[Public Opinion on Korea-Japan Relations Series] ② Changes in Perceptions of Korea-Japan Economic Relations and Economic Cooperation

I. Introduction

Korea-Japan relations are generally analyzed as having shifted from a 'vertically asymmetrical relationship' to a 'horizontally symmetrical relationship' (Tadashi Kimiya, 2022). The most visible area demonstrating the change from 'vertical' to 'horizontal' and from 'asymmetrical' to 'symmetrical' is likely the economic relationship between the two countries. Since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965, capital and technology from Japan were crucial factors in Korea's economic growth (Kim Do-hyeong, 2015). Amidst this, a high valuation of economic cooperation with Japan has been sustained within Korea for a long time. However, as competition among companies from both countries in the global market has intensified and the proportion of economic relations with the other country in their respective economies has shrunk, the visibility of Korea-Japan economic relations has continuously declined (Satoru Okuda, 2015). Consequently, questions have been raised about the necessity of Korea-Japan economic cooperation. Amidst arguments that Japan is no longer a role model for Korea's advanced development and that practical economic cooperation with Japan offers little strategic benefit to Korea, the current significance of Korea-Japan economic cooperation is frequently questioned (Lee Myung-chan, 2023).

Nevertheless, even amidst diplomatic conflicts centered on historical perception issues between the governments of Korea and Japan, the policy discourse advocating for continued economic cooperation on a separate track has persisted. The so-called 'future-oriented' approach to improving Korea-Japan relations, which aims to overcome bilateral conflicts over historical perception issues not through finding solutions to those issues but through cooperation in other areas, has been a long-standing rhetoric, and economic cooperation has always been the most important area for improving 'future-oriented' Korea-Japan relations. Examples include the cooperative approach to Japan diplomacy during the Second Republic, the Park Chung-hee administration's handling of Korea-Japan relations through economic cooperation, and the Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration. In these instances, economic cooperation has maintained a significant position in Japan policy, driving 'future-oriented' improvements in bilateral relations. The 'future-oriented' approach to improving Korea-Japan relations has re-emerged during the process of rapidly mending bilateral diplomatic conflicts between the current Yoon Suk-yeol administration and the Kishida Fumio administration over the past six months, with economic cooperation between the two countries being presented as an important methodology for improving 'future-oriented' bilateral relations (Office of the President, 2023).

Of course, the specific content of economic cooperation mentioned in the context of 'future-oriented' Korea-Japan relations, which frequently appears in the history of bilateral relations, varies by era. Notably, at the recent Korea-Japan summit, economic cooperation for improving 'future-oriented' relations is focused on economic security cooperation. Although the specific content differs by era, economic cooperation for improving 'future-oriented' Korea-Japan relations is a kind of 'holy grail' in Japan policy.

How, then, does Korean society understand the consistent emphasis placed on economic cooperation by policymakers in both countries? The fact that the discourse on economic cooperation is consistently raised by policymakers, despite the superficial decline in the importance of bilateral economic relations, presupposes an active acceptance or, at the very least, a non-rejection of the necessity of economic cooperation by Korean society. In the past, when Korea-Japan economic relations were vertical and asymmetrical, economic cooperation was indispensable. However, changes in bilateral economic relations have relativized the importance of such cooperation. Nevertheless, the continued policy stance emphasizing Korea-Japan economic cooperation leads us to predict a sustained perception of cooperation in the economic sphere within Korean society. This is because, compared to historical perception issues and security cooperation matters, economic cooperation issues are not emotionally charged in bilateral relations for either society, thus naturally leading to a consensus of justification from society.

However, in situations where Korea-Japan economic cooperation experiences fluctuations due to its close connection with conflicts in other areas, such as the successive termination of the Korea-Japan currency swap agreements after 2012 or Japan's export control measures against Korea in 2019, it is difficult to assume that the general public's perception of bilateral economic relations and cooperation remains fixed in a stance of unquestioning acceptance. The complexification of conflicts, linked with economic relations in other areas, has been the fundamental characteristic of recent Korea-Japan tensions (Nam Ki-jeong, 2021). In this context, Korea-Japan economic cooperation may become an undesirable subject, linked with other conflict issues. In other words, as the long-standing principle of separating politics from economics in Korea-Japan relations is damaged, the nature of public perception regarding economic cooperation may have shifted.

The core objective of this study is to verify the possibility that Korean society's perception of Korea-Japan economic cooperation has shifted from its previous unquestioning acceptance amidst the complexification of bilateral conflicts. This study attempts to analyze the changes in the perception of Korean citizens regarding Korea-Japan economic relations and economic cooperation, and the factors driving those changes, based on ten years of survey results (2013-2022) from the "Korea-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey" conducted jointly by the East Asia Institute and the Genron NPO in Japan. Through this, we aim to examine the nature and understanding of the policy discourse on Korea-Japan economic cooperation, which has been revived amidst the recent rapid improvement in bilateral relations driven by policy initiatives without sufficient social consensus.

II. Changes in Perceptions of the Importance of Korea-Japan Economic Cooperation

The "Korea-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey" directly asked about the importance/necessity of Korea-Japan economic cooperation only for the three years from 2019 to 2021. The basic attitude of Korean citizens towards the necessity of economic cooperation shows a response rate of around 80% (<Figure 1>). However, this high response rate for necessity is directly linked to the perception of the importance of Korea-Japan relations, rather than being differentiated for economic cooperation. The question of whether Korea-Japan relations are important to Korea, consistently asked since 2018, has always received an affirmative response of around 80% importance (<Figure 2>). The favorable attitude of Korean citizens towards Korea-Japan economic cooperation is not necessarily based on a specific need for economic cooperation but is also aligned with the perspective that Korea-Japan relations themselves are important from a policy standpoint. Compared to the fact that the proportion of favorable impressions of Japan during the same period remained within a maximum of 30%, with 50% to 70% of respondents holding unfavorable impressions, this indicates a broad public consensus on the principle of Korea-Japan cooperation, separate from perceptions of Japan related to current issues at the time of the survey.

The unquestioning attitude of Korean citizens regarding the necessity of Korea-Japan cooperation itself is also evident in the fact that the response rate regarding the importance of Korea-Japan relations has not significantly changed even after Japan's export control measures in 2019. While the evaluation of impressions of Japan has shown significant fluctuations since Japan's export control measures in 2019, the response rate regarding the importance of Korea-Japan relations has remained largely unchanged (<Figure 2>).

Amidst the high perception of the necessity of cooperation in Korea-Japan relations, a considerable proportion identifies economic factors as the reason for the importance of relations with Japan. When the reasons for the importance of Korea-Japan relations are broadly categorized into economic, cultural/geographical, and value/security factors, the proportion citing economic factors (important trading partner, economic and industrial interdependence) is similar to the proportion citing geographical proximity and cultural similarity (<Figure 3>). The consideration of economic relations as a reason for the importance of Korea-Japan relations can be seen as a sustained perception within Korean society.

This perception is also evident in the evaluation of impressions of Japan. While favorable impressions of Japan have consistently been lower than unfavorable impressions over the past decade, economic-related items (high standard of living, good quality of Japanese products) are, along with cultural items (national character, popular culture, traditional culture), the two main pillars of positive perception towards Japan among those who choose economic reasons for their favorable impression (<Figure 5>).

However, in the last two to three years, the proportion of respondents citing economic factors as the reason for the importance of Korea-Japan relations, and the proportion citing economic factors as the reason for favorable impressions of Japan, have both slightly decreased. What is noteworthy is the significant increase in the proportion of respondents citing value and security factors (shared values of liberal democracy, security cooperation with the US, etc.) as reasons for the importance of Korea-Japan relations and favorable impressions of Japan (<Figures 3> and <Figure 5>). The increase in the proportion of responses citing value and security factors, which were not considered important in the past as reasons for unquestioning Korea-Japan cooperation, appears to reflect the influence of the current administration's foreign policy. In this context, when the proportion of respondents citing economic factors as the reason for the importance of Korea-Japan relations is classified by ideological orientation, it can be inferred why the proportion of liberal respondents in 2023 is higher than that of conservative respondents. As conservative respondents increasingly adopt value and security factors, the proportion citing economic factors as the reason for the importance of Korea-Japan relations appears to have somewhat decreased among them. Conversely, economic factors are consistently maintained at a high level as reasons for the importance of Korea-Japan relations among liberal respondents, who show less preference for value and security factors that are highly linked to the current administration's foreign and security policy stance (<Figure 4>).

The recent trend, which shows some differentiation by ideological orientation, is also observed in the responses to the question about the necessity of economic cooperation. Separate from the question allowing choices among economic, cultural/geographical, and value/security factors, the change in responses by ideological orientation to the question of whether economic cooperation is necessary shows a tendency for liberals to prefer economic cooperation to decrease after Japan's export control measures (<Figure 1>). Of course, more than three-quarters of liberal respondents continue to express agreement with the principle that economic cooperation is necessary, but a discrepancy is observed compared to conservative respondents. However, this is unlikely to be a difference in perception of the prospects for 'economic' cooperation. It indicates that the politicization of Japan policy, which is increasingly influenced by partisan perceptions, is manifesting as differentiated attitudes towards cooperation with Japan by ideological orientation among the public.

Of course, the ideological differences regarding the principle of necessity for Korea-Japan economic cooperation are not as pronounced as in the evaluation of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's Japan policy. Overall, the perspective that views Korea-Japan relations as important is not subject to significant fluctuations in its underlying basis of viewing economic interdependence and trade relations with Japan. From the pragmatic standpoint that Korea-Japan relations are important regardless of whether one likes or dislikes Japan, the economic interconnectedness between the two countries is consistently considered a factor in the necessity of cooperation. Of course, as will be discussed later, the perception of the nature of the relationship between the Korean and Japanese economies, or Japan's importance to the Korean economy, does not suggest that Japan is existentially critical to the Korean economy. However, the perspective of recognizing economic factors as important for Korea-Japan cooperation provides a background that enables policymakers to emphasize economic cooperation between Korea and Japan. And the perception of cooperative preference, which supports the policy authorities' pursuit of Korea-Japan economic cooperation as an important policy agenda, shows potential for partisan influence but remains robust.

<Figure 1> Changes in Perception of the Importance of Korea-Japan Economic Cooperation (Overall, by Ideological Orientation, 2019-2021)

<Figure 2> Perception of the Importance of Korea-Japan Relations and Evaluation of Impressions of Japan (2018-2023)

<Figure 3> Reasons for the Importance of Korea-Japan Relations (2018-2023)

<Figure 4> Proportion Citing Economic Factors as Reasons for the Importance of Korea-Japan Relations (By Ideological Orientation, 2018-2023)

<Figure 5> Reasons for Favorable Impressions of Japan (1st Priority, 2014-2023)

III. Changes in Perceptions of the Nature of Korea-Japan Economic Relations

1. Perception of Japan's Status in the Korean Economy

The unquestioning perception of the necessity of Korea-Japan economic cooperation is not based on the perception that Japan has a significant impact on the Korean economy. The perception of Japan's influence on the Korean economy is intertwined with the decline in Japan's relative importance in Korea's overall trade structure, amidst Korea's economic growth and the expansion of trade relations with China.

The "Korea-Japan National Mutual Perception Survey" has consistently asked since 2016 about which countries are economically important to Korea. In this question, which allows for multiple responses, China and the United States consistently receive overwhelming support, with approximately 80% of respondents choosing them. In contrast, Japan receives a response rate of approximately 35-50% as being important to the Korean economy (<Figure 6>). While a response rate of around 40% indicating Japan's importance to the Korean economy is not necessarily low, Japan's importance is perceived as higher than that of other countries and regions, excluding the US and China.

The difference in the perception of the economic importance of China and Japan within Korean society reflects the current state of Korea's trade structure. As can be seen in <Figure 9>, Japan was a key country for both exports and imports in Korea until the 1980s. However, since the 1990s, China has established itself as Korea's primary trading partner, and as shown in <Figure 8>, trade volume with China has surpassed that with Japan since the 2000s, with a significant gap. This can be seen as a reflection in public opinion surveys of China's status in Korea's trade structure and industrial production network. Compared to the actual changes in trade relations shown in <Figure 9>, the response rate of around 40% indicating Japan's importance to the Korean economy is not low. It can be interpreted as a residual memory of the long history of economic relations with Japan, separate from trade volume. However, as will be discussed later, it is difficult to see this as reflecting the deepened interdependence within the global value chain between companies of both countries, which does not appear in bilateral trade figures.

Even after Japan's export control measures, the perception of Japan's economic importance to Korea has remained largely unchanged. Of course, as shown in <Figure 7>, perceptions of Japan's economic importance are differentiated by ideological orientation. Among liberal respondents, the response rate indicating Japan's economic importance to Korea has declined, widening the gap with the response rate of conservative respondents. However, this gap is not directly linked to perceptions of Japan's economic importance. It is interpreted as reflecting partisan perceptions of approval or disapproval of the government's overall Japan policy, as Japan policy has become politicized.

The characteristic aspect of the responses regarding important countries in economic relations with Korea is not the trend change in the response rate for Japan, but the trend change in the response rate for China. In the mid-to-late 2010s, China's response rate was higher than that of the United States when asked about economically important countries. However, recent evaluations of China's economic importance have shown rapid changes, and these changes are consistently observed regardless of ideological orientation (<Figures 6> and <Figure 7>). This can be seen as a preemptive reflection of concerns about the vulnerability caused by deep economic interdependence with China amidst the US-China competition. This suggests that if China's economic slowdown continues and Japan's economy remains relatively robust, Japan's perceived economic importance may increase further in the future.

<Figure 6> Important Countries in Economic Relations with Korea (China, Japan) (Multiple Responses, 2016-2023)

<Figure 7> Important Countries in Economic Relations with Korea (China, Japan) (By Ideological Orientation, Multiple Responses, 2016-2023)

<Figure 8> Comparison of Trends in Trade Volume with China and Japan (1970-2022)

<Figure 9> Trends in the Proportion of Korea's Exports and Imports by Country/Region (1962-2018)

2. Perception of Parity between the Korean and Japanese Economies

A key indicator symbolizing the shift towards a horizontal nature in Korea-Japan relations is the trend in per capita GDP shown in <Figure 10> and <Figure 11>. Per capita GDP became similar around 2020, and according to IMF data, a reversal in per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity occurred in the late 2010s. The perception that Korea has caught up with Japan in economic power, alongside military strength and soft power, is recognized within Japan, and diverse reactions to this are also observed in Japan (Tadashi Kimiya, 2022; Lee Myung-chan, 2023).

Questions about the parity between Korea and Japan were posed in the "Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey" in 2021 and 2022. In response, around 45% in 2021 indicated that Korea and Japan had already become equivalent relations, while another 45% responded that they were moving towards parity. The response rates in 2022 showed little change, with the combined proportion of those who answered 'already equivalent' and 'moving towards equivalence' being around 90%. Furthermore, ideological orientation did not show differentiation in the responses regarding parity.

There is a strong expectation that the perception of parity will continue in conjunction with the overall shift in the nature of Korea-Japan relations towards a horizontal relationship. Recent commentaries on the Japanese economy and Korea-Japan relations emphasize the future challenges for Korea to further develop a horizontal relationship with Japan (Lee Chang-min, 2022a; Kim Hyun-cheol, 2023). As shown in <Figure 13>, the equalization of Korea-Japan economic relations over the past 30 years has been driven primarily by Korea's growth as well as Japan's long-term stagnation. However, as of 2023, Korea's economic growth prospects have become as sluggish as Japan's. If Korea cannot escape this situation, the horizontal relationship between Korea and Japan may not be sustainable. If the Korean economy becomes structurally low-growth, the perception of parity between Korea and Japan may also shrink again. While "Peak Japan" by Jesper Koll has been widely cited as a metaphor for Japan's declining future, regardless of its content, the current situation is one where "Peak Korea" is a concern, and Korea may fall into "Japanification." "Japanification" is recently often mentioned in the context of China's long-term stagnation, and Korea faces the same concern. The question of whether China can cope with the "Japanification" that Japan endured for 30 years can be directly applied to Korea. And if Korea does not find a path different from Japan's in response to that question, the perception of equal Korea-Japan relations may not last long.

<Figure 10> Trend of Per Capita GDP in Korea and Japan (1980-2022)

<Figure 11> Trend of Per Capita GDP Adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity in Korea and Japan (1980-2022)

<Figure 12> Perception of Equivalent Korea-Japan Relations (Overall, By Ideological Orientation, 2021-2022)

<Figure 13> Trend of Real GDP Growth Rate in Korea and Japan (1991-2023, 2023 figures are IMF estimates)

3. Perception of the Nature of Korea-Japan Industrial Networks

Since the early stages of the "Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey," questions have been consistently asked about whether the economic and industrial relations between Korea and Japan are complementary or competitive. However, the nature of complementarity and competition is difficult for the general public to grasp. The high rate of 'don't know' responses for this item, compared to other questions, indicates that understanding the industrial relations between Korea and Japan, which are the subject of the questions, is not easy. Perceptions of complementarity and competition do not appear to reflect the actual economic relations between Korea and Japan. Rather, responses regarding whether economic relations are competitive or complementary are likely to be strongly linked to perceptions of whether Korea-Japan relations are conflictual or cooperative. This can explain the clear increase in the perception of competition in the 2020 survey after Japan's export controls (<Figure 14>).

Furthermore, the widening gap in perceptions of complementarity and competition in Korea-Japan industrial relations by ideological orientation since 2020 can be understood in a similar context. While liberal respondents in the 2010s showed a more active perception of industrial complementarity with Japan compared to conservative respondents, after the 2019 export controls, the view of Korea-Japan industrial relations as competitive has significantly strengthened. This trend shows a marked difference compared to conservative and moderate respondents (<Figure 15>). Given that Japan's export controls were measures that could significantly impact the production of Korean industrial sectors, the emotional backlash to this resulted in responses interpreting Korea-Japan industrial relations as competitive, and such responses were more prevalent among liberal respondents.

The nature of competition and complementarity in Korea-Japan industrial relations is largely invisible due to the development of global production networks, making it difficult for the public to perceive. China's economic growth since the 1990s (especially strengthened in the 2000s) can be understood within the context of the intensification of global value chains, and companies in Korea and Japan have built close interrelationships within these global value chains. This has created limitations in understanding Korea-Japan industrial relations solely through bilateral trade and investment relations. In various sectors, companies from both Korea and Japan have shown a competitive dynamic on the world stage. However, the trade and production relations between the two countries cannot be simply simplified to a competitive relationship within the globalization of production. Within the development of global value chains, the trade and production relations between Korea and Japan have progressed on a global scale, extending beyond bilateral ties (Yeo In-man, 2019).

The notable aspect in the trend of Korea-Japan trade relations shown in <Figure 16> is the decrease in exports to and imports from Japan in the 2010s. This does not mean that industrial relations between Korea and Japan have weakened. It is related to the departure of the Korea-Japan industrial network from bilateral trade, linked to Korea's active promotion of the materials and components industry, Japanese corporate investment in Korea, and Korean companies' expansion into ASEAN (Lee Chang-min, 2022b). The establishment of global supply chains, developed in conjunction with China's growth, has made the complementarity of the Korea-Japan industrial network less visible, but its importance cannot be judged to have diminished. Although this is not clearly evident at the current juncture of seeking global supply chain reorganization linked to US-China competition, it suggests the need for policy efforts to effectively leverage the strengths of the complementary Korea-Japan industrial network.

<Figure 14> Perception of Complementarity and Competition in Korea-Japan Industrial Relations (2014-2023)

<Figure 15> Difference between Complementarity and Competition Response Rates by Ideological Orientation (2014-2023)

<Figure 16> Trends in Korea's Exports to, Imports from, and Trade Balance with Japan (1965-2022)

IV. Changes in Perceptions of Solutions to Export Controls and Attitudes Toward Economic Security

The Japanese government's export control measures against Korea in 2019 led to critical perceptions of Japan within Korean society, and a high level of conflict unfolded between the two countries. Japan's export control measures involved the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's revision of subordinate regulations under the Export Trade Control Order in July 2019, which converted the existing general export license (valid for three years) to an individual export license for three items: fluorinated polyimide, resist (photosensitive material), and etching gas (high-purity hydrogen fluoride). In August, the ministry revised the Export Trade Control Order to exclude Korea from the whitelist. Exclusion from the whitelist requires individual screening for imports from Japan. Japan's export controls, under the pretext of security needs, aimed to increase transaction costs for Korean companies' production activities and thereby induce a policy shift from the Korean government regarding the follow-up measures for compensation for forced labor victims. Given that Japan's export controls were intended to induce a policy shift from the Korean government on historical perception issues, rather than for superficial security reasons, the Korean government and society showed a very strong response.

Following Japan's export control measures, negative responses toward Japan significantly increased in all issues, including impressions of Japan, in the "Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey." The perception of the unfairness of Japan's export control measures was widespread in Korea, and the recognition that countermeasures should be actively taken, even if they intensified bilateral conflict, was broad within Korean society. For three consecutive years, from 2020 to 2022, when the export control measures were still unresolved, the question of whether to support active countermeasures that would reduce bilateral trade volume received a significantly higher affirmative response than a negative response across all ideological groups (liberal, moderate, conservative) (<Figure 17>). Korean society held a clear policy preference for a strong stance against Japan's export controls.

Of course, there are slight differences in the preference ratios for and against countermeasures depending on ideological orientation. Liberal respondents show a higher preference for countermeasures than conservative respondents. The proportion of those with a less active stance on countermeasures is also higher among conservative respondents than liberal respondents throughout the three years. However, the reduction in support for active countermeasures over the three years is more striking than the differences in ideological orientation. As time passed, the perspective that solutions should be sought increased, and consequently, the proportion of support for countermeasures decreased. Compared to 2020, the preference for active response to the Korea-Japan economic conflict caused by export control measures decreased in 2021 and 2022.

Japan's export control measures against Korea can be understood within the context of global economic securitization. As the weaponization of the economy becomes a global trend amidst US-China competition, Japan's export control measures also served as a beta test for Japan's economic security strategy. Japan's economic security policy has the character of responding to the securitization of the economy, overlapping with US-China strategic competition. While not taking action before the United States, Japan's economic security policy focuses on securing strategic autonomy and strategic indispensability with China in mind. Reducing supply chain dependence on China and securing competitiveness in advanced technologies are the core elements of Japan's economic security policy, and in this process, selective international cooperation plans are established, seeking cooperation with countries like the United States (Park Sung-bin, 2022; Lee Jeong-hwan, 2022).

The survey questions from last year and this year in the "Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey" include items on perceptions of economic restrictions imposed by the United States and Japan on China, i.e., responses to economic security policies. As shown in <Figure 18>, Korean society generally has a large proportion of affirmative responses to accepting the US's economic restrictions on China. This has the same implication as the declining perspective on the importance of economic relations with China found in <Figure 7>. This result suggests that the current administration's US-centric policy of containing China could gain considerable traction within Korean society, transcending ideological orientations, if a certain degree of speed and adjustment is applied. Korea's attitude towards economic restrictions on China is consistent with the current administration's emphasis on economic security cooperation in Korea-Japan and Korea-US-Japan relations.

However, what is observed when comparing the 2022 and 2023 results in <Figure 18> is a significant decrease in the aggressive stance towards China in just one year. In 2023, as the pace of US-China competition has moderated, the US, Japan, and others are also pursuing improved relations with China. This short-term international political dynamic is understood to be reflected in domestic public opinion surveys in Korea.

However, economic security policy clearly has an industrial policy aspect, encompassing not only supply chain stabilization but also securing and maintaining technological competitiveness in future advanced industries. The nature of Korea's relationship with the US, Japan, China, and others in the competition to secure technological competitiveness can differ by industry sector. It is difficult to ascertain whether the opacity regarding whether economic restrictions on China align with Korea's industrial policy interests in the public perception leads to a more reserved attitude. However, depending on the pace and extent of US-China strategic competition, attitudes within Korean society towards economic relations with China and economic cooperation with Japan will inevitably remain variable.

<Figure 17> Support for and Opposition to Active Response to Export Control Measures (2020-2022)

<Figure 18> Support for and Opposition to US Economic Restrictions on China (2022-2023)

V. Japan's Perception of Korea-Japan Economic Relations and Economic Cooperation

Despite tendencies toward partisan division, Korean society generally holds a positive view of Korea-Japan economic relations and economic cooperation. As shown in Figure 20, economic items are highly frequently selected as reasons why the other country is important to one's own country (responses up to second priority). However, as seen in Figure 19, Japanese society perceives Korea's importance to Japan less than Korean society perceives Japan's importance to Korea. While the perception of Korea-Japan relations' importance in Japan has increased amid the improvement of Korea-Japan relations in 2022 and 2023, the proportion of respondents citing economic relations as a reason for the importance of Korea-Japan relations remained at about half that of Korean respondents in both 2022 and 2023. In the question asking respondents to name multiple countries that are economically important to their own country, the proportion of respondents in Japan who consider Korea important is low compared to the proportion of respondents in Korea who consider Japan important (see Figure 21). The difference in positive responses between Korea and Japan regarding the necessity of Korea-Japan economic cooperation, surveyed over the three years from 2019 to 2022, shows a similar pattern (see Figure 22).

The difference in perceptions of Korea-Japan economic relations and economic cooperation between the two countries raises questions about whether conflicts in other areas—primarily historical and territorial issues—are absent and whether Korea-Japan economic cooperation can proceed smoothly. Of course, in the field of economic and industrial policy related to Korea-Japan economic cooperation, it is difficult to consider public opinion a strong determinant of policy direction due to the nature of the policy domain. However, Korea-Japan economic relations themselves have, as mentioned earlier, become somewhat invisible. From the perspective of Japanese society, the perception that economic cooperation with Korea is actively important for Japan is not strong. This contrasts with the perception in Korean society that Korea-Japan economic cooperation is fundamentally necessary, suggesting that Japan's immediate interests in Korea-Japan economic cooperation are not being readily associated. Interpreting this more actively, it implies that Korea-Japan economic cooperation has a strong character as a Korean policy agenda.

Figure 19. Comparison of Korea and Japan on responses indicating the other country is important to one's own country (2019-2023)

Figure 20. Proportion citing economy as a reason for the other country's importance (multiple responses) (2021-2023)

Figure 21. Proportion responding that the other country is important for economic relations (2018-2023)

Figure 22. Proportion responding that Korea-Japan economic cooperation is important (2019-2022)

VI. Conclusion

The perception of Korea-Japan economic relations and economic cooperation in Korean society is not central to attitudes toward Japan. Within the fluctuations of responses influenced by the amplitude of conflicts over historical perception and related intergovernmental disputes that largely define overall Korea-Japan relations, the perception of Korea-Japan economic relations and economic cooperation is largely based on a sense of necessity. However, this sense of necessity lacks passionate engagement. This implies that Korea-Japan economic cooperation does not have enough influence to fundamentally drive the improvement of Korea-Japan relations. Nevertheless, Korea-Japan economic relations and economic cooperation, which are considered important but lack serious and active engagement regarding their importance, may have reached a very high level of development and become invisible in themselves.

Meanwhile, recently, differences in responses regarding Korea-Japan economic relations and economic cooperation have been increasing according to ideological orientation. The ideological differences in responses concerning Korea-Japan relations in the economic sphere are a phenomenon that has emerged as domestic partisanship has intensified in Korea's policy toward Japan. This phenomenon is unlikely to be confined to the economic sphere. However, if it fails to move beyond the politicization of policy toward Japan, the foundation for societal consensus on the necessity of specific details for a 'future-oriented' Korea-Japan relationship, represented by the economic sphere, may continue to weaken. ■

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■ Lee Jeong-hwanis a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.

■ Editor: Oh Joon-chul_EAI Research Assistant

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | jcoh@eai.or.kr