[EAI Working Paper] Liberalism Series ④_ A Liberal Exploration for the Inclusion of Others in Korean Society

I. Introduction: What is the Other?

The mosque construction halted in Daegu is reportedly in a state of 'unresolvable conflict.' Conflicts surrounding mosques, numbering over twenty nationwide, remain latent. In the context of national disaster relief due to COVID-19, the question of who constitutes 'the nation' becomes significant. It is now commonplace for individuals referred to as 'non-citizens,' such as foreign workers, to appear in the Korean media and become subjects of incidents, with their crimes being disproportionately highlighted compared to other offenses. Beyond incidents involving foreigners, issues previously considered 'abnormal' and distinct from the 'normal' are still attracting media attention, even without being explicitly labeled as such. Ultimately, the case of 'Sergeant Byun Hee-soo,' who was forcibly discharged and tragically died, is a prime recent example. The issue of gender identity, specifically being transgender, and the problem of exclusion within the military, perhaps the most masculine of groups, led to another sacrifice. The distinct voting patterns between men and women in their twenties, particularly evident in the 2021 local by-elections, especially the Seoul mayoral by-election, symbolically represented the accumulated gender conflict. With 'fairness' emerging as a key theme in recent Korean society, issues of 'unfairness' related to gender differences or discrimination have also resurfaced, as demonstrated by the voting tendencies in the recent by-elections.

Ultimately, these conflict patterns indicate a situation where diverse issues are superimposed or intertwined, making them difficult to resolve in a uniform manner, rather than being a matter of a single agenda. Nevertheless, what is common to these conflicts is the intensification of hostile emotions, leading to the exclusion and oppression of the opposing party, a phenomenon of 'othering.' 'The Other' refers to that which is excluded and does not fall within the category of 'sameness' that constitutes 'us.' The perception of such others has always varied with the historical context. The problem arises first in defining who is set as the 'other' of society. Although the discussion began with the issue of foreigners or migrant workers at the outset, their issues are likely a very recent phenomenon. Even if we limit our examination of the problem of others in Korean society to the period after liberation, we can discover others appearing at various levels and in various spaces. Particularly since modernity, the historical process of 'identification' in Korean society, emphasizing collectivism, has existed, and the process of identity formation has ultimately encompassed inclusion, forced assimilation, and the accompanying exclusion, ultimately involving a certain process of 'other-making.'[1]

The process of nation-building on the Korean peninsula since modernity has unique characteristics due to special experiences such as colonialism, war, and division, and their subsequent impacts, as well as the independent paths pursued by North Korea in building socialism and South Korea in developing capitalism and democracy. In this process, the experience of 'other-making' accompanying identity formation has also existed. Furthermore, the specificities that emerged during the economic crisis and the neoliberalization of society after democratization also serve as a key to understanding Korean society. We draw attention to the fact that Korean society has shown changes with a certain break from previous periods after experiencing democratization in 1987 and the economic crisis in 1997, and we aim to present ways to overcome the reality of intensified confrontation through various othering phenomena in Korean society, along with diagnoses of these diverse phenomena. The principles of such proposals are fundamentally linked to efforts to overcome the inherent limitations of liberalism, particularly modern liberalism, while simultaneously seeking solutions to the liberal challenges in Korean society. This is because overcoming the modern limitations of liberalism is simultaneously about resolving the liberal and post-modern challenges confronting Korean society.

II. What Creates the Other?

The series of events surrounding the Yemen refugee crisis several years ago clearly demonstrated how hollow the 'multiculturalism' policy, pursued for a long time in Korean society, truly was. When news spread nationwide about the approximately 500 asylum seekers from Yemen in Jeju, a petition titled "Petition to Abolish/Amend the Refugee Act, Visa-Free Entry, and Asylum Application Permits Regarding the Illegal Refugee Issue in Jeju Island" was posted on the Blue House's online petition board, quickly exceeding 200,000 signatures within days. Demonstrations demanding the expulsion of Yemen refugees were organized multiple times in Gwanghwamun Square, Seoul, mobilizing numerous participants. The decision to halt the mosque construction in Daegu, mentioned earlier, can be seen as an extension of this.

The rejection of Yemen refugees and the halt of mosque construction involved more than just discomfort with foreigners; complex issues were intertwined. Primarily, a common element in the rejection of Yemen refugees and mosque construction was the expression of aversion towards Muslims. The anti-Yemen refugee movement in 2018 did not inquire about why they came or the suffering they might have endured in Yemen; it focused solely on their identity as Muslims from the 'Middle East.' This movement resurrected certain cultural stereotypes about Muslims held in Korean society. Our cultural representations of Islam and Muslims are an extension of Western Orientalist perspectives, which we have readily adopted. Particularly after the 9/11 attacks and the IS group incidents in the Syrian region a few years ago that led to a refugee crisis in Europe, the solidified view of Islam has dominated our perceptions and was thus invoked. Specifically, a prominent concern raised in the rejection of Yemen refugees was the need to protect 'our women's safety' from Muslim men. Placards held by those opposing Yemen refugee acceptance at the time bore slogans such as "Not hatred. We want safety," and "Expel illegal fake refugees · National safety first." The formation of an 'emotional alliance' between 'conservative politicians, fundamentalist Christians, young people, and women' was instrumental in generating these anti-refugee voices. Within this alliance, Korean women were utilized as passive symbols, either as protectors of right-wing politicians and conservative Christians or as objects of protection for Korean men (Kim Hyun-mi 2020; 2018, 220-222). In this context, self-proclaimed radical feminists and conservative Protestant hate groups formed a 'dangerous alliance' in the name of women's rights to reject refugees as a common 'enemy' (Kim Na-mi 2018; Jeong Hye-sil 2018). In other words, an ironic alliance was formed with long-standing 'enemies' when faced with a common 'enemy' right before their eyes.

On the other hand, the Afghan refugees who suddenly arrived in Korea following the abrupt withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 – local Korean collaborators – were largely accepted without significant incident, with growing calls for their acceptance. Their status as collaborators with the Korean Embassy or corporations was the primary consideration – not humanitarian appeals for refugees or the obligations of global citizens – which led to their acceptance without substantial opposition. However, reports of five Taliban members infiltrating among the French collaborators who arrived in France around the same time served as a warning of other threats. In this regard, it is difficult to predict how they will be treated in Korean society, given that they are also Muslims whom Korean society fears. It is not coincidental that recent reports are slowly revealing fears about their long-term stay. It is possible that they are hoping for a situation similar to the 1970s, when Vietnamese boat people were accommodated in Busan and subsequently forced to relocate to other countries, with none remaining.

The issue of refugees began to emerge as a legal and social problem in Korean society with its accession to the <Convention relating to the Status of Refugees> and the <Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees> in 1992.[2] Consequently, provisions related to refugees were added to the Immigration Control Act in December 1993 and its Enforcement Decree in June 1994, and applications for refugee status recognition began to be accepted in July 1994. However, not a single refugee was recognized until 2000. After the Republic of Korea became a member of the UNHCR Executive Committee in 2000, the first refugee status was granted in 2001 to Tadase Lerece Dege, an activist from an anti-government organization from Ethiopia. From 1994 to 2020, a total of 71,041 asylum applications were filed, but only 799 individuals were granted refugee status. This starkly contrasts with the refugee recognition rate of 37% in developed countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with Korea barely exceeding 1% recognition.[3]

Despite South Korea's promotion of its status as an international human rights nation by enacting a separate 'Refugee Act' in 2012, the first in East Asia, to guarantee the procedural rights of asylum seekers, the reality is quite different. It is well-known that Korean society has emphasized tolerance and made efforts towards integration for foreigners, migrant workers, and marriage immigrants entering Korean society, while advocating for multiculturalism. However, the Yemen refugee crisis of 2018 revealed how hollow these slogans were and how temporary and ad-hoc the measures were. The anti-Yemen refugee movement has led to the stigmatization of refugees under labels such as 'potential terrorists' or 'potential sex offenders,' and by combining this with dangerous stereotypes of immigrants, illegal aliens, and ethnic Koreans from China, it is advancing the process of defining them as 'non-citizens' who threaten 'national security.'

In this process, multiculturalism, which has shaped major discourse in Korean society, is now being labeled as an outdated ideology that disadvantages the nation, and is being attacked as an ideology that harms the 'pure nation.' Anti-multiculturalists define the government's multicultural policies as reverse discrimination against the nation, pursued unilaterally without national consensus, and express resentment towards the media that defends multiculturalism by labeling them as racists (Yuk Ju-won 2016, 120). The anti-multicultural discourse aligns with the logic of 'protecting our women' that emerged in the movement to reject refugees. It imposes an obsession with the symbolic representation of 'ethnic purity,' objectifies national women, presents the logic of 'protecting our women,' and further expresses aversion to multiculturalism (Yuval-Davis 2012, 58-62). In this sense, the alliance between anti-multiculturalism's rejection of refugees and feminism is ironic, and even dangerous. Nevertheless, it has operated because it stimulates the instinct for self-preservation in an absolute competitive society created by neoliberalism, where individuals must fend for themselves.

Just as the 'absence of the state' was witnessed during the Sewol ferry disaster, a 'state' to protect the 'nation' is now being summoned in response to new changes. The slogan 'People First' has been transformed into 'Nationals First,' demanding a strong state to protect them. Simultaneously, it seeks to resurrect the state, which has long been fading under the dominance of neoliberalism. In a neoliberal society, competition has become extreme and the state has disappeared from the public sphere, yet the state is being called upon to create a framework for competition and to establish boundaries for 'free competition among nationals' to ensure even 'fair' competition. The support for Trump in the United States likely stemmed from the expectation of a strong state, driven by the hope that a free society would emerge from a free competitive society exclusively for Americans. In both the US and Korea, there is a desire for a strong state that can expel refugees, migrant workers, stateless persons, and illegal entrants crossing borders, and erect barriers against them, thereby weakening state power. Multiculturalism is perceived as an expression that reveals the dissolution of borders and the absence of the state.

The Yemen refugee issue ultimately subsided without major controversy, and the problem did not escalate further. While three Yemen refugees applied for asylum, two were accepted, and subsequently, three applied for 'humanitarian stay,' but the court rejected these applications, ruling that "the right of a foreigner to apply for humanitarian stay permits is not explicitly stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, and the right to apply for humanitarian stay permits is a request for protection from the government of the Republic of Korea, not a fundamental constitutional right recognized as a 'human right.'"[4] This ruling can be seen as strictly adhering to the exclusive nature of sovereignty stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the modern characteristic that human rights are realized specifically as rights of members of the political community known as the nation-state.

Looking at the European example regarding the refugee issue, we can infer its contentious aspects. When Syrian refugees entered Europe several years ago, countries did not easily open their doors. Even with appeals to human rights, it was not straightforward, leading to the implementation of quotas at the European Union level. Germany was the country that showed the most active response to the Syrian refugee issue. The favorable actions of Merkel, often praised for her 'Mutti (Mom) leadership,' were possible ultimately due to the conditions of the German economy. While countries like the UK, France, and Italy were struggling with continuous economic recession and high unemployment, Germany was exceptionally experiencing economic boom, low unemployment, and even labor shortages, allowing it to be favorable towards the Syrian refugee issue (Lee Seung-hyun 2016). Of course, despite this, far-right nationalism with racist undertones continues to gain traction in various European countries.

In light of this, the rapid emergence of the 'other' issue in Korean society, leading to aggressive hate speech and even collective exclusion, is intertwined with the rapid neoliberalization of Korean society since the 1997 economic crisis. Individuals thrown into a struggle for survival in a thoroughly competitive society are being pushed into situations where they must step on others to get ahead, creating an effect akin to organizing society according to a push-out game model rather than a coexistence model. Individuals constantly strive to win by exhibiting a vulgar mentality, and those who fail in this competition are treated as 'surplus' beings. A tendency to otherize competitors arises within this competition.

Viewed in this light, the Yemen refugee issue in 2018 was not merely a problem of refugees as a specific group, but rather a manifestation of intersectionality, intertwining with feminism and various other social issues (Joo Won 2020). In particular, as it intersected with the feminist issues that are currently topical in Korean society, and with the added layer of intergenerational conflict, various social problems were seen to be condensing. The rejection of Yemen refugees was an attempt to exclude them by reinforcing long-standing prejudices against Islam, simply because they are Muslim. Simultaneously, the justification for their exclusion employed a 'pseudo-feminist' logic of women's protection. [5] However, in the space vacated by the refugee issue, feminism disappeared, and patriarchal logic re-emerged, once again designating women as objects of othering. Recently, claims have persisted that employed and unemployed individuals in their 20s and 30s in Korea are facing dual oppression in the labor market. Firstly, they must compete with the entry barriers set high by the previous generation of permanent employees in their 40s and 50s, and secondly, they must compete with women of the same generation. The sense of victimhood experienced by men in their early twenties due to military service inevitably leads them to direct their blame towards women in their 20s. Furthermore, resentment towards the quota system given to women amidst fierce employment competition adds further weight to this accumulated sense of victimhood.

Looking at the current manifestations and explosions of conflict in Korean society, it is evident that various social conflicts, alienations, and othering phenomena are superimposed, intertwined, and condensed. Ultimately, specific groups designated as 'others' become targets of attack, condensing the contradictions expressed within Korean society's socioeconomic and political problems. Gender conflict is one of the persistent issues that has not subsided since the refugee issue emerged. The 'Gangnam Station murder case' served as a symbolic trigger for gender conflict. The issue, expressed through symbolic phrases like "killed because she was a woman," was an explosion of accumulated gender conflict, and the term 'misogyny' emerged, leading to an extreme polarization of gender conflict. Subsequently, this issue has persisted in Korean society, not subsiding but maintaining latent explosive potential, through the 'Me Too' movement exposed at various points and the Hyehwa demonstrations. Notably, this issue has also created an extreme form of misandry, where men as a whole are perceived as potential murderers or sex offenders, alongside the suffering of women and the discourse of hatred. Attacks on men have merged with conflicts between the generations of those facing employment in their 20s and 30s, such as the issue of bonus points for military service. The contrasting voting patterns of men and women in their 20s and 30s, revealed in the Seoul mayoral election, were a political expression of such conflict. The female quota system, implemented under the name of affirmative action, has led to controversy over reverse discrimination, and lingering latent conflicts remain regarding men's mandatory military service and its effects. Overlapping with this, the surge in real estate prices is causing intergenerational conflict. This also ties into the discourse of 'fairness' promoted by the Democratic Party and the Moon Jae-in administration. Various incidents that have disappointed public expectations for 'justice through fairness' since President Moon Jae-in took office, including the Cho Kuk scandal, the skyrocketing real estate prices, and the overheated real estate speculation, have led to accumulated dissatisfaction with relative deprivation and unfairness, reaching a breaking point at the end of the administration.

While the refugee issue emerged temporarily due to a visible incident, the accumulated conflicts in various fields and in various ways are leading to extreme exclusion by othering specific forces or groups. While various social problems are intertwined and layered within these conflicts and exclusionary phenomena, politics, which should resolve them, is 'missing.' The logic of neoliberal competition has taken root in the place of politics that should resolve various social conflicts, leaving only the logic of survival, akin to a jungle, where the fittest survive. Therefore, the method for surviving in this jungle-like competition is to exclude competitors, which creates the logic of 'othering.'

III. Who Has Been the Other? The Ways and History of Constructing the Other in Korean Society

In the historical context of division and war following liberation, South Korea has been forming its own national and citizen identity. The process of nation-building in South Korea after liberation involved constructing the nation on the remnants of Japanese colonialism, and simultaneously creating a 'citizenry' in the South distinct from the 'people' of North Korea. In the First Republic, established with the government's founding in 1948 following liberation in 1945, the operational principle for 'nation-building' was 'anti-communism.' With the end of World War II, the Cold War shaped the global political landscape, and the Korean peninsula was at its forefront. The confrontation between North and South was confined within the frameworks of anti-communism and anti-imperialism, and South Korea highlighted the existence of 'reds' as targets to be eliminated. As a form of homo sacer, 'reds' were the first political others in Korean society. The 'enemy' assumed as 'reds' was equated with the people of North Korea, who were in confrontation with South Korea, and thus they were also considered 'enemies' to be eliminated. For a unified, 'anti-communist citizenry' of South Korea, no further others could exist. The criterion for distinguishing between friend and foe was 'anti-communism.'

Following the coup d'état of May 16th by Park Chung-hee, the regime created a new driving force for nation-building, 'economic development,' alongside existing anti-communism. Consequently, the invocation of the citizenry as the subject of economic development acquired new dynamics. While the April 19th movement just before the May 16th coup pursued 'freedom' against Syngman Rhee's oppression, the masses also needed 'bread.' The desire of the masses to escape poverty could be channeled by the forces that seized power through the coup into economic development as a means to secure new legitimacy. The desire of the masses to escape poverty, combined with the coup leaders' need for legitimacy, mobilized South Korea under the slogan of economic development in the 1960s. In this process, new others also emerged. For instance, those forcibly mobilized in the process of creating citizens invoked as subjects of economic development were delinquents or gangsters who had existed on the periphery of society. They were systematically confined and subjected to forced labor to incorporate the entire nation as subjects of economic development. Anti-communism remained a principle during Park Chung-hee's regime. Thus, the work of invoking and creating citizens as subjects of anti-communism and economic development, and the 'others' excluded from this process, were created, and even extremely excluded.

From the 1970s onwards, the line between democracy and anti-democracy was clearly drawn, and it became even clearer after the May 18th Gwangju Uprising in 1980. In that confrontational structure, the 'other' was likely a secondary issue. On the other hand, since the 1970s, nationalism was an important ideology to be appropriated by both Park Chung-hee and his opponents. They sought to preemptively claim the 'national' righteousness and even clashed over who was more nationalistic. In that sense, since liberation, or even before, there was a time of mobilization to be included in the collective subject of the nation or the people. Even those who led the democratization movement did not reject the discourse of the nation and, while invoking a new subject through the term 'minjung' (the people), it was still 'national minjung.' In other words, South Korea, in the long run, was national minjung as members of a unified nation-state. In that sense, until the 1980s, it was an era of grand subjects.

After democratization in 1987, the individuals who had been latent began to awaken, and under the name of the new generation, they sought to assert themselves as individual subjects prior to the grand subject. The 1990s were remarkable for the emergence of diverse social beings in terms of the expansion of individualism, and this was also positive in terms of the birth of new democratic subjects. With the emergence of new generations in the 1990s, various minority groups 'came out,' and simultaneously emerged as 'others' in our society. Of course, newly emerged minorities had already existed in our society, but they were beings that existed but were not recognized, and did not seek recognition. However, with coming out, they emerged as existing beings, and the issue of recognizing their existence began to arise. With the emergence of individuals, pursuits of various forms of individuality appeared, and furthermore, those who had not appeared in public spaces under the name of the socially vulnerable began to gradually assert their rights. Homosexuals coming out, conscientious objectors, and people with disabilities began to publicly demand their legitimate rights in an open society. And Korean society implemented various affirmative action policies, such as quotas for people with disabilities and women, and alternative service systems, to provide various considerations and inclusion policies for social minorities.

The economic crisis of 1997, which occurred amidst these changes, on the other hand, led to the extreme individualization of Korean society. While Korean society had previously protected individuals through frameworks such as family, workplace, and nation, the 1997 economic crisis created a social atmosphere where nothing could protect individuals. Simultaneously, new neoliberal economic policies allowed for the entry of new others from abroad through globalization, such as foreign workers and immigrants, and Korean society needed these outsiders. The number of outsiders has been steadily increasing. They have established themselves around us with significant differences in appearance and culture, emerging as new others in Korean society.

Ultimately, who constitutes the 'nation'? And more broadly, who is the primordial people that makes up the 'nation'? We must calmly answer these questions. The boundaries of the nation, which were long taken for granted after liberation – namely, the anti-communist nation and the nation as a subject of economic development, and on the other hand, the nation embodying thoroughly patriarchal and male-centric thinking – are now beginning to crumble, leading to the emergence of groups exhibiting extreme tendencies and the amplification of extreme confrontations. One of the factors accelerating this and complicating the nature of the confrontation is neoliberal globalization. Perhaps these factors have converged simultaneously, creating more complex and amplified patterns. That is, after the end of the Cold War and the progression of neoliberalization in the late 1980s globally, and the transition to democratization in Korea, the 1990s saw Korea gradually attempting to deepen democracy, leading to a complex entanglement of the emergence of various social groups and the expression of individual desires of citizens. Furthermore, with the globalization of capital and labor, the influx of foreigners has increased, leading to the emergence of new members. In this context, politics, which should be the driving force for social integration, is rather invisible, and the logic of neoliberal competition has taken its place since the 1997 economic crisis. Ultimately, rather than the logic of coexistence for all to live together, only the logic of survival, which requires living by oppressing and excluding others, seems to remain.

IV. What Should Be Done?

Korean society has long been a time of nationalism. Following the failure to transition from a traditional dynastic state to a modern nation-state in the early modern period, and through Japanese colonial rule, the invocation of the nation or people as the subject of liberation and nation-building has proceeded through nationalism. In that sense, Korea has long been a nation of nationalism. In that time of nationalism, there was no place for outsiders. Ironically, the turning point and opportunity for re-evaluation and new transition regarding this nationalism came with the influx of foreign workers due to neoliberal globalization, i.e., the influx of new others and the subsequent search for coexistence. The term 'multiculturalism' became a trend in Korean society, and 'multicultural families' and the modifier 'multicultural' even became terms referring to specific people. However, to that extent, it also contained inherent exclusivity towards outsiders. In fact, despite 'multiculturalism' not being merely a descriptive concept of the existence of diverse cultural identities, but a normative ideal of coexistence where individual cultural identities and their differences are fully recognized as members of society, it has operated as a term with exclusive connotations. In that sense, Canada, often cited as a model of multiculturalism, can be seen as a mosaic society. It is a way in which individuals are recognized for their cultural identities while simultaneously contributing to the formation of a new society.

There is an assessment that Korea underwent a transition to an open and less exclusive nationalism through its 'open' nationalism, as demonstrated during the 2002 World Cup応援 (cheering) events, after navigating the 1990s. However, what is being done in the name of multiculturalism, the extreme expressions of hatred seen in the recent Yemen refugee incident, and of course, numerous other examples of exclusive emotional expressions prior to this, suggest that Korea's past strong nationalistic characteristics have transformed in peculiar ways. Through the rapid influx of neoliberalism, individualistic characteristics have been strengthened, and while there is a desire to embody global citizenship in the context of globalization, we must question whether this is not merely a transformation of the citizen as an economic subject during the Park Chung-hee era into an extreme form of economic animal.

In other words, while acknowledging that exclusive nationalism should normatively be avoided, it is currently adrift without finding a new transformative path or a new ideology for integration within the Korean community. Multiculturalism, once accepted as a normative value, has shown its limitations, and with public rejection being expressed, it cannot be recalled. Since 2010, various European countries have also recognized the limitations of multiculturalism and are attempting new directions. The republican model, or melting pot model, which gained attention in contrast to the mosaic integration model of the United States and Canada after 9/11 in 2001, has also clearly revealed its limitations in the various conflicts seen in France since the 2010s. Republicanism, particularly constitutional republicanism proposed by Habermas and others in the process of strengthening political integration within the European Union, emphasizes the formation of identity based on consensus on political principles, unlike the nationalism of the nation-state era, which emphasized cultural elements of national identity. However, recent developments in French republicanism show that political principles emphasized by republicanism, especially the principle of laïcité (the French principle of secularism), are in practice leading to the exclusion and oppression of Muslims. [6] This is because even political principles that pursue a certain universality can be difficult to understand without considering Western-centric perspectives or completely abstracting cultural backgrounds. Nevertheless, republicans argue that the fundamental principles they emphasize are necessary because they hold a significant position as the minimum requirements for forming a community and, at the same time, encompass the duties and rights that members of the community should possess.

The rapid globalization phenomenon since the 21st century, namely the constant movement of capital, labor, and goods, appears to be gradually eroding the borders of the nation-state era, which were once like impenetrable walls. In that sense, it is perhaps a natural reality that republicanism, which was an effective ideology of integration in the nation-state era, is showing certain limitations. In globalization, borders are becoming blurred, the limits of state power are clear, and demanding republican patriotism, as in the nation-state era, from the numerous people crossing borders may be an excessive demand. Nevertheless, it is also necessary for the community of the nation-state, which still remains valid, and for the people living within it to exercise their duties and rights as members of the community. In that regard, a balance must be found between the members and the community. It is necessary to first establish principles for finding such a balance.

First, the most important recognition must be given to their very existence and their subjectivity. Before being objects of integration or exclusion, they are social beings and subjective beings. They exist as human beings who must have their existence recognized and realize their value in society, rather than being beings who seek recognition from power. Regardless of where they come from, what skin color they have, or what preferences they hold, these are matters of individual subjectivity and should be tolerated as long as they do not harm the community or others, from a liberal perspective. We are all subjects and others at the same time. At the end of the 19th century, Simmel emphasized that strangers are not beings outside of us, but rather "elements that constitute our group itself, just like the poor or various 'internal enemies'" (G. Simmel 2005, 79-80). Furthermore, as Derrida pointed out, Socrates was a stranger to the language of the court at the court, and when Oedipus went to a strange land, he was a stranger there, but the inhabitants there could also be strangers to Oedipus; thus, at any moment, at any point, we can become strangers, so we are all strangers to each other (J. Derrida 2004). Of course, the problem is that such strangers are continuously excluded and oppressed from the community by being othered at certain moments. However, the community that must be created should be one where everyone can be a subject in a situation where everyone is a stranger. Following the grand subject of the modern rational individual, a community by these subjects, mindful of the emergence of diverse subjects and their infinite potential for emergence, is needed.

In that sense, the second principle is the need for an ideology of solidarity that connects communities of diverse subjects. This means that no one should be subjected to 'othering' within the community. Solidarity as fellow citizens is necessary. Since the influx of neoliberalism, especially after the 1997 economic crisis, Korean society exists in a state of individual survival through strengthening individual competitiveness and the absence of the state and society. The grand subjects of the nation or people, which were mobilized or invoked for a long time for economic development and democratization, have disappeared, and competitive individual subjects have taken their place. Individuals are required to cultivate a 'vulgar mentality' to step on their competitors to survive in such a community and avoid becoming 'surplus humans' left behind in the competition. This way of life has become mainstream and is accepted as natural since the neoliberal society began to take root after the 1997 economic crisis. In that sense, we need to revive the memory of national solidarity that was formed for economic development and democratization before the economic crisis. And this national solidarity must be newly constituted as an opportunity for individual subjectivity to be realized in a society where individuality has expanded after democratization. Therefore, a newly constituted ideology of solidarity suitable for the new society must be created. Ultimately, it is a time when an ideology of solidarity is needed to bring together these scattered individual subjects and enable them to live while maintaining communal life. This ideology of solidarity should not be a way of reinforcing internal ties and building external barriers, like the previous nationalistic ideology, but rather a way of simultaneously considering global citizenship obligations and the obligations to our community, in line with the context of globalization. Therefore, solidarity among individuals must be possible in a way that does not homogenize their subjectivity, based on the individual subjectivity mentioned first.

Third, connecting the first and second tasks, there is a need for a kind of new social contract to create a point of convergence between individual freedom and the values of the community. National identity in the era of the modern nation-state was formed through the process of nationalistic invocation by the state, and it was also the process of forming national subjects. However, now, rather than the imposition of identity, a process of subjectivation where individuals construct their own identity is necessary, and this is the starting point of individual freedom. But at the same time, the community's values must be realized, and the state must provide the conditions for the realization of these individuals' freedom, thereby constructing the community's values through that process. It is within the community where individuals' subjectivity is realized, and ultimately, the realization of individual subjectivity must include the role of a citizen within the community. As Durkheim stated, the community, named the state, must be a space where the collective consciousness of its members, i.e., the citizens, is represented. The individual, as the bearer of rights and duties as a citizen, must be positioned in relation to the community called the state. Just as citizens' rights are realized with the recognition of state power, citizens must become bearers of duties as citizens within the community called the state. In this case, duties are duties to the community and also duties to fellow members of the community. Sacrificing private interest for the public good, a strong demand of republicanism, is difficult in contemporary society. In that sense, it is necessary to create a structure where individual interests and the interests of the community can converge. This is a structure where individual interests can be maximized when realized as members of the community. When such a structure is realized, individual freedom and community virtue can expand simultaneously.

Populism is one of the phenomena currently becoming an issue in the political sphere, not only in Korea but globally. Translated as 'populism' or 'demagoguery,' it is often criticized, and can be understood as the political sphere engaging in indiscriminate budget waste or unplanned expenditure to gain votes. However, populism can also be seen as a form of active expression of the public's will. It is also a phenomenon that emerges from the desire to directly express one's intentions amidst distrust of existing representatives. Especially in a situation of accelerating neoliberal competition, individuals driven by competition immediately express and react sensitively to their own interests, leading to populist politics. Furthermore, by proceeding with the othering of specific groups – by creating them as 'public enemies' or scapegoats – populism becomes a tool of oppressive politics. However, populism is clearly a phenomenon that emerged from the limitations of modern politics, particularly the limitations of representative politics. In that sense, it could be an opportunity to overcome the limitations of modern politics. This is possible when it is used as an opportunity for the subjectivation of the masses, moving beyond the limitations of representative politics. It is also an opportunity to transition into new democratic and popular subjects through this process.

The disappearance of politics following the rapid neoliberalization of Korean society and the subsequent emergence of populist mass politics present an opportunity for politics to be renewed. This is also the possibility of expanding democracy demonstrated by the citizens in the candlelight protests of winter 2016, who, despite being cynical about politics, "never turned away from it" (Lee Ji-ho 2017, 7). To transform a society of intensified competition into a society of solidarity, and to mature individuals as citizens of the community rather than making them competitive, the first priority is to find the place of politics. And this endeavor must be undertaken by attempting to seek coexistence for various beings by presenting a new vision for social integration. ■

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[1] Le « discours de haine » fait également partie d'un processus continu et ininterrompu par lequel nous sommes subjectivés (J. Butler 2016, 61).

[2] Certes, l'expérience antérieure de la Corée en matière d'accueil des réfugiés concerne les boat people vietnamiens arrivés pendant plus de dix ans après la chute du Vietnam en 1975. En 1975, 1 335 personnes évacuées avec l'armée coréenne et 216 réfugiés secourus par un navire de fret coréen en mer près du Vietnam ont été accueillis dans un camp temporaire à Busan, et 977 d'entre eux, à l'exception de ceux qui ont obtenu la nationalité par mariage avec des Sud-Coréens, ont été transférés à l'étranger. Les boat people ont commencé à arriver en 1977 et ont été accueillis dans le <Camp d'aide aux réfugiés vietnamiens> installé dans le district de Dongnae à Busan. Cependant, pas un seul d'entre eux n'a été autorisé à s'installer, et la Corée n'était pas un pays où les Vietnamiens souhaitaient s'installer (Jeong In-seop 2009, 204).

[3] Voir le Bulletin mensuel des statistiques de l'immigration et de la politique des étrangers du Service de l'immigration et de la politique des étrangers du Ministère de la Justice, 2020.

[4] « Jugement de rejet pour « absence de droit de demande » dans le procès de permis de séjour humanitaire pour les réfugiés yéménites ». *Munhwa Ilbo* 2021. 9. 2.

[5] C'est identique à la logique patriarcale qui consiste à comparer la patrie à une femme ou à une sœur pendant la période coloniale japonaise et à affirmer qu'il faut les protéger.

[6] En particulier, Marine Le Pen, dirigeante du parti d'extrême droite nationaliste « Front National », a récemment adopté une stratégie de « diabolisation » progressive, passant d'une tendance raciste d'extrême droite à une image plus modérée, et affirme le républicanisme français. Cela montre que le républicanisme, bien que fondé sur des principes politiques, peut renforcer une idéologie exclusive, une sorte de républicanisme « national ».

■ Auteur : Hong Tae-young_Professeur au Graduate School of National Security, National Defense University. Titulaire d'un doctorat en sciences politiques de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales de Paris. Ancien chercheur invité à l'Université de Washington. A été président du comité de rédaction de la Korean Political Science Association en 2021/2022. Ses principaux domaines de recherche sont la sécurité nationale, la pensée politique, la politique coréenne et la politique européenne. Ses ouvrages récents incluent *Au-delà de l'État-nation*, et ses articles comprennent « La gouvernance nationaliste et la construction de la nation », « La naissance de la République française et du républicanisme ».

■ Responsable et éditeur : Yoon Ha-eun_Chercheur à l'EAI

   Contact : 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | hyoon@eai.or.kr