[Future Vision Series on Korea-Japan Cooperation] IX. Korea-Japan Infrastructure Development Cooperation Initiative in the Indo-Pacific Era: A Comprehensive Strategy for Multilateralism

I. Introduction: The unfolding of the Indo-Pacific Era and the potential for rebuilding Korea-Japan relations

The recent state of Korea-Japan relations can be defined as a 'lost decade.' Following President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo in late 2012, conflicts between Korea and Japan intensified, leading to the problematic comfort women agreement during the Park Geun-hye administration and the forced labor compensation issue during the Moon Jae-in administration, with the conflict between the two nations continuously worsening. Japan, from the Yoshihiko Noda cabinet through the Shinzo Abe, Yoshihide Suga, and Fumio Kishida cabinets, has also shown conservative tendencies regarding post-war historical issues, such as visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and re-examination of the Kono Statement, negatively impacting Korea-Japan relations. During this decade of strained relations, dialogue between the governments of both countries has virtually ceased, public sentiment has soured, and tourism exchanges were suspended during the COVID-19 pandemic, leaving bilateral relations frozen.

Despite these challenges, a certain degree of domestic and external political opportunity exists for the positive rebuilding of Korea-Japan relations. Firstly, although Korea has not yet fully participated in the complex multilateralism of the Indo-Pacific (hereafter IP) region, the IP era continues to expand as a geopolitical factor. In fact, the concept of the IP was initiated by Japan and strategized by the United States, serving as a flagship foreign policy of Shinzo Abe and now a central pillar of the current Biden administration's overarching foreign strategy. As early as the first Abe cabinet in 2006, Abe visited India and emphasized the Indo-Pacific as a regional concept linking the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean. At the 6th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 2016, Abe set forth democracy, the rule of law, and market economy as common norms for freedom and openness within the geopolitical space of the Indo-Pacific. In a speech to the Japanese Diet in January 2018, he declared the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)' strategy as the core of Japan's foreign policy (Son Yeol 2019; Cho Eun-il 2020).

The concept of the Indo-Pacific gained international attention when the Trump administration officially emphasized its importance during its Asia tour in November 2017. In August 2020, the Trump administration declared an 'Indo-Pacific NATO,' elevating the consultative body that brought together the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia in 2004 to discuss relief and support for the South Asian tsunami into a regular summit known as the 'Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,' or 'Quad.' The Biden administration has inherited the Quad as a core platform for its Indo-Pacific strategy. Furthermore, during its visit to Korea and Japan in May 2022 to attend the Quad summit in Japan, it officially launched the 'Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)' as another key strategy. At the first IPEF, officially launched in Brisbane, Australia in December of the same year, 14 countries participated, including key U.S. allies such as Australia and New Zealand, ASEAN member states like Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia, as well as India (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy 2012). The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, expanding the Quad as the center of security cooperation and the IPEF as the center of economic cooperation, aligns with Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy in its intention to counter the growing political and economic influence of China in the Asian region. The utilization of U.S. and Japanese Indo-Pacific strategies as a containment strategy against China's expanding influence presents both a diplomatic burden and an opportunity for Korea, which is at a crossroads in the U.S.-China strategic competition. In particular, the strategic value of Indo-Pacific multilateralism can be seen as a window of political opportunity for Korea, serving as a bridgehead for resolving long-standing bilateral conflicts between Korea and Japan.

Second, in addition to external factors in the IP region, it is necessary to pay attention to internal factors within South Korean domestic politics for the construction of a new Korea-Japan relationship. On May 10, 2022, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration was inaugurated, succeeding the Moon Jae-in administration. From his presidential campaign, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has consistently emphasized finding new breakthroughs in Korea-Japan relations and restoring relations with Japan, while maintaining a stance of normalizing the Moon Jae-in administration's perceived subservient diplomacy towards China. In Japanese domestic politics, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who took office in October 2021, while officially adhering to Japan's consistent position on pending issues between Korea and Japan, has shown a relatively more conciliatory attitude towards Korea compared to previous prime ministers, suggesting a possibility for improving Korea-Japan relations. The South Korean government's proposal of a solution to the forced labor compensation issue in March 2023, followed by the Korea-Japan summit where both countries agreed to lift Japan's export restrictions and for Korea to withdraw its WTO complaint, can be seen as the first step in realizing this possibility. In a similar vein, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration made joining the Quad a major campaign pledge, and immediately after his election, he engaged in preparatory work for Korea's accession to the Quad by holding phone calls with the leaders of the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India (Park Daero 2022). Notably, Korea is exploring gradual cooperation measures by participating in working groups under the Quad, such as those on vaccines, climate change, new technologies, and infrastructure development, to seek formal membership. While these changes in South Korea's domestic political landscape increase the likelihood of a shift in Korea-Japan relations in the IP era, to transform this growing possibility into tangible improvements in bilateral relations, a common instrumental strategic mechanism between Korea and Japan is needed to catalyze the transition from a critical point of change to concrete outcomes.

Amidst the evolving domestic and international environment for improving Korea-Japan relations, the China factor operates as a counteracting constant and can, at times, create a critical situation for Korea. The Indo-Pacific strategies of the U.S. and Japan expand the Indian Ocean as a strategic space, incorporate regional cooperation bodies like ASEAN as pillars of security cooperation, and implicitly urge Korea, a U.S. ally, to align with them in the event of contingencies in the Indo-Pacific and Taiwan, ultimately aiming to counter China's assertive foreign policy represented by the 'Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)' (Lee Dong-ryul 2018). If Korea joins U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategies such as the Quad and IPEF, China is expected to retaliate with corresponding economic sanctions. Therefore, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration must employ a strategic approach that can mitigate China's backlash to achieve the objectives of restoring Korea-Japan relations and participating in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.

To achieve a smooth landing on the interconnected multiple goals of restoring Korea-Japan relations, strengthening Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation, and appropriately managing the China factor in the Indo-Pacific era, it is crucial for Korea to seek cooperative relationships with major countries on universal issue areas that are guaranteed by global norms among the objectives of multilateral initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region, such as the Quad. In other words, a gradual approach is needed, starting with cooperation in non-traditional security areas like politically neutral development cooperation or emergency relief, and gradually expanding to economic and security cooperation. Korea should consider Japan as a key partner for this gradual approach and pursue cooperative measures to establish an infrastructure development cooperation initiative within the framework of Indo-Pacific multilateralism. Infrastructure development cooperation projects that Korea and Japan can jointly pursue are fundamentally part of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, thus enabling mutual cooperation with the U.S. on the same trajectory. This will also foster value-based cooperation similar to the European Union's (EU) 'Global Gateway.' While the initiative for Korea-Japan development cooperation will ultimately share the objective of countering China's expansion in Asia and curbing the influence of the Belt and Road Initiative within the context of U.S.-China strategic competition, in the short term, it opens up space for cooperation with China in pursuit of the universal value of development cooperation by supporting economic and social development in Asia. In particular, infrastructure development cooperation projects are areas where China is most actively engaged in development cooperation in the Global South, thus presenting a high potential for competition with China. However, by planning joint projects that complement China's comparative advantages with those of Korea and Japan, a flexible foundation can be provided that does not directly confront China's policies towards Asia but rather enhances the possibility of cooperation (Yoon Yuri 2018; Kim Tae-gyun 2018). In establishing new norms and cooperating on emerging global issues in the Indo-Pacific region, such as supply chains, new technologies, climate and environment, and infrastructure investment and development, Korea-Japan cooperation will become a key pillar of trilateral cooperation among Korea, the U.S., and Japan, emphasizing the rule-based international order advocated by the U.S. Simultaneously, Korea and Japan can jointly address the debt issues of developing countries arising from China's assertive infrastructure investment and Belt and Road Initiative, which emphasizes a China-centric international order, and emphasize universal values distinct from China's development aid through multilateral initiatives like the Quad (Cannon and Rossiter 2022).

In this context, this study re-examines the future of Korea-Japan relations, marked by a decade of conflict, by exploring the possibilities for Korea-Japan cooperation in the realm of international development cooperation issues in the Indo-Pacific era. An infrastructure development cooperation initiative can serve as a starting point for rebuilding Korea-Japan relations in the Indo-Pacific era, can be emphasized as a strategic platform for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration to smoothly integrate into the Indo-Pacific multilateralism of the U.S. and Japan, and possesses instrumental utility for applying global norms to the Indo-Pacific region through trilateral cooperation among Korea, the U.S., and Japan. To this end, this study explains the strategic value of infrastructure development cooperation as an Indo-Pacific strategy and its comprehensive accessibility in encountering global norms, anticipates the potential and role of an infrastructure development cooperation initiative for Korea-Japan cooperation within the Indo-Pacific strategy, and finally, comparatively analyzes cases of multilateral cooperation such as the Quad, 'Building Back Better World (B3W),' and 'Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)' where infrastructure development cooperation for Korea-Japan cooperation can be institutionalized.

II. Strategic Value and Comprehensive Approach of Infrastructure Development Cooperation as an Indo-Pacific Strategy

Major actors pursuing Indo-Pacific strategies, including the U.S., Japan, and the EU, invariably emphasize development cooperation projects as a key policy for implementing their Indo-Pacific strategies. The spectrum of development cooperation mobilized within Indo-Pacific strategies ranges from humanitarian aid, including emergency relief, to grant aid encompassing technical cooperation, and large-scale infrastructure construction projects. The fact that development cooperation agencies are involved in Indo-Pacific strategies and are key players in operating multilateral cooperation bodies confirms their significance (Song Ji-sun 2022). For Korea to attempt development cooperation with Japan through multilateral initiatives like the Quad, it is essential to first understand the strategic value that infrastructure development cooperation holds as a key element of Indo-Pacific strategy, the characteristics of infrastructure cooperation in Indo-Pacific strategy that differentiate it from China's Belt and Road Initiative, and the linkage between infrastructure cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and global norms.

1. Value Diplomacy of Norm-Based Development Cooperation

The shared concept of FOIP between the U.S. and Japan in the Indo-Pacific region has been readily linked with the EU's cooperation strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, and furthermore, active coordination between Korea and the U.S. was attempted in 2020 regarding the Moon Jae-in administration's New Southern Policy (Choi et al. 2021; Botto 2021; U.S. Department of State 2021). This signifies that both the U.S., Japan, the EU, and Korea share a common rival in China and that value diplomacy, based on shared universal values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, is a core pillar of the Indo-Pacific strategy (Kim Tae-hwan 2019). The principles of a rule-based international order, emphasized by both the U.S. and Japan, are applied equally in the Indo-Pacific region, and global norms and development principles such as the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement on climate change are projected into the field of development cooperation, including infrastructure. As can be seen in [Table 1], a comparison of the Indo-Pacific strategies of major state actors in the Indo-Pacific region reveals that the U.S., Japan, Korea, and the EU—though with some variation in expression—share consensus in three normative areas: peace and security, governance, and economic cooperation. In particular, the U.S., in its 'Joint Strategic Plan, FY 2018-2022' jointly published by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State in 2018, emphasizes strategic goals to protect U.S. security and promote U.S. leadership by intervening in actions contrary to good governance, security, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (U.S. Department of State & U.S. Agency for International Development 2018). Japan's revised 'ODA Charter' in 2015 confirms that democracy, freedom, and the rule of law are set as the main philosophical backgrounds for Japan's ODA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2023), and Japan's ODA policy, closely linked with its FOIP strategy, emphasizes maritime security, governance, and connectivity as priority areas.Joint Strategic Plan, FY 2018-2022) where it emphasizes strategic goals to protect U.S. security and promote U.S. leadership by intervening in actions contrary to good governance, security, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (U.S. Department of State & U.S. Agency for International Development 2018). Japan's revised 'ODA Charter' in 2015 confirms that democracy, freedom, and the rule of law are set as the main philosophical backgrounds for Japan's ODA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2023), and Japan's ODA policy, closely linked with its FOIP strategy, emphasizes maritime security, governance, and connectivity as priority areas.ODA Charter) confirms that democracy, freedom, and the rule of law are set as the main philosophical backgrounds for Japan's ODA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2023), and Japan's ODA policy, closely linked with its FOIP strategy, emphasizes maritime security, governance, and connectivity as priority areas.

[Table 1]Comparison of Indo-Pacific Strategy Overviews: U.S., Japan, EU, China, Korea

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Source: Song Ji-sun 2022; supplemented with additional information.

In Korea's case, during the Moon Jae-in administration, to avoid China's economic retaliation over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, ASEAN and India were positioned as new economic cooperation partners. During President Moon Jae-in's tour of Southeast Asia in November 2017, he proclaimed the '3P' principles of 'People, Prosperity, Peace' in his keynote speech at the 'Korea-Indonesia Business Forum,' establishing a system where Korea's ODA policy and public diplomacy mobilized and supported the New Southern Policy. The 3P of the New Southern Policy shares common ground with the principles of value diplomacy embedded in the Indo-Pacific strategies of the U.S. and Japan. Furthermore, through the Korea-U.S. summit in 2020, a normative foundation for Korea-U.S. cooperation was established, encompassing a wide range of issues including enhancing economic prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region—particularly in ASEAN—promoting investment in human capital and good governance, and ensuring peace and security. As the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has chosen a new direction of participating in multilateral cooperation, including joining the Quad, rather than inheriting the previous government's New Southern Policy, the normative elements already agreed upon between Korea and the U.S. need to be applied to the process of establishing common values and norms between Korea and Japan. At a macro level, all attention will be focused on building the philosophical foundation for Korea-Japan cooperation based on value diplomacy and on how the Yoon Suk-yeol administration will pivot from the New Southern Policy to newly position Korea strategically in the Indo-Pacific region.

2. Korea-Japan Infrastructure Development Cooperation Differentiated from China's Development Aid

The strategic value of infrastructure and development cooperation as an Indo-Pacific strategy stems from the normative characteristics inherent in international development and the realization of non-political and universal values in development cooperation. However, even development cooperation that readily accepts universal global norms has a high potential to be politically utilized to achieve the interests of the donor state and is likely to be mobilized as a strategic asset of the donor country in a realist approach. The U.S. and Japan have clearly expressed their intention to actively utilize development cooperation to advance their respective Indo-Pacific strategies, and the agreement between the U.S. and Japan on a rule-based international order is converging into an initiative for infrastructure development cooperation that differentiates itself from China's assertive Belt and Road Initiative (Song Ji-sun 2022). Infrastructure development cooperation and humanitarian aid, along with technical cooperation, are emphasized within the role of the Quad. The B3W initiative, championed at the G7 summit in the UK in 2021, also serves as a rudder for the liberal international order by mobilizing large-scale development cooperation funds to counter China's model of development aid and address the debt issues of developing countries. Nevertheless, the U.S., Japan, the EU, and Quad member states have not yet fully coordinated their respective infrastructure initiatives in response to China's Belt and Road Initiative into a common goal through mutual policy adjustments. The loosely agreed-upon Indo-Pacific strategies of the U.S., Japan, and the EU, which share universal principles, have not produced a single, highly institutionalized infrastructure initiative. However, they maintain flexibility for like-minded countries that can share similar principles and directions to join the U.S., Japanese, and EU Indo-Pacific strategies as countermeasures against China.

The infrastructure development cooperation initiative between Korea and Japan cannot escape the China variable, which is commonly considered in the Indo-Pacific strategies of major countries like the Quad. Rather, strategically utilizing the China variable may be the solution. In the process of discussing an infrastructure initiative between Korea and Japan, both countries should share the fundamental principle of not explicitly excluding China and should also endeavor to identify ODA-funded infrastructure projects that can be linked with China's Belt and Road Initiative. Simultaneously, it is important to emphasize the commonality of the infrastructure development cooperation initiatives of the U.S., Japan, and the EU in the Indo-Pacific region—namely, jointly responding to China's Belt and Road Initiative and providing infrastructure projects to developing countries that are differentiated from the Belt and Road Initiative. As is well known, China's Belt and Road Initiative and development aid have led to critical economic crises for many partner countries in the Global South, pushing them into state bankruptcy or debt traps (Lagerkvist 2013; Brautigam 2009). As shown in [Figure 1], BRI aid from China has been continuously channeled to recipient countries classified as high-risk since 2013. Notably, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, where China has undertaken large-scale infrastructure projects, have recently declared moratoriums and officially applied for bailout assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

[Figure 1]Scale of China's BRI Aid to High-Risk Countries, 2013-2020 (in billions of U.S. dollars)

Source: RWR Advisory Group 2021

3. A Comprehensive Approach Aligned with Global Norms in International Development

The strategic value of infrastructure development cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region can be found in the flexible connectivity of infrastructure projects. Due to the nature of infrastructure projects, they are not limited to a single sector but involve the linkage of various sectors necessary for infrastructure construction, leading to the comprehensive mobilization of resources and personnel across sectors such as construction, paving, labor markets, and capacity building. Furthermore, infrastructure construction, directly linked to economic prosperity, subsequently generates social development impacts stemming from the infrastructure facilities, exhibits relationships with environmental and health issues, and ultimately demonstrates a comprehensive characteristic that connects to good governance, including democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (Lee Jae-yeon, Lee Ju-heon, Kim Yu-cheol 2021). This comprehensiveness in infrastructure development cooperation is increasingly linked to the UN's "integrated approach," which is becoming a global norm in international development (United Nations 2020).

The integrated approach in development cooperation moves beyond a fragmented approach that merely emphasizes economic or technical aspects in project planning and implementation. It is an approach that attempts to understand the relationships between the various components of development projects based on a theory of change and to manage them holistically to ensure development effectiveness and accountability (Park Soo-young, Yoon Yu-ri, Ahn Mi-sun 2021). This integrated approach was presented as a methodology for achieving the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 and has since been shared as a global development principle within the international community. A representative example of the integrated approach is the "Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP)" linkage strategy (Nguya and Siddiqui 2020). The HDP linkage is an integrated approach utilized by many aid organizations, signifying that humanitarian aid, along with medium- to long-term development projects, can yield more desirable outcomes for post-conflict peacebuilding. Furthermore, the integrated approach to development cooperation is noteworthy for its emphasis on actively mobilizing private resources, rather than being limited to Official Development Assistance (ODA) from government budgets. Infrastructure development cooperation, in particular, requires substantial funding, thus opening avenues for private companies to participate as key partners in projects and provide financial resources. While the United States and the EU have established Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and institutionalized collaboration with private companies to secure private funding, South Korea and Japan have yet to establish DFIs, posing a significant challenge for the full-scale promotion of infrastructure development cooperation projects between the two countries. However, both the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) emphasize an integrated approach to development cooperation. South Korea's New Southern Policy has also been evaluated as having been managed in an integrated manner, linking economic and development cooperation (Son Hyuk-sang, Choi Jeong-ho 2008). It is clear that future infrastructure development cooperation initiatives between South Korea and Japan as part of their Indo-Pacific strategies will adhere to the integrated approach, which is emerging as a key principle in international development. To this end, both countries must undertake institutional efforts to resolve issues such as the utilization of private funding.

III. Infrastructure Development Cooperation for South Korea-Japan Cooperation in Indo-Pacific Strategy

Although the United States, Japan, and the EU have not yet articulated explicit principles or directions for their development cooperation policies in the Indo-Pacific region, they universally emphasize the importance of development cooperation, ranging from humanitarian aid to infrastructure projects, within their Indo-Pacific strategies. The US and Japan, in particular, highlight development cooperation and infrastructure projects as key functions of the Quad, prioritizing the establishment of regional strategies in the Indo-Pacific and subsequently seeking points of convergence with the strategies of other cooperation partners (Song Ji-sun 2022). Infrastructure development cooperation for South Korea-Japan collaboration within the Indo-Pacific strategy requires an understanding of Japan's current infrastructure development cooperation strategy, an outlook on the future direction of South Korea's New Southern Policy, and an analysis of the elements necessary for both countries to pursue infrastructure cooperation.

1. Japan's "Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure" and FOIP Strategy

In May 2016, the Abe administration declared the "Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure" (hereinafter referred to as the Expanded Partnership) initiative. In conjunction with the G7 Summit held in Ise-Shima, Japan, in the same year, Japan pledged approximately $200 billion in financial support for global infrastructure projects from 2017 to 2021 based on this partnership (Song Ji-sun 2022: 16). This Expanded Partnership initiative is an expanded and reproduced version of the 2015 "Partnership for Quality Infrastructure." It aims to broaden the scope of cooperation regions from Asia to the entire world, expand the definition of infrastructure to include natural resources and energy, and diversify implementing agencies. This can be interpreted as a strategy actively planned by Japan as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China's aggressive infrastructure investment in the Global South through the Belt and Road Initiative.

According to the strategy document "Japan’s Efforts for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”" released in March 2021, Japan has been building "Expanded Partnerships" with various partner countries in infrastructure development projects as one of its FOIP strategies. These partner countries include European nations such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the EU; the Quad countries (United States, Australia, India); bilateral partners like the United States, India, and New Zealand; ASEAN partner countries, including those in the Mekong region; and African partner countries with whom infrastructure cooperation is underway through TICAD (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2023). While South Korea is not yet included in the Expanded Partnership, major countries worldwide, excluding South Korea and China, are considered infrastructure partners in Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy. Furthermore, this strategy document explicitly states contributions to regional maritime order, economic cooperation, governance, and connectivity. It presents three core pillars of Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy: (1) the rule of law, free trade, and freedom of navigation; (2) economic prosperity; and (3) peace and stability. Although Japan has not yet pursued cooperation in areas such as infrastructure with South Korea under the FOIP framework, the 2021 strategy document explicitly states its willingness to cooperate with any country that shares the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. This suggests the possibility of future infrastructure development cooperation projects with South Korea, a country that shares important values such as democracy and the rule of law.

Traditionally, Japan's development cooperation has been analyzed as prioritizing economic benefits, despite being an early member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Consequently, Japan's infrastructure development cooperation has tended to focus on Asian countries and those with high economic growth rates (Riddell 2007; Lancaster 2007; Browne 1990; Kim Seok-soo 2016). Japan has maintained cooperation and support with ASEAN countries, particularly in the Mekong region, through infrastructure assistance to bordering countries. In addition to long-term diverse cooperation projects with India, Japan pursues a unified strategy with countries like the United States that reflects the economic and security characteristics of the region (Yoon Yu-ri 2018). In the case of India, Prime Minister Abe pledged infrastructure cooperation in 2017 during a summit with Prime Minister Modi, including a loan of approximately 1.948 trillion won for the construction of India's first high-speed railway, with exceptionally favorable terms of a 50-year maturity and an annual interest rate of 0.1%. This demonstrates the Japanese government's significant efforts to foster cooperation with India through infrastructure projects (Oh Hwa-seok 2020). Therefore, Japan is likely to participate in infrastructure development cooperation with South Korea when economic benefits are assured. Given that South Korea's ODA also leans heavily towards concessional loans focused on economic cooperation, there is potential to explore South Korea-Japan infrastructure development cooperation projects within a plurilateral cooperation framework of the Quad through mutual linkage.

2. South Korea's New Southern Policy and a New Korean-Style Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Strategy

To date, South Korea's Indo-Pacific policy has been consolidated under the Moon Jae-in administration's New Southern Policy. Unable to join the Quad, the Moon administration pursued the New Southern Policy by focusing on ASEAN and India to respond realistically to the China variable. However, with the inauguration of a new government, the New Southern Policy is undergoing a comprehensive review (Lee Jae-hyun 2022). The Yoon Suk-yeol administration announced its "Indo-Pacific Strategy for Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity" in December 2022, positioning the protection and promotion of universal values as the core of its foreign policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022). Subsequently, in March 2023, it expressed its intention to participate in the Quad working group. Nevertheless, the infrastructure development cooperation initiatives based on the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's new Korean-style Indo-Pacific strategy cannot entirely deviate from the cooperation framework between the US Indo-Pacific strategy and South Korea's New Southern Policy, which was agreed upon between South Korea and the US at the East Asia Summit in 2020. Furthermore, discussions on infrastructure development cooperation with Japan should proceed based on the South Korea-US cooperation framework. Therefore, a review of the South Korea-US infrastructure cooperation framework from 2020 is necessary, and based on this review, South Korea's cooperation strategy with Japan under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration should also be explored.

The cooperation framework for infrastructure development between the US Indo-Pacific strategy and South Korea's New Southern Policy can be broadly summarized into three main points (U.S. Department of State 2021). First, it emphasizes the linkage between the US Indo-Pacific strategy and South Korea's New Southern Policy's 3Ps, with infrastructure cooperation included as a pillar of economic Prosperity. To achieve economic prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, (1) South Korea-US cooperation is to be enhanced for infrastructure, energy, digital economy, smart cities, and natural resource management (Prosperity); (2) human capital investment for capacity building, anti-corruption programs, and women's empowerment, as well as cooperation in health and climate change initiatives, are to be strengthened to mainstream good governance (People); and (3) South Korea-US cooperation is to be enhanced for capacity building against transnational crime and drug trafficking, cybersecurity, maritime security, marine environmental protection, and disaster response to promote peace and security (Peace). This indicates that the 3Ps of the New Southern Policy are appropriately aligned with the US Indo-Pacific strategy.[1]Second, in the area of development cooperation, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and USAID in September 2019, and consultations on mutual policy cooperation were held. USAID and KOICA agreed to explore joint cooperation measures at the development project level concerning COVID-19 response, gender inequality issues, information and communication technology, and youth education sectors. Third, regarding infrastructure support, based on the MOU signed between the South Korean Ministry of Economy and Finance and the US Department of the Treasury in October 2019, both countries agreed to promote bilateral cooperation that supports market-oriented and private sector investment. The first Korea-U.S. Infrastructure Finance Working Group meeting and the Private Sector Roundtable Meeting were held in Seoul in February 2020. The Export-Import Bank of Korea and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) agreed to regularly explore possibilities for joint financing in the Indo-Pacific region and to promote infrastructure investment in the Mekong region. Furthermore, the South Korean government and the U.S. Department of State agreed to continuously exchange views on the "Blue Dot Network" (BDN) for quality infrastructure.

The cooperation relationship in the infrastructure sector between the US Indo-Pacific strategy and South Korea's New Southern Policy, as discussed between the Biden administration and the Moon Jae-in administration, confirms that despite South Korea's official non-participation in the US-led Quad due to the China variable, there were many areas of practical cooperation with the US. While the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's swift decision to join the Quad and IPEF will undoubtedly lead to a more active and closer level of cooperation compared to the previous Moon Jae-in administration's South Korea-US cooperation, the specific details of infrastructure development cooperation are expected to show little difference from the existing approach. Therefore, an analysis of the outcomes of South Korea-US infrastructure and development cooperation since 2019 is necessary, and based on this analysis, a systematic and integrated approach to infrastructure development cooperation under the Quad framework by the Yoon Suk-yeol administration should be planned. The existing bilateral approach to South Korea-US infrastructure development cooperation will enable infrastructure cooperation with various participating countries within the plurilateral cooperation frameworks of the Quad and IPEF. Focusing initially on Japan as a priority cooperation partner, and subsequently building upon South Korea-Japan cooperation, trilateral cooperation among South Korea, Japan, and the US can be strengthened within plurilateral cooperation.

3. Harmonization of Infrastructure Concepts and Development Mechanisms between South Korea and Japan

For the South Korea-Japan infrastructure development cooperation initiative to be implemented in the Indo-Pacific region, several conceptual and empirical considerations are necessary. First, a review of how South Korea and Japan define the concept and scope of infrastructure is essential. According to Japan's 2016 Expanded Partnership, Japan applies the concept of infrastructure comprehensively, from soft to hard infrastructure, covering an extremely broad range of categories (Song Ji-sun 2022, 16). Specifically, the spectrum of infrastructure in Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy extends from resource development, including natural resources, energy, oil, and gas, to information and media services such as telecommunications, broadcasting, and postal services; public service projects like hospitals and urban development; and social overhead capital facilities such as roads, ports, and railways. Given the expansive definition of infrastructure in Japan, its infrastructure projects have traditionally been criticized for their strong mercantilist tendencies. With concessional loans accounting for 60% of Japan's total ODA, infrastructure development cooperation holds a significant weight, and its expertise is highly regarded ([Figure 2]). Meanwhile, South Korea's concept of infrastructure can be categorized into physical infrastructure (digital, energy, transportation, etc.), human connectivity (education, health, etc.), and governance (administrative capacity). Physical infrastructure, which falls under concessional loans, is primarily handled by the Export-Import Bank of Korea's Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), while infrastructure related to human connectivity and governance is implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KOICA, which handle grant aid. Therefore, although the specific concepts and scopes of infrastructure may differ between South Korea and Japan, it can be assessed that both countries, with their relatively clear distinction between concessional and grant aid, have a high potential for mutual exchange based on the micro-level distinctions in their infrastructure concepts.

Second, the diversification and privatization of financing methods for implementing infrastructure development cooperation projects enhance the potential for infrastructure development cooperation between South Korea and Japan. Hard and physical infrastructure projects are high-cost endeavors, making it difficult to undertake various projects solely through traditional official development assistance. Therefore, the utilization of private funding beyond ODA is crucial. To facilitate this, "blended finance," where ODA acts as a catalyst, is recommended in the international community. Many developed donor countries have institutionalized DFIs as a means to activate the private sector and mobilize private capital in international development. Japan currently utilizes the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) as an institution similar to a DFI, and the US DFC officially serves this role (Oh Soo-hyun 2019). In contrast, South Korea has not yet launched a DFI and is temporarily relying on the Export-Import Bank of Korea to fulfill this role. The Export-Import Bank of Korea participated as a partner in the meeting on joint financing in the Indo-Pacific region with the US DFC in 2020. A pressing task for the government is to establish a South Korean DFI and grant it the institutional authority to mobilize private capital, in order to pursue infrastructure development cooperation initiatives with Japan and the United States. The availability of private funding to support high-cost infrastructure projects will naturally encourage the private sector to become development partners and voluntarily participate in South Korea-Japan infrastructure projects.

[Figure 2] Comparison of Grant Aid/Concessional Loan Allocation Ratios among Major OECD DAC Member Countries (as of 2018)

Source: OECD 2019

Third, examining the development aid promotion structures of South Korea and Japan reveals that both countries are partners capable of jointly pursuing infrastructure development cooperation initiatives among Indo-Pacific nations. As shown in [Figure 2], when ODA composition is divided into concessional loans and grant aid, both South Korea and Japan allocate a significantly higher proportion to concessional loans compared to other OECD DAC member countries. Japan allocates approximately 60% of its total ODA to concessional loans, while South Korea allocates about 40%, ranking first and third among DAC member countries in 2018, respectively. While both countries face criticism from civil society and the international community for their government-led, commercially oriented development aid due to the high proportion of concessional loans, the characteristic of having a high proportion of concessional loans in both countries signifies that a development aid method suitable for infrastructure development projects has already been institutionalized (Jeong Min-seung 2019). In the case of the United States, where grant aid accounts for nearly 100%, pursuing infrastructure cooperation between South Korea and the US or Japan solely with ODA funds, without mobilizing DFIs, may lead to difficulties in achieving chemically bonded cooperation due to the disparate financial structures, making it challenging to achieve outcomes with development effectiveness. Furthermore, the ODA promotion systems of South Korea and Japan are organized in remarkably similar structures. South Korea's current system closely resembles Japan's system prior to 2008. Japan established JBIC, exclusively for concessional loans, in 1999, and then launched the "New Japan International Cooperation Agency (New JICA)" in 2008, integrating concessional and grant aid to address fragmentation issues. However, there is a growing movement to revert to the previous system (Kim Tae-gyun 2010). South Korea currently has separate agencies for concessional and grant aid, and the issue of fragmentation in its ODA promotion system, similar to Japan before 2008, has been a topic of discussion. Both countries have experienced fragmentation issues, and given the strong similarities between the agencies responsible for concessional loans, their expertise and autonomy in infrastructure projects are considered relatively high. Therefore, infrastructure cooperation between South Korea and Japan has a high potential to generate strong solidarity and synergistic effects compared to any other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Consequently, infrastructure development cooperation should be actively pursued as a starting point for South Korea-Japan cooperation within the plurilateral cooperation platform in the Indo-Pacific region.

Finally, for the South Korea-Japan infrastructure development cooperation initiative to be implemented, policy coordination is required to appropriately link the comparative advantage infrastructure projects of both countries. Although South Korea and Japan share similar promotion systems and financial structures for infrastructure development cooperation, their financial scales and areas of comparative advantage differ. Therefore, dialogue channels between South Korea and Japan must be continuously maintained to enable mutual complementarity, and through these channels, the optimal infrastructure cooperation methods should be determined. For example, South Korea could offer human connectivity infrastructure projects while Japan undertakes hard infrastructure components, and through this collaborative effort, experiments can be conducted to find the optimal approach by gradually transitioning roles. Policy coordination between South Korea and Japan can proceed through direct bilateral cooperation, but pursuing infrastructure cooperation within plurilateral cooperation frameworks such as the Quad offers expanded potential for direct linkage with other participating countries like the United States, Australia, and India. It also serves as a crucial defensive shield, utilizing plurilateral cooperation to avoid direct scrutiny from China.

IV. Plurilateralism in South Korea-Japan Infrastructure Development Cooperation: Quad, B3W, PGII

Realistically, the most advisable approach to fostering a new cooperative relationship between South Korea and Japan is to commence with the soft issue area of infrastructure development cooperation. It is highly probable that infrastructure development cooperation between South Korea and Japan in the Indo-Pacific region will take the form of cooperation with regional partners or based on plurilateralism. Indeed, the United States, Japan, and the EU have all explicitly stated their intention to build networks through cooperation with regional partners, countries that have established their own Indo-Pacific strategies, and through plurilateral cooperation and relevant international organizations to implement their Indo-Pacific strategies. Japan's infrastructure development cooperation is also expected to be pursued through this framework (Song Ji-sun 2022, 8). Although South Korea has not yet actively participated in plurilateral cooperation frameworks in the Indo-Pacific region, its decisions to join the Quad and IPEF under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration are likely to position it as an important partner among regional cooperation countries in the near future. If direct bilateral cooperation between South Korea and Japan is premature or insufficient to normalize bilateral relations, it is necessary to pursue infrastructure development cooperation initiatives within the framework of plurilateralism, adhering to the norms and principles applicable within plurilateral cooperation, as a pilot project for South Korea-Japan cooperation, in close communication with Japan during the process of joining plurilateral frameworks like the Quad. The Quad and B3W/PGII are representative examples of plurilateral cooperation frameworks within which South Korea and Japan can pursue infrastructure development cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. It is anticipated that infrastructure cooperation within these two plurilateral frameworks will automatically lead to trilateral cooperation with the United States ([Figure 3]).

[Figure 3] Structural Relationship of South Korea-US-Japan Infrastructure Initiatives

Source: Author's compilation

Amidst intensifying strategic competition between the US and China, the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region is expanding to counter China's aggressive Belt and Road Initiative. South Korea, which was previously hesitant to join the Quad, is now accelerating its participation in the Quad, a core element of the US and Japanese Indo-Pacific strategies, following the transfer of power to the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration. For the United States, it is a crucial strategy to attract South Korea, with its advanced semiconductor industry including companies like Samsung Electronics, into a plurilateral economic security framework led by the US and Japan. Both the US and Japan likely share the common perception that South Korea, as an ally of the US and a developed democratic nation, needs to align its efforts within the Indo-Pacific strategy to complete the FOIP. The participation of South Korea in the Quad and B3W/PGII, among other US Indo-Pacific strategies, is significant because it contributes to the establishment of new global security and economic norms and cooperation led by the US through plurilateralism. For South Korea, participating in plurilateral cooperation offers positive signals, such as expanded opportunities to enter the Indo-Pacific market through infrastructure investment, participation in joint projects, and strengthening the competitiveness of domestic companies in digital and new technology issues by cooperating with major regional powers. The cooperative relationship in the Indo-Pacific region between South Korea and the US has already been established through the New Southern Policy. Therefore, the upcoming task is to determine how to incorporate South Korea-Japan cooperation into the Indo-Pacific strategy. In this context, all three countries—South Korea, the US, and Japan—recognize the necessity of South Korea-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, and the plurilateral cooperation frameworks of the Quad and B3W/PGII serve as platforms for infrastructure cooperation at the intersection of the three countries' interests in infrastructure development cooperation.

1. Infrastructure Development Cooperation within the Quad

The Quad, comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, originated as a plurilateral cooperation framework in the Indo-Pacific region and plays a pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific strategies of its member countries. The Quad has evolved from a strategic dialogue maintained through regular summit meetings and information exchange among the four countries since 2007, including joint military exercises, into a plurilateral cooperation framework for the Indo-Pacific region. Its scope of activities has expanded significantly beyond security issues to include humanitarian aid related to COVID-19 and infrastructure development cooperation. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific strategies of the US and Japan concerning infrastructure development cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region reflect efforts to stabilize cooperative relationships with their recipient countries through plurilateral cooperation, which is largely a strategy to differentiate themselves from China's aggressive aid. The US and Japan have been promoting high-quality infrastructure support within the region through the Quad and pursuing quality infrastructure support via the BDN. In September 2021, the four Quad countries declared the establishment of a "New Quad Infrastructure Partnership," agreeing on principles such as coordinating infrastructure support, identifying regional infrastructure needs, providing technical assistance based on mutual cooperation, collaborating with like-minded countries such as the G7, G20, and the EU, providing sustainable high-level infrastructure support, and maintaining continuous linkage with the BDN (Song Ji-sun 2022, 20). In particular, the BDN, launched by the US in November 2019 as a multi-stakeholder initiative, serves as a platform for private capital investment formed by the four Quad countries to provide evaluation and certification for global infrastructure development projects, focusing on financial transparency, environmental sustainability, and the measurement of economic development impact. It promotes public-private cooperation in conjunction with the Quad's infrastructure projects.

However, as Quad member countries establish their own infrastructure initiatives and cooperation among like-minded countries becomes more complex, the coordination function among infrastructure donor countries has emerged as a key issue. The US is pursuing the establishment of a coordination system for regional infrastructure projects, including the launch of the Quad Infrastructure Coordination Group in September 2021. However, the limited number of countries participating in the Quad Infrastructure Coordination Group and the lack of active participation from donor countries such as the EU, France, and Germany, which have established their own regional infrastructure cooperation strategies, are expected to lead to policy coordination issues among donor countries. This situation contradicts the principle of harmonization of donor policies, one of the five principles of the 2005 Paris Declaration, occurring within the Indo-Pacific region. Notably, India, a key participant in the Quad, maintains ambiguous cooperative relationships with countries like China and Russia, leading to actions that counter US leadership. These conflicts have been further amplified by Indian Prime Minister Modi's refusal to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Given that the US and Japan are pursuing standardization efforts for the "quality infrastructure" principle as a global norm through plurilateral cooperation within the Quad, South Korea must adhere to the quality infrastructure principles pursued by the US and Japan and make efforts to lead in this regard to launch an infrastructure development cooperation initiative with Japan within the Quad. The US and Japan have continuously strived to systematically manage the quality of infrastructure support and differentiate it from China's infrastructure policies by achieving global agreements such as the G7 Ise-Shima Principles for Infrastructure Investment in 2016, the APEC Summit Declaration in 2017, and the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment in 2019 (Song Ji-sun 2022, 19). To align with these efforts, the South Korean government must lay the foundation for South Korea-Japan cooperation by establishing a DFI and strengthening the transparency and accountability of infrastructure projects.

2. Infrastructure Development Cooperation within B3W/PGII

At the G7 Summit held in Cornwall, UK, in June 2021, the Biden administration agreed with G7 member countries to promote the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, a global infrastructure plan targeting low- and middle-income countries in the Global South, as a countermeasure to China's Belt and Road Initiative. South Korea, invited by the US along with Australia, South Africa, and India, participated in the G7 Summit and expressed its intention to join the B3W initiative, which was fundamentally agreed upon by the G7. The B3W initiative declares its main goals as value-driven, high-standard, and transparent infrastructure support, reflecting a practical intention by the US to address the shortcomings of China's infrastructure policies and institutionalize new global norms and principles led by the US for the substantial benefit of developing countries (The White House 2021). At the 2022 G7 Summit in Germany, the G7 agreed on the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) based on the B3W initiative, further expanding the scale of infrastructure project support centered on the G7 and promising more active support to the Global South.

B3W/PGII can be assessed as a global-level anti-China infrastructure cooperation initiative, rather than a regional one, as it has garnered agreement at a global level beyond the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, B3W/PGII encompasses a global scope, from Latin America and the Caribbean to Africa and the Indo-Pacific region. G7 partner countries play a leading role in each region to oversee all low- and middle-income countries situated in the Global South. As governance principles for this, the Biden administration, along with other G7 member countries, has established six criteria: (1) value-driven, (2) good governance and strong standards, (3) climate-friendly, (4) strong strategic partnerships, (5) mobilize private capital through development finance, and (6) enhancing the impact of multilateral public finance. G7 member countries have pledged to meet the infrastructure needs of developing countries, estimated at $40 trillion, through B3W/PGII, promising hundreds of billions of dollars in future support. By presenting a support scale approximately ten times larger than China's Belt and Road Initiative, the G7 member countries have demonstrated cooperation in countering China. The US has explained its plan to invest billions of dollars through bilateral and multilateral channels, including mobilizing private capital and promoting investment from DFIs and multilateral development banks, to advance B3W/PGII (The White House 2021).

B3W/PGII represents an effort to alter the rules and standards of infrastructure development cooperation advocated by China and to establish alternative global norms and principles. Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether the US, G7 member countries, and like-minded countries can provide the promised scale of development finance as planned. Specifically, a plan has not yet been announced on how to raise the massive $40 trillion in funds, and the institutional arrangements among B3W/PGII participating countries are considered less organized than those in the Indo-Pacific region. For South Korea to participate in B3W/PGII, it must improve the quality of its concessional ODA to comply with the value-based, high-standard, and transparent infrastructure development cooperation principles advocated by the G7. Above all, establishing a Korean-style DFI is an urgent priority. Furthermore, while pursuing collaboration with Japan through the Quad in the Indo-Pacific region, South Korea must also explore the possibility of infrastructure cooperation with Japan within the plurilateral cooperation framework of B3W/PGII at the global level.

V. Conclusion: Strategic Formulation of Infrastructure Development Cooperation as a Starting Point for South Korea-Japan Cooperation

Given the changes in the political landscape of the Indo-Pacific region and of South Korea and Japan, domestic and international variables are opening up new political opportunities for South Korea. This suggests that the restoration of at least minimal South Korea-Japan relations may be possible through South Korea's new Indo-Pacific strategy. This restorative capacity in South Korea-Japan relations can begin with development cooperation centered on infrastructure and humanitarian aid. Through infrastructure development cooperation in "low politics," it may be possible to explore the potential for restoring South Korea-Japan relations to "high politics." The South Korea-Japan infrastructure development cooperation initiative can be conceived as bilateral cooperation, but it is time to consider pursuing infrastructure cooperation with Japan through plurilateral cooperation frameworks in the Indo-Pacific region, such as the Quad, and the global platform of B3W/PGII. Cooperation with Japan can serve as a catalyst for automatic trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan, and through this mediation, it can counter China's economic pressure by accessing the broader regional market of the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, if South Korea-Japan infrastructure cooperation is successfully pursued, the possibility of infrastructure cooperation with China can also be explored. Therefore, rather than explicitly excluding China's Belt and Road Initiative, it would be prudent to leave open the possibility of coexistence. Ultimately, the invisible war in the Indo-Pacific region is part of a strategic competition over whether to reorganize the official development cooperation norms and principles prevalent in the region around the US or to replace them with China-centric development standards.

A crucial strategy to consider when seeking infrastructure development cooperation as a starting point for South Korea-Japan cooperation is a comprehensive approach. The "integrated approach," which is gaining prominence in international development and being mainstreamed by the UN, can serve as the foundation for a comprehensive strategy for South Korea-Japan infrastructure development cooperation. Based on the extensibility of infrastructure, an integrated way of thinking that links human capital and climate environment to social overhead capital facility projects should be reflected in the process of restoring South Korea-Japan relations. The integrated approach encompasses not only the horizontal expansion across sectors covered by infrastructure projects but also the vertical expansion across plurilateral cooperation frameworks, which represent a strategic space for South Korea to cooperate with Japan. In other words, by reducing the interfaces between different forms of plurilateralism, policy coordination between differently designed infrastructure projects becomes possible, establishing an organic relationship. The B3W/PGII infrastructure projects planned at the global level should not operate independently from the Quad-centric infrastructure projects planned in the Indo-Pacific region but should be interconnected, allowing for the free exchange of resources and personnel. Therefore, when South Korea pursues infrastructure cooperation with Japan within B3W/PGII and the Quad, it must adopt a strategic stance that considers vertical expansion.

Finally, there is the immediate challenge of establishing a South Korean DFI to discuss infrastructure development with Japan's JBIC. When Japan and the US actively envision infrastructure projects in South Korea and the Indo-Pacific region, a South Korean partner institution is needed to discuss and coordinate private capital acquisition and mobilization. The fact that the Export-Import Bank of Korea is currently fulfilling this role is likely to result in a strategic disadvantage for South Korea. Furthermore, given the high probability of developing a concessional loan-centered infrastructure cooperation relationship with Japan, efforts are needed to improve the content and systems of South Korea's concessional loan projects experienced thus far. As the US and Japan continuously emphasize strengthening quality infrastructure capabilities, if South Korea fails to meet these standards, its qualification as a partner sharing democracy and the rule of law may not be highly attractive to Japan.■

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[1] Korea and the United States established the ROK-U.S. New Southern Policy-Indo-Pacific Strategy Dialogue channel in August 2020. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, working-level consultations were held virtually, leading to a decision to strengthen cooperation in law enforcement, cybersecurity, and Pacific Island countries. Furthermore, additional consultations on infrastructure investment in ASEAN and the Mekong region were initiated at the end of 2020.

■ Author: Kim Tae-gyun_Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Oxford in the UK and the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University in the US. His main research areas include international development, peace studies, international political sociology, and global governance. His major publications include The Korean State and Social Policy: How South Korea Lifted Itself from Poverty and Dictatorship to Affluence and Democracy" (Oxford University Press, 2011), "Counter-Hegemonic Coexistence: Asian Reproductions of Global Accountability" (Seoul National University Press, 2018), and "Critical Korean International Development Theory: A Developmental Reflection on International Development" (Pakyongsa, 2019).

■ Responsible for and edited by: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 204) hspark@eai.or.kr