[East Asia Institute Series on Future Vision of Korea-Japan Cooperation] XI. Changes in Mutual Perceptions between South Korea and China and Implications for Korea-Japan Relations

I. Introduction

Despite the efforts by both the South Korean and Chinese governments to restore relations following the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) conflict, mutual perceptions among their citizens have not recovered and have instead worsened. Given that the South Korea-China relationship involves the most diverse and frequent exchanges of people and goods globally, negative perceptions can mutually influence each other, creating a high potential for complex and unpredictable conflicts and clashes. Thirty years after establishing diplomatic ties, the South Korea-China relationship stands at a critical juncture, weakened by external variables such as the escalating strategic competition between the U.S. and China, global economic recession and supply chain instability, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the advancement of North Korea's nuclear program. The relationship faces a weakening of existing cooperative frameworks and an inability to secure new drivers for cooperation. In this context, if negative mutual sentiments between the two countries become prolonged and structural, there is a possibility that the South Korea-China relationship could deteriorate into one of chronic conflict, even weakening the impetus for its development.

Around 2015, the South Korea-China relationship was evaluated as being at its 'best ever.' At that time, both countries experienced heightened anti-Japan sentiment and strained relations with Japan. China was actively seeking to develop relations with South Korea as a countermeasure to the strengthening U.S.-Japan alliance. However, recently, negative sentiment between South Korea and China has surpassed that between South Korea and Japan. In this situation, Japan's Kishida administration perceives China as the greatest security challenge and is actively participating in the U.S.'s containment of China. Similarly, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, amidst escalating U.S.-China strategic competition, is prioritizing strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance, improving South Korea-Japan relations, and enhancing security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan.

A new dynamic is unfolding in the trilateral relations among South Korea, China, and Japan. Amidst rising anti-China sentiment among the publics of South Korea and Japan, concerns and vigilance from both governments regarding China's assertive actions are also increasing. Just as anti-Japan sentiment in both countries indirectly influenced the development of South Korea-China relations around 2015, it is noteworthy to observe what variable the heightened anti-China sentiment in South Korea and Japan will become for the development of South Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, this paper will primarily analyze the characteristics and implications for South Korea-China relations by examining the mutual perceptions between South Korea and China from various angles based on recent public opinion surveys. Subsequently, it will attempt a preliminary analysis of how changes in mutual perceptions and relations between South Korea and China will impact South Korea-Japan relations and security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan.

II. Changes and Characteristics of Mutual Perceptions between South Korean and Chinese Citizens

1. Changes and Characteristics of South Korea's Perceptions of China

Over the past 30 years since establishing diplomatic ties, the South Korea-China relationship has achieved remarkable quantitative development, primarily through economic cooperation and cultural exchange. According to data from China's Ministry of Commerce, bilateral trade volume increased 57-fold from $6.3 billion in 1992, the year diplomatic relations were established, to $362.35 billion in 2021 (including Hong Kong and Macau). During these 30 years, people-to-people exchanges between the two countries surged approximately 80-fold from 130,000 annually at the time of establishing diplomatic ties to 10.37 million by the end of 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic. Before the pandemic, approximately 1,023 flights operated weekly between the two countries.

However, while cooperation and exchange between South Korea and China have rapidly increased since establishing diplomatic ties, mutual perceptions between their citizens have actually deteriorated. While perceptions of China are generally worsening worldwide, particularly among Western developed nations, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and escalating U.S.-China strategic competition, the mutual perceptions between South Korea and China, especially the negative perceptions of South Koreans towards China, are not only severe but also exhibit unique characteristics compared to other countries.

First, South Korean perceptions of China sharply deteriorated following the THAAD conflict in 2016. China's excessive retaliatory measures against the THAAD deployment were a particularly shocking event that clearly manifested anti-China sentiment among the South Korean public. Public opinion and sentiment can be fluid depending on specific issues and situations. However, a more detailed analysis is needed to determine whether South Korean perceptions of China suddenly worsened due to the THAAD conflict and whether anti-China sentiment could recover if the conflict were resolved.

Looking at the trend of public opinion, perceptions of China among South Koreans have been gradually and continuously deteriorating since the 2000s (see Figures 1 and 2). A survey asking about favorability ratings (out of 10) towards the U.S., China, and Japan showed responses of 7.0 for the U.S., 3.7 for Japan, and 3.2 for China (Federation of Korean Industries 2022). The favorability rating for China was lower than that for Japan and decreased by 0.3 points from 3.5 in 2021. This could be interpreted as perceptions of China improving after 2013 before sharply worsening again due to the THAAD conflict. However, in reality, the improvement in perceptions of China between 2013-2015 was an unusual and temporary phenomenon. In a broader context, it is more accurate to view the situation as perceptions worsening, with the THAAD conflict exacerbating anti-China sentiment.

Second, despite high negative perceptions of China among Western developed nations, they generally do not dispute that China will become an economic powerhouse surpassing the U.S. in the future. However, South Korea is an exception, with only 16% responding that China will become an economic powerhouse, the lowest among the 13 surveyed countries (Silver et al. 2020). In contrast, 77% of South Koreans responded that the U.S. would become an economic powerhouse, more than double the average of 34% across the 13 surveyed countries (Silver et al. 2020). Furthermore, 69.2% of respondents indicated that China poses a threat to South Korea, both economically and in terms of security (East Asia Institute 2021b). As is well known, South Korea's economic dependence on China reaches 25%, and economic cooperation with China remains crucial for South Korea. Especially considering that economic cooperation has driven the South Korea-China relationship over the past 30 years, South Koreans' perceptions of the Chinese economy are unexpected. This signifies the strength and pervasiveness of anti-China sentiment in South Korea.

[Figure 1] Trend of Negative Perceptions of China in Major Countries Including South Korea

Source: Silver et al. 2020

[Figure 2] Trend of Affective Temperature Towards the U.S., China, Japan, and North Korea

Source: Lee O-seong 2021a

Third, while negative perceptions of China are increasing globally, particularly among Western developed nations, since the COVID-19 pandemic, it is noteworthy that anti-China sentiment is particularly high among the younger generation (20s and 30s) in South Korea. The proportion of young people who responded that China is close to an enemy was 62.8%, which is 12 percentage points higher than the overall average of 49.1%. Another survey showed that 60.3% of respondents aged 18-24 chose China as the country they disliked the most. This rate is higher than that for the 25-29 (46.7%), 30-34 (49.1%), and 35-39 (48.8%) age groups (Kwon Min-ji 2021; Park Ye-na 2022).

Fourth, despite ongoing efforts by the governments of South Korea and China to restore relations, negative sentiments between their citizens are not recovering or are even worsening. In cases where government-level conflicts are acute, such as between the U.S. and Australia or Canada, public perceptions generally shift negatively. However, the governments of South Korea and China have continuously sought to restore relations beyond the THAAD conflict, and particularly cooperated closely during the COVID-19 pandemic response. The two countries actively sought close governmental cooperation, including establishing a quarantine cooperation system, controlling COVID-19, opening fast-track lanes (simplified entry procedures), and strengthening cooperation for production recovery. The spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs even exceptionally praised the 'four priorities' achieved in South Korea-China COVID-19 quarantine cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Hua Chunying hosts regular press conference 2020). Nevertheless, the percentage of South Koreans with negative perceptions of China remains high, similar to that of the U.S. (82%), Australia (86%), and Canada (74%) (see Figure 1).

2. Changes and Characteristics of China's Perceptions of South Korea

There are limitations in accurately grasping the current reality of China's perceptions of South Korea due to a lack of sufficient recent objective public opinion survey data. In particular, there are almost no survey data on perceptions of South Korea conducted within China itself. The available data includes public opinion surveys commissioned by South Korea to Chinese polling agencies in 2010 and 2017, and the '2021 National Image Survey' conducted by the Korean Culture and Information Service. National image surveys primarily focus on positive and negative images and favorability, limiting the ability to trace the background and causes of negative perceptions. Nevertheless, based on existing data and considering trends, some inferences can be made.

First, as neighboring countries with significant people-to-people exchanges since establishing diplomatic ties, perceptions between South Korea and China have been, and likely continue to be, mutually influential and interconnected to a considerable extent. Throughout their relationship, conflicts and confrontations over contentious issues have led to the expression of negative mutual perceptions. Therefore, it is natural to assume that as South Korea's perception of China deteriorates, China's perception of South Korea also worsens under its influence. Indeed, survey results from 2010 and 2017 show a deteriorating trend in China's perception of South Korea. In the 2017 survey, the image of South Korea among Chinese respondents was rated 3.40 (out of 10), the lowest among the eight surveyed countries (Jeon Byung-gon & Lee Dong-ryul 2017). This represented the largest decline among the surveyed countries, decreasing by 2.35 points compared to 2010 (see Figure 3). Furthermore, in the 2021 national image survey, China's positive perception rate was 68.6% among the 23 surveyed countries, second lowest after Japan (35%) (Korean Culture and Information Service 2021). In China, perceptions of South Korea began to worsen due to major bilateral conflict issues such as the Cheonan incident, the Yeonpyeong shelling, and the THAAD deployment. Through these issues, Chinese people developed the perception that South Korea was joining the U.S. in containing China, thereby challenging China's security.

[Figure 3] Changes in China's Perceptions of Major Countries

Source: Jeon Byung-gon & Lee Dong-ryul 2017

Second, the rapid and steep rise of China, exceeding expectations, occurred during the period when South Korea's perception of China was deteriorating. This process also brought about a general shift in China's perception of South Korea. Since establishing diplomatic ties, China sought to diversify its economic cooperation partners while vigorously pursuing reform and opening-up policies until the late 1990s. During this period, China valued economic cooperation with South Korea, then an emerging developing country in Asia, and even looked to South Korea as a development model. However, after joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and rapidly growing into a global economic power, the proportion of economic cooperation with South Korea gradually decreased. As China entered the so-called G2 in 2010 and U.S.-China competition intensified, South Korea became a dependent variable influenced by China's diplomacy towards the U.S.

In summary, China's rapid rise has led to a change in South Korea's relative importance and strategic value to China. Recent Chinese public opinion surveys suggest a real decline in China's interest in South Korea. A 2020 Global Times poll ranked South Korea tenth among 11 surveyed countries in terms of influence on China, with only 4.6%, lower than North Korea (5.2%). Among China's neighboring countries, South Korea ranked eighth out of nine surveyed countries with 7.2%, also lower than North Korea (9.0%).Global Times2020.

Third, Chinese public opinion exhibits different characteristics compared to South Korea. South Korean public opinion does not always align with government policy direction; at times, it even expresses resistance in a direction contrary to government policy, influencing it. In contrast, in China, public opinion generally tends to align with government policy direction. Due to the nature of the Chinese system, ordinary Chinese citizens tend to exhibit a form of 'self-censorship,' avoiding public expression of views contrary to government policy.

Therefore, in China, government policy direction can be inferred through public opinion. For instance, since the Trump administration took office, perceptions of the U.S. in China have deteriorated to an all-time low, and comprehensive pressure has been exerted on China. However, negative perceptions of China towards the U.S. have not been actively expressed. This suggests that the Chinese government's policy of avoiding worsening relations with the U.S. is reflected in the lack of expression or control of anti-American sentiment. Similarly, although perceptions of South Korea in China have clearly worsened since the THAAD conflict, this negative sentiment has not been publicly and continuously expressed as it has in South Korea. Currently, as competition and conflict with the U.S. escalate, the Chinese government is pursuing comprehensive diplomacy to stabilize the surrounding situation and secure allies, and in this context, it is actively seeking to restore relations with South Korea. Therefore, while Chinese perceptions of South Korea may not be overtly negative, there is no basis to assume that perceptions have improved; they are simply not being expressed.

III. Factors Contributing to the Deterioration of Mutual Perceptions between South Korea and China

1. Structural Factors: China's Rise, Escalating U.S.-China Competition, and Widening Power Gap between South Korea and China

Negative mutual perceptions between the citizens of South Korea and China began to emerge gradually and continuously after the 2000s, when China's rise truly began. A series of structural changes, including China's rapid ascent, intensifying competition and confrontation between the U.S. and China, and the widening power gap between South Korea and China, have influenced the mutual perceptions of both countries. Indeed, after a period of rapid relationship development since establishing diplomatic ties, a series of conflicts that emerged in the 2000s negatively impacted perceptions between the two nations. Specifically, perceptions began to sour with the garlic dispute in 2000 and the distortion of Goguryeo history through China's Northeast Project in 2004. Subsequent conflicts over historical and cultural heritage, such as the inscription of the Dano Festival on the UNESCO list in 2005, continued at the civilian level, accumulating negative mutual perceptions.

However, at that time, with only ten years since establishing diplomatic ties, both countries still had strong motivations for relationship development based on economic cooperation. China, in particular, needed to maintain relations with South Korea due to intensifying competition with the U.S., and South Korea expected China's role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Consequently, both countries did not pay attention to the signals from structural changes and were preoccupied with patching up conflicts. The accumulated negative sentiments, buried beneath the surface, were finally unleashed with the THAAD conflict. In other words, various conflict situations arose during the process of increasing negative mutual perceptions due to structural factors. However, instead of strengthening the fundamental resilience of the relationship through difficult processes of confronting and seeking fundamental solutions to conflict issues, both countries opted for the relatively easier path of reconciliation, allowing negative sentiments to accumulate layer by layer without being resolved.

In the 2021 public opinion survey results, the main reasons cited by South Korean respondents for their negative perceptions of China were 'disrespect towards South Korea (17.8%)' and 'historical and nationalistic conflicts stemming from Sinocentrism (18.5%)' (see Figure 4). Following realistic issues such as COVID-19 and fine dust (32.5%), structural factors received the next highest number of responses (East Asia Institute 2021b). Chinese respondents in a 2017 survey also indicated that South Koreans do not respect China, with 69.4% agreeing (Lee Dong-ryul et al. 2017). China perceives that South Koreans do not acknowledge its rise, while South Korea harbors resentment that China is increasingly disregarding it due to its unexpectedly rapid growth.

South Korea now perceives China's economic rise not as an opportunity but as a threat and is wary of it. In this process, the geopolitical particularities of the Korean Peninsula have meant that the waves of U.S.-China competition and confrontation have influenced perceptions between the two countries. The direct background for the deterioration of China's perception of South Korea in 2017 was the THAAD conflict. However, analysis of public opinion surveys at the time revealed underlying dissatisfaction that South Korea does not recognize China's great power status and seeks to contain China through its alliance with the U.S. (Jeon Byung-gon & Lee Dong-ryul 2017). Chinese people began to perceive that the factor of the U.S. lies behind South Korea's lack of respect for China.

Indeed, comparing the survey results from 2010 and 2017, Chinese respondents perceive South Korea as having become closer to the U.S. under the Moon Jae-in administration than during the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration in 2010. Compared to 2010, the proportion of respondents who saw South Korea as closer to the U.S. in 2017 increased by 7.9 percentage points to a significant 71.5%, while the proportion who saw it as closer to China decreased by 10.1 percentage points to 10.7% (Jeon Byung-gon & Lee Dong-ryul 2017).

As U.S.-China competition intensifies, China increasingly considers the degree of closeness with the U.S. as one of the criteria for perceiving other countries. The U.S. variable will become increasingly important in China's perception of South Korea, and this trend will likely grow as U.S.-China conflict escalates. In this regard, it is noteworthy that while China's perception of South Korea significantly worsened due to the THAAD conflict, perceptions of the U.S., which actively requested the THAAD deployment, did not change significantly (see Figure 3). This also suggests that as China's national power changes, Chinese people differentiate their perceptions of great powers as competitors and neighboring countries.

2. Domestic Political Factors: Widening Gap in Political Systems and Values

Recently, the widening gap in political systems and value orientations between South Korea and China has narrowed the understanding of each other's political realities among their citizens, leading to increased negative perceptions. South Koreans, having experienced the Candlelight Protests, have increased pride in democratic development and elevated universal values and civic consciousness such as democracy, freedom, justice, and fairness. In contrast, under Xi Jinping's government in China, authoritarianism has been strengthened, widening the political system's heterogeneity between the two countries and prompting a renewed recognition of the differences in values and ideologies among their citizens.

Public opinion surveys in China also reveal peculiar perceptions of South Korean politics. Although influenced by the THAAD conflict, Chinese respondents show unexpectedly negative perceptions of South Korean politics, which achieved a change of government through peaceful candlelight protests. For example, 49.4% disagreed that South Korea's democratization level is high, and a striking 69.3% disagreed that its political environment is stable (Jeon Byung-gon & Lee Dong-ryul 2017).

Conversely, in China, following the constitutional amendment to remove presidential term limits and escalating conflict with the U.S., perceptions of President Xi Jinping within South Korea have also worsened. His favorability rating dropped from 59% during his visit to South Korea in 2014 to 25% in 2017 and 19% in 2018 (Gallup Korea 2018). A Pew Research survey also indicated that trust in President Xi was low, with 74% (2019) and 83% (2020) responding negatively (Silver et al. 2020). The 2020 result, in particular, is the second highest among the 14 surveyed countries, following Japan. In essence, as the heterogeneity in systems and values between the two countries expands, mutual empathy weakens, and antipathy towards each other's systems grows. The worsening mutual perceptions between the citizens of both countries due to differences in systems and values exacerbate conflicts and clashes over issues of historical and traditional cultural heritage, further intensifying negative sentiments between their publics. The recent sensitive disputes over the cultural heritage of kimchi and hanbok are prime examples.

China is actively mobilizing nationalism and ideology to ensure regime stability and consolidate power. South Korea, too, is experiencing heightened public participation and demands due to the aftermath of the 'Candlelight Revolution' and increased pride in its status as an advanced nation. China has important political schedules, including the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party in 2021 and the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party in 2022, which confirmed General Secretary Xi Jinping's third term, leading to heightened political sensitivity and elevated nationalistic sentiment. South Korea also experienced intense ideological debates during the presidential election, with fierce competition between progressive and conservative factions. Particularly, as the rivalry between the U.S. and China surrounding the Korean Peninsula intensifies more than ever, both countries face significant political schedules, increasing the tendency for political circles and media to exploit diplomacy for domestic political gain. Both South Korea and China are in sensitive and complex domestic political situations, which has contributed to the worsening of mutual negative sentiments between their citizens.

3. Neighboring Country Risk Factors: Environment, Climate, Infectious Diseases, Maritime Activities, etc.

In South Korea, as public concern over environmental issues such as air pollution grows, controversies surrounding air pollution originating from China, such as yellow dust and fine dust, have intensified. Issues like marine pollution and illegal fishing by Chinese vessels have also frequently surfaced, accumulating negative perceptions of China. The unexpected outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China, in 2020 particularly heightened sensitivity in South Korea, an adjacent country. In the early stages of the outbreak, a petition on the Blue House website requesting a ban on entry for Chinese nationals garnered 760,000 signatures. Media reports frequently covered the forced quarantine and discriminatory actions against South Koreans in China, leading to an expansion of negative mutual perceptions between the citizens of both countries due to the COVID-19 pandemic. A 2021 public opinion survey identified 'transboundary risks from China, such as COVID-19 and fine dust' as the top reason for negative impressions of China, accounting for 32.5% (see Figure 4).

Regarding the most significant threat factors facing South Korea, respondents over 40 cited trade and friction in high-tech competition among major powers as the top threat (45.56%), while respondents aged 20-30 identified the spread of infectious diseases like COVID-19 as the primary threat (52.7%) (East Asia Institute 2021b). This indicates that, unlike the older generation, the primary reasons for the younger generation's negative perceptions of China are related to realistic issues of daily safety, such as the environment and diseases. While historical preconceptions such as Sinocentrism, communism, and economic backwardness may have influenced the older generation's negative perceptions of China, the factors influencing the perceptions of South Korea's future generations are changing. This foreshadows potential shifts in future key issues and disputes in South Korea-China relations.

[Figure 4] Reasons for Negative Impressions of China (2021)

Source: East Asia Institute 2021b

IV. Implications and Impact on Korea-Japan Relations

The South Korea-China relationship has achieved remarkable development over the 30 years since establishing diplomatic ties. However, the substantive deepening and foundation of the relationship have not kept pace with its outward growth. During this period, structural changes in the external environment, driven by China's unexpectedly rapid and steep rise and the escalation of U.S.-China competition, have placed significant burdens on the South Korea-China relationship, given its geopolitical particularities and the North Korean nuclear issue. The asymmetry in national power between South Korea and China has widened, alongside a growing divergence in systems and values. This has led to an expanding gap in perceptions between the citizens of both countries and an increasing space for misunderstanding and distortion. In South Korea, resistance to dependence on and leaning towards China is growing, while in China, concerns and vigilance regarding South Korea's leaning towards the U.S. are escalating, creating a contradictory situation. In essence, the negative mutual sentiments between the citizens of South Korea and China have historical and structural underpinnings and are likely to persist into future generations, signaling a potential for long-term entrenchment.

Furthermore, public opinion surveys since 2021 indicate that South Korea perceives China more negatively than Japan (East Asia Institute 2021b; Yoo Seung-mok 2022). This is the first time since 2004 that South Korea's perception of China has become more negative than its perception of Japan. Even during the period of rapid advancement in bilateral relations around the 20th anniversary of diplomatic ties in 2012, which led to the relationship being evaluated as 'best ever' in 2015, there was a shared sentiment of anti-Japan feeling due to the East China Sea territorial dispute between China and Japan and historical issues and the comfort women issue between South Korea and Japan. China was more actively seeking improved relations with South Korea to pressure and contain Japan during the East China Sea dispute (Lee Dong-ryul 2014). For example, China did not even hold events to commemorate the 40th anniversary of diplomatic ties with Japan in 2012, whereas then-Vice President Xi Jinping exceptionally attended the 20th anniversary of diplomatic ties with South Korea.

President Park Geun-hye also signaled the importance of relations with China by visiting China before Japan, a first for a South Korean president. At that time, South Korea-Japan relations were also strained due to issues such as history textbooks and the comfort women issue. However, the reason President Park Geun-hye actively pursued relations with China, including attending China's Victory Day celebrations in 2015, was to garner China's support in pressuring North Korea, not to target Japan. Nevertheless, the Park Geun-hye administration faced criticism from both the U.S. and Japan for 'leaning towards China,' and South Korea-Japan relations became further strained. Thus, although anti-Japan sentiment was shared between South Korea and China at the time, the drivers for developing bilateral relations were different.

At that time, there was still a gap in threat perceptions of China between South Korea and Japan. Japan's perception of the threat from China had been escalating since its economic power surpassed China's after 2010. Japan actively embraced the U.S.'s rebalancing strategy in Asia and participated in containing China, while also requesting South Korea's participation. However, the Park Geun-hye administration at the time pursued a 'Unification Jackpot' policy and, despite facing criticism from the U.S. and Japan for 'leaning towards China,' exerted diplomatic efforts to engage China.

However, following the THAAD conflict, perceptions of the threat from China have rapidly increased in South Korea, leading to a convergence in threat perceptions of China between South Korea and Japan to some extent. Both South Korea and Japan perceive China as a military threat after North Korea. South Koreans' perception of military threat from China has increased from 44.3% (2020) to 61.8% (2021) and 65% (2022), while Japan's perception has also increased from 63.4% (2020) to 70.5% (2021) and 72.1% (2022) (East Asia Institute 2021a; East Asia Institute 2022). In the economic sphere, while a gap still exists in perceptions of China between South Korea and Japan, it is gradually narrowing. The proportion of South Koreans who consider China an economically important country decreased from 80.4% in 2021 to 64.7% in 2022, whereas in Japan, it increased from 44.1% (2021) to 47% (2022) (East Asia Institute 2021b; East Asia Institute 2022). The trend of gradually converging perceptions of China between South Korea and Japan compared to the past is noteworthy. This suggests that the possibility of negative impacts on South Korea-Japan relations due to differences in perceptions of China is decreasing, and the possibility of solidarity between South Korea and China surpassing that of South Korea-Japan relations, as seen around 2015, is also significantly diminishing.

As perceptions of security threats from China increase in South Korea and the gap in systems and values between South Korea and China widens, South Korea's perception of trilateral cooperation led by the U.S. is also changing positively. For example, positive responses regarding strengthening security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan increased from 53.6% (2020) to 64.2% (2021) and 72.4% (2022). However, Japan's positive responses regarding strengthening security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan are relatively lower, at 38.9% (2020), 36% (2021), and 37.9% (2022). Furthermore, subtle differences are found between South Korea and Japan regarding the purpose of strengthening security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. For instance, both South Korea and Japan selected peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as the top priority objective of trilateral cooperation. However, for the second priority, South Korea chose containing the rise of China (51.7%), while Japan responded with strengthening security cooperation with the U.S. (44.6%) (East Asia Institute 2021a; East Asia Institute 2022). Additionally, regarding human rights abuses in China, 61% of South Koreans responded that strong countermeasures are necessary, whereas only 35% of Japanese respondents agreed, with a majority of 44.4% expressing neutrality by stating they did not know (East Asia Institute 2021a).

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration emphasizes the necessity of ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation to counter North Korean threats. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that public opinion ranks deterring China's rise as a secondary concern. In contrast, for Japan, the proportion of respondents citing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as the primary reason for ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation was 73.9% in 2022, higher than in South Korea (56.4%). Japan harbors greater concerns about the threat from China than South Korea does. Despite this, Japan does not frame ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation as a response to the threat from China. Japan's approach to security cooperation can be interpreted as prioritizing its alliance with the United States for countering the threat from China. Indeed, the Kishida administration in Japan identifies China as the greatest security challenge and actively participates in U.S.-led efforts to deter China. In summary, while the South Korean government perceives North Korea as the primary security threat, the Japanese government views China as the security threat, and their respective approaches to addressing these threats differ.

Despite South Korean public opinion still considering China more economically important than Japanese public opinion does, there is active public sentiment supporting the raising of China's human rights issues and participation in ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Furthermore, regarding restrictions on trade related to advanced technologies that impact national security to prevent excessive dependence on the Chinese economy, the approval rate in South Korea (62%) is higher than in Japan (47.5%) (East Asia Institute 2021a). Despite high anti-China sentiment, Japan appears to be less interested or more passive than South Korea in taking actions to directly deter China. In reality, the Japanese government maintains a dual strategy that is pragmatic, responding assertively to China on security matters while preserving economic cooperation.

The escalation of negative sentiment between South Korea and China, and the stagnation of bilateral relations, are likely to have a certain impact on South Korea-Japan relations. Coincidentally, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, unlike its predecessor, shows a willingness to actively pursue the strengthening of the ROK-U.S. alliance and ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Given the high anti-China sentiment domestically and the support for strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, the Yoon administration has created an environment and momentum to drive ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation. Indeed, President Yoon emphasized the importance of ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation during his summit with U.S. President Biden in May 2021. Subsequently, at the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit held in Cambodia in November 2022, the first joint statement, the 'Phnom Penh Statement,' was adopted, discussing trilateral cooperation among the ROK, U.S., and Japan to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, strengthening extended deterrence, and cooperation in economic security.

However, although anti-China sentiment currently outweighs anti-Japan sentiment among the public, deep-rooted conflict factors such as historical issues inherent in ROK-Japan relations remain unresolved. Therefore, the possibility of anti-Japan sentiment among the South Korean public resurfacing and expanding at any time cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the likelihood of conflict arising from differing perceptions of China between South Korea and Japan, as in the past, has decreased. Nevertheless, the drivers for security cooperation remain different between South Korea and Japan, and public opinion regarding security cooperation for deterring China remains particularly uncertain. As shown in [Figure 5] and [Figure 6], as of 2021, China (46.0%) is perceived as a significantly greater threat than Japan (11.3%) in South Korea, while affinity towards both Japan (4.3%) and China (4.0%) remains similarly low (Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies 2022, 160-165). Additionally, in the same survey, if a war were to break out on the Korean Peninsula, among the four surveyed countries (U.S., Japan, China, Russia), Japan received the highest response rate of 73.4% for 'acting in its own national interest' (Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies 2022, 169-170). This suggests that despite strong anti-China sentiment and threat perception towards China, the South Korean public's trust and expectations regarding security cooperation with Japan remain low.■

[Figure 5] Degree of Affinity Towards Neighboring Countries

[Figure 6] Degree of Threat Perception Towards Neighboring Countries

Source: Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies 2022

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Silver, Laura, Christine Huang, and Laura Clancy. 2022. “Negative Views of China Tied to Critical Views of Its Policies on Human Rights.” Pew Research Center. June 29. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/29/negative-views-of-china-tied-to-critical-views-of-its-policies-on-human-rights/

Global Times. 2020. “Chinese rational on China-U.S. ties: GT poll.” December 26. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1211038.shtml

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2020. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying Hosts Regular Press Conference.” November 30. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202011/t20201130_5419580.shtml(Accessed: December 20, 2020).

■ Author: Lee Dong-ryul_Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies. Professor at Dongduk Women's University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University. He has served as President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies, a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Korea-China Future Development Committee. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and minority issues. His recent works include "The Origins and 21st Century Transition of Geoeconomics (co-authored)," "South Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History (Modern Era Vol. 3) (co-authored)," "China's Strategy and Role in Korean Peninsula Denuclearization and Peace Process," "Evolution and Current Implications of China's Foreign Policy Discourse Since the 1990s," "A Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemmas of Xi Jinping's 'Maritime Power' Vision," and "Deciphering China's Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea."

■ Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 204) hspark@eai.or.kr