The 20th Presidential Election and the Gender Divide Among 20-Something Voters

※ This document is an interim report for research in progress and not the final research outcome. Therefore, please refrain from quoting it.

1. Introduction

In the study of Korean politics and voter behavior, the concepts of political cleavage that have been importantly addressed include region, ideology, and generation. Looking back at major elections in Korean political history, the Gyeongsang region-conservative-industrialization Baby Boomer generation consistently voted for conservative parties, while the Jeolla region-progressive-democratization Generation X voted for centrist progressive parties, a pattern that repeated itself like a frozen proposition in every election. However, gender, in contrast, has not produced significant outcomes in past elections as a decisive political cleavage influencing the voting choices of Korean voters.

However, a noticeable change occurred in the 20th Presidential Election. Specifically, there was a divergence in the support for candidates of different parties among voters in their 20s, a youth demographic. According to the exit poll results released by the three major broadcasters (KBS, MBC, SBS) upon the conclusion of voting on March 9, 2022, approximately 58.7% of men aged 18 to 29 voted for the People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, while 36.3% voted for the Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung. Conversely, among women in the same age group, 58% voted for the Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung, and 33.8% voted for the People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, revealing a pattern where 20-something men and women supported the two major party candidates in opposing directions. This gender-based support difference within the youth demographic appears to be a unique characteristic of 20-something voters, not prominently observed in other age groups.

In past presidential elections, such a gender gap was not observed in the voting choices of 20-something voters. As shown in [Table 2], in both the 18th Presidential Election in 2012 and the 19th Presidential Election in 2017, the majority of both men and women in their 20s supported the progressive candidate Moon Jae-in. In contrast, the majority of those aged 60 and above overwhelmingly supported the conservative candidate Park Geun-hye in the 2012 presidential election. Due to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, in the 2017 presidential election, Moon Jae-in received the lowest support across all age groups. In summary, the prominent political cleavages in past presidential elections and voting behaviors have been generational or ideological rather than based on voter gender, and the variable of gender has not been treated as a significant cleavage in the study of Korean voter behavior.

[Table 1] Predicted Vote Share by Candidate (KBS·MBC·SBS Exit Poll Results)

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[Table 2] Age and Gender Support Rates in the Last Presidential Election

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* Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2012 Presidential Election Panel Survey (2012)

** East Asia Institute, 2017 Presidential Election Panel Survey (2017)

Why, then, did gender differences in voting choices begin to emerge, particularly among young voters, in the 2022 presidential election? This article examines the election mobilization strategies of political parties and candidates and the context of their election campaigns during the 20th presidential election, and analyzes the extent to which gender cleavages served as an effective variable within the youth demographic in terms of voting choices.

As is well known, research on voter behavior identifies various variables influencing voter choices, including region, ideology, generation, identification with or favorability towards parties and politicians, and issue attitudes. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze how the gender cleavage observed within the youth demographic during the 20th presidential election relates to these traditional political indicators. Furthermore, to verify the unique impact of gender as a political cleavage, especially when controlling for the effects of these major variables, research based on empirical data and quantitative methodologies must be conducted.

2. The 20th Presidential Election and the Emergence of Gender Cleavage

Gender cleavages within the youth demographic have recently become linked to political behavior and voting choices, and this cleavage has deepened further due to its intersection with the election mobilization strategies of political elites. In particular, the evolution of gender issues into a political cleavage began with young men's dissatisfaction directed towards the Moon Jae-in administration and the ruling Democratic Party, stemming from feminism.

From the beginning of his term, President Moon declared he would be a feminist president, and the Democratic Party failed to adequately recognize the intensity of young men's dissatisfaction (Kyunghyang Shinmun 2019). Amidst accumulating dissatisfaction among young men, in 2020, a female mayor of Seoul from the Democratic Party, who identified as a feminist, was accused of sexual harassment by a female secretary and subsequently committed suicide. Around the same time, the mayor of Busan from the Democratic Party admitted to sexually harassing female public officials and resigned. The hypocrisy and contradictory attitudes displayed by Democratic Party figures, who claimed to be feminist-friendly, led to a surge in resentment among young men, ultimately resulting in overwhelming support for the opposition People Power Party candidates Oh Se-hoon (72.5%) and Park Hyung-joon (63%) among men in their 20s during the 2021 by-elections.

As young men's dissatisfaction intensified regarding feminist issues, which had previously achieved a degree of social consensus, and collective support began to shift, the Moon Jae-in administration and the Democratic Party subsequently became unable to strongly advocate for either side due to public opinion. Moreover, with the 2022 presidential election on the horizon, the Democratic Party needed to regain the votes of young men who had defected in the by-elections to secure a second term. The People Power Party, aiming for a change of government, also needed to quickly absorb these young men who had left the Democratic Party as a support base. Following the by-elections, young men from both major parties began to receive attention for their political demands, being referred to as the '20-something male generation' (i-dae-nam).

The People Power Party actively positioned itself as a party representing the interests of young men along the gender cleavage axis. The People Power Party elected Lee Jun-seok, a politician in his 30s symbolizing young men, as its leader. Candidate Yoon Suk-yeol made the abolition of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, a key pledge favored by young men, a central campaign promise. During the presidential campaign, Yoon's approval ratings, which had slightly declined due to discord with Lee, rebounded with the support of young men after the pledge to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family was announced (Korea Economic Daily 2022).

In contrast to the People Power Party's clear stance on feminist issues, the Democratic Party, needing to win back the young male voters who had largely defected in the recent by-elections, found it difficult to actively support feminism during the early stages of the presidential race. To avoid alienating its traditional female voter base, it could not openly adopt an anti-feminist stance either. Furthermore, due to recent sexual misconduct cases involving prominent Democratic Party figures such as Ahn Hee-jung, Park Won-soon, and Oh Keo-don, the party faced a moral dilemma, making it difficult to proudly assert itself as a party pursuing feminist values. Amidst this, Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung, who had a strong negative image among female voters due to scandals such as cursing his sister-in-law and a scandal involving an actress, shared a post from an online community on his Facebook page stating, "You must stop the madness of feminism," thus distancing himself from the feminist leanings of young women. Consequently, young women found themselves without a party or politician to advocate for them, remaining a politically marginalized and adrift group until just before the presidential election (Kook Seung-min et al. 2022; Kyunghyang Shinmun 2021).

However, as the presidential race entered a period of intense competition with the approval ratings of the two main party candidates remaining neck-and-neck, and Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party struggled to gain an edge, the Democratic Party began to abandon its strategy of strategic ambiguity and distance itself from the feminist movement of young women (Kyunghyang Shinmun 2022). For instance, Lee appeared on 'Dot Face,' a YouTube channel discussing women's and LGBTQ+ rights and feminism, to interview young women. He met with female startup CEOs to discuss gender discrimination issues and conveyed the message, "Feminism is a movement to create a better world," in conversations with young job seekers. Furthermore, the campaign recruited Park Ji-hyun, a woman in her 20s who first brought public attention to the 'Nth Room' digital sex crime case, from the investigative group 'Tracking Flames,' to join the presidential campaign team. In the televised debates hosted by the National Election Commission, Lee strongly refuted the People Power Party candidate's assertion that feminism causes difficulties in male-female relationships and low birth rates, stating that feminism is "a movement that recognizes and seeks to rectify women's discrimination and inequality" (Chosun Ilbo 2022).

Thus, as Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung shifted from a stance of ambiguity on feminism to actively supporting it towards the end of the presidential election, a political confrontation finally emerged: Lee Jae-myung of the pro-feminist Democratic Party versus Yoon Suk-yeol (and Lee Jun-seok) of the anti-feminist People Power Party. The gender cleavage within the youth demographic, which had been gradually intensifying in South Korean society since 2015, became a political cleavage in the 2022 national presidential election, amplified by the election mobilization strategies of political elites.

3. Gender Cleavage and Political Attitudes in the 20th Presidential Election

Prior to the 20th presidential election, a sharp gender front had formed within the youth demographic in South Korean society. By the final stages of the 20th presidential election, this had culminated in a distinct political cleavage between the pro-feminist Democratic Party and the anti-feminist People Power Party, driven by the election mobilization strategies of political elites. This suggests that the gender cleavage may have operated as a significant factor influencing voting choices, at least within the youth demographic. To verify this, an analysis was conducted using panel data collected in two waves: from January 12-15 (before the election) and March 10-15 (immediately after the election), commissioned by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and conducted by Korea Research.

First, [Table 3] presents the results of an analysis of variance (ANOVA) followed by pairwise comparisons to determine if there are statistically significant differences in ideological orientation between men and women in their 20s.

It can be confirmed that ideological differences within the 20s demographic are more pronounced by gender compared to other age groups. Using an 11-point scale where 0 represents very progressive and 10 represents very conservative, the average ideological score for men in their 20s was approximately 5.89, which was 1.25 points higher than that for women in their 20s (4.64), and this difference was statistically significant (p<0.001). Among all age groups, the 20s and 30s showed statistically significant ideological differences by gender, with the gap between men and women in their 20s (1.25) being larger than that in their 30s (0.60). Meanwhile, the conservatism of men in their 20s was the second highest among all age and gender groups, following men in their 60s (5.99), and this score was higher than the overall average of 5.29.

[Table 3] Gender Differences in Ideological Orientation within Age Groups

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***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

The following [Table 4] shows the gender differences in party favorability by age group. Favorability was measured on an 11-point scale from 0 (dislike very much) to 10 (like very much) for each party. The most striking point in [Table 4] is that the difference in favorability towards political parties between men and women within their 20s is the most extreme compared to gender differences in other age groups (p<0.001). For example, the difference between 20-something males (2.62) and 20-something females (5) regarding the Democratic Party is approximately 2.38, which is relatively large compared to the gender differences in favorability among other age groups. Similarly, the favorability gap between males and females in their 20s was relatively larger than the gender differences within other age groups for the People Power Party and the Justice Party, with statistically significant differences clearly observed. Unlike the Democratic Party, the difference in favorability towards the People Power Party between 20-something males (5.4) and 20-something females (3.29) was 2.11. For 20-something males, the order of party preference was People Power Party (5.4) > Democratic Party (2.62) > Justice Party (2.16), while for 20-something females, it was Democratic Party (5) > Justice Party (4.52) > People Power Party (3.29).

[Table 4] Gender Differences in Party Favorability within Age Groups

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***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Meanwhile, statistically significant differences in favorability toward the Democratic Party or the Justice Party are found between men and women in their 30s, and significant differences in favorability toward the Justice Party are observed between men and women in their 40s, and toward the Democratic Party between men and women in their 50s. However, the differences are not as large as those found between men and women in their 20s. Across all age groups, the most pronounced difference in favorability is observed between men and women in their 20s.

Next, we examine how favorability toward presidential candidates differs by gender within each age group. Favorability is measured on the same 11-point scale used previously. 'Before election' and 'After election' refer to the results of analysis using public opinion poll data collected in January (12th-15th) before the presidential election and in March (10th-15th) immediately after the election, respectively.

First, as shown in [Table 5] and [Figure 1], there was almost no difference in favorability toward candidate Lee Jae-myung between men and women in their 20s in January before the election, and it was not statistically significant. However, during the survey period in March, immediately after the election, 20-something men showed a low score of 2.93 in favorability toward Lee Jae-myung, while 20-something women showed a higher favorability score of 4.88 compared to men in their 20s. This indicates an increase of approximately 1.1 in favorability toward candidate Lee compared to the pre-election figure of 3.78.

In this context, it is inferred that the Democratic Party and candidate Lee Jae-myung's strategic ambiguity on feminism until just before the presidential election, followed by a full-fledged shift to a friendly stance from late January onwards to win the votes of young women, was reflected in their support base. In contrast, for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, a clear difference in favorability between men and women in their 20s is consistently observed before and after the election, and this gap widened further after the election (2.58) compared to before the election (1.62). While differences in favorability between men and women within other age groups are not statistically significant, a distinct difference in favorability between men and women is found within the 20s age group.

[Table 5] Gender Differences in Favorability Toward Presidential Candidates within Age Groups – Lee Jae-myung, Yoon Suk-yeol

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***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

[Figure 1] Differences in Favorability Ratings for Major Presidential Candidates Between Men and Women in their 20s

Meanwhile, the attitudinal differences between men and women in their 20s were also evident in their favorability ratings for other presidential candidates and politicians. [Table 6] presents the favorability ratings by age group for Sim Sang-jung of the Justice Party and Lee Jun-seok, the leader of the People Power Party, who ran for president. As shown in [Table 6], a clear gender gap is observed among voters in their 20s and 30s regarding their favorability towards Sim Sang-jung and Lee Jun-seok. Sim Sang-jung, the only female candidate among the major party presidential nominees, consistently expressed support for feminism throughout the campaign period, which can be seen as a reason for her higher favorability rating towards the end of the campaign compared to Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party, who maintained strategic ambiguity.

In contrast, Lee Jun-seok, the party leader of the People Power Party, who, as a young man in his 30s, spearheaded the election campaign strategy for Yoon Suk-yeol of the People Power Party, received the highest favorability rating among all age groups from men in their 20s, with a score of 6.15. Conversely, women in their 20s showed a relatively low favorability rating of 2.49, resulting in the largest gender gap across all age groups (p<0.001). While the favorability gap between men and women in their 30s regarding Lee Jun-seok also showed a statistically significant difference, similar to the 20s, the gap was less pronounced than in the 20s.

[Table 6] Gender Favorability Gap for Presidential Candidates within Age Groups – Sim Sang-jung, Lee Jun-seok (Post-Election)

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***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Next, we examine whether gender differences within age groups are closely related to policy attitudes. [Table 7] presents the results of investigating differences in attitudes toward the quota system for women, North Korea policy, and welfare policy, respectively. For the quota system for women, a higher score was assigned for stronger agreement with the question, “What do you think about the quota system that guarantees a certain level of female representation in employment and promotions?” on a 5-point Likert scale. For North Korea policy, 1 point was assigned for choosing the option “Strengthening exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea is more important,” and 0 points for “Maintaining and strengthening a hardline policy toward North Korea.” Finally, for welfare policy, 1 point was assigned if the respondent answered that welfare is more important than growth in the question, “Which is more important in our current society: welfare or growth?”, and 0 points if growth was considered more important.

To compare the three policy attitudes at a glance, the results standardized with variables having a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 are presented in [Table 7] and [Figure 2]. For all three policy issues, higher scores can be interpreted as agreement with the quota system for women, strengthening inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, and prioritizing welfare over growth, respectively. According to <Table 7>, similar to previous political attitudes, the attitude gap between genders within the 20s age group is larger compared to other age groups. Within the 20s, women showed a more favorable attitude toward the quota system for women, were more in favor of strengthening inter-Korean exchange, and responded that welfare is more important than growth compared to men. This pattern of intra-generational gender differences also appeared in the 30s, but the extent was not as pronounced as in the 20s.

[Table 7] Gender Differences in Policy Attitudes within Age Groups

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***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Meanwhile, the survey on ideological orientation previously revealed that young men in their 20s were conservative, while young women were relatively progressive. Table 7 suggests that the ideological gap between men and women in their 20s is most pronounced on issues such as the women's quota system, but this ideological gap is not limited to gender issues. In other words, in terms of ideological direction for North Korea and welfare policies, men in their 20s exhibit a distinct conservative tendency, whereas women in their 20s appear to pursue progressive values more relatively. This gender gap, where women are more progressive than men, is not observed among the older generations in their 50s and 60s, a characteristic of what is termed a modern gender gap. This characteristic becomes more pronounced as the age cohort decreases from the 40s down to the 20s.

4. Gender Cleavage and Voting Choice in the 20th Presidential Election

Thus far, we have confirmed that differences in ideological orientation and various political attitudes are emerging between genders within the 20s age group. We now aim to verify through a logistic regression analysis model whether gender continues to have a significant effect on the candidate choices of the youth generation in elections, even after controlling for the influence of sociodemographic and political variables. Based on the preceding discussion, we can establish two hypotheses: ① Voting behavior will differ by gender within the 20s age group, and ② Men in their 20s will have a higher probability of supporting the People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol compared to women in their 20s.

[Figure 2] Differences in Gender Policy Attitudes within Generations

As a preliminary step to verify the validity of the hypotheses, the variables were measured as follows. The dependent variable in the logistic regression analysis model is voting choice, set as a binary variable coded 1 for respondents who indicated voting for the People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the post-election survey, and 0 otherwise. As explanatory variables in the model, generations were divided into five groups from their 20s to 60s and above, gender was measured as male=1 and female=0, and an interaction term between generation and gender was included in the regression model. Other control variables included in the analysis model were education level, income, residential area, ideological orientation and party identification, evaluation of the Moon Jae-in administration's performance and favorability towards the two major party candidates, and attitudes towards policy, as well as social media usage. Specific measurement methods are presented in [Table 8].

The analysis proceeded in two stages. First, Model 1 excluded 'People Power Party identification' and 'Yoon Suk-yeol favorability' from the variables in [Table 8]. Model 2 included these two variables for analysis. This is because variables such as party identification or favorability are very closely related to the choice of Yoon Suk-yeol, meaning they are likely to absorb the influence of other factors in the causal relationship. They are located at the end of the 'funnel of causality' and have a direct relationship with the voter's choice, which may make it difficult to properly observe the effect of the gender cleavage within generations (Campbell et al., 1960).

[Table 8] Variables and Measurement Methods

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*Survey Period: Voting choice variable is post-March election data; other variables are pre-January election data.

The following [Table 9], [Figure 3], and [Figure 4] present the results of the regression analysis. The analysis results show that the statistical significance of the interaction term between the 20s generation and gender was confirmed in both models (p<0.05). This means that there is a significant difference between men and women in their 20s in terms of the probability of choosing candidate Yoon Suk-yeol. Furthermore, this intra-generational gender difference in voting choice is confirmed as a characteristic unique to the young generation in their 20s, not found in other age groups.

[Table 9] Effect of Gender Cleavage in the Youth Generation on Voting Choice

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***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

[Figure 3] Probability of Voting for Yoon Suk-yeol of the People Power Party (Model 1)

[Figure 4] Probability of Voting for Yoon Suk-yeol of the People Power Party (Model 2)

Looking at the predicted probabilities for each group, divided by age and gender, through [Figure 3], in the case of Model 1, when the values of all other control variables are fixed at the average, the probability of choosing candidate Yoon Suk-yeol is 35% for men in their 20s, but only 13% for women in their 20s, resulting in a gender gap of approximately 22 percentage points. This intra-generational gender gap is the largest compared to the gaps in other generations, and it is the only one that shows statistical significance (30s: 16%p; 40s: 19%p; 50s: 7%p; 60s and above: 5%p).

Meanwhile, [Figure 4] also confirms that this gender gap among those in their 20s remains statistically significant even when variables directly influencing voting choice, such as identification with the People Power Party and favorability towards candidate Yoon, are included in the model. When the influence of other variables is fixed at their average values, the gap between men in their 20s (45%) and women in their 20s (23%), which is 22 percentage points, is confirmed as a significant difference compared to the gender gaps in other generations (30s: 7%p; 40s: 8%p; 50s: 9%p; 60s: 14%p).

In summary, the empirical results above confirm that the gender gap between men and women in their 20s was significantly evident in the 20th presidential election, even after controlling for the influence of other political variables such as ideology, region, generation, party identification, and policy attitudes. The analysis results validated the two hypotheses previously set: ① there is a difference in voting behavior based on gender within the young generation in their 20s, and ② men in their 20s are more likely to support candidate Yoon Suk-yeol of the People Power Party than women in their 20s.

5. Conclusion

This paper aims to explore the extent to which the gender cleavage significantly influenced the final voting choice in the 20th presidential election. To briefly summarize the analysis, the conflict between men and women within the younger generation surrounding feminism emerged as a political cleavage towards the end of the 20th presidential election, with the pro-feminist Democratic Party and the anti-feminist People Power Party forming opposing fronts. The dissatisfaction of men in their 20s with the feminist movement, which had been ongoing since 2015, was directed towards the Democratic Party and the Moon Jae-in administration, manifesting as a significant withdrawal of support for the Moon Jae-in administration and the ruling party in the April 7 by-elections of 2021. In response, the main opposition party, the People Power Party, adopted a clear anti-feminist stance as a strategy to attract these disaffected men in their 20s. Meanwhile, the ruling Democratic Party, initially showing strategic ambiguity, eventually shifted to a pro-feminist position in a last-ditch effort to rebound in the polls amidst a closely contested election. This led to the creation of a political landscape where the younger female demographic gravitated towards supporting the Democratic Party, while the younger male demographic aligned with the People Power Party, divided along gender lines.

It has been revealed that this gender gap within the youth generation is statistically significant even when controlling for factors such as ideology, region, age cohort, party identification, and candidate favorability, which have been discussed as key variables in voting choices in Korean politics. The logistic regression analysis confirmed a statistically significant difference in the probability of voting for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol based on gender among the 20s youth cohort. This gender gap in voting probability was a unique characteristic of the 20s cohort, not observed in other generations. These findings can be interpreted as the gender gap, latent within the youth generation, having fully emerged as a political fissure in conjunction with the mobilization strategies of parties and candidates during the 20th presidential election.

It is difficult to discuss the long-term prospects of how long the gender cleavage originating from within the younger generation will persist in Korean politics based on the findings of this study. However, one thing is clear: not all latent cleavages within society, such as workers versus capitalists, progressives versus conservatives, or Yeongnam versus Honam, can emerge as valid political cleavages in elections. Conflicts latent within society can only function as political cleavages when they intersect with the mass mobilization strategies of political parties and politicians. In this context, from the perspective of citizens, rather than unconditionally interpreting the political expression of conflicts and cleavages by representatives negatively, it is also necessary to positively view the path of seeking solutions in the public sphere by politicizing issues through parties and politicians. This is because, in a representative democracy, one of the fastest and safest ways to lead society towards progress, albeit perhaps slower, is through the discovery of cleavages and their institutional resolution by representatives. From this perspective, the fact that feminism and gender issues, which had been latent as a fuse within the Korean youth generation, were fully politicized in the 20th presidential election and that opportunities for institutional resolution were gained through political representatives of both camps can be evaluated positively, at the very least.

References

Kyunghyang Shinmun (2019). “Why Are Men in Their 20s Angry at the Moon Jae-in Administration?” 2019/01/18 (Accessed: 22.03.22.)https://url.kr/mhn93k

Kyunghyang Shinmun (2021). “The Anti-Feminist Wave Sweeping the Presidential Election, the Silenced Voices of Women.” 2021/11/12 (Accessed: 22.03.22.)https://url.kr/6evbr4

Kyunghyang Shinmun (2022). “Lee Jae-myung Approaches Women in Their 20s and 30s… ‘Caution Against Being Trapped in the Gender Frame’.” 2022/01/10 (Accessed: 22.03.22.)https://url.kr/5na9tc

Kook Seung-min, Kim Eun-ji, & Kim Da-eun (2022). *20s Women*. Sisa IN Books.

Chosun Ilbo (2022). “Lee Jae-myung: ‘What is Feminism?’, Yoon Suk-yeol: ‘One aspect of Humanism’.” 2022/03/02 (Accessed: 22.03.22.)https://url.kr/jupisr

Korea Economic Daily (2022). “A Seven-Word Phrase Left by Yoon Suk-yeol: ‘Abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family’… ‘Explosive Reaction’ from Men in Their 20s.” 2022/01/08 (Accessed: 22.03.22.)https://url.kr/o7f2bp

Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., and Stokes, D. E(1980). The American Voter. University of Chicago Press.

■ Author: Kim Hanna_Researcher at the Institute for Korean Political Studies, Seoul National University. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from Seoul National University and has lectured on Korean politics and party politics at institutions including Seoul National University and Ewha Womans University. Her main research interests include electoral systems and voting behavior, parliamentary politics, and party politics. She has recently published articles in major journals such as Korea and International Politics, Korean Political Science Review, and Korean Journal of Legislative Studies.

■ Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun_EAI 연구원

    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr