[East Asia Institute (EAI) Public Opinion Series on Korea-Japan Relations] Part 1: What Do Koreans and Japanese Think of Each Other?

I. Introduction

This article aims to analyze 'What Koreans and Japanese Think of Each Other' based on the public opinion surveys conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI), a private think tank in South Korea, and the Japanese NPO Genron, from the first Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey in 2013 to the 11th survey in November 2023. The Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey (hereinafter referred to as the 'Mutual Perception Survey') provides useful indicators for examining the differences in mutual perceptions and historical perceptions between Korea and Japan and their backgrounds, by including detailed questions such as 'What comes to mind when thinking of the other country,' 'Mutual evaluation of national character,' and 'Knowledge of the other country's history.' Based on the survey results from 2013 to 2023, the author intends to examine the differences in historical knowledge and historical experiences that lie behind the distinct differences in perceptions between Korea and Japan regarding the causes and solutions to historical issues.

The Mutual Perception Survey by the East Asia Institute reflects public opinion over the past decade, during which Korea-Japan relations were mired in historical issues. It began with the visit to Dokdo by former President Lee Myung-bak and his remarks demanding an 'apology' from the Emperor in August 2012, followed by a series of events including the announcement of the comfort women agreement by the Park Geun-hye administration in 2015, the final Supreme Court ruling on forced mobilization in 2018, and the Japanese government's export control measures in 2019. During this period, the right-wing shift in Japanese politics and anti-Korean sentiment in Japanese society intensified, with hate speech and anti-Korean books promoted by groups like Zaitokukai becoming rampant. In South Korea, anti-Japanese sentiment surged, leading to boycotts of Japanese products and cancellations of trips to Japan. From the first half of 2020 onwards, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, mutual civilian exchanges were completely suspended. Consequently, this period has been described as 'a lost decade in Korea-Japan relations' and 'the worst Korea-Japan relations'.

In the surveys conducted up to 2022, when Korea-Japan relations were in unprecedented conflict, the impression of the other country was consistently more negative than positive. The 2022 survey results show that while the majority of Koreans (81.1%) desire the recovery of Korea-Japan relations, more than half of the respondents expect relations to remain 'the same as they are now' in the future. Furthermore, both in Korea (57.7%) and Japan (66.3%), 'resolution of historical issues' was cited as the most significant challenge for improving relations. However, when examining the specific issues to be resolved in the historical context, a significant difference in perception is evident: Koreans cite 'Japan's recognition of its wartime aggression, the comfort women issue, compensation for forced mobilization, and lack of repentance and apology for past actions,' whereas Japan points to 'South Korea's anti-Japanese education and textbook content, and anti-Japanese actions.' Ultimately, this led to responses where Korea perceived Japan as 'militaristic,' and Japan perceived Korea as 'nationalistic.' Notably, for Koreans, 'negative impressions of Japan,' 'what comes to mind when thinking of Japan,' and 'issues to be resolved in Korea-Japan historical problems' are inseparable and coincide, demonstrating that perceptions of Japan are overwhelmingly dominated by historical issues.

<Figure 1 Impressions of the Other Country (2023 EAI-Genron NPO Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey: Japan and Korea-Japan Relations)>

The Mutual Perception Survey reveals that perceptions of mutual impressions, favorability, historical knowledge, historical perceptions, and mutual identity are interconnected. The differences in views between Korea and Japan regarding historical issues, which lie at the core of the difficulties in Korea-Japan relations, and their solutions, are deeply entrenched, shaped by South Korea's historical reflection and Japan's 'post-war forgetting' since liberation. However, Korea-Japan relations are also in a state of ongoing change. The fact that the reasons for 'favorable impressions' of the other country are heavily weighted towards experiential responses, such as the national character or living standards in Japan, or the culture and food in Korea, and that responses vary significantly by generation depending on the item, suggests the possibility of future changes in Korea-Japan relations. In particular, the items related to popular culture, added in 2021, clearly show the preference of Japanese people for Korean popular culture, and it is evident that enjoying the other country's popular culture drives mutual favorability.

The 2023 Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey indicates that public opinion in both countries is moving away from the mire of mutual distrust stemming from historical issues. Amidst an atmosphere of improved bilateral relations, including the restoration of diplomatic ties between the leaders of Korea and Japan in 2023, the public in both countries felt the improvement in relations. In Japan, the proportion of responses indicating a 'favorable impression' of South Korea (37.4%) surpassed that of 'unfavorable impressions' (32.8%) for the first time since the survey began in 2013. This reflects the recent progress in Korea-Japan relations being actively incorporated into Japanese public opinion (Son Yeol, Kim Yang-gyu, Park Han-soo 2023.10.12). The number of Japanese respondents who answered 'democracy' instead of 'nationalism' as the mode of political and social operation in South Korea has also increased. In contrast, in the 2023 survey, the proportion of South Korean respondents with a 'favorable impression' of Japan did not increase, and the proportion of those who responded that Korea-Japan relations are important also decreased. Furthermore, while Japanese respondents evaluated the attitude of the Korean and Japanese governments towards improving relations as 'good,' Korean respondents evaluated it as 'I don't know,' reflecting a deep-seated difference in positions.

Despite the divergent assessments of Korea-Japan relations by the publics of both countries, a consistent perception revealed in this survey is that 'Korea-Japan relations are important.' The proportion of respondents who believe 'Korea-Japan relations are important to their country' is higher in South Korea than in Japan. However, considering the generally high proportion of 'I don't know' responses from the Japanese side, the response in the 2022 survey that 'Korea-Japan relations are important' (56.5%) was four times higher than 'not important' (14.4%). Furthermore, the proportion of Japanese respondents who stated 'Korea-Japan relations are important to their country' increased to 61.8% in 2023. In the 2022 survey, the overwhelming reason given by Japanese people for the importance of South Korea was 'because it is a neighboring country with deep historical, geographical, and cultural ties' (71.9%). While 'neighboring country' was also a key factor in the Korean responses (64%), 'economic interdependence is important' received slightly more responses. Meanwhile, in the 2023 Japanese responses, the answer 'because we share common security interests as allies of the United States' significantly increased to 40.9%, notably surpassing economic importance (37.1%) and highlighting the growing significance of security issues.

While the mutual perceptions of the Korean and Japanese publics significantly influence policymakers due to domestic and international political factors, there are few studies that have systematically analyzed mutual perception surveys. This article analyzes the mutual perceptions between Korea and Japan over the past decade, referred to as the 'worst Korea-Japan relations,' to shed light on the gap in historical perceptions between the two countries and to discern its implications and clues for change.

II. What Impressions Do They Have of Each Other?

1. 'Favorable Impressions' and 'Unfavorable Impressions'

Since 2013, the first question in the Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey has been 'What impression do you have of the other country?' This is followed by questions asking for the reasons behind the responses of 'favorable impression' and 'unfavorable impression.' The overwhelming reason for 'unfavorable impressions' between Korea and Japan lies in 'historical issues.' In 2021, about half of Japanese respondents answered that they have an 'unfavorable impression of South Korea (48.8%).' The reasons for this negative impression (multiple responses allowed for two items) were cited as 'because they criticize Japan over historical issues, etc.' (45.4%), 'because they feel discomfort with the current South Korean government's actions' (35.3%), and 'because of the territorial dispute over Dokdo' (31.1%). The proportion of these responses was high regardless of gender or age. The reasons for Koreans having an unfavorable impression of Japan (multiple responses allowed for two items) were high for 'because they do not properly reflect on the history of invading Korea' (66.7%) and 'because of the Dokdo issue' (52.3%).

<Table 1 Reasons for 'Unfavorable Impression' of South Korea (2021 Japan Key Item Data Results, East Asia Institute)>

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While negative impressions of the other country were overwhelmingly influenced by historical conflicts, the reasons for positive impressions were more diverse. Since the initial perception surveys, Koreans have consistently cited 'Japan's kind and diligent national character' and 'a developed country with a high standard of living' as major reasons for positive impressions, while Japanese respondents have consistently pointed to 'Korean popular culture,' 'food culture and shopping' as the primary reasons. 'Shopping' was also the top reason for visiting Korea cited by Japanese respondents.

<Figure 2 Reasons for Having a Positive Impression of the Other Country (2023 East Asia Institute-Genron NP0 Survey on Mutual Perceptions between Japan and Korea: Japan and Korea-Japan Relations)>

In the 2021 mutual perception survey, regarding the question 'Do you think Korea and Japan are in an equal relationship, given that Korea has surpassed Japan in per capita GDP and defense spending is at a similar level for both countries?', Korean respondents who answered 'Japan is superior' or 'I don't know' combined accounted for just over 10%, with the majority responding that the relationship is 'equal' (44%) or 'not yet equal but moving in that direction' (44.2%). Among Japanese respondents, 'I don't know' (43.6%) was the largest category regarding equality, while the responses 'already equal' (15.7%) and 'moving towards equality' (26.5%) were nearly three times more frequent than the response 'Japan's superiority is firmly established' (14.2%). Korea is also classified as a 'developed country' in the international community[1], and it is interesting that despite the majority of Koreans judging that Korea is 'equal or moving towards equality' with Japan, they consistently cite 'a developed country with a high standard of living' as a reason for their positive impression of Japan.

Despite sometimes referring to Japan as a 'digitally backward country' in its response to COVID-19, the rankings of 'diligent and kind national character' (49.8%) and 'a developed country with a high standard of living' (38.5%) were maintained in 2023, as they were in 2022. Examining the responses for 'a developed country with a high standard of living' in the 2022 survey, there were no significant differences in responses between generations regarding their experiences of the economic gap between Korea and Japan; rather, respondents in their 20s showed the highest rate at 30%. This suggests that the standard of living in Japan as assessed by the Korean public may be on a different dimension from measurable economic indicators such as wages, income, nutrition, health, and life expectancy, and further research in this area is expected to yield interesting findings.

<Table 2 2022 Results: Reasons for Having a Positive Impression of Japan (1st Priority)>

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2. Mutual Perception and Evaluation of National Character

In 2013 and 2014, during the initial phase of the mutual perception survey, questionnaires were administered to gauge perceptions and evaluations of national character. The concept of national character, which posits the uniqueness of the culture, society, behavior, and ways of thinking of a nation's members in today's complex and large-scale societies, has a fundamental limitation in that it assumes national community members are a homogeneous group, thereby overlooking internal diversity. Nevertheless, it is useful for capturing popular mutual perceptions, and as demonstrated in the research by Lee Eui-beom (2004, pp. 13-14; 20-21)[2], perceptions of national character tend to remain stable over long periods, differentiating them from responses in the political sphere, which are sensitive to changes in Korea-Japan relations. This mutual perception survey revealed positive evaluations by Koreans of Japanese national character, and it is believed that positive perceptions of civic virtues such as 'friendliness' are not unrelated to the aforementioned evaluation of a 'high standard of living'.

In the 2014 survey, among the contrasting traits of <unfriendly/considerate, diligent/lazy, peaceful/warlike, flexible/stubborn, trustworthy/untrustworthy, honest/dishonest, creative/imitative, cooperative/uncooperative, altruistic/egoistic, collectivist/individualist>, the most frequent response from Japanese respondents regarding Korean national character was 'neither'. Japanese respondents answered 'neither' to 9 out of 10 items concerning Korean national character, indicating a lack of a distinct image of Korean national character. Among the given options, over half of the respondents identified a specific trait of Koreans as 'stubborn (51.9%)'. Other frequently cited traits included 'egoistic (44.7%), diligent (42.9%), warlike (41.3%), untrustworthy (41.1%), uncooperative (38.1%), and dishonest/insincere (31.9%)'. With the exception of 'diligent', most of these were negative attributes.

In the 2014 survey, the response 'neither' was also most common for the five items concerning Japanese national character as perceived by Koreans. However, among the items where a majority of respondents chose either 'yes' or 'no', there were positive evaluations such as 'friendly (70.3%)' and 'diligent (75.6%)'. Additionally, negative perceptions such as 'stubborn (36.1%)', 'untrustworthy (37.6%)', 'uncooperative (36.0%)', and 'egoistic (48.9%)' coexisted with positive perceptions such as 'honest and sincere (33.1%)' and 'creative (42.1%)'.

Following former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo and his demand for an apology from the Japanese Emperor in 2012, intense anti-Korean protests erupted in Japan. The Hallyu (Korean Wave) phenomenon was replaced by a wave of anti-Korean books. Sakurai Makoto's <The Great Era of Anti-Korean Sentiment>, published in 2014, went into its sixth printing in just over twenty days. The anti-Korean atmosphere in Japan was fully conveyed to South Korean society through news reports, fueling anti-Japanese sentiment. The fact that positive evaluations of Japanese national character were maintained, despite escalating distrust and anger towards 'Japan' and 'Japanese politicians', can be considered a unique aspect of the South Korean responses. This is even more pronounced when compared to perceptions of Chinese national character.

The 2022 survey included additional items allowing for a comparison of perceptions of 'national character' between Japanese and Chinese people. When asked to choose from options such as 'friendly/blunt, flexible/stubborn, planned/spontaneous, bold/meticulous, creative/imitative', Koreans perceived Japanese national character as 'friendly (77.5%), planned (64.8%), exclusive (55.2%), and meticulous (49.4%)'. In contrast, perceptions of Japanese and Chinese people differed to an almost opposite degree. Koreans perceived Chinese people as 'blunt (62.5%), stubborn (61.2%), bold (64.8%), imitative (73%), exclusive (63.7%), and warlike (62.5%)', with negative evaluations consistently exceeding a majority, which was a notable characteristic.

Meanwhile, regarding the 2022 question asking which country, South Korea or China, elicited greater feelings of closeness, the most frequent response from the Japanese side was 'feel no closeness to either (35.2%)'. The next most common responses were 'feel closeness to South Korea' (25.9%) and 'feel closeness to both countries' (14.6%), with only 7.7% expressing 'feel closeness to China'. In South Korea, 'feel no closeness to either (40.8%)' was also the most common response, followed by 'Japan' (24.3%), 'China' (16.9%), and 'feel closeness to both countries' (14.4%). Despite the conflict over historical issues between South Korea and Japan, and despite judging the future importance of relations with China to be greater than those with Japan or Korea respectively, it is characteristic that feelings of closeness between South Korea and Japan are higher than those towards China. This trend was even more pronounced in 2023. Younger age groups tend to feel closer to South Korea, whereas no age-related correlation was observed for feelings of closeness towards China. Therefore, it can be inferred that the younger generation's feelings of closeness towards South Korea are linked to their consumption of popular culture.

<Table 3: Which Country is Closer, South Korea or China (Japan Main Item Data Results, East Asia Institute 2021)>

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III. What comes to mind about the other country?

1. Mutual Images of Korea and Japan

In the 2013 and 2014 surveys, the question 'What comes to mind when you think of the other country?' was included. In the 2013 Korean survey, the response options included: <Japanese cuisine, high-quality products, the Japanese flag, Mt. Fuji, cherry blossoms, samurai, economic superpower, Emperor, science and technology, the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Dokdo issue, comfort women, politicians' outrageous remarks, the Pacific War (Hiroshima, Nagasaki atomic bombings), right-wing groups, manga/anime, the Self-Defense Forces, the Korean Wave, Japanese residents in Korea, the bubble economy>. In 2014, the following were added: <Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the Senkaku Islands, the Trans-Pacific Partnership>.

In the 2013 Japanese survey, images of Korea included: <Korean cuisine, home appliances such as LCD TVs, high-rise buildings in Seoul, Incheon Airport, scenery of the Han River, the gap between rich and poor, efforts towards economic liberalization such as FTAs, Sungnyemun Gate, democracy, conscription, the annexation of Korea, the Korea-Japan Basic Treaty, chaebol companies such as Samsung and Hyundai, Panmunjom, the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup, the Won (currency), anti-Japanese sentiment/demonstrations, Korean Wave dramas/K-POP, the Dokdo issue, Taekwondo>. In 2014, the following were added: <Incheon Airport, comfort women, conscription, chaebol companies such as Samsung and Hyundai, the annexation of Korea, President Park Geun-hye, the Sewol ferry disaster>.

Regarding the 2014 question 'What comes to mind when you think of Japan?' (up to 3 choices), Korean respondents mentioned 'the Dokdo issue' (66.4%), 'comfort women' (56%), and 'politicians' outrageous remarks' (24.5%). In 2014, the reasons for having a negative impression of Japan (1st + 2nd priority) were cited as 'lack of reflection on the history of invading Korea' (76.9%) and 'the Dokdo issue' (71.5%). The Korean responses indicate that the historical issues are so overwhelming that the 'negative impression of Japan' and 'what comes to mind about Japan' are not separated but coincide. Notably, the Dokdo issue, which was a current event at the time, was chosen as the top response by over 30% across all age groups, and was not influenced by personal experiences such as visiting Japan.

<Figure 3 2014 Korea Data Results East Asia Institute>

Meanwhile, the first survey in 2013 showed that 59.1% of Japanese respondents chose 'Korean cuisine' when thinking of Korea, followed by 'the Takeshima issue' (56.7%) and 'Korean dramas, K-POP' (47.2%). Although it was a time when anti-Korean sentiment was escalating in Japan due to former President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo and remarks about the Emperor in August 2012, and the Korean Wave boom was rapidly cooling, it is characteristic that responses related to Korean culture were dominant. In 2014 as well, 'Korean cuisine' (46.0%), 'Korean Wave dramas, K-Pop' (36.3%), and 'the Sewol disaster' (38.2%) received more responses than 'the Dokdo issue' (36.7%) and 'the comfort women issue' (31.0%). This reveals a difference in that when Japanese people think of Korea, Korean culture and experiences such as food and popular culture come to mind before historical issues between Korea and Japan.

Let us compare the responses from mutual perception surveys over the past 10 years with those from the 1980s-1990s. Park Jin-woo (2014) analyzed five opinion polls jointly conducted by the Dong-A Ilbo and Asahi Shimbun from 1984 to 1997, asking respondents to freely describe what they associate with the other country. He analyzed that Japan views Korea from a cultural perspective and observes Korea's economic development after the Seoul Olympics with ease. On the other hand, he points out that regarding Korea, while there is admiration for Japan as an economic power and technologically advanced country, anti-Japanese sentiment stemming from colonial rule and aggressive wars consistently accounts for around 30%.

<Figure 4 'What Japanese people associate with Korea (%)' Park Jin-woo (2014:114)>

<Figure 5 What Korean people associate with Japan (Park Jin-woo 2014: 114)>

Looking at the 'associations' of Koreans with Japan in the 1980s-1990s from the table above, the issue of Japan's invasion and colonial rule and lack of reflection, expressed as '36 years of suffering,' occupies the largest proportion of Korean associations. However, specific issues such as the Dokdo issue, comfort women, and forced labor, which are prominent today, were not recognized at that time. The first public testimony of a comfort woman victim, Kim Hak-soon, occurred in 1991, marking the beginning of the full-fledged debate on comfort women, one of the most contentious historical issues between Korea and Japan. The year 1993 saw the Kono Statement, followed by the establishment of the 'National Committee for Asian Women's Peace' in 1995 and Prime Minister Murayama's statement. This period can be seen as a new phase in Korea-Japan relations as they marked the 50th anniversary of the end of the war. Subsequently, private cultural exchanges entered a new dimension with the 'Joint Declaration for a New Korea-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century' in 1998, the opening of Japanese popular culture to Korea in 1999, the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup, the Korean Wave boom initiated by 'Winter Sonata' in 2003, and the reorganization of the Shin-Okubo Koreatown Korean Wave commercial district. However, this period also saw the rise of historical revisionism denying the post-war historical perspective of democracy and the overt emergence of 'anti-Korean sentiment' in Japanese society. Yamano Sharin's <Manga Hankanryu> (The Anti-Korean Wave Manga) became a bestseller immediately upon its publication in 2005, followed by the formation of Zaitokukai and the rampage of 'net-uyoku who took to the streets' (Koichi Yasuda 2013) gaining the name 'conservative activists.' This period can be described as the time when the content of the 'history war' between Korea and Japan became concrete. Therefore, let us examine the historical perceptions of the people of both countries underlying the historical conflicts between Korea and Japan by considering 'what aspects of the other country's history they remember.'

2. What aspects of the other country's history are remembered?

The first and second mutual perception surveys included a question asking respondents to name two 'historical events of the other country that they know.' In the first survey in 2013, Korean respondents cited 'the Imjin War' (80.6%), 'the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki' (74.8%), 'the Pacific War' (55.4%), and 'the forced annexation of Korea' (49.9%). In 2014, Koreans again most frequently selected 'the Imjin War' (86.3%), followed by 'the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki' and 'the forced annexation of Korea.' In contrast, Japanese respondents in the first survey in 2013 most frequently cited 'the birth of a female president' (72.4%), followed by 'the Seoul Olympics' (71.1%) and 'the Korea-Japan World Cup' (70.0%), indicating a higher interest and knowledge of more recent events. In the 2014 survey, Japanese respondents also cited 'the Seoul Olympics' (67.0%) and 'the Korea-Japan World Cup' (63.0%), clearly demonstrating that the temporal focus in viewing mutual history between Korea and Japan differs.

The concentration of Korean historical interest on the colonial period leads to the result that a majority of respondents view Japan as 'militaristic' in the question about 'perceptions of Japan's social and political systems.' While Koreans evaluate Japan's democracy highly (in the 2021 survey, 67.1% were satisfied with 'Japan's democracy'), they simultaneously hold a contradictory view, associating Japan with militarism. Meanwhile, among Japanese respondents, 'nationalism' (52.3%) is the dominant response when viewing 'Korea's political and social situation.' A notable characteristic of the Japanese responses is the significant generational difference: while 'democracy' was the most frequent response among those in their 20s and 30s, 'nationalism' increased with age (2021 survey). In the 2023 survey, 'democracy' became the more frequent response when viewing Korea, indicating that Japanese public opinion reacts promptly to changes in Korea-Japan relations. In 2023, the response 'militarism' (45.4%) remained dominant among Koreans, reflecting a deep-rooted perception of historical issues, but 'capitalism' (42.1%) was a close second, suggesting the possibility of future changes in mutual perceptions.

<Table 4 Korean Responses to the Question 'What do you think is the current operational method of Japanese politics and society?' (2021 Survey, East Asia Institute)>

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<Table 5. How do you think the current Korean political and social systems are operating? (2021 Japan Major Survey Data Results, East Asia Institute)>

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<Figure 6 2023 Mutual Perception Survey (2023 EAI-Genron NPO Japan-Korea Mutual Perception Survey: Japan-Korea Relations)>

IV. Korea-Japan Relations and Historical Perception

1. The Gap Between Historical Obsession and Amnesia

The frequent recall of the Imjin War by Koreans in the history of Korea-Japan relations may be linked to the fact that Admiral Yi Sun-sin is the most respected figure in Korea (Gallup 2019). In the Gallup survey, Admiral Yi Sun-sin was the most respected figure in Korea in 2019, as he was in 2014 (King Sejong the Great was second). Admiral Chungmu Yi Sun-sin has been consistently portrayed in historical dramas, novels, and musicals centered on the Turtle Ship and naval victories, gaining sustained popularity. The commercial success of director Kim Han-min's films 'The Admiral: Roaring Currents' (2014) and 'Hansan: Rising Dragon' (2022) clearly demonstrates the public's enduring admiration for Admiral Yi Sun-sin. Dramas and films set during the Japanese colonial period, reenacting Japan's invasions and the national suffering under Japanese rule, have also been consistently produced, particularly those addressing contentious historical issues between Korea and Japan such as the comfort women issue and forced conscription. Considering only the feature films that garnered significant attention, these include 'The Age of Shadows' (2016), 'Dongju: The Portrait of a Poet' (2016), 'A Taxi Driver' (2017), 'The Battleship Island' (2017), 'Mal-Mo-E: The Secret Mission' (2019), 'A Resistance' (2019), 'The Battle: Roar to Victory' (2019), and 'Road to Boston' (2023).

In contrast, after its defeat, Japan began to erase the memory of its aggressive wars in Asia. In his book 'The Myth of August 15: The Politics of Japanese History Textbooks and Media' (2007), Sato Takumi begins by questioning 'Why is August 15th the anniversary of the end of the war?' and describes the relationship between memory, history, and media surrounding the 'end of World War II' in 1945. He argues that the Japanese Emperor's 'Gyokuon-hōsō' (Jewel Voice Broadcast) on August 15, 1945, along with newspaper reports, radio broadcasts, and history textbooks, created the so-called 'Myth of August 15th,' which posited that the end of the war was due to the Emperor's 'sacred decision.' Consequently, post-war Japanese society, while conscious of the Pacific War within the framework of 'August 15th, the end of the war,' has marginalized its perspective on its colonies. According to the Emperor's declaration of the end of the war, the war began with the attack on Pearl Harbor and was a war against the United States and European nations. From this perspective on the war, the history of aggression against Asian countries is easily overlooked.

Following the lifting of the GHQ occupation, Japanese history education in textbooks began to construct a narrative that framed Japan's series of aggressive actions in Asia as defensive wars against Western powers, thereby diluting their character as wars of aggression (Park So-young 2023). While individuals and civil society have made efforts to reflect on Japan's colonial aggression and its legacies, records of war experiences among the Japanese public in the 1960s focused on the Asia-Pacific War. In particular, post-war accounts concentrated on the suffering experienced by the Japanese populace during the war and post-war detention in Siberia, neglecting to mention the violence inflicted upon other Asian nations, thus leading to their omission from public consciousness (Igarashi Yoshikuni 2022, 290). Yoshida Yutaka (2004, 5-6) points out that while reflection on aggressive wars and colonial rule should be the starting point and foundation of post-war historical scholarship, there are very few research papers on the history of aggression against Asian countries or the war suffering endured by Asian peoples. In the unique context of Japan's post-war settlement, particularly within the international order of the Cold War, the Japanese were able to focus on high economic growth while neglecting historical perception issues. Meanwhile, amidst the transformation of post-war Japanese society's view of war, there was a shift in the ambiguous consciousness of being both a victim and perpetrator of war. Notably, from the 1980s onwards, a political and realistic view of war emerged, influenced by international relations. Consequently, while outright denial of 'aggressive war' persisted, the acknowledgment of 'aggressive acts' and pronouncements of 'reflection' increased, leading to a rapid decline in 'pro-Greater East Asia War' sentiments around the 50th anniversary of the war's end in the 1990s. However, even in NHK public opinion polls from the 1980s-90s, the response that it was an 'aggressive war' accounted for half, while 'it was an unavoidable war' also accounted for about 40%, indicating a precarious situation that persisted, suggesting a continued double standard regarding the war.

Over twenty years later, a 2015 public opinion survey on Japan's view of war (a survey conducted by Nikkei Shimbun targeting 1,584 readers on the 70th anniversary of the war's end) showed that the response 'it was an aggressive war' increased to 66%. However, simultaneously, 77% responded that the Japanese government's apologies were 'already sufficient' (<Nihon Keizai Shimbun> 2015/05/27). In the same year, a Mainichi Shimbun poll indicated that 47% of the public considered World War II a 'wrong war,' while 24% each responded it was 'unavoidable' or 'don't know.' Among those who called it a 'wrong war,' over half cited 'because it was an aggressive war (56%)' as the reason. However, a significant number also responded 'because Japan lost' (3%) or 'both reasons' (34%). This survey also revealed that 42% believed apologies for past colonial rule and aggression should be included in the Abe statement on the 70th anniversary of the war's end, compared to 15% who thought they should not be included. Nevertheless, over half of the respondents stated that apologies for damages to neighboring countries were 'already sufficient' (44%) or 'originally unnecessary' (13%), with only 31% responding that 'apologies were insufficient.' This contrasts with a 2005 Mainichi survey where 'apologies are sufficient' (36%) and 'unnecessary' (11%) were outnumbered by 'apologies were insufficient' at 42%, indicating a shift in perception (Hankyoreh 2015).

The gap between Korea's historical remembrance and Japan's amnesia, and the differing perceptions of both countries regarding war responsibility and apologies, are most starkly revealed in the divergence of views on what needs to be resolved in Korea-Japan historical issues. Although the temporal focus of knowledge and interest in history differs, the perception that historical issues are the 'fault of the other country' is common. In a 2021 survey asking what historical issues need to be resolved in Korea-Japan relations, the Korean side cited Japan's 'history textbook issue' (67.4%), the 'comfort women issue' (67.1%), 'Japan's perception of its aggressive wars' (61.4%), 'Japan's compensation for war reparations and forced labor' (54.3%), and 'Japan's lack of reflection or apology for past actions' (52.8%). The most frequent responses from the Japanese side were 'Korea's anti-Japanese education and textbook content' (56.7%), 'Koreans' excessive anti-Japanese actions regarding historical issues' (53.8%), and the 'comfort women issue' (40.0%). These findings align with the reasons cited for 'unfavorable impressions' of the other country: Koreans cited 'Japan's failure to properly reflect on its history of invading Korea,' while the Japanese cited 'Korea's continuous criticism of Japan over historical issues.'

<Table 6 Historical Issues to be Resolved in Korea-Japan Relations (Results of the East Asian Perceptions Survey of Koreans 2021.9 EAI)>

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<Table 7. Historical Issues to Resolve (Japan) (Major Survey Data Results 2021, East Asia Institute)>

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Both Korean and Japanese publics recognize the importance of Korea-Japan relations, but a prevailing sentiment is that improving relations is not easy. The background to this is the difference in solutions regarding the historical issues, which are a prerequisite for restoring relations. Koreans cite 'Japan's perception of its war of aggression, the comfort women issue, issues of compensation for forced mobilization, and insufficient reflection and apology for past wrongdoings' as the biggest problems, while Japanese cite 'Korea's anti-Japanese education and textbook content, and anti-Japanese actions' as the biggest problems. The difference in the historical trajectories of the two countries, with Korea still reflecting on the history of the Japanese colonial period, while Japan has moved towards forgetting its history of aggression in Joseon and Asia, is reflected in this survey, and it reconfirms that finding a resolution to historical issues that can satisfy both publics will be very difficult.

2. Popular Culture and Korea-Japan Relations

Korea-Japan relations are in a constant state of ongoing change. Recently, 'popular culture' has emerged as a significant keyword in surveys and analyses of mutual perceptions between Korea and Japan. Of course, since the first mutual perception survey in 2013, popular culture has been an important reason for Japan's 'favorable impression' of Korea. However, the inclusion of questions focusing on popular culture and mutual favorability is a major change in the mutual perception surveys since 2021. According to the 2021 survey, 18% of Koreans enjoy Japanese popular culture, and among them, 67% (10.4% responded 'have a good impression', 56.6% responded 'have a generally good impression') stated that it led to a favorable impression of Japan. The proportion of Japanese respondents who enjoy Korean popular culture was 34.5%, and 81.2% of them showed favorability towards Korea (25.8% responded 'have a good impression', 55.4% responded 'have a generally good impression'). In other words, it has become clear that there is a deep connection between consuming popular culture and having a favorable impression of the other country, and that the consumption of popular culture drives mutual favorability (Oh Seung-hee 2020; August 11, 2020; Son Yeol & Lee Ha-yeon, November 15, 2021).

<Table 8 Do you enjoy Korean popular culture? (Results from key Japanese survey items 2022, East Asia Institute)>

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<Figure 7. Whether Popular Culture Enhances Perception of the Other Country (2023 EAI-Genron NP0 Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey: Japan and Perceptions of Japan-Korea Relations)>

<Table 9. Whether Deterioration of Korea-Japan Relations Affects Consumption of Korean Popular Culture (Question for Respondents Enjoying Popular Culture) (Results Table of Major Questions for Japan, EAI 2022)>

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The attitude that 'even if Korea-Japan relations worsen, there is no change in enjoying popular culture' (Korea 32.4%, Japan 64.6% in 2021; Korea 35.6%, Japan 61.0% in 2022) suggests that the space for cultural consumption and communication through it will not shrink despite negative political issues. Just as the fourth Korean Wave boom occurred in 2020 amidst 'the worst Korea-Japan relations,' the opinion that Japanese consumers of the Korean Wave remain unchanged in their enjoyment of popular culture even if Korea-Japan relations deteriorate is also evident. Popular culture is the most meaningful medium for mutual and contemporary communication, and communication through popular culture and the intimacy derived from it can be predicted to become the most important asset for a friendly future between Korea and Japan. However, at the same time, this attitude can also be interpreted as an extension of the absence of historical recognition or ignorance/indifference towards Korea-Japan relations.

It is easy to assume that the younger generation, who have a high degree of mutual affinity through popular culture, would have a positive outlook on the future of Korea-Japan relations, but their answers are surprisingly otherwise. In a 2022 survey asking about the importance of Korea-Japan relations, the response 'important' was highest among those aged 60 and over, and as age decreased, the response 'I don't know' increased. For the question 'Should Korea-Japan relations be improved?', the older the age group, the more opinions there were that 'it should be improved'. Regarding 'historical issues to be resolved', the younger the respondent's age, the higher the 'I don't know' response, reaching 40% among those under 20 (Park Seung-hyun, 2022.9.14.). This is reminiscent of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's remarks that the burden of dark history cannot be placed on generations unrelated to the war. Seok Ju-hee (2020) noted the phenomenon of clear separation between popular culture, politics, economics, and historical issues among the MZ generation and pointed out that the analysis that increased cultural exchange between Korea and Japan would solidify mutual cooperation should be reconsidered. However, the power of culture alone, the contemporary space-time of communication through popular culture, is undoubtedly the greatest asset that 'neighboring countries with deep historical, geographical, and cultural ties' can share. The value of culture can be fully realized only when it is freed from the shackles of Korea-Japan relations, which are politically and historically entangled.

V. Conclusion

This study analyzed the differences and implications in mutual perceptions, historical perceptions, and solutions to historical issues between Korea and Japan, based on the "Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey" conducted by the East Asia Institute and NPO GERON (言論) since 2013. From the initial perception surveys, the Japanese consistently cited 'Korean popular culture,' 'food culture, and shopping' as the main reasons for their positive impressions of Korea. While the majority of Koreans judged Korea to be 'equal' to Japan economically, they consistently cited 'advanced country with a high standard of living' as a reason for their 'good impression' of Japan, while simultaneously evaluating the Japanese people's character as 'kind and diligent' positively. Similar to the high Japanese response that 'consumption of popular culture is not affected by Korea-Japan relations,' the evaluation of the Korean people's character by Koreans was notably unaffected by Korea-Japan relations.

Historical issues overwhelmingly influence the 'bad impressions' of both Korea and Japan. Both nations' populations cite historical issues as the biggest variable in the development of Korea-Japan relations. Korea points to Japan's lack of reflection on its war of aggression, the Dokdo issue, forced labor, and comfort women issues, while Japan primarily raises Korean anti-Japanese sentiment and actions. When Koreans think of Japan, historical issues are so overwhelming that 'bad impressions of Japan' and 'what comes to mind when thinking of Japan' are inseparable and identical. In contrast, even when anti-Korean sentiment was high and the Hallyu boom cooled, Japanese respondents showed a high level of favorability towards Korean culture. Historical knowledge of the other country also differs: Korea traces its history back to the 'Imjin War' and 'colonial rule,' while Japanese historical knowledge focuses on recent issues such as Korean presidential elections. Due to these differences in historical perception, Korea perceives Japan as 'militaristic,' and Japan perceives Korea as 'nationalistic.' In particular, the contrasting responses between Korea and Japan regarding 'what needs to be resolved in Korea-Japan historical issues' most clearly reveal the difference in the trajectories of the two countries: post-liberation Korea, which has dwelled on and reflected upon the history of national suffering, and postwar Japan, which has moved towards forgetting the history of its invasion of Korea and Asia. As seen in the 2023 mutual perception survey results, while the atmosphere of improving bilateral relations, such as the restoration of shuttle diplomacy between the leaders of Korea and Japan, has led to an increase in Japanese people who are favorable towards Korea, the favorability of Koreans towards Japan has actually decreased (Son Yeol, Kim Yang-gyu, Park Han-soo, 2023). While Japan's impression of Korea improves when bilateral relations improve, Korea's improved relations do not lead to an improved impression of Japan, indicating the 'deep-rootedness' of the Korean side's historical perception.

The perception survey also highlights the importance of the media in Korea-Japan relations. Critical research on Korea-Japan relations and the media has been conducted, including the argument that negative images of the other country held by the people of both nations are significantly shaped by information led by mass media (Cho Kyu-cheol, 2003), criticism that media reports reproduce negative stereotypes of the other country (Lee Chang-hyun, 2007), and criticism of the partisan reporting practices of media that exploit Korea-Japan conflicts for political interests (Park Young-heum & Jeong Je-hyuk, 2020). The results of the mutual perception survey are consistent with this. When asked about the channels through which they obtain information about the other country or Korea-Japan relations, both Korean and Japanese respondents cited 'their own country's media outlets.'[3]In the 2014 survey, over 60% of respondents in both Korea and Japan agreed that 'media reports have a very significant influence on the national sentiment between Korea and Japan,' and when 'somewhat influential' responses were included, this figure reached 80-90%. Despite this, the level of trust in the fairness of their own media's reporting on Korea-Japan relations is low, with the proportion of respondents who believe that 'the media does not provide objective and fair reporting on Korea-Japan relations' consistently being higher. In 2021, Korean respondents evaluated media outlets as being swayed by political situations or stances (62.3%), stimulating anti-Japanese sentiment based on sensationalism (20.7%), and lacking expertise on Japan (12.2%). Further detailed discussion on public evaluation of media reporting on Korea-Japan relations will be necessary.

In opinion polls conducted in the 1980s-90s, memories of past national suffering were vaguely expressed, such as '36 years of suffering,' but since the 2000s, historical issues requiring Japan's 'apology and reflection,' such as the 'comfort women issue,' 'forced labor issue,' and 'Dokdo issue,' have become specific. Furthermore, the past decade during which the mutual perception survey has been conducted has been a period when the differences in positions between Korea and Japan surrounding these issues have surfaced and conflicts have intensified. Therefore, this period can be seen not as a 'lost decade' of 'worst Korea-Japan relations,' but as an unavoidable period of painful adjustment in confronting the entangled past history between Korea and Japan and seeking compromise solutions. Korea-Japan relations are often summarized by the phrase 'facing the past and aiming for the future.' Therefore, we hope that research analyzing the differences in mutual perceptions, the gaps in historical perceptions, and their historical contexts can contribute to promoting mutual understanding between Korea and Japan and to the future of Korea-Japan relations. We also hope that the results of this work can lead to efforts to re-evaluate and publicize the historical agreements and achievements that Korea and Japan have made together. ■

[1]The item 'equal' was added in 2021 when the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) unanimously decided, with all 195 member states agreeing, to change Korea's status from a developing country to a 'developed country.' Korea is the only country to have transitioned from a developing to a developed country since the establishment of UNCTAD in 1964, and is now officially classified among the 32 countries in the UN's developed country group, which includes the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France.

[2]Through the National Character National Survey (conducted every five years since 1953) by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics and the Consciousness Structure Survey (conducted every five years since 1975) by NHK, it is interesting to note that Japanese people themselves perceive diligence, perseverance, politeness, and kindness as the most prominent characteristics of Japanese people. These characteristics are similar to those perceived by Koreans as Japanese traits, and these responses have remained largely unchanged from the late 1950s to the present. Lee Yi-beom highlights through these survey results that the characteristics and tendencies of Japanese people, as argued in 'Nihonjinron' and 'Nihon Shakai Ron,' generally align, and that these have persisted for the past 40 years despite significant changes in the Japanese way of life and social environment.

[3]Among the media used by those who cited 'domestic media,' television accounted for the largest proportion, followed by mobile devices and computers. There are significant generational differences in the media used. In the 2021 Korean results, television accounted for 95.3% among those aged 60 and over, while among those aged 18-29, television accounted for only 30%, with computers at 36.9% and mobile devices at 33.1%, reflecting the generational differences in commonly used media.

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■Park Seung-hyunis a professor in the Department of Japanese Language and Japanese Literature at Keimyung University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Oh Jun-cheol_EAI Research Assistant

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | jcoh@eai.or.kr