[Future Vision Series for Japan-Korea Cooperation] ⑩ China's Diplomacy Toward the US and Neighborhood Diplomacy to Strengthen National Power: Will it Become an Opportunity for Japan-Korea Cooperation?

Introduction

The international situation surrounding South Korea and Japan is changing very rapidly. The US-China relationship, which had been gradually escalating in tension, entered a new phase after late 2017, significantly impacting the world. In economic terms, decoupling is progressing in technological fields, including electronics, leading to discussions about supply chain reorganization. In terms of military security, the United States aims to win the competition with China by strengthening its alliances. The Biden administration has formed AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States: AUKUS), a security cooperation framework, and decided to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, while also diligently working to strengthen relations with Japan and South Korea.

The Xi Jinping administration initially advocated for the establishment of a new type of great power relationship, emphasizing the stabilization of relations with the United States. To avoid the so-called 'Thucydides Trap,' where a rising power clashes with a hegemonic power, it even changed its North Korea policy in 2017 when the Trump administration took office. However, in the National Security Strategy released in January 2018, following President Trump's visit to China in December 2017, and the Defense Strategy, the US identified China, along with Russia, as revisionist states undermining the international order, and considered China, rather than Islamist extremism, as the greatest external threat to the United States. While China continues to urge dialogue and cooperation to stabilize its crucial relationship with the US, it has simultaneously committed to a long-term strategic competition with the US, and in its pursuit of this, views everything from Russia's invasion of Ukraine to the security policies of Japan and South Korea through the lens of competition with the US. This behavior might suggest a 'Russification' of Chinese diplomacy.

This paper examines the Xi Jinping administration's neighborhood diplomacy amidst the escalating tensions in US-China relations. While China appears to present a cooperative and conciliatory neighborhood diplomacy policy, its actual actions have been unilateral and assertive. This paper will explore the reasons behind China's behavior from multiple perspectives. Furthermore, it will consider how Japan and South Korea can coexist with a China that is increasing its national power and exhibiting assertive behavior. Can China's Belt and Road Initiative and Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy be compatible? With these questions in mind, we will consider the responses that countries situated between the US and China, such as Japan and South Korea, should adopt.

I. The Xi Jinping Administration's Neighborhood Diplomacy: Why the Discrepancy Between Words and Actions?

A key characteristic of Xi Jinping's neighborhood policy is the inconsistency between diplomatic rhetoric and actual behavior. While the words are gentle, the actions are rough, and there is a gap between speech and action. An example of gentle rhetoric can be found in Xi Jinping's speech at the 'Symposium on Neighborhood Diplomacy Work' in October 2013 (Xi Jinping 2014, 327-331). In this speech, Xi Jinping declared, 'We will strive to develop more friendly political relations, strengthen economic ties, deepen security cooperation, and foster closer people-to-people exchanges with neighboring countries.' He further stated that he would adhere to the policy of 'approaching neighboring countries with sincerity, treating them as partners, and fostering amity, trust, and mutual benefit,' which had been in place for a decade, and also proposed his own concept of 'amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness' (친, 성, 혜, 용).[1]

Furthermore, regarding relations with Southeast Asian countries bordering the South China Sea, he delivered a speech at the Indonesian Parliament in October 2013 (Xi Jinping 2014, 324). He stated, 'Disputes and conflicts over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests between China and some Southeast Asian countries should be properly resolved by both sides through peaceful means, equal dialogue, and friendly consultation, so as to safeguard the overall relationship between the two sides and regional stability.' If China were to act in accordance with these stated principles, no one would have any complaints.

However, actual actions have been quite assertive. In November 2013, China announced the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea. While it is not unusual for China to establish an ADIZ, as Japan and South Korea have already done so, China's ADIZ overlapped with those of Japan and South Korea and included airspace over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), which are disputed with Japan, and the Socotra Rock (Ieodo), which is a point of contention with South Korea. In addition, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense demanded the submission of flight plans from aircraft not flying towards Chinese airspace and stated that it would take emergency defensive measures by force if instructions from Chinese authorities were not followed, provoking strong backlash from neighboring countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013).

Furthermore, in the South China Sea, in May 2014, China began oil drilling by towing a large oil rig into waters off the Paracel Islands, escorted by dozens of ships. It also constructed facilities such as runways on seven artificial islands, involving large-scale environmental destruction. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled, largely denying China's claims over territory and maritime rights in the South China Sea. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which China is a party, the arbitral tribunal's decisions are final and legally binding on the disputing parties. However, China consistently argued that the arbitration process was invalid and dismissed the ruling as a mere piece of paper.

The cause of this discrepancy between words and actions can be attributed to the rise of what is termed the 'behavior-first' approach. Traditionally, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has adopted a relatively friendly stance, the Party's Central Propaganda Department, which controls the media, has often leaned towards a hardline foreign policy. Moreover, the People's Liberation Army, which is increasingly involved in foreign policy, the Coast Guard, which is the equivalent of Japan's Maritime Security Agency, and sectors such as oil and fisheries, appear to have a strong tendency to disregard diplomacy and take actions to establish de facto situations to secure their interests. Behavior comes first, and diplomacy follows. In other words, diplomacy's role becomes to handle the issues that arise after actions have been taken.

The 'behavior-first' approach is evident in the frequent dispatch of patrol vessels to the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Since the Japanese government purchased three islands of the Senkaku Islands from their private owner in September 2012, Chinese patrol vessels have frequently intruded into the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. In 2013, a Chinese naval destroyer also targeted a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer with fire-control radar. In 2022 as well, multiple patrol vessels entered the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands almost daily and intruded into the territorial waters several times a month.[2]

One reason for the 'behavior-first' approach is the growth of national power. Deng Xiaoping advocated for a foreign policy of 'hiding one's capabilities and biding one's time' (also known as 'taoguang yanghui'). However, China, having quickly recovered from the global financial crisis of 2008 and played a leading role in the global economy, has gained confidence in its national strength and international standing. A prevailing sentiment emerged that China should actively assert its claims by enhancing its military projection capabilities to protect and expand its overseas interests. Under the Xi Jinping administration, this has shifted to a policy of 'striving and achieving' (분발유위).

A second reason could be attributed to Xi Jinping's personal characteristics. In July 2016, a week after the aforementioned ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Xi Jinping stated, 'The capabilities of the Chinese nation have been suppressed for too long. We must unleash them to achieve the great Chinese dream.'[3]This statement was made to encourage workers during a factory visit, not as an order to the navy, coast guard, or fishing sectors. However, various departments interpret the top leader's words to their convenience. A Chinese international relations scholar, citing Xi Jinping's remarks, discussed the possibility of military actions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait from 2018 onwards (Jin Canrong 2016).

A third reason is the emergence of a bad habit among great powers of disregarding international law when it is not in their favor. In China's case, domestic order is not underpinned by the rule of law, but by 'Pax Communista' (the peace of the Communist Party), which signifies support by the overwhelming power of the Communist Party. Therefore, the 'Pax Sinica' that some Chinese envision in East Asia may simply be an extension of 'Pax Communista' lacking the rule of law.

Fourth, even if actions lead to conflicts with other countries, Xi Jinping is not afraid of domestic criticism, but rather of overseas criticism. There is even a notion that some friction with other countries might be beneficial for consolidating domestic opposition and strengthening leadership cohesion. Lu Shaye, the Chinese ambassador to France, is known for his 'wolf warrior' diplomacy, characterized by assertive nationalist rhetoric. Lu Shaye stated, 'Westerners criticize us for violating diplomatic etiquette, but our standard for self-evaluation is not how foreigners see us. It is how our own people see us, whether it goes against the interests of our country and people, whether our people are satisfied or dissatisfied, whether they accept it. [...] It is not whether people from other countries like it.' (Observer 2021) However, if domestic nationalism truly ignites, it can negatively impact the maintenance of social stability, which is the greatest challenge. It is extremely difficult to moderate nationalism for the sake of domestic unity and stability.

Fifth, the 'behavior-first' approach can be attributed to a 'great power syndrome' where China fails to view itself objectively. As indicated by the name of the meeting, 'Symposium on Neighborhood Diplomacy Work,' China refers to diplomacy with neighboring countries as 'neighborhood diplomacy' rather than 'neighborly diplomacy.' If one points out to the Chinese that this reflects a self-centered consciousness, most are surprised and unaware, responding, 'It would be better to change the expression.' Xi Jinping also frequently uses the phrase in his speeches that the Chinese nation does not have the DNA for invading other countries or dominating them, and he may genuinely believe this. In the past, Zhou Enlai frankly told Kissinger that China also had a tradition of expansionism, having invaded Vietnam, Burma, and Korea (Mori Kazuko, Masuda Hiroshi 2004). In contrast, today, the great power syndrome is undoubtedly widespread.

China, in the midst of modernization, is increasingly prone to anti-Western and traditionalist thinking in its attempt to preserve tradition, caught in the paradigm of 'enriching the country and strengthening the military' (부민강국). In terms of returning to tradition, what influences international relations is the emergence of a hierarchical order (階統秩序観). The attitude that great China is the center of the region, and other countries should look up to China and respect its intentions and interests, is becoming noticeably more prevalent. At the ASEAN Regional Forum Foreign Ministers' Meeting in July 2010, when the United States and Southeast Asian countries criticized China's actions in the South China Sea, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi glared at Singapore's Foreign Minister and retorted, 'China is a great power, and you are small countries. This is a fact.' (Landler et al. 2010) Since around that time, statements that consciously perceive interstate relations as hierarchical and demand respect for the strong, such as 'Objectively evaluating China's development, shouldn't we now acknowledge that China is superior to Japan?' have frequently appeared even among high-ranking Chinese officials (Amasu Satoshi 2022).

Of course, China's neighborhood diplomacy is not confined to rhetoric. Recent examples include the provision of masks and vaccines, and even infrastructure investments, which have indeed brought tangible benefits to neighboring countries. However, China has also consistently adopted a strategy of gradually expanding its actions, akin to the 'salami-slicing' tactic, to overwhelm its counterparts. The underlying principle is the realism of the Chinese Communist Party regime, which worships power and money, and its propaganda capabilities have been skillfully used to articulate this. The gap between the self-proclaimed appearance of a regime based on the alliance of workers and peasants and its reality is also evident in China's foreign policy.

II. Japan's China Policy and Japan-Korea Cooperation

For a long time, Japan did not perceive China as a security threat. However, with China's increasing maritime activities, Japan has been compelled to respond. Particularly after the 2010 collision incident involving a Chinese trawler in the waters near the Senkaku Islands and China's strong reaction to the Japanese government's purchase of the Senkaku Islands in 2012, defense spending, which had decreased for ten consecutive years, began to increase from 2013 onwards (Ministry of Defense n.d.). The number of Japan Air Self-Defense Force scrambles against Chinese aircraft has also significantly increased since 2012 (Yomiuri Shimbun 2022). It goes without saying that the recent security legislation and the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance are being pursued with competition with China in mind.

However, China is also a very important economic partner for Japan. In 2021, Sino-Japanese trade reached a total of approximately 38 trillion yen (exports about 18 trillion yen, imports about 20 trillion yen), significantly exceeding US-Japan trade, which amounted to about 24 trillion yen (exports about 15 trillion yen, imports about 9 trillion yen). Meanwhile, as the US-China technological hegemony competition intensifies, companies in Japan and South Korea are becoming entangled in the decoupling of advanced technology sectors. However, US-China trade itself is steadily expanding. In 2021, US imports from China increased by 28% year-on-year to $576.6 billion, and exports to China increased by 33% to $179.5 billion, with both import and export values reaching record highs (JETRO 2022).

While the US-Japan alliance and the ROK-US alliance are clearly in a strategic competition with China, on the other hand, economic cooperation and interdependence are deepening. Japan, South Korea, the United States, and China all face the extremely difficult challenge of simultaneously pursuing intense competition and cooperation.

While there is no easy answer to how to deal with this situation, it is relatively easy to identify the direction to avoid. That is, we must avoid choices that sacrifice one for the sake of the other, whether it be security or economy. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the joint actions of Chinese and Russian warships and aircraft around Japan have occurred. It is natural for Japan, facing heightened security tensions, to seek to further increase its defense budget. However, the stable development of the economy is a crucial task for any country, and it is self-evident that restricting economic exchange with an important economic partner is not a policy that serves national interests. This will likely be the same for South Korea.

As part of Xi Jinping's 'pet project,' China has proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to connect the East Asian and European economic spheres through infrastructure development. In June 2017, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed his assessment of this initiative, stating the possibility of Japanese cooperation, provided certain conditions were met, such as openness, transparency, economic viability, and ensuring the fiscal soundness of project implementing countries (Prime Minister's Office 2017). Meanwhile, in 2016, Japan proposed the concept of a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific.' Both the BRI and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific are, in themselves, mere concepts without concrete substance. They are like constellations; their reality lies in the stars, i.e., the projects. We should not be mesmerized by the constellations. We should examine each project individually and cooperate if it meets the conditions set forth by our country. There is no problem with two constellations sharing one star.

Of course, the BRI, like the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, has another aspect besides economic cooperation: security. In the security domain, there is no room for cooperation. However, focusing on economic cooperation, it is entirely possible for China to cooperate with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. If Xi Jinping could have stated at an appropriate time that China could cooperate with Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific, in response to Abe's remarks on BRI cooperation in 2017, it would have sent a major shockwave not only to Asia but to the world. The Sino-Russian joint statement issued when President Putin visited China on February 4, 2022, mentions the Indo-Pacific (President of Russia 2022). It states that the negative impact of the US Indo-Pacific strategy on regional peace and stability is viewed with great concern. This indicates that the concern is directed solely at the US strategy for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which emphasizes security; it should be noted that China leaves room for cooperation with Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept.

Given the immense infrastructure development needs in Asia, if China were to provide funding and Japan and South Korea were to formulate and jointly operate projects, it would be welcomed by many countries. However, sacrificing security for economic gain and undermining defense systems could lead to disaster and must be avoided.

Furthermore, in the process of responding to the common challenge of China, we must strive to avoid serious differences in views or communication breakdowns between Japan and South Korea. We must avoid situations where one party acts unilaterally, causing difficulties for the other. To this end, it is crucial to create opportunities for frequent exchanges of opinions at various levels. There is a significant gap in perceptions between Japan and China, which is based on substantial informational discrepancies. While numerous specific examples can be cited, a major misunderstanding, for instance, is the widespread belief among high-ranking officials and intellectuals within the Chinese government that Japan has not apologized for its past wars. When Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Japan in April 2007, he stated, 'Since the normalization of diplomatic relations, the Japanese government and leaders have on several occasions expressed their stance on historical issues, publicly acknowledged aggression, and expressed deep remorse and apologies to the victimized countries. The Chinese government and people highly appreciate this,' thereby taking a courageous step towards reconciliation by accepting Japan's apologies (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Japan 2007). Unfortunately, human perception is shaped by daily information. Repeated exposure to information that deviates from facts inevitably leads to misunderstandings, which can become more severe. To jointly align and cooperate on China policy, Japan and South Korea must first strive to build trust by working to bridge the perceptual and informational gaps that exist between the two countries.

Finally, I would like to point out the importance of cooperation with Southeast Asia for the stable development of the region. With China's rise and maritime expansion, anxiety is spreading in East Asia that a rules-based order may collapse. Maintaining the rule of law and ensuring the stable development of East Asia is of paramount importance for the national interests of both Japan and South Korea. As seen in the recent case of the military coup in Myanmar, establishing a democratic system that limits the abuse of power and guarantees human rights is ultimately crucial for the stable development of society. However, as economic stagnation and social instability spread, movements favoring rule by strong power may emerge. In this context, Japan and South Korea should promote consultations and cooperation regarding social development in Southeast Asia.■

References

Mori Kazuko, Masuda Hiroshi (translators). 2004. *Zhou Enlai Kissinger Secret Talks*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. 38.

Ministry of Defense. (n.d.). 'About the Current Status of Defense-Related Expenditures: What You Want to Know About the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces!' https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/shiritai/budget_h26/index.html

Prime Minister's Office. 2017. 'Prime Minister Abe's Speech at the 23rd International Conference 'The Future of Asia'.' https://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11095919/cache.kantei.go.jp/jp/97_abe/statement/2017/0605speech.html(Accessed May 1, 2018.)

Amasu Satoshi. 2022. 'Dealing with Authoritarian China: Japan Must Clarify Its Assertions and Revitalize Its Economy.' *Mainichi Shimbun*. January 19. https://mainichi.jp/premier/politics/articles/20220107/pol/00m/010/053000c

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2013. 'Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Regarding the Chinese Ministry of National Defense's Announcement of an 'East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone'.' November 24. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/page4_000293.html

'Yomiuri Shimbun'. 2022. 'Air Self-Defense Force Scrambles 1,004 Times, 70% Against Chinese Aircraft... Number of Intelligence Gathering and Patrol Aircraft Flights Increased Last Fiscal Year.' April 15. https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/20220415-OYT1T50263/

Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Japan. 2007. 'Premier Wen Jiabao's Speech at the National Diet of Japan: 'For Friendship and Cooperation'.' April 12. https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPCH/20070412.S1J.html

JETRO. 2022. 'US-China Trade in 2021 Reached Record Highs in Both Imports and Exports, Semiconductor Imports Also Increased.' March 29. https://www.jetro.go.jp/biz/areareports/2022/8f530d7e9147b49a.html

Jin Canrong. 2016. 'Sino-US Strategic Philosophy.' July 23. http://cn3.uscnpm.org/model_item.html?action=view&table=article&id=11268

Xi Jinping. 2014. *Xi Jinping Discusses State Governance*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

'Xinhuanet'. 2016. 'Xi Jinping Inspects Ningxia.' July 19. http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016-07/19/c_1119245499_4.htm

'Guancha'. 2021. 'Zheng Ruolin Interviews Ambassador to France Lu Shaye: 'Our Diplomatic Style Has Changed, You Need to Adapt to Our New Style'.' June 16. https://www.guancha.cn/lushaye/2021_06_16_594555_s.shtml

Landler, Mark, Jim Yardley, and Michael Wines. 2010. 'China’s Fast Rise Leads Neighbors to Join Forces.' The New York Times. October 10.

President of Russia. 2022. “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development.” February 4. http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770

[1] Translated, this means ‘intimacy, sincerity, reciprocity, and inclusiveness.’ This information that it was Xi Jinping’s own proposal comes from a former Chinese government official in 2014.

[2] Regarding the movements of vessels belonging to the China Coast Guard in the waters around the Senkaku Islands, please refer to the Japan Coast Guard website (http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/mission/senkaku/senkaku.html)

[3] The Xinhua News Agency article presents a more moderate expression ( "Xinhua Net" 2016).

■ Author: Akio Takahara_Professor at the Graduate Schools for Law and Politics and the Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyo. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Sussex in 1988 and has held visiting scholar positions at the Consulate General of Japan in Hong Kong, the Embassy of Japan in China, Harvard University, Peking University, the Mercator Institute of Chinese Studies, and the Australian National University. He has served as a professor at Obirin University and Rikkyo University and has held positions such as President of the Association of Asian Political Economy and Secretary-General of the Japan-China Friendship 21st Century Committee. From 2018 to 2020, he served as Dean of the Graduate School of Public Policy. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, a Policy Advisor at the Japan Forum on International Relations, and Director of the Ogata Sadako Peace and Development Research Institute at the Japan International Cooperation Agency. His major English publications include The Politics of Wage Policy in Post-Revolutionary China (Macmillan, 1992), Japan-China Relations in the Modern Era (co-authored, Routledge, 2017), “Introduction to the special issue on the comparative study of Asian countries’ bilateral relations with China”, Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 10, 2 (2021).

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 204) hspark@eai.or.kr

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