← Back · ← Home · ← Back to list
[East Asia Institute Series on the Future Vision of Korea-Japan Cooperation] Vol. 1 Towards Korea-Japan New Era 2.0: Foreword to the Joint Research on the Future Vision of Korea-Japan Cooperation
Editor's Note
Yeol Yo, Director of EAI and Professor at Yonsei University, points out the need to move beyond the debate over the forced labor issue, which has focused on whether Japan's corresponding measures match South Korea's improvement efforts, and to adopt an approach that comprehensively reviews the benefits of improved Korea-Japan relations. While efforts to seek Korea-Japan cooperation in multilateral spaces have stagnated due to historical conflicts, new challenges such as de-globalization and intensifying US-China strategic competition have emerged, posing significant burdens on both countries. The joint research team for the Future Vision of Korea-Japan Cooperation analyzes tasks such as managing US-China strategic competition based on rules, improving understanding and cooperation through enhanced mutual perception between South Korea, Japan, and China, and economic cooperation for the liberal trade order and international development cooperation.
I. The Knot of Improving Relations
Korea-Japan relations are emerging from a long tunnel of darkness. The announcement of South Korea's solution for the forced labor issue on March 6 and the summit meeting on March 16 provided an opportunity for relations to recover. The conflict between Korea and Japan, which began in earnest with a triple crisis in history, security, and economy—marked by the breakdown of the 2015 comfort women agreement, the postponement of the GSOMIA signing, and the termination of the currency swap agreement—entered a second crisis with the aftermath of the 2015 comfort women agreement and escalated to its worst point with the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor in October 2018, Japan's export restrictions on semiconductors, and South Korea's declaration to terminate GSOMIA. The "crisis of trust" caused by a "lost decade" is not easily overcome by the series of efforts by the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. In this context, the heated debate among politicians, the media, and academia surrounding the government's forced labor solution is not surprising.
The problem is that the debate over the benefits surrounding the forced labor solution is unfolding with an excessively narrow perspective. Both the "subservient diplomacy theory" and the "future-oriented diplomacy theory" currently in opposition remain within the framework of diplomatic exchanges concerning the forced labor issue, specifically the debate over Japan's corresponding measures to South Korea's proposed solution. The argument that relations cannot improve without confronting the past in a way that meets the expectations of the Korean people is sharply contrasted with the argument that future-oriented cooperation can overcome the past (i.e., elicit corresponding measures).
However, the variable of corresponding measures should be only one part of the calculation of benefits that improved Korea-Japan relations would bring in the broader context. How important is the improvement of Korea-Japan relations from the perspective of national interest? Where should Korea-Japan relations aim? What kind of cooperation should be pursued? In the midst of a rapidly changing international order, we must meticulously re-examine and re-evaluate the value, status, and role of Korea-Japan relations and, within that context, comprehensively consider the benefits of improving these relations.
The world has changed significantly during the decade of stagnation in Korea-Japan cooperation. First, US-China strategic competition, which began in trade, has expanded to advanced technology, systems, values, and military sectors, intensifying daily. Second, the advancement of neoliberal globalization has widened income disparities and weakened social cohesion, leading to the resurgence of economic nationalism and protectionism. Furthermore, the acceleration of economic security competition between the US and China has led to supply chain restructuring and technological decoupling, plunging the liberal international economic order into chaos. Third, common transnational threats such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the climate crisis have emerged prominently, while global governance remains fragile, making international joint responses difficult. As a nation located on the fault line of great power strategic competition, South Korea and Japan, as open trading states, are facing a situation where the scope for cooperation is expanding and the need for cooperation is increasing due to these common challenges. Both countries must set common agendas and establish international rules and norms to protect their national interests.
Therefore, the equation for improving Korea-Japan relations must be solved by including not only variables at the bilateral level, such as historical reconciliation, but also variables that incentivize cooperation in regional and global spaces. This involves meticulously examining the necessity, direction, and feasibility of security, economic, and development cooperation at multiple levels, including Korea-US-Japan, Korea-US-Japan-China, Quad Plus, the Indo-Pacific, and global governance. Ultimately, this is the process of designing a future vision for Korea-Japan relations and unraveling the knot of improving relations accordingly.
II. The Frustration of the New Era of Korea-Japan Relations
Since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965, South Korea and Japan have conducted their diplomatic relations primarily centered on bilateral political, economic, and security issues. Within the unique historical context of colonizer and colonized, the two countries formed trade and investment relations based on economic aid as a developed-developing country relationship and expanded bilateral security relations within the framework of the US-led anti-communist alliance. This particularistic bilateral relationship faced various challenges with changes in the strategic environment, such as the end of the Cold War, and the advancement of economic globalization. Riding the wave of globalization, China achieved rapid economic growth and emerged as the largest trading partner for both South Korea and Japan, and with its military power growing in proportion to its economic strength, it became a key security player. As China's strategic importance increased, the mutual economic and security benefits of the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan gradually diminished. Furthermore, regional multilateralism has strengthened as a regional manifestation of globalization, leading to the advancement of regional institutionalization through forums such as APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3 (APT), and the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the formation of regional free trade agreements and currency swap arrangements. Consequently, Korea and Japan have met more frequently within multilateral frameworks.
South Korea and Japan have reached a point where they must seek cooperation in multilateral spaces at the regional and global levels, beyond the framework of bilateral relations. The joint research report "Proposals for a New Era of Korea-Japan Relations," published in 2011 as the result of joint research by intellectuals representing both countries, proposed a plan for "building a complex network of coexistence" that simultaneously considers the past, present, and future along the time axis and encompasses Korea-Japan, East Asia, and global spaces along the spatial axis. It was a future plan to achieve peace, prosperity, and coexistence through the establishment of networks among various actors, including the United States, China, Southeast Asia, and non-state actors, in multifaceted areas of international politics and economics, not just bilateral relations between Korea and Japan.
However, the future was held back by the past. In July 2011, a Constitutional Court decision brought the comfort women issue to the forefront as a diplomatic matter, followed by the failure of the comfort women agreement the next year, the unsuccessful pursuit of GSOMIA, then-President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo and his remarks demanding an apology from the Emperor, and the termination of the Korea-Japan currency swap. Exclusive nationalism began to rise, particularly among the political circles of both countries, and as historical issues expanded into security and economic conflicts, a lost decade ensued. Amidst this, the New Era report lost its luster due to the full-scale revival of the old era, which was not anticipated.
There are two other future obstacles that the New Era report did not sufficiently anticipate. One is the retreat of globalization. The vision of prosperity presented in the report, which was premised on the advancement of globalization, has faced the challenge of deglobalization, including the reduction of trade, restrictions on labor mobility, and the restructuring of global supply chains in the 2010s. Neoliberal globalization, which began in earnest after the end of the Cold War, brought prosperity to the entire globe, but due to excessive market competition, it has led to domestic economic inequality, social polarization, and political division, giving rise to populism and economic nationalism. As a result, the liberal international economic order is in significant turmoil. Japan and South Korea, having advanced to developed country status as trading nations, now find themselves in a position where they must re-examine their visions and strategies in the face of such profound challenges.
The other is the insufficient consideration of the impact of intensifying US-China strategic competition on regional order and Korea-Japan relations. The New Era report was based on a somewhat constructive outlook on China, positioning South Korea, Japan, and China as key actors in building a complex network for coexistence. It proposed a strategy where South Korea and Japan would actively cooperate to ensure that China, experiencing rapid political and economic growth, could flexibly adapt to universal norms and practices. However, since the 2008 global financial crisis, China has exhibited assertive and coercive diplomatic behavior in areas such as the South China Sea and the East China Sea, advocated for its own regional institutional initiatives, and demonstrated a trajectory of challenging the existing US-led order with imperial ambitions such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Consequently, US-China strategic competition has intensified, and the economic and technological division between the US and China is becoming a reality.
III. Towards Korea-Japan New Era 2.0
In 2023, South Korea and Japan are at a juncture where they must establish Korea-Japan New Era 2.0. Looking at Korea-Japan relations from a long-term perspective, aiming for 2050, global transformations will accelerate, including intensifying US-China strategic competition, the disruption of the liberal world economic order due to the reversal of globalization, and the emergence of common transnational threats to humanity. Therefore, both countries must carefully manage specific bilateral issues while simultaneously exploring the necessity, direction, and possibilities of joint responses to common challenges, and seeking visions and strategies.
The East Asia Institute conducted a joint research project with experts from South Korea and Japan to prepare a future vision for Korea-Japan cooperation, moving beyond the forced labor controversy. The manuscript was prepared through six online discussion sessions held in 2021-2022. The first task of the joint research is for South Korea and Japan to contribute to managing the US-China strategic competition so that it does not result in conflict involving military force, and to foster competition based on rules. Professor Atsushi Ishida of the University of Tokyo discusses ways to agree on the "limits of acceptable behavior" among major powers to prevent large-scale armed conflict. Professor Jaesung Lee of Seoul National University presents the tasks and possibilities for security cooperation between South Korea and Japan in response to intensifying US-China strategic competition and the growing military threats from China and North Korea. Meanwhile, Professor Satoru Mori of Keio University points out that the Korea-US-Japan security cooperation, traditionally developed as a coordination mechanism for responding to North Korea's nuclear threat, is expanding into functional areas (climate change, health security, advanced technology, etc.) and suggests conditions for strengthening strategic cooperation in these areas. Professor Jaejeok Park of Yonsei University analyzes cooperation among four countries—South Korea, the US, Australia, and Japan—through case studies of building an information network in the Indo-Pacific region.
The second task is to analyze the three bilateral relationships—Korea-China, Japan-China, and Korea-Japan—from the perspective of mutual perception and the US-China relationship. Professor Akio Takahara of the University of Tokyo discusses the possibility of China's great power diplomacy serving as an opportunity for Korea-Japan cooperation. Professor Dongryul Lee of Dongduk Women's University analyzes the implications of deteriorating mutual perception between South Korea and China for Korea-Japan relations. Professor Toyomi Asano of Waseda University points out the differences in sentiments, values, and memories between South Korea and Japan, emphasizing that a common understanding of the origins of historical issues among the people of both countries must deepen for historical reconciliation.
The third task is to present a new direction for Korea-Japan economic cooperation. Amidst the resurgence of protectionism and the advancement of economic and technological decoupling due to US-China strategic competition, Professor Jeonghwan Lee of Seoul National University argues that economic cooperation between South Korea and Japan should evolve into global cooperation that benefits both economies, emphasizing the establishment of global norms to protect the free trade order. Professor Yoshiko Kojo of Aoyama Gakuin University also argues that both countries should avoid becoming deeply entangled in the US-China conflict, pursue supply chain restructuring in a direction that reduces excessive dependence on China, and expand and strengthen the framework of regional multilateral cooperation. Meanwhile, Professor Byungyeon Kim of Seoul National University proposes short-term tasks for Korea-Japan economic cooperation, including joint ODA efforts for building Asian digital infrastructure, joint responses to low birth rates and aging populations, and the establishment of a Korea-US-Japan cooperation body for North Korean economic development. Professor Taegyun Kim discusses the potential for Korea-Japan cooperation in infrastructure and development in the Global South and presents strategies for Korea-Japan cooperation through the mini-lateral cooperation body, the Quad, and the global platform, B3W.
The proposal for a solution to the forced labor issue is merely the first step toward improving Korea-Japan relations. Both countries must not miss this opportunity, as the great changes in the international order—intensifying US-China strategic competition, the reversal of globalization, and the increase in transnational threats—are increasing the need for cooperation between the two nations more than ever before. Beyond the wasteful debates surrounding the improvement of relations, efforts should be concentrated on designing a future vision towards Korea-Japan New Era 2.0.■
■ Author: Yeol Yo_ Director of EAI. Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and, after serving at Chung-Ang University, is currently a professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, and Director of the East Asia Institute. He has served as Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies, Head of the Underwood International College, Director of the Institute for Sustainability Studies, and Director of the Institute for International Studies at Yonsei University. He has also been a Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo, and a Visiting Scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) and the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Political Science Association (2019) and President of the Association for Modern Japanese Studies (2012). He has been a Senior Fellow at Fulbright, MacArthur, the Japan Foundation, and the Advanced Research Center for Japanese Studies at Waseda University, and has served as an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation, as well as a specialist member of the Committee for Northeast Asian Cooperation. His areas of expertise include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include "Conditions for Presidential Success in 2022" (2021, co-edited), "Policy Recommendations for the New Government's Foreign Policy in 2022" (2021, co-edited), "The Global Appeal of BTS" (2021, co-edited), "South Korea's Choices After the Crisis" (2021, co-edited), Japan and Asia's Contested Order(2019, with T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia(2016, with Jan Melissen), “South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking,” The Pacific Review23, 6 (2019), and "Middle Power Diplomacy of South Korea" (2017, co-edited).
■ Managed and Edited by: Hansoo Park_ EAI Researcher
For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.