. Historical issues between South Korea and Japan, intertwined with Japan's right-wing tendencies, have further exacerbated ROK-Japan relations. Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine, textbook screening issues, and the comfort women issue provoked backlash not only from South Korea but also from neighboring countries. Conflicts over history and territory, such as President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo in 2012, have become entrenched. Relations further deteriorated with the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor compensation in 2018 and Japan's export control measures. Since then, with the emergence of new leadership in both South Korea and Japan, progress has been made in ROK-Japan cooperation. In this context of a rapidly changing regional order, it is necessary to build a long-term and stable cooperative relationship between South Korea and Japan. While seeking to revitalize private exchanges, including public diplomacy, continuous consideration and meticulous analysis are needed regarding anti-Korean sentiment and anti-Japanese sentiment, which hinder ROK-Japan cooperation. ■

[1]In Japan, public diplomacy is referred to as 'Public Diplomacy'.

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■ Seok Ju-heeis a researcher at the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

■ Editor: Oh Jun-chul_EAI Research Assistant

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | jcoh@eai.or.kr