[EAI Working Paper] Liberalism Series ④_A Liberal Exploration for the Inclusion of the Other in Korean Society

I. Introduction: What is the Other?

The mosque construction halted in Daegu is reportedly in a state of 'unresolvable conflict.' Conflicts surrounding mosques, numbering over 20 nationwide, remain latent. The question of who constitutes 'the people' also becomes crucial in the context of national disaster relief related to COVID-19. It is now commonplace for individuals referred to as 'non-citizens' to appear in the Korean media and become subjects of incidents, including crimes committed by foreign workers, which are disproportionately highlighted compared to other offenses. Not only incidents involving foreigners but also matters previously considered 'abnormal,' distinct from the norm, continue to attract media attention, even if they are no longer explicitly labeled as 'abnormal.' The case of Private First Class Byun Hee-soo, who was forcibly discharged and ultimately lost her life, is a representative recent example. The issue of gender identity, specifically being transgender, and the problem of exclusion within the military, perhaps the most masculine of groups, led to another tragedy. The stark difference in voting patterns between men and women in their 20s during the recent 2021 local by-elections, particularly for the Seoul mayoral by-election, symbolically demonstrated the accumulated gender conflict. With 'fairness' emerging as a key theme in Korean society, issues of gender-based differences or 'unfairness' related to discrimination have resurfaced, as evidenced by the voting patterns in the recent by-elections.

Ultimately, these patterns of conflict indicate a situation where various problems are superimposed or intertwined, making it difficult to resolve them in a uniform manner, rather than being a single agenda issue. Nevertheless, what is common to these conflicts is the intensification of hostile sentiments, leading to the exclusion and oppression of the opposing party, a phenomenon of 'othering.' 'The Other' is an expression referring to those excluded and not included within the category of 'sameness' that constitutes 'us.' The perception of such others has always varied with the times. The problem arises first in determining who is designated as the other in society. Although the discussion began with the issue of foreigners or migrant workers at the outset of this text, their issues are likely a very recent phenomenon. Even if we examine the problem of the other in Korean society limited to the period after liberation, we can find others appearing at various levels and in various spaces. In particular, since modernity, Korean society has undergone a historical process of 'identification' that emphasized collectivism, and this process of identity formation ultimately encompasses exclusion, forced assimilation, and a certain process of 'other-making.'[1]

The process of nation-building on the Korean Peninsula since modernity has unique characteristics due to special experiences such as colonization, war, and division, and their impacts, as well as the independent paths pursued in North Korea's socialist construction and South Korea's capitalist economic development and democratization. In this process, the experience of 'other-making' accompanying identity formation also existed. Furthermore, the particularities that emerged amidst economic crises and the neoliberalization of society after democratization also serve as a key to understanding Korean society. We draw attention to the fact that Korean society has shown changes with a certain break from previous periods after experiencing democratization in 1987 and the economic crisis in 1997. We aim to diagnose these various phenomena and propose ways to overcome the reality of intensified confrontation through various othering phenomena in Korean society. The principles of these proposals are fundamentally linked to efforts to overcome the inherent limitations of liberalism, particularly modern liberalism, while simultaneously seeking solutions to the liberal challenges facing Korean society. This is because overcoming the modern limitations of liberalism is also about simultaneously resolving the liberal and post-modern challenges confronting Korean society.

II. What Creates the Other?

The series of events surrounding the Yemeni refugee crisis several years ago clearly demonstrated how hollow the 'multiculturalism' that had been pursued as policy in Korean society for a long time truly was. When news spread nationwide about the approximately 500 asylum seekers from Yemen in Jeju, a petition titled 'Petition to abolish/amend the Refugee Act, visa-free entry, and refugee status recognition regarding the illegal refugee issue in Jeju' was posted on the Blue House's online petition board, exceeding 200,000 signatures within days. Demonstrations demanding the expulsion of Yemeni refugees were organized multiple times in Gwanghwamun Square, Seoul, mobilizing numerous participants. The decision to halt the mosque construction in Daegu, mentioned earlier, can be seen as an extension of this.

The rejection of Yemeni refugees and the halt of mosque construction involved more than just a general aversion to foreigners. A common element in the rejection of Yemeni refugees and mosque construction was the expression of anti-Muslim sentiment. The anti-Yemeni refugee movement in 2018 did not inquire about their reasons for coming or the suffering they might have endured in Yemen; it focused solely on the fact that they were Muslims from the 'Middle East.' This, in turn, evoked certain cultural stereotypes about Muslims prevalent in Korean society. Our cultural stereotypes about Islam and Muslims are an extension of Western Orientalist perspectives, which we have uncritically adopted. Particularly, the view of Islam, solidified after the 9/11 attacks and the IS incidents in the Syrian region a few years ago that led to a refugee crisis in Europe, has dominated our perceptions and was invoked here. The primary argument raised against the rejection of Yemeni refugees was the need to protect 'our women' from Muslim men. Placards held by those opposing the acceptance of Yemeni refugees at the time read, 'Not hate. We want safety,' and 'Expel illegal fake refugees · National safety first.' The formation of an 'emotional alliance' among 'conservative politicians, fundamentalist Christians, youth, and women' was instrumental in generating these voices opposing refugee acceptance, and within that alliance, Korean women were utilized as passive symbols, constructing a superior position as protectors of conservative Christians and right-wing politicians, or were represented as objects of protection for Korean men (Kim Hyun-mi 2020; 2018, 220-222). In this context, self-proclaimed radical feminists and conservative Protestant hate groups formed a 'dangerous alliance' in the name of women's rights to reject refugees as a common 'enemy' (Kim Na-mi 2018; Jeong Hye-sil 2018). That is, an ironic alliance was formed with a long-standing 'enemy' in the face of a common 'enemy' right before their eyes.

Meanwhile, the Afghan refugees who suddenly entered Korea following the abrupt withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in August 2021 – local Korean collaborators – were largely accepted without significant opposition, as voices advocating for their acceptance grew louder. Their status as collaborators with the Korean Embassy or companies was the primary consideration – not an appeal to humanitarianism or the duty of global citizens – leading to their acceptance without much resistance. However, reports of five Taliban members hiding among French collaborators who entered France around the same time served as a warning of other threats. In that regard, it is difficult to easily predict how they will be treated in Korean society, given that they are Muslims, a group feared in Korea. It is not coincidental that recent reports have gradually revealed fears about their long-term stay. Perhaps there is an expectation of a situation similar to the 1970s, when Vietnamese boat people were housed in Busan and subsequently forced to emigrate to other countries, with none remaining in Korea.

The issue of refugees began to emerge as a legal and social problem in Korean society with its accession to the 'Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees' and the 'Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees' in 1992.[2] Accordingly, provisions related to refugees were added to the Immigration Control Act in December 1993 and its Enforcement Decree in June 1994, and applications for refugee status recognition began to be accepted from July 1994. However, not a single refugee was recognized until 2000. After South Korea became a member of the UNHCR Executive Committee in 2000, the first refugee status was granted in 2001 to Tadesse Leresse Degue, an activist from an anti-government organization from Ethiopia. From 1994 to 2020, a total of 71,041 asylum applications were filed, but only 799 were granted refugee status. This starkly contrasts with Korea, where just over 1% are recognized, compared to the refugee recognition rate of 37% in developed countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).[3]

In 2012, Korea enacted a separate 'Refugee Act,' the first in East Asia, promoting its status as an international human rights nation that guarantees the procedural rights of asylum seekers. However, the reality falls short of this image. It is well-known that Korean society has emphasized tolerance and made efforts towards integration for foreigners, migrant workers, and marriage immigrants entering Korean society, while advocating for multiculturalism. Yet, the Yemeni refugee incident in 2018 revealed how hollow these slogans were and how temporary and ad hoc the measures taken were. The anti-Yemeni refugee movement has led to the labeling of refugees through terms like 'potential terrorists' or 'potential sex offenders,' and by conflating them with dangerous stereotypes of immigrants, undocumented aliens, and ethnic Koreans from China, it has proceeded to define them as 'non-citizens' who threaten 'national safety.'

In this process, multiculturalism, which had formed a major discourse in Korean society, is now being labeled and attacked as an outdated ideology that harms the nation through reverse discrimination, or as an ideology that harms 'pure citizens.' Anti-multiculturalists define the government's multicultural policies as reverse discrimination against citizens, unilaterally implemented without consensus, and express resentment towards the media that labels them as racists and defends multiculturalism (Yuk Ju-won 2016, 120). The anti-multicultural discourse aligns with the logic of 'protecting our women' that emerged in the movement to reject refugees. It compels an obsession with the symbolic representation of 'ethnic purity,' objectifies national women, promotes the logic of 'protecting our women,' and further expresses aversion to multiculturalism (Yuval-Davis 2012, 58-62). In this sense, the alliance between anti-multiculturalism's opposition to refugees and feminism is ironic, even dangerous. Nevertheless, it has been effective because it stimulates the instinct for self-preservation required in a society of absolute competition created by neoliberalism, where individuals must fend for themselves.

Just as the 'absence of the state' was witnessed during the Sewol ferry disaster, a new change has led to a call for a 'state' that will protect the 'people.' The slogan 'People First' has been replaced by 'Citizens First,' demanding a strong state to protect them. On the other hand, it seeks to recall the state, which has long been fading under the dominance of neoliberalism. In a neoliberal society, competition has intensified, and the state has disappeared from the market sphere; however, people are now demanding that the state provide a framework for this competition and create a boundary for 'free competition among citizens' to ensure it is at least 'fair.' The fervent support for Trump in the United States was likely driven by the expectation that a strong state would lead to a free society by creating a free competitive environment solely for Americans. In both the US and Korea, there is a renewed hope for a strong state that expels refugees, migrant workers, stateless individuals, and illegal entrants crossing borders, and erects barriers against them, while simultaneously weakening state power. Multiculturalism is perceived as an expression that reveals the demise of borders and the absence of the state.

The Yemeni refugee issue ultimately subsided without major incident, and the problem did not escalate further. At the time, three of the Yemeni refugees applied for refugee status, and two were accepted. Subsequently, three applied for 'humanitarian stay,' but their applications were also rejected by the court, which ruled that 'the right of foreigners to apply for humanitarian stay is not explicitly stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, and the right to apply for humanitarian stay is a request for protection from the government of the Republic of Korea, not a fundamental constitutional right recognized as a 'human right.'[4] This ruling clearly adheres to the exclusive nature of sovereignty stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the modern characteristic that human rights can only be realized concretely as rights of members of the political community, the nation-state.

Looking at the European example regarding the refugee issue, we can infer its implications. When Syrian refugees entered Europe several years ago, countries did not easily open their doors. Even appeals to human rights were not easily successful, leading to the implementation of quotas at the European Union level. Germany was the country that showed the most active response to the Syrian refugee issue. The favorable measures taken by Merkel, often praised for her 'Mutti (Mom) leadership,' were ultimately possible due to the conditions of the German economy. While countries like the UK, France, and Italy were struggling with prolonged economic recession and high unemployment, Germany was exceptionally prosperous with low unemployment and even a labor shortage, allowing it to be favorable towards the Syrian refugee issue (Lee Seung-hyun 2016). Of course, despite this, far-right nationalism with racist undertones continues to gain traction in various European countries.

In light of this, the rapid emergence of the 'other' issue in Korean society, leading to aggressive hate speech and collective exclusion, is intertwined with the rapid neoliberalization of Korean society since the 1997 economic crisis. Individuals thrown into competition to survive after entering a thoroughly competitive society are being pushed into situations where they must step on others to get ahead, creating an effect similar to constructing society through a model of exclusion rather than coexistence. Individuals constantly strive to win in competition by exhibiting a vulgar mentality, and those who fail are treated as 'surplus' beings. A tendency to otherize competitors arises within this competition.

Viewed in this light, the Yemeni refugee issue in 2018 was not merely a problem of a specific entity called refugees but a manifestation of intersectionality, where feminist issues and various social problems intersected (Joo Won 2020). In particular, the feminist issues that are currently topical in Korean society are intertwined, and with the added layer of intergenerational conflict, various social problems are becoming condensed. The rejection of Yemeni refugees on the grounds of being Muslim aims to exclude them by reinforcing long-standing prejudices against Islam. Simultaneously, the justification for their exclusion employs 'pseudo-feminist' logic of women's protection.[5] However, in the vacuum left by the refugee issue, feminism has disappeared, and patriarchal logic has re-emerged, once again designating women as objects of othering. Recently, claims have been continuously raised that male job seekers and those in the workforce in their 20s and 30s are facing dual oppression in the labor market. Firstly, they must compete with the entry barriers set high by the older generation of permanent employees in their 40s and 50s, and secondly, they must compete with women of the same generation. The sense of victimhood experienced by men in their early 20s due to their military service inevitably leads them to direct their blame towards women in their 20s. Furthermore, resentment towards the quota system implemented for women amidst fierce employment competition adds further weight to this accumulated sense of victimhood.

Observing the current expressions or outbursts of conflict in Korean society, it becomes clear that various social conflicts, alienations, and othering phenomena are superimposed, intertwined, and condensed. Ultimately, specific groups designated as 'others' become targets and objects of attack, condensing the contradictions manifested within Korean society's socioeconomic and political problems. Gender conflict is one issue that has not subsided since the refugee issue emerged. The symbolic incident that triggered gender conflict was the 'Gangnam Station murder case.' The issue, expressed through symbolic phrases like 'killed because she was a woman,' was an explosion of accumulated gender conflict, and the emergence of the term 'misogyny' led to the polarization of gender conflict. Subsequently, this issue has continued in Korean society, fueled by the 'Me Too' movement and protests in Hyehwa-dong, maintaining a latent explosive potential. In particular, this issue has created extreme forms of misandry, where men as a whole are perceived as potential murderers or sex offenders, alongside the suffering of women and the term 'hate.' Attacks on men have merged with conflicts among the 20s and 30s generations facing employment, such as the issue of military service bonus points. The contrasting voting patterns of men and women in their 20s and 30s, revealed in the Seoul mayoral election, were a political expression of such conflict. The female quota system, implemented under the name of affirmative action, has led to controversy over reverse discrimination, and lingering conflicts related to men's mandatory military service and its effects remain. Overlapping with this, the skyrocketing real estate prices are causing intergenerational conflict. This also aligns with the discourse of 'fairness' promoted by the Democratic Party and the Moon Jae-in administration. Various incidents, including the Cho Kuk scandal, the surge in real estate prices, and speculative overheating, have led to a sense of relative deprivation and accumulated dissatisfaction with unfairness, betraying the public's expectations of 'justice as fairness' emphasized since President Moon Jae-in's inauguration, reaching a breaking point towards the end of the administration.

While the refugee issue emerged temporarily due to a visible incident, the accumulated elements of conflict in various fields and through various means are leading to extreme attempts at exclusion by 'othering' specific forces or groups. Amidst these conflicts and exclusionary phenomena, various social problems are intertwined and layered, while the politics responsible for resolving them is 'missing.' In place of politics that should resolve social conflicts, neoliberal competitive logic prevails, leaving only the logic of survival of the fittest, akin to a jungle, for social conflicts. Therefore, the method to survive in this jungle-like competition is to exclude competitors, which creates the logic of 'othering.'

III. Who Was the Other? The Way Others Are Constructed in Korean Society and Their History

Following liberation, the process of division and war led to the formation of South Korea's own national identity and citizen identity. The process of nation-building in South Korea after liberation, built upon the remnants of Japanese colonialism, was also a process of creating 'citizens' of South Korea distinct from the 'people' of North Korea. The operational principle of 'citizen-making' in the First Republic, established with the government's founding in 1948 following liberation in 1945, was 'anti-communism.' The end of World War II and the subsequent onset of the Cold War determined the global political landscape, and the Korean Peninsula was at its forefront. The confrontation between North and South was trapped within the framework of anti-communism and anti-imperialism, and South Korea highlighted the existence of 'reds' as targets to be eliminated. As a form of homo sacer, the 'red' was the first political other in Korean society. The 'enemy' designated as 'red' was equated with the people of North Korea, the primary adversary confronting South Korea, and thus they were also considered 'enemies' to be eliminated. For the singular 'anti-communist citizen' of South Korea, no further others could exist. The criterion for distinguishing friend from foe was 'anti-communism.'

Following the May 16 coup by Park Chung-hee, the regime created a new driving force for nation-building, 'economic development,' alongside existing anti-communism. Consequently, the invocation of citizens as subjects of economic development acquired new dynamics. While the April 19 Revolution immediately preceding the May 16 coup pursued 'freedom' against Syngman Rhee's oppression, the masses also needed 'bread.' The desire of the masses to escape poverty could be channeled by the regime that seized power through the coup into economic development as a means of securing new legitimacy. The convergence of the masses' desire to escape poverty and the coup regime's need for legitimacy mobilized South Korea in the 1960s under the banner of economic development. In this process, new others also emerged. For example, in the process of creating citizens who were called upon as subjects of economic development, those forcibly mobilized were often marginalized individuals such as vagrants or gangsters who had existed on the periphery of society; they were systematically confined and subjected to forced labor to incorporate the entire nation as subjects of economic development. Anti-communism also remained a principle during Park Chung-hee's rule. Thus, while the work of invoking and creating citizens as subjects of anti-communism and economic development proceeded, 'others' were created who were excluded from this process, and in some cases, extremely so.

From the 1970s onwards, the line between democracy and anti-democracy was clearly drawn, and it became even clearer after the May 18 Gwangju Uprising in the 1980s. In that confrontational structure, the other was likely a secondary issue. On the other hand, since the 1970s, nationalism has been an important ideology to be appropriated by both Park Chung-hee and his opponents. They vied to claim the correct interpretation of 'the national' and clashed over who was more nationalistic. In that sense, since liberation, or even before, there has been a time of mobilization to be named and included in the collective subject of the nation or the people. Even those who led the democratization movement did not reject the discourse of nationalism; while they invoked a new subject through the term 'minjung' (the people), it was still 'national minjung.' That is, South Korea was, in the long run, the national minjung as members of a unified nation-state. In that sense, until the 1980s, it was the era of grand subjects.

After democratization in 1987, the individuals who had been latent began to awaken, and under the name of the new generation, they sought to assert themselves as individual subjects rather than part of a grand collective. The 1990s were a notable period in terms of the expansion of individualism, with the emergence of various social existences, which was also positive in terms of the birth of new subjects of democracy. With the emergence of new generations in the 1990s, various minorities 'came out,' and simultaneously emerged as 'others' in our society. Of course, newly emerged minorities had already existed in our society, but they were beings that existed yet did not exist because they were not recognized nor did they seek recognition. However, with their coming out, they emerged as existing entities, and the issue of recognizing their existence began. With the emergence of individuals, various forms of pursuit of individuality appeared, and furthermore, those who had not appeared in public spaces under the name of the socially vulnerable began to gradually assert their rights. Homosexuals coming out, conscientious objectors, and people with disabilities began to publicly demand their legitimate rights in an open society. And Korean society implemented various affirmative action policies, such as quotas for people with disabilities and women, and alternative service systems, to provide various considerations and inclusion policies for social minorities.

The economic crisis of 1997, which occurred amidst these changes, led to the extreme individualization of Korean society on the other hand. While Korean society had previously protected individuals through frameworks such as family, workplace, and state, the 1997 economic crisis created a social atmosphere where nothing could protect individuals. Simultaneously, new neoliberal economic policies, through globalization, allowed for the entry of new others from abroad, such as foreign workers and immigrants, and Korean society needed these strangers. The number of these strangers has been steadily increasing. They have settled around us with significant differences in appearance and culture, emerging as new others in Korean society.

Ultimately, who constitutes the 'people'? Furthermore, who is the primordial people that constitutes the 'people'? We must calmly answer these questions. The boundaries of the people, which were long taken for granted after liberation—anti-communist and subjects of economic development on one hand, and thoroughly patriarchal and male-centric on the other—are now beginning to crumble, leading to the emergence of groups exhibiting extreme tendencies and the amplification of extreme confrontation. One of the situations accelerating this and complicating the nature of the confrontation is neoliberal globalization. Perhaps these factors have converged simultaneously, creating a more complex and amplified situation. That is, globally, after the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and the progression of neoliberalization, and following South Korea's transition to democracy, the 1990s saw South Korea gradually attempt to deepen democracy, leading to a complex entanglement of the emergence of various social groups and the expression of individual desires by citizens. Furthermore, with the globalization of capital and labor, the influx of foreigners has increased, leading to the emergence of new members. In this context, politics, which should be the driving force for social integration, is absent, and since the 1997 economic crisis, the logic of neoliberal competition has taken its place. Ultimately, it seems that only the logic of survival, which requires suppressing and excluding others, remains, rather than the logic of coexistence for all to live together.

IV. What Shall We Do?

Korean society has long been a time of nationalism. After the failure to transition from a traditional dynastic state to a modern nation-state in the early modern period, the period of Japanese colonial rule was followed by liberation and the construction of a nation-state, where the invocation of the nation or the people proceeded through nationalism. In that sense, Korea has long been a nation where nationalism prevailed. In that era of nationalism, there was no place for strangers. Ironically, the turning point and opportunity for reflection on this nationalism and a new transition came with the influx of foreign workers due to neoliberal globalization, i.e., the influx of new others and the subsequent search for coexistence. The term 'multiculturalism' became a trend in Korean society, and 'multicultural families' and the modifier 'multicultural' even became terms referring to specific people. However, this also implies that multiculturalism harbored inherent exclusivity towards strangers. In fact, although 'multiculturalism' is not merely a descriptive concept of the existence of diverse cultural identities, but a normative ideal that allows for coexistence by fully recognizing each cultural identity and its differences as members of society, it has operated as a term with exclusivity. In that sense, Canada, a model example of multiculturalism, can be seen as a mosaic society, where individuals are recognized for their cultural identities and simultaneously contribute to shaping the new society.

There is an assessment that Korea, through the 'open' nationalism demonstrated during the 2002 World Cup応援 (cheering) events, made a transition to an open and less exclusive nationalism in the 1990s. However, the actions taken under the name of multiculturalism, the extreme expressions of hatred seen in the recent Yemeni refugee incident, and, of course, countless previous examples of exclusive emotional expressions suggest that Korea's strong past nationalistic characteristics have transformed in peculiar ways. With the rapid influx of neoliberalism, individualistic characteristics have been strengthened, and while striving to embody global citizenship in the context of globalization, we must question whether this is merely a transformation of the citizen as an economic animal into an extreme form, as was the case with the citizen as a subject of economic development during the Park Chung-hee era.

In other words, while acknowledging that exclusive nationalism should be normatively avoided, it is currently adrift without finding a new unifying ideology for the Korean community or a new form of nationalism. Multiculturalism, once accepted as a normative value, has shown its limitations and is facing public rejection, making it unlikely to be invoked again. Since 2010, many European countries have also recognized the limitations of multiculturalism and are attempting to shift in new directions. The republican model of France, the 'melting pot' model, which received attention in contrast to the mosaic integration model of the United States and Canada after 9/11, also clearly revealed its limitations in various conflict situations in France since the 2010s. Republicanism, particularly constitutional republicanism proposed by Habermas and others in the process of strengthening political integration within the European Union, emphasizes identity formation based on consensus on political principles, unlike the nationalism of the nation-state era which emphasized cultural elements of identity. However, the recent manifestations of republicanism in France show that political principles emphasized by republicanism, especially the principle of laïcité (the French principle of secularism), are, in practice, leading to the exclusion and oppression of Muslims. [6] This is because even political principles that pursue a certain universality may be difficult to understand without being viewed from a Western-centric perspective or by completely abstracting their cultural background. Nevertheless, republicans argue that the fundamental principles they emphasize are necessary because they hold a crucial position as the minimum requirements for forming a community and, at the same time, encompass the duties and rights that members of the community should possess.

The rapid globalization in the 21st century, characterized by the constant movement of capital, labor, and goods, appears to be gradually dissolving the borders of the nation-state era, which were once like impenetrable walls. In that sense, it is perhaps natural that republicanism, which was effective as an ideology of integration during the nation-state era, is showing certain limitations. In the context of globalization, where borders are blurred and the limits of state power are evident, demanding republican patriotism, similar to that of the nation-state era, from the numerous people crossing borders may be an excessive demand. Nevertheless, the community of the nation-state, which still remains valid, and the people living within it must exercise their duties and rights as members of the community, which is also a necessary role. In that regard, a balance must be found between the members and the community. It is necessary to first establish principles for finding such a balance.

First, the most important recognition should be given to their very existence and their subjectivity. Before being objects of integration or exclusion, they are social beings and subjective beings. They are human beings who must recognize their own existence and realize their value in society, rather than beings who seek recognition from power. Regardless of where they come from, what skin color they have, or what tastes they possess, it is a matter of individual subjectivity, and from a liberal perspective, it should be tolerated as long as it does not cause 'harm' to the community and others. We are all subjects and, at the same time, others. In the late 19th century, Simmel emphasized that strangers are not beings outside of us, but 'elements that constitute our group itself, just like the poor or various 'internal enemies'' (G. Simmel 2005, 79-80). Furthermore, as Derrida pointed out, Socrates was a stranger to the language of the court when he was in court, and Oedipus was a stranger in a foreign land, but those living there could also be strangers to Oedipus. Thus, at any moment, at any point, we can become strangers, so we are all strangers to each other (J. Derrida 2004). Of course, the problem is that such strangers are continuously excluded and oppressed from the community by being othered at certain moments. However, the community that must be built should be one where everyone can be a subject in a situation where everyone is a stranger. A community by these subjects is needed, keeping in mind the emergence of various subjects after the grand subject of the modern rational individual and their infinite potential for emergence.

In that sense, the second principle is the necessity of an ideology of solidarity that connects communities of diverse subjects. This means that no one should be subjected to 'othering' within the community. Solidarity as fellow citizens is necessary. Since the influx of neoliberalism, especially after the 1997 economic crisis, Korean society exists in a state of individual survival through enhanced individual competitiveness and the absence of the state and society. The grand subjects of the nation or the people, which were mobilized or invoked for a long time for the goals of economic development and democratization, have disappeared, and competitive individual subjects have taken their place. Individuals are required to develop a 'vulgar mentality' to step on their competitors to survive in such a community and avoid becoming 'surplus humans' left behind in the competition. This way of life has become mainstream and is accepted as natural since the neoliberal society began to take root after the 1997 economic crisis. In that sense, we need to revive the memory of national solidarity that was formed for economic development and democratization before that economic crisis. And this national solidarity must be newly constituted as an opportunity for individual subjectivity to be realized in a society where individuality has expanded after democratization. Therefore, we must create a solidarity ideology that is newly constituted to suit the new society. Ultimately, it is a time when a solidarity ideology is needed to bring together these scattered individual subjects and enable them to live while maintaining a communal life. This ideology of solidarity should not be a way of strengthening internal ties and building external barriers, like the existing nationalist ideology, but should be one that can simultaneously consider global citizen duties and the duties to our community in accordance with the situation of globalization. Therefore, solidarity among individuals should be possible in a way that does not homogenize their subjectivity, based on the individual subjectivity mentioned as the first point.

Third, there is the need for a new social contract to bridge the gap between individual freedom and the value of the community, connecting the first and second tasks. National identity during the modern nation-state era was formed through the process of nationalistic invocation by the state, and it was simultaneously the process of forming national subjects. However, now, instead of identity imposition, a process of subjectivation where individuals construct their own identity is needed, and this is the starting point of individual freedom. But at the same time, the community's values must be realized, and the state must provide the conditions for the realization of these individuals' freedom and, through that process, construct the community's values. It is within the community where individuals' subjectivity is realized, and ultimately, the realization of individual subjectivity must include the role of a citizen of the community. As Durkheim argued, the community in the name of the state must be a space where the collective consciousness of its members, i.e., the citizens, is represented. Individuals, as bearers of rights and duties as citizens, must be positioned in relation to the community called the state. Just as citizens' rights are realized with the recognition of state power, citizens must become bearers of duties as citizens in the community called the state. Here, duties are duties to the community and also duties to fellow members of the community. Sacrificing personal interests for the public good, a strong demand of republicanism, is difficult in modern society. In that sense, it is necessary to create a structure where individual interests and the interests of the community can converge. This is a structure where individual interests are maximized when realized as members of the community. When such a structure is realized, individual freedom and community virtues can expand simultaneously.

One of the phenomena currently becoming an issue in the political sphere, not only in Korea but globally, is populism. Translated as 'popularity-seeking' or 'mass-following,' populism is criticized for referring to the indiscriminate waste of budgets or unplanned expenditures by politicians to gain votes. However, populism can also be understood as a form of active expression of the masses' will. It is also a phenomenon that emerges from the outpouring of desire to directly express one's will amidst distrust of existing representatives. In particular, as neoliberal competition accelerates, individuals driven into competition become immediately responsive to demands for their own interests, leading to the result of popularity-seeking politics. Furthermore, populism becomes a tool of oppressive politics by proceeding with the othering of specific groups—making them 'public enemies' or scapegoats. However, populism is clearly a phenomenon that emerged from the limitations of modern politics, especially the limitations of representative politics. In that sense, it can also serve as a new opportunity to overcome the limitations of modern politics. This is possible when it is used as an opportunity for the subjectivation of the masses, transcending the limitations of politics through representation. It is also an opportunity to transition into new democratic and popular subjects through this process.

The absence of politics following the rapid neoliberalization of Korean society and the emergence of populist mass politics in its place represent an opportunity for politics to be renewed. This is also the possibility of expanding democracy, as demonstrated by the citizens in the candlelight protests in the winter of 2016, who, despite being cynical about politics, 'never turned away from it' (Lee Ji-ho 2017, 7). To transform a society of intensified competition into a society of solidarity, and to mature individuals as citizens of the community rather than simply making them competitive, the first priority is to find the place of politics. And this endeavor must be undertaken by attempting to seek coexistence for various beings by presenting a new vision for social integration. ■

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[1] El discurso de odio también es parte de un proceso continuo y constante de subjetivación (Butler, J. 2016, 61).

[2] Por supuesto, la experiencia previa en Corea de la acogida de refugiados se relaciona con los refugiados de Vietnam que llegaron durante más de una década después de la caída de Vietnam en 1975. En 1975, 1.335 personas que se retiraron junto con el ejército coreano y 216 refugiados rescatados por buques de carga coreanos en aguas cercanas a Vietnam fueron alojados en un campamento temporal en Busan, y 977 de ellos, excluyendo a los que obtuvieron la nacionalidad al casarse con hombres coreanos, fueron reubicados en el extranjero. Luego, los refugiados de Vietnam comenzaron a llegar en 1977 y fueron alojados en el <Refugio para Refugiados de Vietnam> instalado en el distrito de Dongnae, Busan. Sin embargo, ninguno de ellos recibió permiso de asentamiento, y para los vietnamitas, Corea no era un país al que quisieran establecerse (Jeong In-seop, 2009, 204).

[3] Véase el <Boletín estadístico de política de inmigración y extranjería> de 2020 del Servicio de Inmigración y Política de Extranjería del Ministerio de Justicia.

[4] “Demanda de permiso de residencia humanitaria para refugiados yemeníes desestimada por ‘falta de derecho de solicitud’”. *Munhwa Ilbo*, 2 de septiembre de 2021.

[5] Es idéntico a la lógica patriarcal de que los hombres deben proteger a las mujeres o a las hermanas, equiparando la patria a una mujer o a una hermana durante el período colonial japonés.

[6] En particular, Marine Le Pen, líder del partido de extrema derecha nacionalista «Frente Nacional» (FN), ha adoptado una estrategia de desdemonización, que se aleja gradualmente de las tendencias racistas de la extrema derecha, para defender el republicanismo francés. Este caso demuestra que, aunque el republicanismo se basa en principios políticos, puede reforzar una ideología excluyente, una especie de republicanismo «nacional».

■ Autor: Hong Tae-young_Profesor en la Escuela de Estudios de Seguridad Nacional de la Universidad Nacional de Defensa. Obtuvo un doctorado en Ciencias Políticas en la École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales de París. Ha sido investigador visitante en la Universidad de Washington y fue presidente del comité editorial de la Asociación Coreana de Ciencias Políticas en 2021/2022. Sus principales áreas de investigación son la seguridad nacional, el pensamiento político, la política coreana y la política europea. Sus obras recientes incluyen *Más allá del Estado-nación* y artículos como «La gobernanza nacionalista y la construcción de la nación» y «El nacimiento de la República Francesa y el republicanismo».

■ Editor y responsable: Yoon Ha-eun_Investigador del EAI

   Contacto: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | hyoon@eai.or.kr