[Future Vision Series on Japan-Korea Cooperation] ② Focal Points for Coexistence

Introduction

No great power can maintain an overwhelming advantage in power indefinitely. The distribution of power will inevitably shift over time. At that point, will not the order created by the victor's power advantage be challenged by emerging powers that have not benefited from that order? Great powers also suffer from such anxieties.

During periods after World War II when the United States' power advantage, whether military or economic, began to waver, 'power transition' theory and the subsequent 'hegemonic stability' theory were developed to theoretically express these anxieties of great powers.[1] After the end of the Cold War, a unipolar system emerged with no peer to the United States, but this was short-lived. As China's rise cast a shadow over America's power advantage, power transition theory, not significantly different from its earlier iterations, re-emerged.[2] This is the theory of the 'Thucydides's trap.'

Graham Allison argues that shifts in the distribution of power create tensions in the power structure between great powers, leading to 'unintended consequences,' but he does not clearly explain why these tensions lead to war between great powers (Allison 2017). This requires further explanation, especially in the nuclear age, where the breakdown of coordination of interests and the resulting armed conflict would inevitably bring immense sacrifice, damage, and destruction between nuclear-armed great powers.

Indeed, the geopolitical situation in East Asia does not allow for optimism. For example, in March 2021, Admiral David Davidson, then Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, stated to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 'Taiwan is one of the clear ambitions (of China). The threat... will materialize within six years,' indicating a perception of imminent Chinese military action against Taiwan (United States Senate Committee on Armed Services 2021). However, the prevailing view is that the 'flashpoints' of concern for armed conflict in East Asia are not limited to the Taiwan Strait but also include the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea.

Recently, security doctrines focused on preparing for contingencies have gained traction in East Asia. However, on the other hand, it cannot be said that there is a shared perception among related countries, including not only the U.S. and China but also North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, regarding the 'limits of acceptable behavior' during crises without large-scale armed conflict. In particular, it is difficult to speak of 'approved situations among related countries' regarding the flashpoints in East Asia. This paper aims to theoretically clarify the conditions for coexistence from this perspective.[3]

I. Limits of Acceptable Behavior

In times of crisis, the absence of a shared perception among related countries regarding the 'limits of acceptable behavior' can lead to unintended 'escalation of conflict.' Let us consider the following scenario.

There is a conflict of interest between Country A and Country B. A conflict of interest situation typically refers to a scenario where one party achieves a 'more desirable' adjustment of interests on a particular issue, while the other party achieves an 'undesirable' adjustment. For example, let us assume that the two countries are in conflict over the control of the area between lines N and S, as shown in [Figure 1] (Conflict of Interest Situation). Let us also assume that military conflict between the two countries will result in war. In this case, what is the rational course of action for A, advancing from the south, and B, advancing from the north, in deploying their forces up to which of the three lines—N, M, or S?

[Figure 1] Conflict of Interest Situation[Table 1] Conflict and Convergence of Interests

Let us now consider this situation as a game, as presented in [Table 1] 'Conflict and Convergence of Interests.' The players in this game are A and B. As options for action, both A and B have the strategies N (advance to N), M (advance to M), and S (advance to S). This table specifies the outcomes for both countries based on the combination of players' strategies and indicates the payoff each player receives in each outcome. The payoffs are presented in the order of (Payoff for A, Payoff for B).

For example, if neither B, located at N, nor A, located at S, moves their forces, their payoffs remain (0, 0) as there is no new gain for either side. If A remains at S and B advances to M or S, B's payoff increases from 0 to 1 and then to 2 as their controlled territory expands. Conversely, if B remains at N and A advances to M or N, A's payoff also increases from 0 to 1 and then to 2. Furthermore, if both A and B advance to M, their payoffs become (1, 1). However, if A attempts to advance to N while B attempts to advance to S, their forces clash, leading to war. In this scenario, the cost of war (human casualties, financial losses, physical destruction, etc.) is assumed to be sufficiently high, resulting in payoffs of (-1, -1) for both sides due to the war.

Given that both countries are aware that the outcomes are determined by the combination of their strategies, not just one country's strategy, and share the information presented in [Table 1], what would be the rational course of action? We assume here that neither country can observe the other's moves before deciding its own, thus assuming imperfect information. Furthermore, we assume that no binding agreement can be made in advance regarding their action plans, thus assuming the absence of binding agreements.

In this game, it is rational to continuously avoid war and coexist by avoiding confrontation at any of the lines N, M, or S. Specifically, the strategy combinations (N, N), (M, M), and (S, S) (in the order of A's strategy, B's strategy) are stable in the sense that no player can increase their payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy, and thus no player has an incentive to change their strategy to increase their payoff. (In non-cooperative game theory, a combination of strategies where each player's best response strategy maximizes their payoff given the other player's strategy is called a 'Nash equilibrium'). Moreover, the 'coexistence (territorial compartmentalization)' achieved by (N, N), (M, M), and (S, S) is efficient, as it is impossible to increase one party's payoff without decreasing the other party's payoff.

Conversely, (N, M), (N, S), and (M, S) are inefficient because they lead to war and do not satisfy the efficiency condition mentioned above. Therefore, avoiding war to achieve coexistence is a common interest for both countries, and herein lies the 'convergence of interests' between them.

However, there is a clear 'conflict of interests' between the two countries regarding which of the three lines—N, M, or S—will serve as the boundary for coexistence. This is because N is optimal for A, M is second best, and S is worst, while S is optimal for B, M is second best, and N is worst, meaning that a 'more desirable' adjustment of interests for one party becomes a 'less desirable' adjustment for the other.

In a situation where potential boundaries for coexistence are contested, can related countries overcome divergent interests and coexist at a specific boundary? To avoid war, which would bring unbearable sacrifices to both sides, there must be a shared expectation (conceptualized as 'convergent expectations') that the boundary of coexistence will be mutually respected (Schelling 1957, 35). 'Focal points' enable the 'coordination of behavior' through the convergence of expectations about each other's actions (Schelling 1957, 21, 22, 28, 30). Of course, agreement is not always easy, as strategic incentives to elicit concessions from the other party by insisting on an interpretation of 'a red line that no one should cross' that is favorable to oneself are also at play (Schelling 1957, 19). If coordination of behavior is not possible through 'focal points,' it becomes difficult to avoid the outbreak of war or to limit its escalation.

During the Cold War, a certain level of understanding regarding the 'limits of acceptable behavior' was shared between the two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The discussion by diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis is considered a prime example (Gaddis 1986, 132). Although the concept of focal points is not explicitly mentioned, the mutual recognition of spheres of influence, avoidance of direct military confrontation, mutual restraint in the use of nuclear weapons, and mutual restraint in subverting each other's regimes, as enumerated by Gaddis, can also be interpreted through the lens of focal point theory.[4]

II. The Scope of Justifiable Exception

There are several ways to apply focal points to the use of force by states.

First, there is a regime that regulates war. A regime refers to a normative focal point that enables shared expectations among states regarding the appropriate scope of behavior in a particular domain of international relations (Martin and Simmons 2002, 326, 328). The legal regulation of war can generally be divided into the regulation of the outbreak of war ('jus ad bellum') and the regulation of war once it has broken out ('jus in bello'). Here, we will focus on the former legal regulation to consider under what conditions related countries can avoid the outbreak of armed conflict or limit its escalation. Since World War II, the UN Charter has made exceptions for the use of force based on Security Council resolutions (decisions recognizing the existence of a threat to international peace, etc., and measures to maintain or restore international peace) or the right to self-defense (including individual and collective self-defense), while the use of force based on the independent judgment of individual states is not permitted.

Another method is to specify the conditions for collective action by treaty states, based on collective self-defense, through alliance treaties between specific countries. This involves defining the 'casus foederis' (grounds for invoking the treaty).casus foederis The alliance treaties concluded by the United States during the Cold War defined a 'treaty area' and considered an armed attack within this area as grounds for collective action (Fromkin 1970, 696). Provisions for collective action are found in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (signed in 1949), Article 3 of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States (signed in 1953), and Article 4 of the ANZUS Treaty (signed in 1951), among others. In other words, under these mutual defense treaties, an armed attack, which serves as the condition for exercising the 'right' of collective self-defense, is considered the condition for invoking the 'obligation' of collective action by treaty states.

With the exception of actions based on Security Council resolutions or self-defense, the use of force based on the independent judgment of individual states is, in principle, prohibited. There is broad consensus in the international community on this matter. This was evident in the debates surrounding Russia's military action in Ukraine in February 2022. While the UN General Assembly, in a resolution adopted by a majority of member states (with a few opposing votes from Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, Russia, and Syria), condemned Russia's actions as tantamount to 'aggression' (UN Doc., A/RES/ES-11/1, 2 March 2022), Russia, the target of the condemnation, also attempted to justify its use of force based on its interpretation of self-defense as an exception to the principle of non-use of force (for Russia's claims, see S/2022/154, 24 February 2022).[5] In other words, a certain common understanding of the principle of non-use of force enables condemnation and justification among the states that constitute the international community.

Today in East Asia, unlike in the Middle East prior to the 2003 Iraq War, there are no Security Council resolutions that can be interpreted as explicitly permitting the use of force by UN member states (e.g., Resolution S/RES/678 authorizing the use of force during the Gulf War and Resolution S/RES/687 establishing a ceasefire). Therefore, if an act of force occurs, it will likely be based on the right to self-defense. In that case, will there be a clear focal point among states that distinguishes between military actions that can be justified as the use of force in self-defense and those that cannot?

If counterattacks to repel an attack (acts of self-help) and defensive actions, whether individual or collective, are not prohibited as long as they meet the conditions of 'necessity' (no alternative means to eliminate the attack) and 'proportionality' (the scope of the counterattack is not excessive compared to the attack), then threatening a counterattack to signal intent and thereby deter an attack (deterrence that satisfies the self-help requirement) is also not prohibited. However, there is a significant risk that even among allies, perceptions regarding the imminence of a threat will differ when it comes to executing a counterattack against an attack that has not yet materialized (e.g., a preemptive strike against a missile base of a state in a security-deterrence relationship).

If deterrence policy lacks credibility, not only in terms of the 'threat' of imminent military action to justify the use of force in self-defense, but also in terms of the 'restraint' not to engage in military actions that cannot be justified as the use of force in self-defense, it will cause anxiety in the opposing country and, furthermore, fail to alleviate the anxiety of that country. While an expansive interpretation of self-defense may seem to increase options for self-preservation and thus contribute to a country's security, it may actually harm that country's security by failing to achieve convergence in expectations between states. To prevent this situation from worsening, if mutual understanding regarding restraint in the use of force among related countries cannot be established, the arms race will intensify, leading only to heightened tensions between nations.[6]

III. Absence of Focal Points for Coexistence

Among the arms control treaties that existed at the end of the Cold War, the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (signed in 1972) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (signed in 1987) expired in 2002 and 2009, respectively. The ABM Treaty limited the development and deployment of missile systems capable of intercepting strategic ballistic missiles, but the United States announced its withdrawal in December 2001 to respond to new threats after 9/11, leading to its expiration the following year. The INF Treaty was a groundbreaking arms control agreement that stipulated the elimination of all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a certain range, but it expired in 2019 amid concerns about China's nuclear buildup and mutual accusations of treaty violations between the U.S. and Russia.

Against this international backdrop, turning our attention to East Asia, the Japanese government, for example, decided in December 2003 to introduce ballistic missile defense systems, viewing them as 'purely defensive means, the only means available, and suitable for Japan's defense policy of exclusively defense-oriented policy' (Cabinet Decision, December 19, 2003). Subsequently, in 2022, the government adopted the 'National Security Strategy' (Cabinet Decision, December 16, 2022), acknowledging limitations in ballistic missile defense capabilities and deciding to enhance standoff missile defense capabilities that allow for counterattacks within the enemy's territory. Furthermore, with the expiration of the INF Treaty, discussions about the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces in Japan have arisen, and the U.S.'s 'strategic ambiguity' towards Taiwan has become a contentious issue, rendering the future of the East Asian region uncertain.[7]

As discussed so far, external factors are amplifying tensions within the East Asian region. Moreover, despite ongoing arms buildups, as shown in [Table 2], there is insufficient shared understanding among related countries regarding mutually acceptable behavior in potential conflict zones in East Asia where the use of force is a concern. This is a serious situation as it can lead to unintended armed conflict.

[Table 2] Absence of Approved (Mutually Acceptable) Situations Among Related Countries

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Furthermore, not only is there no clearly recognized status quo or consensus among the involved parties for each of the four potential flashpoints, but there is also no shared perception regarding the priority of addressing the disputes in these four areas.

Conclusion: A New Era of Coexistence

Based on the discussion in this paper, for South Korea and Japan to usher in a new era of coexistence, it is imperative that the involved parties, including not only the two nations but also the United States, China, North Korea, and Taiwan, reach a consensus on the "acceptable limits" that can be realized without escalating into large-scale armed conflict during crises. First, attention must be drawn to the seriousness of this issue, fostering regional public opinion through intergovernmental cooperation as well as exchanges of views among private intellectuals as a second track.■

References

Allison, Graham. 2017. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? London: Scribe. xiv.

Christensen, Thomas J. 2015. The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Fromkin, David. 1970. “Entangling Alliances.” Foreign Affairs 48, 4: 688-700.

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1986. “The Long Peace: The Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System.” International Security 10, 4: 99-142.

______. 1987. “The Origins of Self-Deterrence: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1958.” in John Lewis Gaddis. The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 1996. “Thomas Schelling and Strategic Bargaining.” International Journal 51, 3: 555-576.

Martin, Lisa L. and Beth A. Simmons. 2002. “International Organizations and Institutions,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons eds., Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage. 326, 328.

Monteiro, Nuno P. 2014. Theory of Unipolar Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Organski, Abramo Fimo Kenneth. 1958. World Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1957. “Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 1, 1: 19-36.

______. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press.

United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. 2021. Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States Indo-Pacific Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the Future Years Defense Program. March 9. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/21-10_03-09-2021.pdf (Accessed May 4, 2022)

Wohlforth, William C. 1999. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” International Security 24, 1: 5-41.

[1] Power transition theory originates from Organski 1958. Subsequent theories on hegemonic stability originate from Gilpin 1981.

[2] Regarding the stability of the unipolar system after the end of the Cold War, see Wohlforth 1999: 23-28. However, there are also theories suggesting that a 'unipolar world' does not necessarily guarantee peace. These theories posit that power asymmetry arises because the self-restraining commitments of great powers (promises not to use their overwhelming power advantage to coerce concessions from weaker states) are not credible. Monteiro 2014: 156-159.

[3]This was inspired by Christensen's concept of a 'mutually accepted territorial status quo.' While in the East China Sea or South China Sea, the background of confrontation lies in the disagreement among related countries regarding territorial status, in the case of the Taiwan Strait issue or the North Korean nuclear issue, as will be discussed later, the fundamental reason for confrontation is the disagreement among related countries regarding more general political phenomena. Christensen 2015: 106.

[4]Through National Security Council Policy NSC 162/2 (October 30, 1953), the United States solidified its intention to use nuclear weapons in response to aggression by the Soviet bloc, in other words, its intention of 'first use' of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, although proposals for nuclear use were repeatedly made to the President, the United States never made a decision to use nuclear weapons. Gaddis 1987: 105, 124.

[5]Prior to the adoption of this resolution, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida had condemned Russia's 'unilateral change of the status quo by force' as 'aggression.' (Asahi Shimbun, February 28, 2022) Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had previously stated in response to a question at the House of Representatives Budget Committee on April 25, 2013, that the definition of aggression is not established in academia or the international community.

[6]Lebow argues that natural geographical features such as rivers should not be directly treated as focal points between nations, but rather as social constructions arising from the interactions of members of the (international) community. Lebow 1996: 569. In Schelling's interpretation, the Yalu River, the border between Korea and China, was viewed from the US perspective as the 'Rubicon' (i.e., a line that must not be crossed) of the Korean War. Schelling 1966: 134. In response, Lebow argued that for the Chinese side, this was the 38th parallel, and there was no consensus between the two countries. Lebow 1996: 567.

[7]'Strategic ambiguity' is a US policy aimed at simultaneously alleviating Taiwan's 'fear of abandonment' and the US's 'fear of entanglement.' Its purpose is to maintain the political status quo by deterring both unilateral changes to the status quo by China (military annexation of Taiwan) and unilateral changes to the status quo by Taiwan (declaration of Taiwan's independence). After the termination of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States unilaterally expressed its intentions through the Taiwan Relations Act (1979). Specifically, it stated that any plan to determine Taiwan's future by means other than peaceful ones would be a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and a matter of grave concern to the United States, and therefore, it intended to provide defensive weapons to Taiwan. This policy itself, by conditioning US future actions (reaction) on prior actions (action) by China or Taiwan (a conditional commitment), does not contradict the argument of this paper that the establishment of a focal point is necessary in certain situations.

[8]'Complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament (CVID)' of North Korean nuclear weapons refers to the demand repeatedly made to North Korea since UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (S/RES/1718, October 14, 2006) concerning North Korea's first nuclear test.

■ Author: Atsushi Ishida_Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo. Served as President of the Japan Association of International Relations from 2016 to 2018, and as Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and College of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo from 2017 to 2019. His main research area is the theory of international security.

■ Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 204) hspark@eai.or.kr

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