[Future Vision Series for Japan-Korea Cooperation] IV. The Potential for ROK-US-Japan Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region

Introduction

Is trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan possible in the Indo-Pacific region? If so, what form could it take? The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential for ROK-US-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Historically, ROK-US-Japan cooperation has centered on the North Korean issue. However, the Biden administration is actively promoting functional solidarity to build a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific, fostering cooperation among allies and particularly emphasizing the need for improved ROK-Japan relations and cooperation. Consequently, the agenda of ROK-US-Japan solidarity as regional cooperation is emerging.

Regarding ROK-US-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Yasuyo Sakata clearly indicated in the spring and summer of 2021 that the Biden administration's stance, along with joint statements between the US and Japan, and between the ROK and the US, showed a growing movement for trilateral cooperation in the region (Sakata 2021). However, she assessed that differences in national approaches meant that concrete cooperation was still distant at that time. Subsequently, Fumio Kishida's cabinet was inaugurated in Japan on October 4, 2021, and Yoon Suk-yeol was elected president of South Korea on March 9, 2022. According to Junya Nishino, South Korea and Japan have reasons to prioritize improving relations, and there is increasing scope for cooperation on issues such as North Korea, Russia, and Indo-Pacific strategy (Nishino 2022). Therefore, this paper will examine the development of ROK-US and ROK-Japan consultations in the Indo-Pacific region and explore potential areas for trilateral cooperation.

I. US-Japan and ROK-US Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

As Sakata pointed out, the United States is the most proactive nation regarding ROK-US-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. The Biden administration clearly signaled its active stance from the outset. In an op-ed published in The Washington Post on March 14, 2021, prior to their visits to Japan and South Korea, Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin expressed their commitment to strengthening relations among allies. The two secretaries asserted that the three nations—the US, Japan, and South Korea—are already cooperating not only on North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles but also on upholding democratic values, climate change, cybersecurity, health security, pandemic response, and strengthening economic ties. They argued that a 'free and open Indo-Pacific region based on respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law' is a shared goal for the three countries. Furthermore, they stated that China is posing a threatening challenge to this international order, and only by joining forces can the ROK, US, and Japan defend against China's challenge (Blinken and Austin 2022).

The Biden administration's position was subsequently reflected in joint statements with the Japanese and South Korean governments. The third section of the joint statement from the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), or '2+2,' on March 16, 2021, stated, 'Trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea is indispensable for the security, peace, and prosperity of our shared Indo-Pacific region.'[1]This marked the first time that ROK-US-Japan cooperation was mentioned in the context of the Indo-Pacific in an official US-Japan document (Sakata 2021). At a press conference following the US-Japan summit on April 16 of the same year, then-Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga stated that he and President Biden shared the view that 'trilateral cooperation among the ROK, the US, and Japan is becoming increasingly important for responding to North Korea and for the peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region, and confirmed that they would promote such cooperation' (Prime Minister's Office of Japan 2021). The joint statement from the SCC on January 7, 2022, also included the agreement to 'strengthen bilateral and trilateral cooperation between the US, Japan, and the ROK, which is indispensable for shared security, peace, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and the world' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2021a). However, in the joint statement following the US-Japan virtual summit on January 21, a more nuanced expression was used: 'Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden confirmed the importance of close cooperation between the US, Japan, and the ROK to address common challenges and emphasized that robust trilateral relations beyond security are indispensable' (The White House 2022a).

Meanwhile, South Korea maintained an approach of interpreting its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region within the context of ROK-US relations. The joint statement from the ROK-US Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting on March 18, 2021, did not explicitly state that ROK-US-Japan cooperation was for Indo-Pacific cooperation. Instead, it stated that the ROK and the US would cooperate to promote peace, security, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region (U.S. Department of State 2021). The US and South Korea sought policy coordination by aligning the Biden administration's 'Indo-Pacific Strategy' with the Moon Jae-in administration's 'New Southern Policy.' The New Southern Policy was one of three initiatives to realize President Moon's 'Northeast Asia Plus Community of Responsibility' (along with the 'Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Platform' and the 'New Northern Policy'), and it was an initiative introduced during President Moon's visit to Indonesia in November 2017. The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Platform was considered the 'axis of peace,' while the New Southern Policy and New Northern Policy were considered the 'axis of prosperity' (Lee Jong-won 2020). The New Southern Policy aimed to develop relations between South Korea and ASEAN towards building a 'human community,' 'peace community,' and 'co-prosperity community,' thereby strengthening strategic cooperation and economic cooperation through a 'Special Strategic Partnership' with India, alongside practical cooperation with the four surrounding powers (US, China, Japan, Russia).[2]

Furthermore, the New Southern Policy evolved into the 'New Southern Policy Plus,' announced in November 2020, by developing cooperative initiatives to respond to US-China confrontation and the COVID-19 outbreak. The New Southern Policy Plus outlined seven efforts: 1) comprehensive healthcare cooperation, 2) sharing Korean models for human resource development, 3) promoting mutual cultural exchange, 4) realizing mutually beneficial and sustainable trade and investment, 5) supporting local villages and developing urban infrastructure, 6) cooperation in emerging industries, and 7) cooperation to achieve safe and peaceful communities (Kim 2021).

The Moon Jae-in administration held a 'ROK-US Dialogue on Indo-Pacific Strategy and New Southern Policy' with the Trump administration in August 2020. After the launch of the Biden administration, approximately two months after the aforementioned ROK-US Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, a director-level consultation titled 'ROK-US Policy Dialogue on ASEAN and Southeast Asia' was held on May 13, 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea 2021). Approximately one week later, in a joint statement on May 21, the leaders of the ROK and the US stated, 'We oppose any activities that undermine the rules-based international order, cause instability, or pose a threat to it, and agree to maintain a comprehensive, free, and open Indo-Pacific.' They also agreed to 'align South Korea's New Southern Policy with the US vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific and cooperate to create a secure, prosperous, and dynamic region' (The White House 2021a). The ROK and the US integrated the two working-level consultations mentioned above and held the '1st ROK-US Dialogue on Southeast Asia and Oceania Policy' on February 9, 2022. Consultations were conducted to coordinate the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the New Southern Policy under the agenda items of 'Policy Priorities and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and Oceania' and 'Areas of Transnational Themes with Potential for Cooperation' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea 2022).

II. Heightened Atmosphere for ROK-US-Japan Cooperation

As discussed above, Japan showed a responsive attitude to the Biden administration's trilateral cooperation approach, which sought to include Indo-Pacific regional cooperation within the ROK-US-Japan framework. However, the Moon Jae-in administration maintained a bilateral approach of coordinating its New Southern Policy with the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. Nevertheless, since 2022, the Biden administration has been pursuing diplomacy that promotes ROK-US-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, predicated on the improvement of ROK-Japan relations.

The Biden administration explicitly stated its intention to promote ROK-US-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region on February 11, 2022, immediately after the '1st ROK-US Dialogue on Southeast Asia and Oceania Policy.' While continuing to mention ROK-US-Japan cooperation in Section 4 concerning North Korea, Section 2 on strengthening diplomatic relations urged the strengthening of relations among US allies and cited 'South Korea and Japan' as examples (The White House 2022b, pp. 9, 13). Furthermore, the 'Action Plan' listed at the end of the document treated 'Expanding ROK-US-Japan Cooperation' as a standalone initiative, expressing the will to coordinate regional strategies among the three countries beyond their current level by cooperating not only on responses to North Korea but also on issues related to aid and infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region, critical technologies, supply chains, and women's leadership and rights (The White House 2022b, p. 17).

On February 12, 2022, one day after the announcement of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the ROK-US-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting was held in Honolulu, the first in five years. In their joint statement, the foreign ministers of the three countries emphasized 'shared recognition of a comprehensive, free, and open Indo-Pacific, shared respect for the rules-based international order, and pledged to further expand trilateral cooperation' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2022b). The joint statement mentioned North Korea, the Ukraine crisis, and Myanmar, and in the middle section, it stated, 'We strongly oppose any actions that attempt to change the status quo in the region or that increase tensions.' At the end, it stated, 'We emphasized the importance of trilateral cooperation to strengthen the rules-based economic order and ensure prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and the world.' They also confirmed their intention to align in the economic security field, including cooperation on climate crisis, critical supply chains, gender equality and rights, development finance, the COVID-19 pandemic, and further strengthening intelligence and cybersecurity, as well as promoting innovation in critical emerging technologies based on democratic values and respect for universal human rights (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2022b).

Most importantly, President Yoon Suk-yeol, elected in March 2022, advocates for a 'Global Pivotal State' and has outlined a policy of expanding South Korea's role in the region and the international community by respecting alliances, liberal democracy, market economy, and human rights (nippon.com 2022). Prime Minister Kishida has indicated his willingness to improve relations, meeting with the policy consultation delegation sent to Japan by President Yoon (Abe Ryutaro 2022). The forward-looking moves by both governments led to an agreement between the leaders of South Korea and Japan at their summit on March 16, 2023, to jointly respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats and cooperate in pursuing their respective Indo-Pacific strategies.

III. Potential for Trilateral Cooperation by Functional Area

These developments indicate a growing momentum to promote ROK-US-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. The three areas actively promoted by the Biden administration—climate change policy, pandemic response, and strengthening economic ties—are considered areas where South Korea and Japan can readily advance trilateral cooperation. We will examine the existing US-Japan and ROK-US cooperation in these three areas and consider potential individual policy tasks for cooperation.

1. Climate and Clean Energy

Regarding climate change, the US and Japan issued a joint statement on 'US-Japan Climate Partnership for Ambitious Decarbonization and Clean Energy' at their summit in April 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2021c). The ROK and the US also agreed to cooperate on climate change and clean energy in their joint statement from their summit in May of the same year (The White House 2021). What ROK-US-Japan can do in solidarity is to coordinate public-private investment for Indo-Pacific countries in line with the goal of 'achieving net-zero global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050,' a goal already being pursued by the US-Japan and ROK-US partnerships.

Japan and the United States have already established programs such as the Japan-US Mekong Power Partnership (JUMPP) and the Japan-US Clean Energy Partnership (JUCEP). South Korea's participation could be considered. On the other hand, South Korea and the United States aim to promote cooperation through information exchange on nature-based solutions for decarbonization, as well as leading international conferences on marine debris and plastic pollution. Japan should also actively participate in these initiatives and draw in Indo-Pacific countries.

In particular, ROK-US-Japan should prioritize energy issues, which lie at the root of climate change problems. While progress in clean energy technology cooperation between the US-Japan and ROK-US is evident, trilateral cooperation should be sought in areas such as renewable energy, energy storage technologies (hydrogen energy, lithium-ion batteries, etc.), and smart grids, and programs should be developed to offer these to Indo-Pacific countries.

2. Health Security

ROK-US-Japan are undertaking various efforts to prevent and prepare for future pandemics, and such cooperative relationships have been confirmed between the US-Japan and ROK-US (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2021d). In the healthcare sector, establishing multilateral cooperation beyond bilateral cooperation with the US is paramount and crucial. For example, the US, Australia, Japan, and India (QUAD) are working as part of a vaccine partnership to strengthen vaccine manufacturing capacity. Efforts are underway to manufacture, procure, and distribute safe, effective, and affordable vaccines in the Indo-Pacific region. South Korea should be actively drawn into the Quad Vaccine Partnership. Furthermore, to prepare for the sudden outbreak of pandemics in the Indo-Pacific region at any time, ROK-US-Japan should establish a system for effective response by securing a resource pool in terms of medical equipment and supplies, and health security costs. As members of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) for infectious disease countermeasures, ROK-US-Japan should agree on priority tasks in this area, create various plans, and take the lead in guiding member countries.

3. Strengthening Economic Relations

Although the Biden administration's return to the CPTPP is highly unlikely, it has announced its intention to promote the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) within its Indo-Pacific Strategy. According to the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the IPEF includes promoting high-standard trade, digital economy governance, strengthening supply chains and enhancing security, promoting transparent and high-standard infrastructure investment, and strengthening digital connectivity (The White House 2022). Furthermore, the IPEF, launched in May 2022, is structured around four pillars: 1) Trade Facilitation and Digital Trade, 2) Supply Chain Resilience, 3) Clean Economy and Decarbonization, and 4) Fair Economy (Tax and Anti-Corruption). Countries can participate in the pillars they choose (Hoyama 2022; Meltzer 2022). South Korea and Japan are likely to fully participate in the IPEF structure, providing an opportunity for ROK-US-Japan to align and strengthen their economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.

The delegation sent to Washington by President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol (at the time) in early April 2022 conveyed the intention that 'South Korea, as a responsible major country, hopes to jointly build the regional economic order' during discussions with the US (Park Hee-chang 2022). It was also reported that the South Korean government would establish a task force to consider joining the IPEF (Yonhap News Agency 2022). While some view the IPEF cynically, suggesting it will not have the same economic impact as US accession to the CPTPP, the absence of a US strategy for regional economic engagement is also undesirable. Therefore, the Kishida and Yoon administrations must work in concert with the Biden administration to promote the IPEF in the Indo-Pacific region, even as a second-best option. Furthermore, since the Moon Jae-in administration applied for CPTPP accession and the Yoon Suk-yeol administration is expected to engage in accession negotiations (JoongAng Ilbo 2022), Japan should also support South Korea's accession and continue to promote the expansion of a high-standard free trade network.

IV. Exploring Strategic Cooperation

The three areas of ROK-US-Japan cooperation discussed in the previous section are areas where some progress has already been made. On the other hand, areas of cooperation with high barriers include the long-standing issue of export controls between South Korea and Japan, and the issue of a Taiwan contingency, which could provoke China. While these are difficult issues that do not require immediate active cooperation, they are problems that cannot be ignored if a free and open regional order is to be realized. In particular, political leaders of South Korea and Japan need to exercise leadership, so this section will examine these issues.

1. Advanced Technology Cooperation

In April 2021, the US and Japan proposed the 'US-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership,' identifying areas for US-Japan cooperation in competitiveness and innovation, including 5G and next-generation mobile communication networks (6G or Beyond 5G), building cybersecurity capabilities, establishing international standards, fostering and protecting critical technologies including semiconductors and managing supply chains, biotechnology including genome analysis, and quantum technology (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2021d). Meanwhile, in the Fact Sheet released at the ROK-US summit in May 2021, ROK-US cooperation areas included mutually complementary investments in semiconductors, joint research and development in artificial intelligence (AI) and 6G, development and standardization policies for 5G Open RAN technology, and space cooperation for civilian purposes (participation in the Artemis program), including South Korean satellite positioning systems (The White House 2021b).

In the realm of advanced technologies, South Korea and Japan can reach agreements on principles of use and cooperate on dissemination and supply chains, particularly with the Indo-Pacific region in mind. At the Quad summit on September 24, 2021, the US and Japan presented 'Principles for United States, Japan, Australia, and India on Technology Design, Development, Governance, and Use,' establishing principles in three sections: 'Upholding Universal Values,' 'Building Trust, Soundness, and Resilience,' and 'Promoting Healthy Competition and International Cooperation to Advance the Frontiers of Science and Technology.' These principles include statements such as 'Technology should not be misused or abused for malicious activities such as authoritarian surveillance or repression, terrorist purposes, or the spread of disinformation.' As South Korea is a country that supports these principles, ROK-US-Japan should agree on shared principles for the use of advanced technologies and promote agreement on technology export policies to Indo-Pacific and other countries.

Furthermore, ROK-US-Japan can consider strengthening cooperation to address various risks and threats that may arise in the diverse technology supply chains of the Indo-Pacific region. In their May 2021 summit joint statement, the ROK and the US explored the establishment of a ROK-US supply chain task force and a working group on bilateral investment screening cooperation (The White House 2021b). Meanwhile, the US and Japan also agreed to establish a ministerial-level US-Japan Economic Policy Consultative Committee (economic version of '2+2') during their virtual summit on January 22, 2022 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2022a), and held its first meeting in July 2022. ROK-US-Japan could initially consider establishing a forum for information exchange on risks affecting supply chains in the Indo-Pacific region. The Japanese government is proceeding with the enactment of the Economic Security Promotion Act, and the South Korean government has enacted the Special Act on the Promotion and Protection of National Strategic Technologies (Semiconductor Special Act) and is working on supply chain management for economic security. Therefore, there is potential to develop ROK-Japan or ROK-US-Japan cooperation in this area, requiring political leadership from both South Korea and Japan.

2. New Security Cooperation

To date, the US-Japan alliance has engaged in various defense and security cooperation with deterrence and response to North Korea and China in mind, while the ROK-US alliance has focused on deterrence and response to North Korea. As North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, it is natural for ROK-US-Japan to maintain close consultations on responses to the North Korean issue and take appropriate measures.

Meanwhile, in recent years, the possibility of China's forceful unification of Taiwan has emerged as a significant threat to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there has been discussion about how China might revise its thinking or calculations regarding the conquest of Taiwan. However, if China were to use force against Taiwan, it is unclear when or in what form it would occur. Nevertheless, if China were to launch a military attack on Taiwan, it is difficult to imagine that the United States would remain inactive. To delay a US military response, China might consider the possibility of attacking US forces in Japan or South Korea using various means. This era necessitates such considerations.

In this context, the US-Japan alliance, the ROK-US alliance, and furthermore, the US-Australia alliance are expected to play a role in deterring China's use of force. While care must be taken not to excessively provoke China, without pursuing new defense cooperation in discreet ways, a favorable military balance for ROK-US-Japan in Northeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific cannot be maintained. There are undoubtedly barriers to advancing defense cooperation between South Korea and Japan. First, defense and diplomatic authorities of ROK-US-Japan could consider consultations starting from a shared sense of crisis that discord leads to weakened deterrence. South Korea, recognizing the vital importance of sea lanes around Taiwan, likely fully understands the necessity of responding to such a situation. It is conceivable that the United States, Japan, and South Korea, possibly including Australia, could secretly consult on contingency plans for Taiwan, aiming to deter China's use of force and promote regional peace and stability by coordinating roles, missions, and necessary capabilities and systems. This should be pursued in the near future.

Conclusion

If ROK-US-Japan can effectively align in various fields, the formation of a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region will be facilitated. This paper has not covered all possible areas for ROK-US-Japan cooperation. However, areas such as climate change, energy, health security, and strengthening regional economic relations are fields in which the US, Japan, and South Korea are already cooperating, and greater effects can be expected if a trilateral cooperation framework is established. Strategic cooperation in areas such as advanced technologies and Taiwan contingencies presents political challenges and undeniable high barriers, but they are not impossible to overcome. As is well known, improving ROK-Japan relations is a prerequisite, and particularly in light of the significant barriers of export controls and historical issues, the South Korean government's announcement of a solution for forced labor in March 2023 marked a step forward in improving relations.

As a result of the Japanese government's removal of South Korea from the list of countries subject to preferential export treatment (so-called whitelist or Group A countries) under Article 3 of the Export Trade Control Order (1949 Order No. 378), which took effect on August 28, 2019, general comprehensive permits no longer apply to the export of Korean cargo and provision of technology (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan 2019). In response, on September 18 of the same year, South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy strengthened its overall export controls toward Japan, classifying Japan as a new export control country, judging it to be a country with which international cooperation is difficult, leading to stagnation in ROK-Japan relations for the past few years.

Following the South Korean government's announcement of a solution for forced labor, the ROK-Japan export control policy dialogue resumed on March 2022, after a three-year hiatus since March 2020. Japan agreed to lift the export control measures on three items implemented in 2019, and South Korea agreed to withdraw its WTO complaint regarding these measures. Discussions were also held to restore the removal of South Korea from the whitelist.

In South Korea, debates surrounding the forced labor solution continue amidst a situation where the ruling party does not hold a majority in the legislature. However, it is believed that there is room for Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden to support President Yoon's efforts to resolve the situation through political decisions. One possible approach would be for President Biden to host a ROK-US-Japan summit, fully supporting the mutual responses of South Korea and Japan, and simultaneously promoting the creation of functional ROK-US-Japan cooperation as outlined in Section III.

The biggest hurdle remains the domestic politics of both South Korea and Japan. However, the US President and the ambassadors to Japan and South Korea could strongly support the improvement of ROK-Japan relations, thereby supporting Prime Minister Kishida and President Yoon and attempting to calm domestic public opinion in both countries. Furthermore, discussions among experts, not just political leaders, should be actively pursued regarding the opportunities and achievements that can arise from the improvement of relations between the two countries, which have been stagnant. Through these processes, by strengthening mutual understanding and cooperation, and by building mutual trust as partners capable of flexible policy coordination, the option of South Korea's phased participation in the Quad could become a reality. Ultimately, the question remains to what extent South Korea can align with the United States, Japan, Australia, and India on China policy. The scope of ROK-US-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific will change depending on whether mutual understanding of contributing to peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, not just among ROK-US-Japan, spreads between South Korea and Japan, and to what extent the leaders of both countries can exercise domestic political leadership.

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[1]  Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2021b. The Japanese side was attended by Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi.

[2]  Lee Jong-won. 2020. President Moon explained the core of the New Southern Policy in the online journal “Project Syndicate.” Moon 2017.

■ Author: Satoru Mori_Professor of Contemporary International Relations, Faculty of Law, Keio University. He researches U.S. strategy in Asia, U.S. defense innovation and its impact on allies, and the history of U.S. defense strategy. He holds a Bachelor of Laws from Kyoto University, a Master of Laws from Columbia University and Kyoto University, and a Ph.D. from the University of Tokyo, and previously worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was a visiting scholar at Princeton University from 2014 to 2015 and at George Washington University from 2013 to 2015. His book on U.S. diplomatic history, "The Vietnam War and Alliance Diplomacy" (2009, University of Tokyo Press), received the 15th Hiroshi Shimizu Award for outstanding academic research from the Association for Asian Studies. He has received the Yasuhiro Nakasone Award and is a Senior Fellow at the Yasuhiro Nakasone Peace Research Institute.

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr

Attachment: [Future Vision of Japan-Korea Cooperation] ④ Possibilities for Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.pdf